Koidex

🚨 𝗔𝘅𝗶𝗼𝘀 𝘄𝗮𝘀 𝗰𝗼𝗺𝗽𝗿𝗼𝗺𝗶𝘀𝗲𝗱 𝗼𝗻 𝗻𝗽𝗺. 𝗧𝗵𝗲 𝗿𝗲𝗮𝗹 𝗽𝗮𝗰𝗸𝗮𝗴𝗲. 𝟭𝟬𝟬 𝗺𝗶𝗹𝗹𝗶𝗼𝗻 𝘄𝗲𝗲𝗸𝗹𝘆 𝗱𝗼𝘄𝗻𝗹𝗼𝗮𝗱𝘀. Not a typosquat. Not a lookalike. A lead maintainer's npm account was hijacked, and the attacker published two malicious versions - [email protected] and [email protected] - targeting both release branches within 39 minutes of each other 👇 🔓 𝗧𝗵𝗲 𝗵𝗶𝗷𝗮𝗰𝗸: The attacker compromised the maintainer's npm credentials, swapped the account email to an anonymous ProtonMail, and published manually - bypassing the project's normal OIDC Trusted Publisher flow. No GitHub tag, no commit, no release trail. 🎯 𝗧𝗵𝗲 𝗽𝗮𝘆𝗹𝗼𝗮𝗱: A single phantom dependency (plain-crypto-js) was injected - never imported anywhere in Axios source. Its only job: run a postinstall hook that downloads a full cross-platform RAT for macOS, Windows, and Linux, then erase all evidence of its own execution. 💀 𝗧𝗵𝗲 𝗯𝗹𝗮𝘀𝘁 𝗿𝗮𝗱𝗶𝘂𝘀: It wasn't just direct installs. Packages that depend on axios with a semver range like ^1.x and happened to publish during the attack window silently pulled the compromised version into their own releases. We've already found downstream packages shipped with [email protected] baked into their dependency tree - their maintainers never touched axios directly.

🚨 𝗪𝗲'𝘃𝗲 𝗷𝘂𝘀𝘁 𝗳𝗼𝘂𝗻𝗱 𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝗳𝗶𝗿𝘀𝘁 𝗲𝘃𝗲𝗿 𝗺𝗮𝗹𝗶𝗰𝗶𝗼𝘂𝘀 𝗠𝗶𝗰𝗿𝗼𝘀𝗼𝗳𝘁 𝗢𝘂𝘁𝗹𝗼𝗼𝗸 𝗮𝗱𝗱-𝗶𝗻 𝗶𝗻 𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝘄𝗶𝗹𝗱. 𝟰,𝟬𝟬𝟬+ 𝗰𝗿𝗲𝗱𝗲𝗻𝘁𝗶𝗮𝗹𝘀, 𝗰𝗿𝗲𝗱𝗶𝘁 𝗰𝗮𝗿𝗱𝘀, 𝗮𝗻𝗱 𝗯𝗮𝗻𝗸𝗶𝗻𝗴 𝘀𝗲𝗰𝘂𝗿𝗶𝘁𝘆 𝗮𝗻𝘀𝘄𝗲𝗿𝘀 𝘀𝘁𝗼𝗹𝗲𝗻 - 𝗰𝗮𝗺𝗽𝗮𝗶𝗴𝗻 𝘀𝘁𝗶𝗹𝗹 𝗹𝗶𝘃𝗲: Our research team discovered #AgreeToSteal - a legitimate Outlook add-in that was abandoned by its developer and hijacked by an attacker who turned Microsoft’s own infrastructure into a phishing weapon 👇 🖋️ 𝗧𝗵𝗲 𝘀𝘁𝗼𝗿𝘆: In 2022, a developer built a meeting scheduler called AgreeTo, and published it to Microsoft's Office Add-in Store. Then, they abandoned the project. The hosting was deleted, but the add-in stayed listed. 🎣 𝗧𝗵𝗲 𝘁𝗮𝗸𝗲𝗼𝘃𝗲𝗿: An attacker claimed the orphaned URL and deployed a phishing kit. Microsoft continued serving it with no store submission or review. When victims open the add-in, they get a fake login that compromises credentials. 💀 𝗧𝗵𝗲 𝗱𝗮𝗺𝗮𝗴𝗲: We got inside the attacker's exfiltration channel and recovered 4,000+ stolen credentials, credit cards, and banking security answers. The same attacker runs at least 12 phishing kits across banks, ISPs, and webmail providers. 𝗧𝗵𝗶𝘀 𝗶𝘀 𝗮 𝗯𝗶𝗴 𝗱𝗲𝗮𝗹 𝗯𝗲𝗰𝗮𝘂𝘀𝗲 𝗶𝘁 𝘂𝗻𝗰𝗼𝘃𝗲𝗿𝘀 𝗮 𝗺𝗮𝗷𝗼𝗿 𝘀𝗲𝗰𝘂𝗿𝗶𝘁𝘆 𝗳𝗹𝗮𝘄 𝗶𝗻 𝗢𝗳𝗳𝗶𝗰𝗲 𝗮𝗱𝗱-𝗶𝗻𝘀: they are all one expired domain away from becoming a phishing weapon. These add-ins are not code, but live URLs that Microsoft signs once and never checks again. We've reported the add-in to Microsoft and notified affected victims. New victims are still being compromised.

🚨🐛 GlassWorm is back — and evolving 🐛🚨 We’ve been tracking the GlassWorm group closely, and just caught a new variant sneaking into npm. Package: [email protected]. GlassWorm knows how to harvest npm tokens - and this time, it looks like it grabbed one 👀 Stay sharp, audit your dependencies, and rotate credentials if needed.

🚨 PackageGate - 𝗪𝗲'𝘃𝗲 𝗱𝗶𝘀𝗰𝗼𝘃𝗲𝗿𝗲𝗱 𝟲 𝘇𝗲𝗿𝗼-𝗱𝗮𝘆𝘀 𝗶𝗻 𝗝𝗮𝘃𝗮𝗦𝗰𝗿𝗶𝗽𝘁 𝗽𝗮𝗰𝗸𝗮𝗴𝗲 𝗺𝗮𝗻𝗮𝗴𝗲𝗿𝘀 𝘁𝗵𝗮𝘁 𝗯𝘆𝗽𝗮𝘀𝘀 𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝗱𝗲𝗳𝗲𝗻𝘀𝗲𝘀 𝗲𝘃𝗲𝗿𝘆𝗼𝗻𝗲 𝗮𝗱𝗼𝗽𝘁𝗲𝗱 𝗮𝗳𝘁𝗲𝗿 𝗦𝗵𝗮𝗶-𝗛𝘂𝗹𝘂𝗱. 𝗻𝗽𝗺 𝗶𝘀 𝗿𝗲𝗳𝘂𝘀𝗶𝗻𝗴 𝘁𝗼 𝗳𝗶𝘅, 𝘀𝗼 𝘄𝗲'𝗿𝗲 𝗯𝗹𝗼𝘄𝗶𝗻𝗴 𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝘄𝗵𝗶𝘀𝘁𝗹𝗲: After Shai-Hulud compromised 700+ packages last November, everyone adopted the same 2 defenses: disable lifecycle scripts and commit lockfiles. We searched for holes in that playbook and found 6 zero-days across npm, pnpm, vlt, and Bun. We're calling this discovery - 𝗣𝗮𝗰𝗸𝗮𝗴𝗲𝗚𝗮𝘁𝗲 👇 🛡️ 𝗗𝗲𝗳𝗲𝗻𝘀𝗲 𝟭 - 𝗗𝗶𝘀𝗮𝗯𝗹𝗲 𝘀𝗰𝗿𝗶𝗽𝘁𝘀: Packages can automatically run code when you install them, but the --𝘪𝘨𝘯𝘰𝘳𝘦-𝘴𝘤𝘳𝘪𝘱𝘵𝘴 flag is supposed to block that. We found bypasses in npm, pnpm, vlt, and Bun - ranging from config hijacks to git loopholes to file overwrites to blind trust in package names. 🔓 𝗗𝗲𝗳𝗲𝗻𝘀𝗲 𝟮 - 𝗟𝗼𝗰𝗸𝗳𝗶𝗹𝗲𝘀: Lockfiles guarantee you get the exact same code every time you install. We found that pnpm and vlt don't verify externally-hosted packages. Attackers can serve clean code during review, then swap in malware later. ✅ pnpm, vlt, and Bun all patched their exploits within weeks. ❌ npm closed our report as "works as expected." We challenged the decision, requested mediation, and reached out directly to their team. No response. This is the last open vulnerability out of the 6. If your organization depends on npm with --𝘪𝘨𝘯𝘰𝘳𝘦-𝘴𝘤𝘳𝘪𝘱𝘵𝘴 as your safety net, that net has a hole in it right now. 𝗖𝗼𝘂𝗻𝘁𝗹𝗲𝘀𝘀 𝗼𝗿𝗴𝗮𝗻𝗶𝘇𝗮𝘁𝗶𝗼𝗻𝘀 𝗮𝗿𝗲 𝘀𝘁𝗶𝗹𝗹 𝘃𝘂𝗹𝗻𝗲𝗿𝗮𝗯𝗹𝗲 𝘁𝗼 𝗮 𝗽𝗼𝘁𝗲𝗻𝘁𝗶𝗮𝗹 𝗦𝗵𝗮𝗶 𝗛𝘂𝗹𝘂𝗱 𝟯.