Daniel Fu (@DanielFuIR) header
Daniel Fu (@DanielFuIR) profile picture

Stonex PhD Scholar in International Relations @LSEIRDept/@lseideas. Previously @HarvardHBS & @GovAIOrg. @BostonCollege and @Columbia alum. U.S.-China Tech.

London, England
Joined December 2019
Photo by Daniel Fu (@DanielFuIR)Photo by Daniel Fu (@DanielFuIR)Photo by Daniel Fu (@DanielFuIR)Photo by Daniel Fu (@DanielFuIR)Photo by Daniel Fu (@DanielFuIR)Photo by Daniel Fu (@DanielFuIR)Photo by Daniel Fu (@DanielFuIR)Photo by Daniel Fu (@DanielFuIR)Photo by Daniel Fu (@DanielFuIR)Photo by Daniel Fu (@DanielFuIR)
The Yom Kippur War led to substantial electoral punishment for Israel's incumbents despite eventual military victory. This paper below from Getmansky at al shows this pretty convincingly. Confused as to why the war in Gaza has not produced the same political consequences for Netanyahu.
2026 Election vote count complete: Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's bloc holds 53 seats in the 120-member Knesset, while opposition parties have 67. Follow Haaretz's election updates here: haaretz.com/israel-news/elec…
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In this piece, Lizzi Lee and I argue that both the US and China need to enact domestic reforms on AI safety incident reporting to make global cooperation possible.
When it comes to AI safety, @wstv_lizzi and @simonhedlin see a problem: Neither the US nor the Chinese government is currently receiving the information it needs from its respective frontier AI companies. project-syndicate.org/commen…
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These changes will only make human, qualitative analysis and investigation more necessary. If AI and co. will generate terrific insights about patterns, human tenacity and sensitiveness will be even more necessary to shed light on mecanisms. In other words, the parts of political science that have been "economicsized" the most, those that today look at the rest from top to bottom because of their mastery of increasingly complex statstical tools, will suffer the most. The rest will become more invaluable, though I doubt this will translate in any meaningful change in academia. Most will simply accept that the researcher's job is just to be a research assistant, an explorer looking for new data to feed the machine.
We obviously haven’t had the major jobs wipeout yet. But you read stuff like this. And you read what economics students themselves are saying about working with AI (ht @odavis_h) and it’s hard not to feel like the seismic shift is on its way.
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My new piece for @ChinaBriefJT China’s expanding international dispute-resolution forums support its global ambitions, but perceived tensions between fairness and advancing national interests could undermine foreign firms' trust in the system. jamestown.org/chinese-disput…
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[1/7] China’s AI labs are also talking about “recursive self-improvement” (RSI). A big question here is: Is Beijing coordinating a race to achieve RSI? @ZilanQian and I looked at Chinese AI companies, investors, and policy docs. We found a more bottom-up, commercial story.
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Everybody should apply to @GovAIOrg’s fellowship opportunities! Was lucky to complete the DC track alongside an excellent cohort. Check out their brilliant work here ranging from the technical to the philosophical: governance.ai/post/dc-summer….
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With GTC Europe underway and Nvidia planning $2B+ in European AI deals, Europe has a golden opportunity to strengthen its position in AI. Investment across healthcare, robotics and computing infrastructure is key to strategic autonomy and job creation. bloomberg.com/news/articles/…
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“The United States’ efforts to hamstring Chinese technology firms… led China to accelerate its technological development, which in turn spurred American fears of Chinese domination—a self-perpetuating spiral.” From some of the original theorists of “weaponized interdependence”foreignaffairs.com/united-st…
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Well China will have just as hard of a time trying to limit export of Chinese models as the U.S. American models
The Mofcom explainer of the revised export control rules. sinocism.notion.site/MOFCOM-… risks of building a business on PRC open AI models going up. “facilitation measures such as automatic licensing may apply if they are deployed in relatively controllable-risk circumstances, such as on a company’s own cloud infrastructure overseas 如果部署在海外自有云等风险相对可控的情形下,可适用自动许可等便利措施”
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This is the way. Not by framing Taiwan as an actor in a struggle between democracy vs autocracy or by presenting Taiwan in relation to looming great power war. Building awareness of Taiwan's indispensability to America's economic future is the best path to durable US support.
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Washington is restricting China's access to advanced AI hardware, but in doing so is accelerating Chinese model efficiency, domestic chip adoption, and software-hardware integration. Short-term constraints produce long-term competitors. Thanks @JChengWSJ for sharing my research.
“Technological bottlenecks constraining Chinese advances are not static. As Washington restricts one part of the AI technology stack, Chinese firms have successfully substituted, economized on, or circumvented that constraint.” centerforchinaanalysis.asias…
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The Washington Post and now Bloomberg argue in favor of allowing more Chinese investment into the US. I wrote about how the US should manage the risks and reap the benefits of Chinese tech products & investments: brookings.edu/articles/a-new…
America should not be so scared of Chinese money bloomberg.com/opinion/articl…
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1/ Article now officially out in @ISQ_Jrnl! Every day, we hear about how disruptive technologies are "breaking" international security. AI. Quantum. Biotech. Hypersonics. If alarm bells are sounding, isn't it time to regulate? Yet policymakers almost always wait. 🧵
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Friedberg’s (@AaronFriedberg) new book is a valuable intervention to the burgeoning literature on chokepoints and weaponized interdependence. I’m particularly pleased that he cites my @ChinaBriefJT article on the political drivers of China’s private-sector demise.
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I read Jon Ossoff’s (@ossoff) work as a Master’s student at @LSEIRDept. His review of Kishore Mahbubani’s The Great Convergence is devastatingly brilliant. If elected president, he’d be the most intellectually grounded president on international relations in American history.
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Excited to share my latest research for @AsiaPolicy on how China’s leading AI start-ups are often successfully adapting to U.S. export controls. I look at novel algorithmic efficiencies, model architectures, and domestic chip alliances and substitution. centerforchinaanalysis.asias…
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This research came out of my summer fellowship with @GovAIOrg. Special thanks to my wonderful supervisor @jjding99, @pstAsiatech for partially inspiring this and my wider PhD dissertation, and @wstv_lizzi for her rounds of edits and ultimately publishing this!
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How do Chinese AI firms make money? In a new report, @cherylwoooo and @ansonwhho identify five revenue sources and analyze how much each contributes. 🧵
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Good piece by @DesmondShum on how positionality impacts analysis. But the dichotomy is too crude: what Western analyst really doesn’t approach official sources with scepticism? Or look for how a source compares historically? Or seek to corroborate with other kinds of sources? 1/3
Why Chinese and Western Analysts See China Differently On a regular basis, I probably review ten Chinese-language podcasts or pieces of writing on China for every two from Hong Kong and one in English. Over time, I have noticed a consistent difference among them. Hong Kong analysis often sits somewhere between the two, but broadly speaking there are two largely separate worlds of China watching: the Chinese-language world and the English-language world. desmondshum.substack.com/p/w…
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