The Hyperliquid Bet That Broke Their Position Limits
I think for the Hyperliquid trade, it was such an extremely high-conviction thing. I was over here trying to scrounge up points, buying points from people on the market.
The funny story is, we had to mark our points internally in the fund because we still had to credit investors with the fact that there's a value to these points. I kept kind of erring on the high side, but it's one of those things where it's way better to be low than high. I don't want to tell people, “Oh, I think it's going to be worth [unclear].”
I'm over here like, “These are going to be worth $8 a point or something,” which was extremely bullish at the time. I really thought it was going to be worth quite a bit more, so I kept being extremely conservative. I remember every month just rerating them up and up—from $2 a point, to $4 a point, to $8 a point.
At one point, there were really early primitives of those protocols. I remember there was LPoint and the whale thing, where people were trying to OTC points from one another. I was trying to find so many different ways to find points.
The thing we found that was incredibly good for generating points was basically doing very rudimentary market making on the PURR spot market. If you did a lot of PURR volume back then on the spot ticker, you got thousands of points a week. It was extremely incentivized. The moment we found that out, we just went incredibly hard into it.
Looking back on it, the P&L of that particular trade is revolting. I think we might have spent $2,000 on fees market making the PURR spot market, but got 20,000 or 30,000 points from it, which is now worth—I have no idea how much at this point. So that was a very large “make it” trade for us, essentially.
My partner wouldn't love me telling this story, but it's funny because the TGE was at 4 a.m. He was in a different time zone from me. I wanted to buy more at TGE. He wanted to sell some of our point allocation at TGE, and he was completely well reasoned in why he wanted to.
He was like, “It's going to come out at a $2.5 billion to $5 billion FDV. That's the ceiling for perp DEXs. It's going to be like every other airdrop and it's just going to dump. We got a nice, chunky airdrop. Let's just sell.”
And I was like, “No, no, no. This is going to go to a minimum of $20 billion.” They're like, “No, there's no way. That's crazy.”
Our fund, up to that point in time, our biggest positions were like 10% positions. We had these caps on what we were allowed to hold. As Hyperliquid kept going up to $4, $6, $8, $12, and $20, it kept creeping up in position. I kept adding to it as well.
Then I had all the people at my fund saying, “Okay, we have to sell now. We actually have to sell. We literally have to sell.” And I was like, “Okay, everybody, shut up. We're going to keep holding this,” essentially.
We even kind of broke some of our previous rules that we set for ourselves because we just thought it was such a generational trade.
At that time, I didn't have a Twitter, so I wasn't putting it out there. But I was probably one of the few people who genuinely believed that. I remember telling my partners, “No. This is a $20 billion to $50 billion TAM thing,” if it really hits.
Now, the fact that it's even trading north of that is very gratifying, but we had extremely high conviction that it was going to get to this point.
ft.
@koolkrypto223 @DeFi_Dad @Nomaticcap