Eric Brewer

“Mr. Vance’s missive made clear that a resolution to the nuclear question was necessary and Iran’s nuclear program must be on the negotiating table from the start” Ok, but what does “on the negotiating table” mean? By one definition, Iran’s program has always been on the table. But if the U.S. is looking for some sort of up front, in principle commitment to abandon everything in perpetuity, that’s likely to fail, as it has to date. The details here are everything.

I would not be surprised if Iran agreed to allow inspectors back in. But important details would need to be decided in advance: Which sites? For how long? And under what terms? The answers would determine whether that access would be useful or basically useless. I would be VERY surprised if Iran agreed to part with its HEU stockpile—its most important nuclear bargaining chip—any time soon.

It is entirely unclear what this would achieve. Any tactical successes against military targets will be temporary (as Trump himself said recently, “as soon as you stop hitting them, they start rebuilding again.”). There is no military solution for remaining nuclear sites (Pickaxe, Esfahan tunnels), and the program remains generally paused. Striking energy targets is unlikely to cause Iran to capitulate to U.S. negotiating demands. And there’s also the small problem of Iranian retaliation. Iran has been clear about their target set (US forces/bases, energy infrastructure, tech/data infrastructure, cables, etc.) and I think we should take them at their word. They will aim to make the war not just more painful for the U.S. and its partners, but longer than we would prefer. The risks of this operation far exceed any gains.

Remember this (accurate) quote the next time someone talks about “finishing the job.”

Excellent piece by Cole Bucy on how the war has changed Iran's strategic mindset and what that means moving forward. warontherocks.com/tehran-is-…

Both of the following can be true: 1. Hardliners were ascendant long before the war. 2. The war accelerated their ascendance and helped them consolidate power.

But might a single gram of enriched uranium be downblended?

I’ve no doubt Iran sees Republican losses in the midterms as a way to punish and constrain Trump, but it’s hard to parse how much that goal is driving its increased attacks on shipping—a development that was almost certainly going to happen anyway given the economic impact of the blockade. There are other dogs that haven’t yet barked (attacks on regional energy infrastructure, data centers, etc) and it will be telling to see the extent to which Iran is willing to escalate in the coming weeks in an attempt to impose that political pain, or whether it would prefer to avoid the escalation risks and hold those targets in reserve for a return to full scale war. washingtonpost.com/world/202…

A few thoughts on this FT article about growing calls for the bomb in Iran. 1. This was entirely predictable (and predicted). The U.S. and Israel made an attempt at regime change—an existential war for Iran—and are arguably still gunning for regime collapse. Between that, and killing the person who was likely one of the main impediments to the bomb (Ali Khamenei), it’s not hard to see why arguments for nuclear weapons are gaining steam. 2. But it’s not just the nature of the current war. It’s the failure of Iran’s prior nuclear strategy, which held that having an ability to produce nuclear weapons—vice the bomb itself—could provide an adequate deterrent to major strategic attacks. That failure was arguably there in 2024, and made patently obvious following the 2025 strikes and 2026 war. With that failure, it’s perfectly logical for Iran to undertake some searching for alternatives. An obvious one is actually building nuclear weapons. 3. But let’s be honest: The decision to build nuclear weapons isn’t going to be made by popular vote. That decision, if it occurs, will be made by a very small number of officials. So we should be careful about using this public discourse as an indicator of a near term decision to develop the bomb. That said, growing popularity for nuclear weapons can provide a degree of political top cover for any decision. That public discussion can also strengthen the hand of weapons advocates internally. But at the end of the day, this is an insider game. ft.com/content/1f23e859-5e70…

But has she actually made the decision to produce them or is she hedging?

Agree with the first part of this. But there was no public debate that preceded Operation Epic Fury. No evidence provided as to why it was necessary. Just a series of constantly shifting assertions and rationales after the fact. That flaw persists today (is the goal to collapse the regime? Force a deal?). The lack of a clear objective and realistic plan to achieve it are the main reasons why most Americans do not support the war.

Worth noting that this is not the first time NPT withdrawal has come up in Friday prayers. In 2003, Ahmad Jannati said “What harm would it do to get out of the NPT, to reconsider it?” Of course, vastly different circumstances today.

Russia might want to look in the mirror.

Some people are interpreting this as the administration moving away from a zero enrichment policy. Maybe. But to me it reads more like Vance is referring to steps Iran would need to take (specifically, on 60%) as part of a war-termination agreement, not a final deal. This would be consistent with other reporting that the U.S. is seeking more concrete steps from Iran on the nuclear program in that accord that go beyond the promises made in the MoU. Of course, if this is the U.S. position, Iran’s asking price will almost certainly be higher.

Respectfully, the notion that the U.S. is responsible for the trajectory of Iranian domestic politics is overly simplistic at best. It ignores the agency of Iranian actors and in this case specifically Khamenei’s decades-long efforts to empower hardliners and weaken moderates and reformists.

The administration has been offering this justification for a while. While it's certainly possible, there's been no evidence presented as of yet to support the theory. For example, nothing in the unclassified intelligence assessments issued on Iran suggest this was Iran's strategy.