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Part 1 of a new series, "Lessons from China's Imperial History for Contemporary U.S.-China Relations." Today's episode: Why Understanding China's Past is the Key to Understanding Its Future.
Hi All. Today I start a new series that I believe will help us see why should be both more optimistic about the likelihood of conflict between the United States and China, and also more worried about possible errors in US decision-making with regard to the "rising China threat."
My analysis today will be relatively short -- mostly an overview of why the United States should not overly concerned should China be able to overcome some of its entrenched problems (aging population, weak financial system, environment degradation, etc.) to grow its economic and commercial power.
The key point is this: Chinese leaders are quite constrained from being overly assertive/aggressive in foreign policy because they know that China's domestic stability is very sensitive to developments outside the country. Over the past two thousand years, almost every major imperial dynasty -- from the Tang dynasty in the late 9th century, to the Song and Yuan in the 13th and the Ming in the late 16th -- has collapsed due to a combination of foreign adventures that proved too costly; trade ties that caused economic dislocations/regional conflicts; and commercial connections that increased the infiltration of foreign ideas that undermined internal cohesion.
When these factors mixed with or reinforced existing problems at home -- a government's inability to fund flood control, provide aid during drought, deal with growing regional inequalities, and so forth -- Chinese imperial leaders found themselves facing domestic revolts and mass movements that led either to devastating civil conflicts or to the overthrow of a dynasty.
Bottom-line: the Chinese leadership today knows that if it is not cautious in its foreign policy behavior, it could spark a series of developments that undermine its popularity and legitimacy at home, potentially destroying what the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has spent eight decades building up -- its hold on power.
Let me deal with an obvious counter upfront: namely, that Xi Jinping has set up such a strong "surveillance state" that the CCP no longer has to worry about large-scale domestic revolts. Two things to say in response. First, the very reason Xi has spent so much effort on the surveillance state is that he's been very worried ever since he assumed office in 2022 about changing GDP growth and trade levels causing something like the Tiananmen Square crisis of 1989. Indeed, he spent the first three months in power reassessing exactly why Tiananmen happened, and why Communist states in Eastern Europe fell the same year. The party created a three-hour film on what to avoid (economic disruptions, loss of legitimacy) that it forced all senior and mid-level officials to watch.
Second, in the Henan banking crisis of July 2022, when corrupt banking officials stole the life savings of many citizens in the Henan province, the government in Beijing ordered People's Liberation Army tanks on to the streets in cities to quell the street demonstrations that had broken out. The local police could not be trusted to do the job. So as with Tiananmen in May-June 1989, the country's army had to be called in to put down the nascent rebellion. The crisis showed both that widespread popular crises can still break out, and that that leaders in Beijing know that they need the army at home, not abroad, if such crises are to be dealt with before they get out of hand.
What CCP officials know is that China has had for two thousand years a fundamental problem: that 90% of China's vast population (historically about 20-25% of the world's population) is concentrated, because of geography, on only about one-third of the country's land. (The egg-shaped area from Beijing to the southern coast, and from its coastline to the beginning of the Tibetan plateau.)
With the massive industrialization of the country over the past four decades, moving hundreds of millions from the countryside to urban areas, China now has over 50 cities with two million people or more, and two cities with over 25 million (Beijing and Shanghai). The United States, by contrast, has only four cities over two million, and the largest (New York) has about 8-9 million. (See the last quarter of chap. 10 of A World Safe for Commerce for more on China's population concerns.)
When you are leading a country with that kind of incredible population concentration, you will have to act with a sense of domestic constraints that no other great power in history has had to face. And here's the kicker: continued GDP growth through trade can only make your internal situation more fragile, yet you need that trade just to keep your population happy.
You are "riding a tiger" that you can't get off.
Next time, I'll begin to talk about some of the key imperial cases of the above dynamic, cases that Chinese leaders know very well -- but of which western leaders are largely ignorant.
Dale Copeland retweeted
Replying to @o_ozturk07
Yes to both points, Ozgur. The stopping power of water notion of JJM is, to be honest, a completely ad hoc "variable" in his theory. Any time a great power has the ability to land troops abroad and establish a "beachhead" for its own extension of power inland, there is no stopping power of water. Moreover, as you imply, states can overcome any costs that a water barrier implies through technology. Thus the landing craft for D-Day in June 1944, surely one of the hardest sea-based invasions in history (against a consolidated Nazi state) and yet it worked. And the British empire in the 19th C, before the U.S. "empire" after 1945, was based on naval power projection combined with the taking of territory as beachheads for further penetration of an interior (Britain in India, after 1750, and Britain in Africa after 1880).
Paradoxically, JJM undermines the potential power of his own theory by holding too strongly to the stopping power of water thesis -- he can't explain U.S. global hegemony (the "FDR legacy") and many other U.S. adventures since 1945, including the landings during the Korean and Vietnam Wars, the temporary occupations of Dominican Republic in 1965 and Haiti 1994, the Iraq invasion of 2003, etc.
Yet the real problem with JJM's theory is that it posits that rational actors must assume "worst case" about the adversary -- that it not only will grow in power but that it will do nasty things later when it gets more power. This is simply an indefensible stipulation, as I show in chapter one of A World Safe for Commerce and in my response to Mariyaaa Grinberg's defense of offensive realism in her essay on the Robert Jervis Int'l Security Studies Forum from last summer. See below for link.
issforum.org/roundtables/285…
Dale Copeland retweeted
Today I begin a new series: Understanding Contemporary U.S. Foreign Policy. Today's episode is entitled: "Making Sense of the Recent Policies of the Trump Administration, Part I".
Almost all observers of American foreign policy have been mystified by the actions of the Trump Administration over the last six months. With the release of the National Security Strategy (NSS) in December 2025 and the National Defense Strategy (NDS) in January, it seemed clear that the U.S. was going to pursue a moderate "flexible" form of realism that would focus on building America's long-term position and that would avoid costly wars that might hurt that position over time (in short, to avoid regime-changing crusades such as George W. Bush's attack on Iraq in 2003).
Yet on February 28th, with the U.S.-Israeli coordinated attack on Tehran and Iran's military installations, Washington found itself embroiled in an escalating war that not only led to counterattacks on U.S. bases and allies in the region, but to the closure of the vital waterway of the Hormuz Strait, through which 20% of the world's oil flows. The objectives stated in the first few days of the operation -- the overthrow of the Iranian fundamentalist regime, the reduction of Iran's nuclear program, and the completion of the destruction of its missile capability (left unfinished by the June 2025 attacks) -- have not been achieved, despite the killing of many of Iran's top leaders, including 86-year-old Ayatollah Khamenei, and the pummeling of Iran's missile sites. The closure of the Strait has raised energy prices around the world by more than 50%, threatening a global recession. And Iran continues to fund terrorist groups around the region, such as Hezbollah and Hamas.
Perhaps most worrisome, the Ayatollah's energetic and ideologically-driven 56 year old son is now in power, and has every reason to quickly turn Iran's 450 kg of enriched uranium -- enough for 10-11 nuclear bombs -- into some form of a workable nuclear deterrent that could be used to prevent future attacks on the country. (North Korea's secure position after the acquisition of nuclear weapons in the 1990s surely is a model to emulate.) And with the recently signed Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) opening the Strait, relaxing sanctions on Iran, and promising it $300 billion in reconstruction aid, Tehran is poised to throw the new influx of cash into a crash program for both nuclear weapons and the missile needed to carry them.
Most analysts, in the face of these dysfunctional outcomes, are inclined to argue that the Trump administration has no well-thought-out "grand strategy" and that U.S. policy is simply a function of the shifting desires of the man at the top -- desires that often seem to change on a day to day basis. For pundits and scholars on both the left and right, the Trump administration is hurting the long-term position of the United States in the world both economically and politically/militarily --especially relative to the Chinese state, which seems to be taking advantage of U.S. missteps in the Mid-East and with allies in Europe and Asia to further its own goals of trade dominance and naval power projection.
The purpose of this series is not to defend the Trump administration's foreign policy over the last year. Major mistakes have indeed been made, and most of these mistakes could have been avoided through better planning, greater internal discussion, and a keener sense of the likely costs and benefits of alternative courses of action. Rather, my goal is to try to understand what might be driving the administration apart from a mere consideration of the personality of the leader himself. There is no question that "Trump is Trump", and a full explanation of U.S. policy must include the characteristics of this unique individual. But if you've been reading my X posts over the last couple of years, you know that my inclination is to start any explanation of great power behavior with an analysis of the systemic and the domestic forces that might be pushing leaders to do what they do, independently of their personality types.
Now you might say right off the bat: Sure, but in this case Trump's personality is so dominant that it (excuse the pun) trumps all other factors that might have normally shaped American policies in the past. And indeed, that is how I briefly dealt with the first Trump presidency in my final chapter of A World Safe for Commerce. After showing that factors at the systemic level -- namely, drives to expand the U.S. economic-commercial power sphere and the need to deal with threats to that sphere -- were key forces across 250 years of American foreign policy, from 1775 to 2026, I stated that I could not explain Trump 2017-21 because of his unique personal goals that cut against traditional national economic security objectives.
This series will seek to do something bolder. I will try to show, through a careful analysis of the NSS and NDS statements from December-January that there is indeed a "larger logic" to much of what the Trump administration has been doing over the last year and a half. And that indeed it is a form of realism, even if not the kind of realism I have usually promoted and argued for in my three books.
Since this post has already gone on too long, I'm going to stop now and wait until Part 2 to lay out the fuller argument. But let me leave you with this: We need to return to 2025 and the U.S. administration's belief that the United States was in decline relative to China, both economically and militarily, and that without a significant shift in policy China might overtake the United States over the long term to become the number one state in the system. To sustain America's traditionally preponderant power position, the administration felt it had to act in new ways to counter U.S. decline. And the new ways, as the NSS and NDS as well as Trump's recent trip to China show, require the country to recalibrate its geopolitical and geoeconomics interests, not just in the Indo-Pacific and Europe, but in the Western Hemisphere itself.
In short, and even though I don't necessarily agree with how the administration is executing its strategy or even its strategic objective, there are good systemic and domestic reasons for believing that something new is required given the realities that the U.S. is up against, both in the global environment and at home. As I will show, the best parallel in contemporary history is with the Nixon Administration 1969-72 and the perceived need to recalibrate American strategy to counteract decline and to create breathing space for the reconstitution of U.S. power and influence.
So while I don't think the current administration is necessarily going about this in the correct way, I believe we can understand what it is trying to do through an analysis of the systemic and domestic changes that have been going on for the last two decades. And hopefully by understanding some of the broader causal forces that go beyond an analysis of leader personality, we can help the U.S. ship of state to adjust its course and emerge from the current storm in better shape.
More soon! :)
Dale Copeland retweeted
Replying to @SMUMustangAlum
Thanks for your thoughts, Greg. Here's my main point, a point that comes across in the final "implications" chapter of each of my three books, and is developed theoretically in chapter two of my last book, A World Safe for Commerce, which I believe you have (if not, let me know, and I'll figure out a way to get you a copy). It is this:
ALL great powers in history -- just by being capable of hurting the state we care about (what I call "state Y" in chapter 2) -- are indeed "adversaries" and state Y can not afford not to keep its power position strong and its readiness for military action clear. That is why I have advocated for decades a strong realist power projection of both economic and military power into the Indo-Pacific and Europe. This is the "offensive realist" side of my dynamic realist theoretical posture that I outline in chap 1 of AWSFC: state Y has to worry about the future intentions and power of a rising X (e.g., China) or a declining state Z (e.g., Russia) even if in the near term it does not expect either X or Z will directly attack Y or its core interests.
Yet as chap 2 makes clear, adversaries are on a spectrum in terms of their "characters". Some rising (and declining) state Xs are like Nazi Germany and its leaders Hitler: they are crazy states that are inexorably driven to start massive wars, either for a warped sense of their own national security or for glory/greed or ideological ends. These are states we don't just "deter" or "contain" -- we are smart to initiate a major preventive war with them, precisely because we can have this war now, while we are still superior, and avoid an almost certain and more terrible war (since X is "undeterrable") later. If we had full information in 1933 about Hitler's plans for total war in 6-8 years (stated clearly in early February 1933 to his generals; See my Origins of Major War, chap 5), it is a no-brainer that we (Britain, France, U.S.) would have been justified in attacking Germany then, and not have waited until 1939-44.
At the other extreme is a rising state X that is closer to what Britain was from 1850 to 1880 or the U.S. was to Britain from 1890 to 1910 -- namely, a more moderate great power that was less likely to destroy state Y's security later through war or the active whittling away of Y's global position. Here, state Y is wise to remain "cautious" but not to initiate highly hard-line actions, let alone preventive war -- because of the second more defensive realist aspect of my argument in AWSFC, namely, the fear that one will start an escalatory spiral of mistrust and hostility that leads to a steep decline in one's power (through the costs of arms races) and security (through long wars that let sideline-sitting states Z and W to grow in relative power).
So the real question now is: What kind of state is China relative to other adversaries the U.S. has faced in its history?
Clearly Xi's China is not a Hitlerian state. Xi is just too aware of the domestic costs of expansion -- namely, loss of trade, counterbalancing and inadvertent wars -- to just go on a Nazi-like rampage through East Asia let alone the Asia-Pacific. In short, Xi is a very rational actor, and he calculates China's interests in terms of domestic stability and national security.
Nor is China today like the Cold-War Soviet Union 1945-70, where the U.S. felt it necessary to adopt an all-out "containment" strategy that included a very aggressive attempt to prevent all trade with the SU and Communist China to "keep them down". China is very integrated economically with the world; the SU was largely autarchic. China does not have a universal ideology that it wants to spread; the SU wanted to see Communism spread everywhere. China does not have boots on the ground around the world, as the SU did in Africa, Mid-East, Asia (including in proxies like North Vietnam), and South America.
So while clearly we can't see China as akin to 1860s Britain (Disraeli, Gladstone's England), it is not as worrisome as the Cold War Russians and Maoist Chinese, let alone interwar Germany.
This means that we have to think about the trade-offs between preserving our power position and doing this in a way that might spark an all-out Cold War (2.0) that would have all the dangers of the first Cold War (e.g., Berlin Crisis 1961 and Cuban Missile Crisis 1962).
All of this is explained in much more detail in chapters 1-2 and chapter 10 of A World Safe for Commerce if your'e interested. But hopefully this short note gives you a feel for my "middle-ground" position that fuses the insights of offensive realism and defensive realism in a way that can help U.S. leaders make smart choices going forward.
Cheers, Dale :)
Dale Copeland retweeted
Replying to @o_ozturk07
Yes, Ozgur. Mearsheimer has this odd conclusion in his 2001 Tragedy of Great Power Politics that great powers will stop at "regional hegemony" because it is too hard to go beyond a region, given what he calls "the stopping power of water." But he forgets that the U.S. in 1944-46 did not stop with hegemony in the Western Hemisphere, but deliberately (and smartly) established a hegemonic arc of political-economic control from Britain through Western Europe to the Middle East and Southeast Asia to Japan (and pretty well everything below that).
The reasons for this are explained in my empirical chapters (A World Safe for Commerce, esp chaps 7-8). Great powers have an "offensive realist economic baseline"-- they must grab opportunities to expand their economic power spheres in order to secure the access to resources, investments, and markets ("RIM") that will sustain their economic and military power over the long term. (Today China is pushing back against the "FDR legacy" with the Belt and Road Initiative, for similar reasons.)
Because Mearsheimer does not grapple with the importance of commerce for a great power's long-term power position, he misses all this.
Dale Copeland retweeted
Hi All,
For a variety of reasons, I've been quiet on X for the last few months. But starting today I'm going to return to providing postings that link current events to international relations history and theory.
So much has been going on in the world since the new year, most obviously the war with Iran, but also the moderation of tensions with China.
My goal over the next few weeks is to provide some thoughts about what is driving U.S. foreign policy right now, and whether we should see Trump's foreign policy as an anomaly or as tied to factors that have driven other U.S. administrations to adopt somewhat parallel policies.
To hint at where I'll be going: the Trump administration is both very different and quite similar at the same time. The differences are rooted in the very personalistic style of decision-making, such as deciding to attack Iran in late February based on meetings with Netanyahu and Israeli Intelligence without a full discussion of the implications and downsides with his National Security Council and cabinet. But the similarities are tied to Trump and the administration's perception that the U.S. is currently suffering from relative decline and that the country both needs to deal now with long-term threats to America's long-term position in the world -- in particular from Iran in the Middle East and China in the Asia-Pacific. The execution of U.S. policy in these areas may seem unusual, and indeed some aspects are. But overall, we can see parallels with the thinking of other Republican administrations over the last half-century or so, including Nixon in the 1969-73 period and George W. Bush in the 2001-05 period.
More soon! :)
Dale Copeland retweeted
Here is a response to my first installment in the new series by Ozgur Ozturk that may be of interest, at least to those who find the offensive vs defensive realist distinction in International Relations theory of some value.
Everyone should feel free to weigh in on the first installment and subsequent episodes in the new series. Like all analysts, I'm feeling my way through the emerging and very chaotic "new world (dis)order", and I like to self-correct as I go. Feedback on what I write is essential to doing this well.
My response to Ozgur:
Thanks for highlighting a key page in A World Safe for Commerce, Ozgur, about my general dissatisfaction with both offensive realism (John J. Mearsheimer) and defensive realism (Jervis, Walt, Glaser). As I'll explain as the new series gets going, Mearsheimer's offensive realism can indeed explain why the United States attacked Iran so furiously -- based on JJM's belief that great powers must assume "worst case" about the adversary -- even though he oddly enough ignores his stated assumption when it comes to policy, and believes the U.S. should always be moderate and reluctant to go after rising regional powers such as Iran. Defensive realists, on the other hand, are so concerned with causing a spiral of mistrust and hostility by being overly hard-line that they are almost always mystified when great powers take preventive war actions, as Germany did in 1914 and Japan in 1941 (and the U.S. in 2003 against Iraq).
This does not mean that every preventive action/war initiated by a declining great power is rational -- i.e., the best action for security given the circumstances and the alternatives. And indeed, the attack on Iran in late February was not the best option, and should have been seen as problematic at the time and not just in retrospect. The best option in February would have been to negotiate a new deal over Iran's 450 kg of enriched uranium and over its regional behavior -- and indeed a deal was very close when the February 28th attacks began, largely because Israel was not interested in any deal and Netanyahu convinced Trump that bombing was the better option (as NY Times reporting has revealed).
As you know from reading chapter 1 of A World Safe for Commerce, I seek to build a "dynamic realist" approach to global great power politics that fuses the insights of both offensive and defensive realism. I will talk about how this fusion can help us understand the strengths and weakness of recent Biden-Trump foreign policy over the next few installments of the new series. In the meantime, feel free to weigh in again as you proceed through the first couple of chapters of AWSFC and let me know if I can clarify anything. (And feel free to challenge my assertions, of course.)
Cheers, Dale. :)
Dale Copeland retweeted
Replying to @DAlperovitch
Above is the new Foreign Affairs article detailing why it is still very hard for China to invade and occupy Taiwan without paying a huge cost, a cost that would likely undermine its economy and increase the risk of domestic upheaval.
Dmitri and I have been co-discussants on podcasts on Taiwan in the past, and while we disagree on whether China has a strong interest in absorbing Taiwan (I think Xi would like to do so if the island just fell into his lap, but does not want to incur the risks to the CCP's dominance at home that an invasion imply), I have great respect for his recent book on the subject.
Best, Dale
Dale Copeland retweeted
Hi All, Just a heads-up that I will try to get Part 2 of the new series on Understanding Contemporary U.S. Foreign Policy out by tomorrow. (Sorry for the delay, but I've been caught up in some department administrative business, but should be done by late this afternoon.). My goal in part 2 is to link what has been happening in last year and a half to parallels in the thinking of U.S. foreign policy makers in the 1960 to 1970 period -- not just Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger's "realist" shift due to perceived decline versus the rising Soviet Union, but John F Kennedy's and Lyndon Johnson's "preemptive" efforts to head off the economic and political growth in the Communist sphere, including in Southeast Asia, Africa, and Latin America and how those policies largely failed to stop the perceived momentum of the adversary's growth.
Without giving too much away, I'll be arguing that many of Trump's best advisors and document writers understand that China right now has a momentum that can't be "stopped" by simply switching to an intense containment strategy (as we did 1945-64) but rather that some form of a great power cooperative structure is needed to keep the U.S. on top (as a "first among equals") for the long term.
For Nixon-Kissinger -- two very "realist" Republicans who were formerly devoted in the 1950s to all-out containment -- this was a shift to what became known as detente or a "relaxation of tension" within a larger power standoff. Something parallel is part and parcel of the logic of the more prudent realists that are advising Trump from behind the scenes. And this policy shift, notwithstanding the anomaly of the Iran War (which these advisors did not approve of), will likely go forward now that the formal period of "war" between Iran and the United States seems to have ended.
More tomorrow! :)
Hi All, Just a heads-up that I will try to get Part 2 of the new series on Understanding Contemporary U.S. Foreign Policy out by tomorrow. (Sorry for the delay, but I've been caught up in some department administrative business, but should be done by late this afternoon.). My goal in part 2 is to link what has been happening in last year and a half to parallels in the thinking of U.S. foreign policy makers in the 1960 to 1970 period -- not just Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger's "realist" shift due to perceived decline versus the rising Soviet Union, but John F Kennedy's and Lyndon Johnson's "preemptive" efforts to head off the economic and political growth in the Communist sphere, including in Southeast Asia, Africa, and Latin America and how those policies largely failed to stop the perceived momentum of the adversary's growth.
Without giving too much away, I'll be arguing that many of Trump's best advisors and document writers understand that China right now has a momentum that can't be "stopped" by simply switching to an intense containment strategy (as we did 1945-64) but rather that some form of a great power cooperative structure is needed to keep the U.S. on top (as a "first among equals") for the long term.
For Nixon-Kissinger -- two very "realist" Republicans who were formerly devoted in the 1950s to all-out containment -- this was a shift to what became known as detente or a "relaxation of tension" within a larger power standoff. Something parallel is part and parcel of the logic of the more prudent realists that are advising Trump from behind the scenes. And this policy shift, notwithstanding the anomaly of the Iran War (which these advisors did not approve of), will likely go forward now that the formal period of "war" between Iran and the United States seems to have ended.
More tomorrow! :)
Dale Copeland retweeted
Replying to @clashreport
Take a look at the above interview with JP Morgan Chase CEO Jamie Dimon on how we need to be thinking about China now. I can't agree with all of it, of course, but a solid quick summary of the need to deal with China in a rational way, not as a cold-war adversary (as with Soviet Union 1945 to 1986).
Dale Copeland retweeted
Replying to @jenzhuscott
Something (above) of concern that we already understood but now are pretty certain of -- that China is increasingly outdoing the U.S. and the West in the cutting-edge technologies.
Dale Copeland retweeted
Replying to @AlecStapp
The above expresses a traditional truth -- that the United States attracts the "best and the brightest" from around the world to its universities, and historically because of its open attitude to immigrants and freedom of speech and assembly. Of course, that was the historical reality, and given the changes over the past decade, including China's phenomenal investment in higher education and technology and the U.S. new approach to potential talents from abroad, China has advantages that the U.S. does not have -- only in certain areas, to be sure, but those areas are likely to driven the world economy over the next three decades.
Dale Copeland retweeted
Replying to @PeterLakewood
A very interesting point, indeed puzzle: Ukraine had hit nuclear-armed Russia with conventional drones deep inside its territory and seemingly not feared escalation to Russian nuclear retaliation. Likewise, despite having nuclear weapons (albeit undeclared), Israel has been hit often by Iranian conventional weapons.
My short answer is that states with what are perceived to be rational stable regimes may be hit by small states with conventional weapons because the first is unlikely to initiate a nuclear response. This was North Vietnam versus the U.S. in South Vietnam, 1964-72, for example: Hanoi could expect the U.S. not to go to nuclear weapons in response.
But it is risky: Nixon sought to portray himself as potentially unstable in 1970 to convince Hanoi he might just use nuclear weapons if it didn't come to the negotiation table in a serious way. (The "madman" theory of IR.) But it didn't work because the U.S. was seen as too rational and constrained -- esp with nuclear China and Russia supporting NV.
Israel likewise would only use nuclear weapons if a true existential crisis -- a land-based invasion that clearly threatened to occupy the country. And not surprisingly, since 1973 no Mid-East country has threatened this. (And even in 1973, Sadat only "took back" the Sinai, and stopped before reaching Israel proper.)
Dale Copeland retweeted
Replying to @PeterLakewood
Thanks for your response, Peter. I suppose the basic point is that nuclear weapons are the ultimate deterrent. Even a country with just a couple of them (as with North Korea by the late 1990s/early 2000s) can deter great powers such as the U.S. from attacking because the devastation that a single bomb can wrought. The Clinton administration actively considered preventive strikes on North Korea in 1994 before Pyongyang had completed its nuclear program because in 1994 North Korea could only respond with conventional force. But by 2000, a whole city in East Asia -- Seoul, Tokyo, etc. -- could have been wiped out in a NK retaliation. Hence, no U.S. administration had seriously contemplated a preventive strike on North Korea.
Today I begin a new series: Understanding Contemporary U.S. Foreign Policy. Today's episode is entitled: "Making Sense of the Recent Policies of the Trump Administration, Part I".
Almost all observers of American foreign policy have been mystified by the actions of the Trump Administration over the last six months. With the release of the National Security Strategy (NSS) in December 2025 and the National Defense Strategy (NDS) in January, it seemed clear that the U.S. was going to pursue a moderate "flexible" form of realism that would focus on building America's long-term position and that would avoid costly wars that might hurt that position over time (in short, to avoid regime-changing crusades such as George W. Bush's attack on Iraq in 2003).
Yet on February 28th, with the U.S.-Israeli coordinated attack on Tehran and Iran's military installations, Washington found itself embroiled in an escalating war that not only led to counterattacks on U.S. bases and allies in the region, but to the closure of the vital waterway of the Hormuz Strait, through which 20% of the world's oil flows. The objectives stated in the first few days of the operation -- the overthrow of the Iranian fundamentalist regime, the reduction of Iran's nuclear program, and the completion of the destruction of its missile capability (left unfinished by the June 2025 attacks) -- have not been achieved, despite the killing of many of Iran's top leaders, including 86-year-old Ayatollah Khamenei, and the pummeling of Iran's missile sites. The closure of the Strait has raised energy prices around the world by more than 50%, threatening a global recession. And Iran continues to fund terrorist groups around the region, such as Hezbollah and Hamas.
Perhaps most worrisome, the Ayatollah's energetic and ideologically-driven 56 year old son is now in power, and has every reason to quickly turn Iran's 450 kg of enriched uranium -- enough for 10-11 nuclear bombs -- into some form of a workable nuclear deterrent that could be used to prevent future attacks on the country. (North Korea's secure position after the acquisition of nuclear weapons in the 1990s surely is a model to emulate.) And with the recently signed Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) opening the Strait, relaxing sanctions on Iran, and promising it $300 billion in reconstruction aid, Tehran is poised to throw the new influx of cash into a crash program for both nuclear weapons and the missile needed to carry them.
Most analysts, in the face of these dysfunctional outcomes, are inclined to argue that the Trump administration has no well-thought-out "grand strategy" and that U.S. policy is simply a function of the shifting desires of the man at the top -- desires that often seem to change on a day to day basis. For pundits and scholars on both the left and right, the Trump administration is hurting the long-term position of the United States in the world both economically and politically/militarily --especially relative to the Chinese state, which seems to be taking advantage of U.S. missteps in the Mid-East and with allies in Europe and Asia to further its own goals of trade dominance and naval power projection.
The purpose of this series is not to defend the Trump administration's foreign policy over the last year. Major mistakes have indeed been made, and most of these mistakes could have been avoided through better planning, greater internal discussion, and a keener sense of the likely costs and benefits of alternative courses of action. Rather, my goal is to try to understand what might be driving the administration apart from a mere consideration of the personality of the leader himself. There is no question that "Trump is Trump", and a full explanation of U.S. policy must include the characteristics of this unique individual. But if you've been reading my X posts over the last couple of years, you know that my inclination is to start any explanation of great power behavior with an analysis of the systemic and the domestic forces that might be pushing leaders to do what they do, independently of their personality types.
Now you might say right off the bat: Sure, but in this case Trump's personality is so dominant that it (excuse the pun) trumps all other factors that might have normally shaped American policies in the past. And indeed, that is how I briefly dealt with the first Trump presidency in my final chapter of A World Safe for Commerce. After showing that factors at the systemic level -- namely, drives to expand the U.S. economic-commercial power sphere and the need to deal with threats to that sphere -- were key forces across 250 years of American foreign policy, from 1775 to 2026, I stated that I could not explain Trump 2017-21 because of his unique personal goals that cut against traditional national economic security objectives.
This series will seek to do something bolder. I will try to show, through a careful analysis of the NSS and NDS statements from December-January that there is indeed a "larger logic" to much of what the Trump administration has been doing over the last year and a half. And that indeed it is a form of realism, even if not the kind of realism I have usually promoted and argued for in my three books.
Since this post has already gone on too long, I'm going to stop now and wait until Part 2 to lay out the fuller argument. But let me leave you with this: We need to return to 2025 and the U.S. administration's belief that the United States was in decline relative to China, both economically and militarily, and that without a significant shift in policy China might overtake the United States over the long term to become the number one state in the system. To sustain America's traditionally preponderant power position, the administration felt it had to act in new ways to counter U.S. decline. And the new ways, as the NSS and NDS as well as Trump's recent trip to China show, require the country to recalibrate its geopolitical and geoeconomics interests, not just in the Indo-Pacific and Europe, but in the Western Hemisphere itself.
In short, and even though I don't necessarily agree with how the administration is executing its strategy or even its strategic objective, there are good systemic and domestic reasons for believing that something new is required given the realities that the U.S. is up against, both in the global environment and at home. As I will show, the best parallel in contemporary history is with the Nixon Administration 1969-72 and the perceived need to recalibrate American strategy to counteract decline and to create breathing space for the reconstitution of U.S. power and influence.
So while I don't think the current administration is necessarily going about this in the correct way, I believe we can understand what it is trying to do through an analysis of the systemic and domestic changes that have been going on for the last two decades. And hopefully by understanding some of the broader causal forces that go beyond an analysis of leader personality, we can help the U.S. ship of state to adjust its course and emerge from the current storm in better shape.
More soon! :)
Here is a response to my first installment in the new series by Ozgur Ozturk that may be of interest, at least to those who find the offensive vs defensive realist distinction in International Relations theory of some value.
Everyone should feel free to weigh in on the first installment and subsequent episodes in the new series. Like all analysts, I'm feeling my way through the emerging and very chaotic "new world (dis)order", and I like to self-correct as I go. Feedback on what I write is essential to doing this well.
My response to Ozgur:
Thanks for highlighting a key page in A World Safe for Commerce, Ozgur, about my general dissatisfaction with both offensive realism (John J. Mearsheimer) and defensive realism (Jervis, Walt, Glaser). As I'll explain as the new series gets going, Mearsheimer's offensive realism can indeed explain why the United States attacked Iran so furiously -- based on JJM's belief that great powers must assume "worst case" about the adversary -- even though he oddly enough ignores his stated assumption when it comes to policy, and believes the U.S. should always be moderate and reluctant to go after rising regional powers such as Iran. Defensive realists, on the other hand, are so concerned with causing a spiral of mistrust and hostility by being overly hard-line that they are almost always mystified when great powers take preventive war actions, as Germany did in 1914 and Japan in 1941 (and the U.S. in 2003 against Iraq).
This does not mean that every preventive action/war initiated by a declining great power is rational -- i.e., the best action for security given the circumstances and the alternatives. And indeed, the attack on Iran in late February was not the best option, and should have been seen as problematic at the time and not just in retrospect. The best option in February would have been to negotiate a new deal over Iran's 450 kg of enriched uranium and over its regional behavior -- and indeed a deal was very close when the February 28th attacks began, largely because Israel was not interested in any deal and Netanyahu convinced Trump that bombing was the better option (as NY Times reporting has revealed).
As you know from reading chapter 1 of A World Safe for Commerce, I seek to build a "dynamic realist" approach to global great power politics that fuses the insights of both offensive and defensive realism. I will talk about how this fusion can help us understand the strengths and weakness of recent Biden-Trump foreign policy over the next few installments of the new series. In the meantime, feel free to weigh in again as you proceed through the first couple of chapters of AWSFC and let me know if I can clarify anything. (And feel free to challenge my assertions, of course.)
Cheers, Dale. :)
Dale Copeland retweeted
Deng Xiaoping's former interpreter, Prof. Zhang Weiwei:
"Chairman Mao laid China's foundation -- literacy, public health, women's liberation, land reform. India's problem is they did not have a Chairman Mao."
China: poorer than Zimbabwe in 1978, now leads US in 57 of 64 tech.
Dale Copeland retweeted
I wish I had more books to assign on US foreign economic policy but at least we have @Copela1492 with his new magnum opus A World Safe For Commerce press.princeton.edu/books/pa… (8/14)
Dale Copeland retweeted
Still collecting my notes for my first substantive post in a number of months (see my post from Friday below)
Here are a few of the puzzles I'm grappling with:
Can we really see the current administration as having anything close to a "strategy", let alone a grand strategy, when so much of its behavior seems to be based on how its leader feels on a day by day basis? (Strategy after all implies a long-term vision and the careful gathering of facts and means-end logics that will serve to realize a state's foreign policy ends.)
Doesn't strategy require an understanding of what the main adversary is all about -- that is, doesn't it require us to delve deeply into China's motives and changing power position, and not just into the desires and causal thinking of the United States and its officials?
Is it perhaps not the case that the U.S. should not even have or strive for a grand strategy in the current environment, with so much up for grabs or "in motion" in Europe, the Middle East, East Asia and even in Latin America? That is, isn't a posture of "improvisation," where what the U.S. actually does reflects the changes up to that point in time, better than a futile search for a policy that will guide our actions over years or even decades (as "containment" did after 1947 and up to 1988)?
More soon! 🙂
nitter.cf/Copela1492/statu…
Hi All,
For a variety of reasons, I've been quiet on X for the last few months. But starting today I'm going to return to providing postings that link current events to international relations history and theory.
So much has been going on in the world since the new year, most obviously the war with Iran, but also the moderation of tensions with China.
My goal over the next few weeks is to provide some thoughts about what is driving U.S. foreign policy right now, and whether we should see Trump's foreign policy as an anomaly or as tied to factors that have driven other U.S. administrations to adopt somewhat parallel policies.
To hint at where I'll be going: the Trump administration is both very different and quite similar at the same time. The differences are rooted in the very personalistic style of decision-making, such as deciding to attack Iran in late February based on meetings with Netanyahu and Israeli Intelligence without a full discussion of the implications and downsides with his National Security Council and cabinet. But the similarities are tied to Trump and the administration's perception that the U.S. is currently suffering from relative decline and that the country both needs to deal now with long-term threats to America's long-term position in the world -- in particular from Iran in the Middle East and China in the Asia-Pacific. The execution of U.S. policy in these areas may seem unusual, and indeed some aspects are. But overall, we can see parallels with the thinking of other Republican administrations over the last half-century or so, including Nixon in the 1969-73 period and George W. Bush in the 2001-05 period.
More soon! :)
Dale Copeland retweeted
Just noticed on Amazon that the paperback version of A World Safe for Commerce is temporarily 40% off the $27.95 price, at $16.98.
amazon.com/World-Safe-Commer…





