Henry Olsen (@henryolsenEPPC) header
Henry Olsen (@henryolsenEPPC) profile picture

Senior Fellow, @EPPCdc. Host of Beyond the Polls and Conservative Crossroads podcasts - https://nitter.cf/t.co/NtSQiPNl8J

Washington DC (aka Mos Eisley)
Joined October 2014
Photo by Henry Olsen (@henryolsenEPPC)Photo by Henry Olsen (@henryolsenEPPC)Photo by Henry Olsen (@henryolsenEPPC)Photo by Henry Olsen (@henryolsenEPPC)Photo by Henry Olsen (@henryolsenEPPC)Photo by Henry Olsen (@henryolsenEPPC)
Should @JDVance be the GOP 2028 nominee? That's what @gerardtbaker and @therightfrankd discuss in the latest episode of Conservative Crossroads. Listen!
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Henry Olsen retweeted
Spain, SocioMétrica poll: PP-EPP: 32% PSOE-PES: 29% (+1) Vox-PfE: 19% FA-EGP|PEL: 5% ERC-EFA: 3% SALF-*: 2% AA-*: 2% EH Bildu-ELA: 2% Junts-EDP: 1% Podemos-ELA: 1% BNG-EFA: 1% Comp.–FV-EFA: 1% EAJ/PNV-EDP: 1% UPN-*: 1% CC-1ºCAN-EDP: 0% UPC-EFA|ELA: 0% D21+-ALDE: 0% +/- vs. 01 September 2026 - 15 November 2026 Fieldwork: 01 September 2026 - 21 November 2026 Sample size: 6,842 ➤ europeelects.eu/spain
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Henry Olsen retweeted
Spain, 40dB poll: PP-EPP: 32% PSOE-PES: 32% (+1) Vox-PfE: 17% FA-EGP|PEL: 4% SALF-*: 1% (-1) Comp.–FV-EFA: 1% Podemos-ELA: 1% UPC-EFA|ELA: 0% +/- vs. 16-20 November 2026 Fieldwork: 17-21 November 2026 Sample size: 2,000 ➤ europeelects.eu/spain
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Henry Olsen retweeted
US faculty leaned 39-33 left-to-right in 1969, with more conservatives than liberals in STEM fields (Lipset & Ladd 1972). Now the faculty are at least 6:1 to the left (much higher in elite schools), with STEM fields strongly left-leaning.
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Henry Olsen retweeted
Voters elected Democratic senators this year in 10 states that went for Trump in 2024. That's the highest “mismatch rate” between states’ Senate and presidential votes in two decades.
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(10/10) Put it all together. Before April 2026: ~80% of Iran’s trade through two southern ports. After: a naval blockade at sea — and seven land and Caspian corridors carrying ~$22B, every one of them growing. Caspian cargo +50%. Bazargan trucks +60%. Razi rail +300%. Astara +33%. A China–Iran block train running. Iran’s own port operator buying a Caspian port. The documents I reviewed clearly showed that Tehran planned this pivot and is funding it. Closing the gaps means pressure on Baghdad and Ankara, sanctions on the corridor operators, and watching the Caspian — where no warship can go.
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Henry Olsen retweeted
I reviewed 110 financial documents and reports of main Iranian land and sea transportation companies along with regional custom data. Here is what @CENTCOM new Task Force Iron Gate — announced today to squeeze Iran’s land borders and the Caspian — is actually up against. Since April 2026, a U.S. naval blockade has shut Bandar Abbas and Chabahar, ports that handled roughly 163 million tons of cargo and about 80% of Iran’s trade. But Iran has seven back doors: Iraq, Turkey, the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. Together they carried about $22 billion in trade in 2024–25 — $15.3B out, $6.8B in. Since the blockade, every one of these corridors shows traffic surging. That is the gap Iron Gate has to close. A thread with the numbers, corridor by corridor. (1/10)
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Henry Olsen retweeted
Signs of significant squeeze on Iran’s land routes. Trains and trucks face a line of over 120 km at Yallama, on the Kazakhstan-Uzbekistan border. China-to-Iran freight could stretch past three months at this point. Yallama is two borders short of Iran. Kazakh state media put the line at 40 km last week. Officials there blame volume: a crossing built for 1,000 vehicles a day is handling 1,500 and the flow has slowed down or stopped. @CENTCOM’s Task Force Iron Gate does not need to close a single border to tighten it. It draws on something unique to CENTCOM: decades of military relationships with the forces guarding these borders, from Iraq and Pakistan to Central Asia. CENTCOM funded Turkmenistan’s Altyn Asyr checkpoint, facing Iran, in 2006. Iron Gate does not have to close Iran’s back doors. It makes each one slower, costlier and less certain.
I reviewed 110 financial documents and reports of main Iranian land and sea transportation companies along with regional custom data. Here is what @CENTCOM new Task Force Iron Gate — announced today to squeeze Iran’s land borders and the Caspian — is actually up against. Since April 2026, a U.S. naval blockade has shut Bandar Abbas and Chabahar, ports that handled roughly 163 million tons of cargo and about 80% of Iran’s trade. But Iran has seven back doors: Iraq, Turkey, the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. Together they carried about $22 billion in trade in 2024–25 — $15.3B out, $6.8B in. Since the blockade, every one of these corridors shows traffic surging. That is the gap Iron Gate has to close. A thread with the numbers, corridor by corridor. (1/10)
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Henry Olsen retweeted
Astonishing impact assessment by His Majesty’s Treasury following the Brussels Deal: “The policy increases both GDP and the population (through higher net migration) by similar proportions, so the impact on GDP per capita is 0.0% at one decimal place.”
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The comment about the trade surplus is the thing that many nations don't understand about Trump. He cares more about that than he does about the sectoral substance of any deal. Of course, for many nations the surplus is the whole point - American money fuels their growth.
Trump says he and Mexico's Sheinbaum talked trade and cartels during their meeting in Shenzhen. "We are getting close to a (trade) deal. I said, 'Claudia, we can't have you have a surplus,'" Trump says. "And we're working with her on the cartels because the cartels are running Mexico." @Claudiashein
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Sen. Ossoff says he's "heard about" the effort to draft him into the presidential race. But he said "my thinking is unchanged" He said in October he'd serve his full six-year term draftossoff.com
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Westminster Voting Intention: LAB: 29% (+1) CON: 25% (=) RFM: 19% (-1) LDM: 9% (=) GRN: 8% (+1) RES: 5% (-1) SNP: 3% (=) Via @Moreincommon_, 13-15 Nov. Changes w/ 6-9 Nov.
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Henry Olsen retweeted
Many people are saying national polls aren't accurate as Reform is outperforming these in by-elections National polls are firstly, of course, designed to be nationally representative, while a by-election will usually favour a certain party based on voting history, demographics etc Reform have averaged 24.4% across the 165 council by-elections since 8 May 2026, standing in every one, while their current national poll average is 21.1%. These wards have on average been older and whiter than national averages, and Reform did slightly better in these wards at GE2024 than nationally. In these wards, Reform now get 1.47 times their 2024 general election vote. Across Great Britain, 1.47 x 14.7% = 21.6%, against 21.1% in the polls.
Reform showing continuing strength in a series of by elections last night, particularly pattern in places still feeling effects of closures of traditional industry. Despite national poll dip areas of country that have felt those impacts still turning to Reform for something new.
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France, YouGov poll: Presidential run-off election Le Pen (RN-PfE): 54% (+2) Philippe (HOR-*): 46% (-2) Le Pen (RN-PfE): 58% (+3) Glucksmann (PS/PP-PES): 42% (-3) Le Pen (RN-PfE): 63% (-5) Mélenchon (LFI-ELA): 37% (+5) Le Pen (RN-PfE): 55% Attal (RE-*): 45% Philippe (HOR-*): 61% (-5) Mélenchon (LFI-ELA): 39% (+5) +/- vs. 14-16 October 2026 Fieldwork: 12-17 November 2026 Sample size: 1,030 ➤ europeelects.eu/france
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Henry Olsen retweeted
Is #Iran preparing to break the U.S. naval blockade? 🔹IRGC spokesperson Hossein Mohebbi made several important statements today that offer important insights into Tehran’s current military calculations and its approach to negotiations with Washington. 🔹First, he claimed that Iran has already demonstrated a missile range of 4,500 kilometers, specifically referring to Diego Garcia. This is particularly important given earlier reports that Iran attempted to target the island during the 40-Days War. Although those missiles reportedly failed to reach their destination, Tehran is now openly claiming the capability to threaten U.S. military assets far beyond the Persian Gulf, including in Europe. 🔹More importantly, Mohebbi rejected the description of the current situation as “no war, no peace,” arguing that Iran is already at war and will not tolerate a prolonged war of attrition. He said the conflict would be brought to a definitive conclusion, either on the battlefield or through Washington accepting Tehran’s conditions. 🔹This statement should be read alongside reports that Iran is preparing to resume oil exports despite the U.S. naval blockade. A Fars News Agency report warned that any attempt to stop an Iranian tanker preparing to depart would trigger attacks on energy facilities in six GCC countries. TankerTrackers has also reported preparations to resume Iranian oil exports. 🔹If these reports are accurate, Tehran may be preparing to actively challenge the blockade. The logic is quite clear: if an Iranian tanker successfully passes through, it would undermine the effectiveness of the blockade. If U.S. forces intercept or attack it, Tehran would have a direct trigger for retaliation. Such a move would also suggest that Iran has already considered how to confront or deter U.S. naval forces. 🔹In other words, Tehran appears to be seeking to take the military initiative while leaving Washington with the responsibility for triggering the next escalation. 🔹Mohebbi’s remarks about a potential U.S. ground operation reinforce this assessment. He argued that Iran’s defensive capabilities are significantly stronger on land than in the air or at sea, while questioning Washington’s ability to conduct ground operations. This reflects a broader perception within the Iranian military establishment that the U.S. can inflict substantial damage but lacks the means to force Iran into submission. 🔹On diplomacy, Mohebbi reiterated that Iran will not reopen Hormuz until its seven conditions are met and their implementation is verified. Only afterward would Tehran consider discussing the nuclear issue, and even then, its rights under the NPT – implicitly including domestic uranium enrichment – must be guaranteed. 🔹Another noteworthy point was his confirmation that the earlier decision to accept the MoU had been jointly endorsed by military and diplomatic officials. This appears intended to dismiss reports of divisions within the Iranian leadership and underline that the IRGC was itself part of the decision. 🔹Overall, these remarks suggest that Tehran is increasingly convinced that time and military endurance favor its position, while the Trump administration faces growing constraints on further escalation. 🔹The immediate implication is that Iran may no longer be willing to wait for a diplomatic breakthrough while the blockade continues. Instead, it appears increasingly prepared to challenge the blockade directly, accepting the risk of renewed military confrontation. 🔹The danger, however, is that Tehran’s growing confidence in Washington’s constraints may lead it to underestimate the risk of a much stronger U.S. military response, which could inflict devastating damage on Iran’s energy infrastructure and further weaken its already struggling economy.
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Henry Olsen retweeted
The blockade is systematically trimming the Iranian regime's options. We would have seen this scenario play out last summer, except the MOU reset the blockade, allowing the regime to clear 70 million barrels of oil, set up 6 months of cash flow through Southeast Asia transfers, and lock in a stalemate. ⤵️ "The immediate implication is that Iran may no longer be willing to wait for a diplomatic breakthrough while the blockade continues. Instead, it appears increasingly prepared to challenge the blockade directly, accepting the risk of renewed military confrontation. The danger, however, is that Tehran’s growing confidence in Washington’s constraints may lead it to underestimate the risk of a much stronger U.S. military response, which could inflict devastating damage on Iran’s energy infrastructure and further weaken its already struggling economy."
Is #Iran preparing to break the U.S. naval blockade? 🔹IRGC spokesperson Hossein Mohebbi made several important statements today that offer important insights into Tehran’s current military calculations and its approach to negotiations with Washington. 🔹First, he claimed that Iran has already demonstrated a missile range of 4,500 kilometers, specifically referring to Diego Garcia. This is particularly important given earlier reports that Iran attempted to target the island during the 40-Days War. Although those missiles reportedly failed to reach their destination, Tehran is now openly claiming the capability to threaten U.S. military assets far beyond the Persian Gulf, including in Europe. 🔹More importantly, Mohebbi rejected the description of the current situation as “no war, no peace,” arguing that Iran is already at war and will not tolerate a prolonged war of attrition. He said the conflict would be brought to a definitive conclusion, either on the battlefield or through Washington accepting Tehran’s conditions. 🔹This statement should be read alongside reports that Iran is preparing to resume oil exports despite the U.S. naval blockade. A Fars News Agency report warned that any attempt to stop an Iranian tanker preparing to depart would trigger attacks on energy facilities in six GCC countries. TankerTrackers has also reported preparations to resume Iranian oil exports. 🔹If these reports are accurate, Tehran may be preparing to actively challenge the blockade. The logic is quite clear: if an Iranian tanker successfully passes through, it would undermine the effectiveness of the blockade. If U.S. forces intercept or attack it, Tehran would have a direct trigger for retaliation. Such a move would also suggest that Iran has already considered how to confront or deter U.S. naval forces. 🔹In other words, Tehran appears to be seeking to take the military initiative while leaving Washington with the responsibility for triggering the next escalation. 🔹Mohebbi’s remarks about a potential U.S. ground operation reinforce this assessment. He argued that Iran’s defensive capabilities are significantly stronger on land than in the air or at sea, while questioning Washington’s ability to conduct ground operations. This reflects a broader perception within the Iranian military establishment that the U.S. can inflict substantial damage but lacks the means to force Iran into submission. 🔹On diplomacy, Mohebbi reiterated that Iran will not reopen Hormuz until its seven conditions are met and their implementation is verified. Only afterward would Tehran consider discussing the nuclear issue, and even then, its rights under the NPT – implicitly including domestic uranium enrichment – must be guaranteed. 🔹Another noteworthy point was his confirmation that the earlier decision to accept the MoU had been jointly endorsed by military and diplomatic officials. This appears intended to dismiss reports of divisions within the Iranian leadership and underline that the IRGC was itself part of the decision. 🔹Overall, these remarks suggest that Tehran is increasingly convinced that time and military endurance favor its position, while the Trump administration faces growing constraints on further escalation. 🔹The immediate implication is that Iran may no longer be willing to wait for a diplomatic breakthrough while the blockade continues. Instead, it appears increasingly prepared to challenge the blockade directly, accepting the risk of renewed military confrontation. 🔹The danger, however, is that Tehran’s growing confidence in Washington’s constraints may lead it to underestimate the risk of a much stronger U.S. military response, which could inflict devastating damage on Iran’s energy infrastructure and further weaken its already struggling economy.
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Henry Olsen retweeted
Polish PM Donald Tusk on Russian missile and drone incidents in Polish airspace: Let's not fool ourselves. There is an incident that requires a response, but our allies, for example the United States, do not want to overreact. They do not want that response to trigger another spiral of escalation, and I understand that. But I do not always, to put it mildly, agree with the American side's assessment and interpretation of these incidents.
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Henry Olsen retweeted
After more than 16 years with great colleagues at Heritage and spending the last year and a half at ED working to wind down the agency, I’m honored to join the @CatoInstitute and continue the work to advance education freedom.
We are pleased to announce that @lindseymburke, PhD, will join the Cato Institute as Director of its Center for Educational Freedom. ow.ly/YzQ65108gE6
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We are pleased to announce that @lindseymburke, PhD, will join the Cato Institute as Director of its Center for Educational Freedom. ow.ly/YzQ65108gE6
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Australia, Lighthouse & Growth Intelligence Centre poll: Victoria regional election L/NP (Centre-right|Conservative): 31% (-1) ONP (Right): 24% (+1) ... +/- vs. 13 November 2026 Fieldwork: 02-15 November 2026 Sample size: 1,351 ➤ oceaniaelects.com/australia
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