Dani | Web3 Sec πŸ›‘ (@DaniWeb3Sec) header
Dani | Web3 Sec πŸ›‘ (@DaniWeb3Sec) profile picture

Passionate about Web3 & Blockchain Security | Smart Contract Auditor | Get your code secured πŸ›‘οΈ πŸ‘‰πŸ½ DM for private audit

ZΓΌrich
Joined August 2012
Photo by Dani | Web3 Sec πŸ›‘ (@DaniWeb3Sec)Photo by Dani | Web3 Sec πŸ›‘ (@DaniWeb3Sec)Photo by Dani | Web3 Sec πŸ›‘ (@DaniWeb3Sec)Photo by Dani | Web3 Sec πŸ›‘ (@DaniWeb3Sec)Photo by Dani | Web3 Sec πŸ›‘ (@DaniWeb3Sec)Photo by Dani | Web3 Sec πŸ›‘ (@DaniWeb3Sec)Photo by Dani | Web3 Sec πŸ›‘ (@DaniWeb3Sec)Photo by Dani | Web3 Sec πŸ›‘ (@DaniWeb3Sec)Photo by Dani | Web3 Sec πŸ›‘ (@DaniWeb3Sec)Photo by Dani | Web3 Sec πŸ›‘ (@DaniWeb3Sec)
Dani | Web3 Sec πŸ›‘ retweeted
A few hours ago, Penpie @Penpiexyz_io , a farming protocol built on the Pendle Protocol, suffered a reentrancy attack resulting in a loss of ~$27M. Since Penpie has been paused, we are now providing a detailed root cause analysis. This is a typical issue due to the lack of reentrancy guard. Specifically, the vulnerable contract (0xff51c6, the implementation contract of PendleStaking) fails to consider that the provided argument, i.e., markets, might be untrusted, which can abused to reenter into this contract. Attack preparation TX: app.blocksec.com/explorer/tx… The attacker initially created a counterfeit SY (standardized yield token, i.e., 0x4476b). Although the SY tokens themselves were worthless, the contract was set up with two high-value PENDLE-LPT market tokens (i.e., 0x6010_PENDLE-LPT, 0x038c_PENDLE-LPT) as the reward tokens. By doing so, the attacker then created a market on Pendle and registered it on Penpie. Attack TX: app.blocksec.com/explorer/tx… During the attack, the attacker executed the batchHarvestMarketRewards() function to harvest rewards, which were calculated based on the difference in balanceOf() before and after the redeemRewards() function was invoked. The redeemRewards() function, in turn, triggered the claimRewards() function of the specific market. As the protocol did not anticipate the possibility of a market being maliciously controlled, the attacker was able to re-enter the victim contract through the depositMarket() function. After that, the attacker deposited the two high-value LPT market tokens, which were mistakenly treated as rewards. Simultaneously, the attacker received minted shares corresponding to these deposits. Consequently, the attacker could withdraw the same valuable LPT market tokens along with the corresponding shares minted in depositMarket(), and claim the reward to realize a profit.
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🚨 Again another victim lost $72,857 (28.89 $stETH) 10 minutes ago, due to a malicious smart contract interaction. πŸ€¦πŸ»β€β™‚οΈ πŸ“©I've reached out to the victim via an on-chain message for more details on the incident and am currently monitoring the movements of the scammer...πŸ”Ž More details soon...πŸ‘‡πŸ»
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πŸ“œTX: 0x76a4a8467b6d27b9460b304b2624fadf4684a96fa7badb2253e291fbf6606b5d πŸ’ΈVictim: 0xba1809Ab216562442B4F798D9DE0Be5452D60D49 πŸ‘ΉMalicious smartcontract: 0x0000db5c8B030ae20308ac975898E09741e70000
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🚨 Alert: A user lost $809,851 (321 $stETH) just 2 hours ago due to a malicious smart contract interaction. πŸ“©I've reached out to the victim via an on-chain message for more details on the incident and am currently monitoring the movements of the scammer...πŸ”Ž Stay tuned for further updates...πŸ‘‡πŸ»
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πŸ“œTX: 0xfe1ebf81870a7799ff557e3f623198ae1a3c6fbd18f793d6d04fe236d2ab017e πŸ’ΈVictim: 0x0D15c865c537683D797996EDdb5eF28e974B6F70 πŸ‘Ή Malicious Smart Contract: 0x0000db5c8B030ae20308ac975898E09741e70000
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🚨 ATTENTION WEB3 USERS! 🚨 Beware of fake dApp websites! Scammers are still using Google Ads to trick you. Example: Searching "defisaver" on Google? The top ad might lead you to "defissaver .com" - a scam site with Inferno drainer! πŸ” Always double-check URLs & never sign transactions hastily. Stay safe out there! πŸ”’ #Web3Security *BTW @DeFiSaver you should do something about it!
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🚨 1 hour ago (sealgoodman.eth) lost $26,067 (1000 $PIXL) by interacting with a malicious smart contract. I’ve sent an on-chain message to the victim to understand what happened and am tracking the crypto scammer...πŸ”Ž More details below...πŸ‘‡πŸ»
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πŸ“œTX: 0x1381e7c8ce7b424d4d014cb444facfac8e5063ce086954b28d03ce38d0daaff5 πŸ’ΈVictim: 0x439901eCaB06F75B14bC25fD60d53bB3A3b9e277 πŸ‘Ή Malicious Smart Contract: 0x0000db5c8B030ae20308ac975898E09741e70000
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🚨 Someone just lost 3.69 $ETH ($9,219.56) by interacting with a fake claim function in a malicious smart contract. I’ve sent an on-chain message to the victim to understand what happened and am tracking the scammers...πŸ”Ž More details below...πŸ‘‡πŸ»
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πŸ“œTX: 0xd74c5e58f6375c124fd7c8a4aa0383c78920a735b0e71351c6b9ba75ccddd8a1 πŸ’ΈVictim: 0x9453e7b8E0C83943938D40BA74117D1ae6a2bAe0 πŸ‘Ή Malicious Smart Contract: 0x000095c13a0354b7131769b6312F344930eb0000
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🚨 Just uncovered a smart contract that’s been siphoning multiple approvals through interactions with wallets. Some of these wallets hold massive fortunes that could be at risk of being drained. πŸ•΅οΈβ€β™‚οΈ ⚠️ Users, be extremely cautious and make sure to revoke any unnecessary approvals immediately! Stay safe out there. More details soon...
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🚨 1 hour ago someone lost $180,198 (67 $stETH) by interacting with a malicious smart contract. I’ve sent an on-chain message to the victim to understand what happened and am tracking the crypto scammer...πŸ”Ž More details below...πŸ‘‡πŸ»
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πŸ“œTX: 0xefdb08b6f25e18865cbc50372f0299fa4bf24156db1e7272e49c8ab189bf7ccb πŸ’Έ Victim: 0xc4239f64c1A4607fE5145a5b7F9945A592f2bF6F πŸ‘Ή Malicious Smart Contract: 0xed0e416e0fEEA5b484ba5c95d375545AC2b60572
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πŸš€ It looks like utility tokens are starting to pump! Could this be a sign that the market is shifting, and the hype around meme coins is fading? πŸ€”
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🚨Yesterday a victim lost $55.43M in $DAI after signing a phishing transaction that changed the owner of their DeFi Saver Proxy. The attacker then drained the funds. Always verify transactions before signing to avoid such scams!
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WTF! How it's even possible !? 🀯
🚨 5 hours ago, a victim lost $55.43M in DAI after signing a phishing transaction targeting its DeFi Saver Proxy. How did this happen? πŸ‘‡
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Just lost 4,064 $BTC ($238M). Has anyone come across them? πŸ˜­πŸ‘€
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🚨 Seven hours ago, a potentially fraudulent transfer of 4064 BTC ($238M) occurred. πŸ“œBitcoin Transaction hash: 4b277ba298830ea538086114803b9487558bb093b5083e383e94db687fbe9090 The funds were rapidly distributed across platforms like ThorChain, eXch, Kucoin, ChangeNow,...
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