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New paper: Can Only Meat Machines be Conscious? Free link until November 26th: authors.elsevier.com/a/1luwh… 1/
Ned Block retweeted
Three reasons why AI is extremely unlikely to be conscious - and why this matters. Joint opinion in @nature with Giulio Tononi and Ned Block @De_dicto
LLMs can mimic thought and feeling with uncanny skill, but intelligence alone is not enough for subjective experience
go.nature.com/3VSXWQ4
Ned Block retweeted
Two Dimensionalism about Other Minds, and Its Implications for Brain Organoids and Robots
[link in thread]
Two-dimensionalism says that we're justified in attributing consciousness to others only when *both* their physiology and their functional/behavioral patterns are similar.
Ned Block retweeted
videos from the landmark NYU meeting on infant consciousness are now online!
with @LorinaNaci, @ghisdl, tim bayne, @De_dicto, @AnnaCiaunica, @SidKouider, @joel_frohlich, @smatthewliao, @onemorebrown, many more.
congrats @cpassosf for a great event!
youtube.com/playlist?list=PL…
from Sally Kornbluth's letter to Trump: "...In that free marketplace of ideas, the people of MIT gladly compete with the very best, without preferences. Therefore, with respect, we cannot support the proposed approach to addressing the issues facing higher education."
biological realizers, or both, is crucial for assessing the prospects of consciousness in AI and less complex animals.
Current theories of consciousness are 'meat-neutral', but if specific physical substrates are necessary, AI may never achieve consciousness. Understanding whether consciousness depends on computational roles, 5/
I show that there is a systematic tension in our criteria for consciousness: prioritizing computational roles favors consciousness in AI, while prioritizing subcomputational biological realizers favors consciousness in simpler animals. 4/
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that subcomputational biological mechanisms, which realize computational processes, are necessary for consciousness. By contrasting computational roles with their subcomputational biological realizers,...3/
Computational functionalism claims that executing certain computations is sufcient for consciousness, regardless of the physical mechanisms implementing those computations. This view neglects a compelling alternative: 2/
Ned Block retweeted
five excellent talks from the NYU workshop on functions of consciousness last month.
speakers: dylan ludwig (who also organized), joshua shepherd (@ERC_Conscious), @MatthiasMichel_, marisa carrasco (@carrasco_lab), and @axelcleeremans.
youtube.com/playlist?list=PL…









