GoPlus Security 🚦

📢GoPlus #DeepScan Comprehensive Upgrade: A New Paradigm of AI-Powered Smart Contract Security. Smart contracts hold funds — and hackers are already using AI to uncover deep-layer vulnerabilities. One-time audits can no longer keep pace with today's attack-defense dynamics. The industry must evolve toward AI-powered, continuous security: higher efficiency, lower cost, full-lifecycle protection. GoPlus DeepScan delivers three interconnected modules forming a closed-loop, continuous security service for the entire smart contract lifecycle: AI Contract Audit, Continuous Security Monitoring, and Token Security Self-Check. Features AI Auditing AI-powered deep analysis of contract source code, permission management, and business logic. Systematically detects syntax vulnerabilities and business-logic flaws, and delivers a structured audit report — including security scores, key findings, issue details, and remediation recommendations. Security Monitoring Post-audit, always-on assurance for live contracts. Tracks newly disclosed vulnerabilities, on-chain attacks, and status changes in external dependencies (oracles, cross-chain bridges) in real time. AI continuously assesses impact, triggers targeted re-reviews, and issues alerts — moving beyond the "audit as finish line" model. Token Security Checking A rapid pre-launch self-inspection tool for tokens preparing to launch or list. Identifies common high-risk characteristics in minutes, including: Honeypot detection, Malicious mint detection, Blacklist mechanism detection, Abnormal buy/sell tax detection, Owner privilege & trading restriction risks. Benchmark An open-source benchmark built from real-world attack incidents. Extracts vulnerable contract source code from attacked projects to systematically evaluate AI capabilities in vulnerability identification, attack-path understanding, contextual reasoning, and audit stability. Nearly 100 real, representative attack cases from May 2025 to date, continuously updated. Use Cases Developers — Cost-effective, high-efficiency security scanning with audit-grade quality, enabling fast, confident innovation. Project Teams — Pre-launch scanning as a complement to traditional audits; continuous auditing and monitoring during operations to stay ahead of attackers. Exchanges — Enhanced pre-listing security review efficiency and capability; continuous monitoring as routine risk control to catch new threats early and minimize post-listing incidents. Get Started GoPlus DeepScan is live — try it now: **deepscan.gopluslabs.io/** AI Auditing Benchmark: github.com/GoPlusSecurity/ai…

🚨 GoPlus Security Alert: Brazilian exchange @MercadoBitcoin has experienced abnormal asset outflows from its multichain custody wallets, with losses exceeding $30 million. Some stolen funds have been frozen. MB has suspended deposits and withdrawals following the attack. The stolen assets span at least 9–10 networks, including Bitcoin, Ethereum, Arbitrum, Solana, Tron, Stellar, Polygon, Avalanche, BNB Chain, and XDC. The Ethereum wallet transferred out approximately 2,852 ETH, while the Solana wallet transferred out approximately 10,695.56 SOL. On Bitcoin, alongside a transfer of approximately 104.43 BTC, another transaction spent funds from 54 distinct addresses across 86 inputs. Large XLM, USDC, and EURC outflows were also recorded on Stellar. The underlying issue may involve abuse of hot-wallet signing or transaction authorization systems. Concentrated outflows across multiple chains and simultaneous spending from multiple Bitcoin addresses warrant priority investigation into key management, signing services, and withdrawal approval workflows. These characteristics resemble the earlier Binance theft, but the available evidence does not yet identify a specific threat group. 📌 Attacker-Related IOCs: EVM Receiving Address Across Multiple Chains: 0xe485e7A70b1131216Cb47CA4555c4Bbb2C742478 Bitcoin Receiving Address: 19qGpsHvzh1t6pVi526XNNkh6hW6prDZp Solana Receiving Address: 3YX6WHncP1Ra4AotE9YLawFt4nPmxyux288FWXkEW97J Tron Receiving Address: TEX3HuDRHRa3tnYpy96M4UfSx62VhDyA5L Stellar Receiving Address: GDXYRI6IONQA5YTGRLQ6O3FGJ2BWXPJTTQPUXFPSEXSRKBZLFKMZSOLP 🛡️ Security Recommendations: Exchanges and custodians should strengthen transaction risk controls: check recipient addresses, networks, assets, and transaction amount patterns; enforce delays on withdrawals to new recipient addresses, additional review for large transfers, aggregate limits across chains, and circuit breakers for anomalous outflows. MPC/HSM deployments should be paired with independent authorization policies to limit the damage from compromised administrator privileges. Users should follow official updates and avoid using the service until MB confirms it is secure and service has been restored. Preserve account balance records and transaction records, and watch for phishing exploiting the incident. Obtain updates on service restoration or reimbursement only through verified official channels. Never share passwords, verification codes, private keys, or seed phrases with supposed “reimbursement support.”

Paid plans start at $99. You can check them out on the official website: deepscan.gopluslabs.io/

In September’s report, we called it the year’s costliest month: $793M lost. October broke that record: $6.46B in Web3 losses, led by the $6.3B #Binance multichain hot-wallet theft… Sobering.

13/13 📌 Related Addresses and Transactions Attacker Address: 0xbeBa8CEfD0D75d747C5AD966Dc17C0Bb60D84dBd Attack Contract: 0x577168C8c6fA937495C3D6961f1d7D734b2d785f Affected Vault Contracts: 0x45dF5EA836A15B561937Ae8373ab9eE984aea531 0xbae43c546DFADC69576aE73C68e0694A54F08e1B 0x6A1FC0E1c60BA6564CDe4910A425F1F1a1d18C1F 0xDC631d88dbB5eb39f5c4Bf8B4e5298d098912fFf 0xD46993F25D298ebbCD31E941156C66f7e628A52a 0xBe3E229319f86f5ee96ee1dc0b6d55e8b68a439e Attack Transactions: arbiscan.io/tx/0xe3c263fcae5… arbiscan.io/tx/0x64602cbbeba… arbiscan.io/tx/0xd7e8086df05…

12/13 3️⃣ Drain the ARB-related vaults in the second exploit transaction The attacker repeated the same pattern against the ARB call and put vaults. arbiscan.io/tx/0xd7e8086df05…

10/13 Most of the 4.4904 WBTC came from the 3.76125 WBTC vault collateral locked in step (1). The attacker also recovered their own deposits. The pool transferred ~0.01125 WBTC to 0x7bf2392b…, consistent with a 0.3% fee.

9/13 C. Call withdraw to send 4.4904 WBTC from the pool to the attack contract

8/13 B. Execute tiny option trades in the same tx, producing many TransferSingle events

7/13 A. Deposit small WBTC amounts (0.28065, 0.46775…) to establish or adjust LP positions

6/13 (2) Inside the empty pool, the liquidity path captured the vault’s collateral. Once collateral entered the pool, its allocation depended on pool-side accounting. As the only participant controlling activity in the pool, the attacker could:

5/13 The problem: this was an empty pool the attacker had just created, yet the vault still treated it as a legitimate market.

4/13 (1) An option purchase through the normal trading flow triggered the vault itself to send WBTC into the empty pool. The vault followed its normal underwrite/trade (write) path: buyer paid 0.11714618 WBTC premium; vault locked 3.76125 WBTC collateral into the Premia po

3/13 Take the pSV-WBTC/USDCe-C vault in this tx: arbiscan.io/tx/0x64602cbbeba… Vault: 0x45dF5EA836A15B561937Ae8373ab9eE984aea531 Empty pool: 0x1B25F69Cfc2b3A9fCC0A7C0944A81723d5dcD77d

2/13 2️⃣ Drain the WBTC- and WETH-related vaultsOption tokens including WBTC-USDC-06NOV2026-78000-C and WETH-USDC-06NOV2026-2200-P were minted and burned. Collateral moved from the vaults into the newly created pools, then to the attack contract.

1/13 ⚠️ Exploit Breakdown: Premia Labs Options Vault Attack On November 1, @PremiaLabs vault contracts on #Arbitrum were exploited for over $400,000. The factory allows permissionless deployment of option pools, but the vaults lacked sufficient checks to establish whether those pools were safe to interact with. The attacker created empty pools, used flash loans to buy options and trigger the vaults to lock collateral into those pools, then extracted the collateral through the pools’ liquidity mechanisms. 🔍 Root Cause: Premia v3 separates options trading into two layers: ① Option Pool: Deployed permissionlessly through the factory for a given underlying/quote pair, strike price, expiry, and option type (call or put). Anyone can create a new series. ② Underwriter Vault: Users deposit a single asset. The vault uses those deposits as collateral to write options for buyers and collect premiums. Call vaults hold the underlying asset (WBTC/WETH/ARB), while put vaults hold USDC.e. When a buyer trades with a vault, the vault locks collateral into the corresponding option pool. If the vault checks only whether the pool was deployed by the official factory—without checking its liquidity, age, or whether it is an empty pool controlled exclusively by the attacker—then: • The attacker can deploy a fresh, empty pool with no other LPs. • A flash loan can fund the entire sequence in one transaction: establish a position → trigger the vault to lock collateral into the pool → extract that collateral through liquidity or pool-side accounting mechanisms. • In an empty pool, the attacker effectively controls the entire market and can manipulate the initial trading path and accounting state. 🔗 Attack Flow: 1️⃣ Deploy empty option pools The attacker’s EOA called the attack contract to create the six option pools used in the subsequent exploit. arbiscan.io/tx/0xe3c263fcae5…

🚨 GoPlus Security Alert: On October 31, the official Flap and Kintsu websites suffered DNS hijacking attacks. The attacker likely compromised a domain registrar, with more than 10 other domains also hijacked alongside Flap and Kintsu. By manipulating DNS, the attacker redirected traffic from official project domains to malicious clone sites to steal assets. ⚠️ How Funds Are Stolen: Users who click “Connect Wallet” on the clone sites are redirected to a malicious wallet-connection or drainer page. The theft takes two forms, with attack characteristics pointing to the #StepDrainer group: 1. Direct native-token transfers: Users sign a transaction sending BNB to the attacker’s Safe. 2. ERC-20 approval abuse: Users approve the Safe to spend their tokens. The attacker then calls `transferFrom` to move the tokens. Attacker-controlled Safe recipient address: 0x24497068cA4166ca32a04ae530ce00Cf79755bD5 Safe’s sole owner / execution address: 0x33dfc810365193bff54326812d7df34b3e438da3 🚑 Recovery Status: Kintsu is back online (kintsu.xyz). Flap is also back online (flap.sh), with flap.cool remaining available as an alternative domain. The cause of the DNS hijacking is still under investigation. 🛡️ Security Recommendations: 1️⃣ Stay alert to unusual behavior or anything that differs from the site’s usual behavior. DNS hijacking can redirect you to a malicious clone. 2️⃣ If you signed a suspicious transaction or notice a suspicious transfer, investigate immediately and move your remaining assets to a fresh, secure wallet as soon as possible. 3️⃣ Use tools such as the GoPlus security extension to check for and revoke suspicious token approvals promptly.

DeepScan’s AI audit flagged the @zkLink_Official vulnerability in just 10 minutes. We recommend that project teams use DeepScan AI audits for continuous smart-contract scanning to strengthen contract security and reduce related risks. Full report: deepscan.gopluslabs.io/audit… Benchmark update: github.com/GoPlusSecurity/ai…

4/4 Attacker Address: 0xaCA0655a11200A80d33D0E48786317304cDE5718 Attack Contract: 0xD5f162B68a0281686E8Dc76dB8d67d2f3E6Aff07 Affected Custody Contracts: 0x5fD9F73286b7E8683Bab45019C94553b93e015Cf 0xAd16eDCF7DEB7e90096A259c81269d811544B6B6 Vulnerable Contracts: 0x1Ee09A2cAa0813A5183f90F5a6d0E4871f4C6002 (Proxy) 0x7a0Bb4805EcB7fD3C8DAbbE4AFa0E91cB1761E34 (Implementation) Impersonated Gateway Contract: 0x83Bc7394738A7A084081aF22EEC0051908c0055c Fund Distribution Addresses: 0x211b4aebefea02470587286b398ed28fb7e09c6a 0x2d5a8aabf7af4022e314eb2a54753ba2402bafb0 0x75dcf3395b6cbefc6b66b28d6d93f193b58dc0f3 Attack Transaction: etherscan.io/tx/0x4f3c23e75b…

3/4 The protocol designated `SyncL2TxHashRelayer` as an authorized relayer, while `SyncL2TxHashRelayer` itself could be called by anyone. Logs from the attack transaction show that the Ethereum Gateway’s identity (`0x83Bc7394738A7A084081aF22EEC0051908c0055c`) was used to invoke the gateway-only function `ZkLink.syncBatchRoot`. An attacker-chosen value was written as the `l2LogsRootHash` for batch 116409. Subsequent withdrawal inclusion proofs were checked against that root, so forged ETH and ERC-20 withdrawals were accepted. Funds moved directly from the custody contracts to the attacker’s EOA, without first passing through the attack contract. etherscan.io/tx/0x4f3c23e75b…

2/4 etherscan.io/address/0x1ee09… etherscan.io/address/0x7a0Bb…