Autograph retweeted
Replying to @autographHQ
@AutographHQ is like Cursor for business ops, but with strong guardrails and reliable data integrations.
@haridigresses and the team ship fast, have a world-class bar for products, and are building an App Store for internal business apps.
The next big "business data" platform is already in the making.
So excited to launch Autograph today. We raised $2.1M from elite operators, founders, and investors to build a platform that feels like God Mode for Operators.
It's a single platform that integrates with existing systems — the alphabet soup of enterprise software, like your HRIS, ERP, FP&A, ATS, CRM, along with data warehouses and spreadsheets — to combine, clean, and make sense of your data.
This data feeds a series of pre-built apps and agents that allow you to level up as an operator: run your complex, multi-functional workflows 10x better. We're solving the processes that takes forever and is really frustrating, but is essential to operating and scaling effectively: our first few apps are headcount planning, compensation reviews, and sales capacity.
We're moving insanely fast. We're shipping a new app every couple of weeks. Soon, we'll have hiring pipelines, vendor analytics, resource allocation, unit economics, CX capacity, people analytics, and more.
The best part? It's incredibly fast to set up thanks to our powerful agentic data engine, that processes any data source like magic. That means no long implementations, no multi-year contracts.
We think it's the biggest leap forward for operators since the spreadsheet.
Book an 20-minute onboarding to get started!
Autograph retweeted
So excited to launch Autograph today. We raised $2.1M from elite operators, founders, and investors to build a platform that feels like God Mode for Operators.
It's a single platform that integrates with existing systems — the alphabet soup of enterprise software, like your HRIS, ERP, FP&A, ATS, CRM, along with data warehouses and spreadsheets — to combine, clean, and make sense of your data.
This data feeds a series of pre-built apps and agents that allow you to level up as an operator: run your complex, multi-functional workflows 10x better. We're solving the processes that takes forever and is really frustrating, but is essential to operating and scaling effectively: our first few apps are headcount planning, compensation reviews, and sales capacity.
We're moving insanely fast. We're shipping a new app every couple of weeks. Soon, we'll have hiring pipelines, vendor analytics, resource allocation, unit economics, CX capacity, people analytics, and more.
The best part? It's incredibly fast to set up thanks to our powerful agentic data engine, that processes any data source like magic. That means no long implementations, no multi-year contracts.
We think it's the biggest leap forward for operators since the spreadsheet.
Book an 20-minute onboarding to get started!
Autograph retweeted
PLATFORMS VS. NOT-PLATFORMS
Enterprising Software, Part I
Parker Conrad, the founder of Rippling, coined the term “Compound Startup.” He proposes the idea of a B2B software platform that intentionally takes a platform approach to build a series of related products, rooted in the following principles:
— Customers like everything in one place
— You can build a product that is top tier (but not obviously #1); and still win the deal because you offer centralization
— Being multi-product this way is a more efficient way to build (certain types of) companies — cross-selling makes go-to-market more efficient, and building shared infrastructure and components makes product & engineering more efficient
This perspective flies in the face of traditional wisdom, which is to focus and to build a wedge that customers gravitate to. This “lean” strategy also lends itself to iteration; building a compound startup is a much bigger risk. If the founder’s vision is wrong, the company is probably done. So why do a Compound startup?
If you have the credibility to raise a boatload of money, a Compound startup is the most straight-line path to build a generational company.
1. Generational companies are usually platforms.
2. Building a product (contrasted with a platform) runs the risk of getting trapped at a local maximum — and never graduating to a platform.
3. And if you really want to swing for the fences, targeting the untapped customer need to solve several problems in one place is a very good way to build a category-defining platform.
However, it’s not the only way.
——
NOT-PLATFORMS (AKA PRODUCT COMPANIES)
Before we get to the different ways to build a platform, I should clarify the distinction between platforms and not-platforms.
Conventional wisdom:
— Start with a “wedge,” or initial product that is quick to get adoption.
— Build a “better mousetrap” — a new solution to an existing market, or identifying a narrower, better sliver to unbundle an existing solution.
— If the new solution solves some critical aspect of the problem 10x better, it will get adoption.
The risk here is that the low barrier to entry. If you can do it, someone else can, too. The first-mover’s success will draw others, and probably result in a feature arms race. This makes a massive success harder. The most probable result, then, is a Product Company.
A product company is synonymous with its singular or primary offering.
Additional product lines are negligible to their revenue, and don’t necessarily compound or cement each other in a way that defends well against competition. As a result, Product Companies typically operate in a competitive market.
If the category is large enough, a product company can still be big; Dropbox, Box, Mailchimp, and Qualtrics are good examples.
Cloud storage is a particularly good example of a category that induces product companies.
— Hard technical problem to solve well → which consumes all their development attention (meaning no bandwidth to build multiple products).
— Feature arms race on the core product (specifically, storage and latency).
— Shoe-horning a platform in is always hard; so, unsurprisingly, later attempts to extend into a platform are harder because they didn’t start out that way (e.g., Dropbox Paper).
— The result is a competitive category: Dropbox, Box, Google Drive (and OneDrive, I guess).
This is not forever; product companies will seek repeatedly to make the leap to a platform. In the case of file storage, recent attempts include a) acquisitions (e.g., HelloSign & Docsend for Dropbox) and b) allowing users to run LLM workflows on top of documents.
——
PLATFORMS
Contrasted with a Product Company, a Platform Company is a business that achieves durability through multiple reinforcing products or integrations
There are three paths to achieving this: Compound, Catalyst, and Composite. Each path implies different day 1 choices, core competencies, buyer personas, and failure modes.
— A Catalyst Startup solves a novel problem, creating a “paradigm shift”
— A Compound Startup build a multi-product suite from the get-go
— A Composite Startup builds connective tissue across fragmented data / workflows
These archetypes are intermediate, not final states. Just as Product Companies seek to become Platform Companies, each flavor of Platform will naturally seek to nail multiple of these over time.
For example, a company may start as a Catalyst, then build network effects in the market to become more Composite over time. Another may start by building Composite use cases, then adding additional modules to go Compound.
Enduring technology companies (e.g., Microsoft, Google, Salesforce) have done all 3 in some order; and the best companies in the last 10 years are onto their 3rd act (Stripe, OpenAI).
——
NEXT UP
Tomorrow, we’ll dive into each of the three types of companies, and the day after, we’ll analyze how market environments are more or less hospitable to each style of building.
Autograph retweeted
FairOffer v3 is live!
This has been a labor of love for many months.
• FREE data-science driven compensation guidance in seconds.
• Powered by a new compensation engine: so accurate it’s like magic. Honestly? I got goosebumps multiple times while backtesting.
• 5M+ offer permutations: 200+ roles • 600+ geos • 30+ company stages.
• Now covers bonuses, price-per-share tweaks, and sector-specific roles.
• Shareable links: Finance, HR, Hiring, and candidates all see identical numbers.
We built this to help you avoid guessing (and second-guessing) compensation... I hate when lack of visibility and bad data slows hiring, results in lost candidates, and causes problems with headcount spend.
May is launch month for Autograph:
1️⃣ Fair Offer Part III & IV white papers ✅
2️⃣ Fair Offer v3 ✅
3️⃣ Culture Compass ← Myers-Briggs, but for your company
4️⃣ Autograph’s Headcount OS
Follow @autographHQ for more free, high-leverage headcount tools. Link in comments.
Autograph retweeted
I have a friend and founder who I respect a ton. They're looking for a principal eng / CTO for their startup, in the HR space.
Funded and ready to roll. Shoot me a DM if you know anyone.
Autograph retweeted
AN ODE TO EARLY EMPLOYEES
I once had someone tell me:
“Hari, you’re essential to this company, and we might have died if not for you. But we’re founders and you’re not, and nothing you do can change that."
That single sentence shapes the entire way I think about the people at a startup: founders, founding team, early employees, and everyone else.
Until the 1990s in Silicon Valley…
… being a founder was the toughest job around.
It wasn’t cool to be a founder back then. Everyone thought “entrepreneur” was just a fancy way of saying “unemployed.”
The greats busted their ass in the proverbial garage for years until they shipped something. They didn’t have AWS or a million open source libraries. They set up servers to run that shit, and built their databases and components from scratch.
They tried desperately to recruit early employees because no one wanted to give up their cushy job. Even if they could find the rare person who wanted to change the world, the company was (probably) going to fail and they would get yelled at by their SO or their parents for wasting their life.
There were very few VCs, so capital was precious. Founders had to give up onerous terms during fundraising, because they had no power. 3x liquidation preference + participating preferred was the norm back then.
Starting a company and finding product-market fit is hard enough. Imagine if it was this much harder.
And so, those who had the courage to start something in the face of such immense adversity, were celebrated once they succeed. They were truly one in a million. Special.
Today, founders are still treated as if in a class of their own
The world has changed a lot in the last 30 years.
Virtually any founder(s) — assuming one of them can code — with the glimmer of an idea, can raise millions of dollars before there’s a product or revenue.
Creating a prototype has never been easier. Literally a weekend project.
Yet… “founders” are more celebrated than ever. Adored, even.
I don’t think I truly understood this until I became a founder myself. As a founder of a pre-seed startup in 2019 who had accomplished exactly nothing to date, I suddenly had access to VCs and invitations to exclusive events. Way more than when I’d been a non-founder-COO who had been critical to building a successful Series B startup.
It’s like moving up from economy to business class. Except I’d paid in blood, sweat and tears for that economy ticket; and I’d managed to enter business class simply by putting on a suit and walking in like I belonged.
The burden of building has shifted from “founders” to “founders & founding team”
When early employees join a startup today, they’re not joining a de-risked company with PMF.
They’re usually joining a company with a Figma prototype and a bunch of money in the bank.
Don’t get me wrong. The money is important. It means they aren’t working for peanuts like some early employees might have, back in the day. A staff engineer or head of operations at a seed stage company is usually making $140-180K base in SF / NY. That capital is incredibly valuable because it buys time to build and sell things.
And the founders either had a lot of credibility, or undertook a herculean effort to raise that capital. Raising money is not easy.
But the risk from that point on is not that different from that of a founder. 99.9% of the hard work is still ahead.
Which means that early employees, particularly “ex post facto founders” (h/t Jason Lemkin: early employees or execs who shoulder “founder-like” burdens), are — according to current norms — left with the worst deal in the ecosystem, when it comes to equity, respect, and influence on a risk-adjusted basis.
Here is a list of things that founders are subject to, that early employees don’t have to deal with:
1. Months spent in the wilderness, exploring if the idea can even become a company
2. Reputational & social capital risk with investors & employees
Here is a list of things that both founders and ex-post-facto cofounders take on:
1. Reputational risk with partners, suppliers, customers
2. Day-to-day stress of success and failure
3. Stress of shielding junior / rank-and-file employees from the ups and downs
Here is a list of things that all early team members (founders, execs, and early employees alike) take on:
1. Lost opportunity cost of making a “market” salary
2. Risk of product-market fit
3. Brand risk
In return, founders make 1-2 orders of magnitude more equity; typically control the company through board seats and super-voting rights, and several orders of magnitude more recognition in the ecosystem for their role in the company.
Here’s a visual to make it clear. Founders deal with some of the worst parts, and get some of the best perks. Later-stage employees deal with the best parts, and don’t really get any of the perks. You see lots of red and green in those columns.
But why are we okay with a sea of orange and yellow for the columns in the middle?
Of course it’s hard being a founder. I’m just saying that it might not be 10-100x times as hard, which is what the equity, voting rights, and recognition would imply. Take two co-founders with 30% each at a Series A, four years in. The apportionment would imply that they were each twenty times as valuable as the next strongest employee, and three to five times as valuable as all 20 employees to date, combined. If you’ve started or helped build a company before, you’ve hopefully learned that this is pretty much never reality. This is why nothing frustrates me more than accepting “first employee gets 1%” like it’s gospel.
Being a founder is harder than any other role at the company. (Most) founders earn every bit of the money and credibility they get.
So this is not about tearing down founders. Hell, I’m a founder now.
This is about putting the founding team, ex post facto founders, and early employees where they belong.
This ends up hurting both sides:
- Companies get hamstrung and have to deal with too many transitions, because many of the best early employees leave 3-4 years in, very consistently.
- There are too many companies being started, because lots of people with an entrepreneurial streak end up starting something even if they would have otherwise opted to be an early employee… because being an early employee is just such a bad deal.
OK, SO NOW WHAT?
Here are a few suggestions; many are controversial, so pick and choose what you like. Any of them would be a step in the right direction towards a trusting relationship and celebration of those who enabled the company in its earliest days:
Be generous with honorary titles.
Apparently Jack Ma made every one of his early employees a “co-founder” of Alibaba. They had like 17 co-founders. I’m not sure if we need to go that far, but I love the push behind the sentiment… personally, I’m trying out co-founder, founding team, and early employees. And if someone establishes a function — e.g., sales — give them the benefit of “founding head of sales” or “founding designer”.
Allow people to get promoted into these honorary titles.
It’s normal to promote high performers with title and compensation, so why not here? For example, someone starts as founding team and knocks it out of the park (i.e., behaves like an ex-post-facto cofounder), honor it by promoting them to co-founder status one or two years in. If someone is an early employee (or a ridiculously strong exec) but earns it, make them a co-founder or founding team later on. Notion did this their COO, Akshay Kothari, and Rewind did this more recently with Paul Stamatiou.
Being a cofounder shouldn’t give anyone immunity.
Underperforming co-founders shouldn’t get to coast or rest-and-vest. Such breakups are hard, but it’s even worse for morale if you let cofounders play by different rules or be held to a lower standard.
Get more generous with early employee equity.
Get rid of this silly 1% benchmark for first employee.
Set up a dedicated “founding team pool” of 10-15% in restricted stock for the first 5-10 employees. Grant your first few employees several percent (at least); and if you want to trust but verify, split it across multiple “promotion” grants issued upfront, or set up a 6-year / 5-year vest for them.
That way, your early employees can look at your 25% to their 4% and feel that it’s at least in the ballpark of reasonable. The founders would still each get perhaps twice the equity of the first 5 employees combined… but it starts to approach a “fair” setup.3
Institute friendly equity management policies
Early exercise and / or an extended exercise window. The reasons not to do this are administrative and dumb, so push back on your lawyers if they tell you not to do this. (Not legal advice.)
Earmark restricted stock for your founding team, not options. Your early employees deserve as “cheap” an exercise as possible for the risk they took.
Founders and early team members should play by the same rules when it comes to liquidity. If there is a secondary in a financing round, founders, founding team, and early employees should get to participate in proportion to their (vested) holdings.
Once the company crosses certain milestones (5-6 years in, Series C/D+), get more friendly to secondaries. If you don’t, they’re going to happen anyway in quiet handshake deals, and the devil you know is better than the devil you don’t.
None of this stuff is rocket science! Just… Reward people in proportion to their contribution.
A neutral third party should be able to take a fresh look at the arrangements and say “yeah that seems okay.” Because right now, it’s a deeply skewed incentive and reward system.
Startups innovate all the time. Let’s apply some of that creativity to treating critical teammates the right way.
Autograph retweeted
This is what happens when the team asks me to design business cards 😈 .
Who's going to be at @hr_transform next week?
Come say hi to @AutographHR and @AbstractOpsCo at Booth 164!
Autograph retweeted
Decoding the Black Box of Compensation, Part II
Introducing FairOffer.ai, a tool to algorithmically estimate fair compensation — for any title, at any stage of company, anywhere in the world.
After thousands of regressions, analyses and backtests, we’ve determined that there are only 3 inputs (i.e., independent variables) in determining “total rewards” compensation for any employee:
1. Entry level salary
2. Title / Level
3. Stage of Company
(For those less familiar, Total Rewards is an industry term for the sum of base salary, incentive compensation, and equity; sometimes, it is used in a way that includes benefits, but we are not including that for the purposes of our methodology.)
This post covers the methodology:
- discussing individual patterns produced by the above independent variables in isolation
- then setting them in the context of an overarching compensation framework
- providing the actual formulas underlying each step, and integrate them.
MARKET-WIDE ENTRY-LEVEL SALARY
First, we need to set the figure for a Baseline Level 1. It’s the foundational piece for any ladder — you start at the bottom and work your way up the titles from there, and serves as an anchor for the algorithm.
With the Fair Offer Baseline, we work off Zone 1 salary — San Francisco & New York City (with the intent of applying location adjustments later on; more on this in Part III tomorrow).
In earlier iterations of the model, I used a “plug” — a constant that seemed like a roughly reasonable figure for a full-time, entry-level office worker in San Francisco or New York City.
However, during more recent iterations, it became clear that there is an external market force setting this, by regulation: minimum exempt salaries. Specifically, California and New York City are the highest, with California clocking in at $66,560 for 2024 (and $64,480 the year before that).
Given this is an objective market standard set by regulation, this is what the algorithm uses for organic inflation adjustments in the model. We index this figure against the leveling for the earliest stage company (more on that in the formulas listed below).
TOTAL REWARDS BY TITLE: AN EXPONENTIAL PATTERN UP THE LADDER
Next up, we need to determine how the Total Rewards should be calculated as you rise up the ladder.
The most important realization that made the Fair Offer Algorithm possible, is that there is a constant “multiplier” for compensation between levels within a given function.
In other words, the difference between levels in a given function in the market neatly follows an exponential function for total rewards (as opposed a linear function). E.g., If a Sr. Manager in Finance makes $150K and a Finance Manager makes $120K, this is not because each level makes $30K more than the one below, but rather that each level makes 25% more.
This isn't something the industry got together and planned; rather, this is the natural way that the "wisdom of the crowds" have settled, to estimate the market value of employees as a function of seniority.
This multiplier effectively ends up being a “golden ratio” for the levels for any given company. It ranges from 1.15 (for the very earlier stage company — at founding) to 1.35 (for companies that are the most mature from a compensation. perspective).
This simple difference ends up having a dramatic effect due to compounding, and is more commensurate with what we see in the market. (Note that the below examples are for total rewards, not base salary.)
THE LATER THE STAGE OF THE COMPANY, THE HIGHER THE LEVELING MULTIPLIER
Entry level roles are fairly similar at any company, but compensation higher up the chain rises much more significantly at large, mature companies than it does at a small organization. For example, an engineering leveling guide might look like the following at example early stage (where each level makes vs. late stage vs. public company.
APPLYING THE ALGORITHMIC PATTERNS TO A STANDARDIZED LEVELING GUIDE
OK so how do we map these isolated patterns back, to establish a standard and algorithmic approach to compensation?
The trickiest part in this step is that Levels (and corresponding) Titles are dramatically different across various functions. This is partially due to semantics, and partially due to the labor market for various roles.
Nevertheless, it’s very clear that a Director of Operations, Director of Engineering, and a Director of Customer Support do not have the same compensation in the market.
Currently, best practice is to create separate compensation levels & total rewards for each function. This may be necessary and prudent.
However, it started to become clear during our analysis that it is better to start with a single ladder of “Baseline Levels,” and simply map back the different titles (and functional levels) to a single ladder. It is not perfect, but it surprisingly gets 95% of the way there.
I was skeptical of this too, but it works reasonably well in most cases; you may choose to tailor individual levels as you customize Fair Offer for your company (as you should!). However, we recommend starting from the approach above, rather than starting from scratch.
There is one huge benefit to setting the Baseline Levels and indexing functional levels & titles to it: making periodic company wide adjustments for inflation, or as you change your compensation framework completely (e.g., going from Series A to B, or from late-stage to public) is dramatically easier with 12-15 levels rather than 100+ levels.
So how would this mapping look? Through a combination of regressions and trial and error, we’ve found that the titles & functional levels cluster in the following way.
Here is a sampling of mid-to-senior levels for illustrative purposes:
There is no “industry standard” but this is the most common set of titles and ladders that we’ve observed. Perhaps one side effect of Fair Offer will be that this will be more standardized against “Fair Offer titles,” but execs and HR teams are understandably quite opinionated on this topic!
COMBINING THE INPUTS TO GENERATE A FAIR OFFER
The combination of these formulas are surprisingly simple.
Where:
ExemptThreshold = $66,560 (for 2024)
Multiplier ranges from 1.15 (founding stage) ~ 1.35 (90th+ percentile public company)
L is the Baseline Level, and ranges from 1 (entry level) ~ 12 (executive) according to the mapping table provided above
That’s it, surprising though it may seem.
If you’d like to backtest this, head on over to FairOffer.ai to try out combinations.
Tomorrow, we'll cover cash-equity splits, and potential ways to address location-based adjustments.















