Hunting Bugs Everywhere | https://nitter.cf/t.co/5Sj1CzQ4zn for private audits
Web3
Joined June 2020
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Self custody always had the risk, ask your father about the money he barried under the farm and was stolen, solution? -> banks
same to cex. easy 2FA/biomitric sign in instead of a seed phrase/cold wallet that you can't afford to have the headache to secure.
Binance hack was covered by binance, but your hack will be covered by who?, none.
worst part?, is you need to establish the trust (again).
people wanted to replace non transparent banks by blockchain?, imo this seems like a naive slogan, cause initially you could have held your money under your bed anyways and only leave small amounts for txn needs in the bank.
i know people may say that we had blockchain for other purpose, not my points here.
Hackers need to be correct 1 time though as much time he wants to give.
Auditors need to be wrong 1 time through the most constraint auditing weeks (audit duration)
the probability of Me having my two copies of seed phrases in two different places and they catch burn/stolen is higher than my cex gets drained.
the cost of self custody
Security researchers, please work more on target selection.
You hunt on a chain that has 1 txn every couple of years, then gets surprised that they don't care about a chain halt bug.
bro, they are living the halt all along
Why the binance hacker didn't implement a swapper function in their eip7702 then sweep to avoid blacklistable assets.
Either they missed it. Or automated guards flags approvals (i assume)
my gut feel that remaining CEXs are also susceptible. when binance withdrawals open, people will rush to the next big cex. and then it will get hacked.
if you want to withdraw from binance, make sure to withdraw to self custody till all of this settle
Hunter retweeted
Reading the reconstructed bytecode of the Binance EIP-7702 sweeper (`0x63e8...6fae`) is wild.
This wasn't a generic drainer. It was custom-engineered for Binance 14's architecture:
- Leaves exactly 1 ether behind (`bal - 1 ether`) when sweeping ETH so Binance's automated hot wallet queue wouldn't error on gas and trip alarms.
- Uses raw `staticcall` + `continue` loops with custom error codes (`SweepItemFailed`) so one bricked or blacklisted ERC-20 wouldn't revert the $6B batch.
- Includes a custom `callExecute` function to impersonate Binance 14 as controller of an external vault holding $823M in USDC.
They leave a comment: "robberies could be prevented if getaway cars were slower."
You can't fully blame EIP-7702, but it sped up the attack. Without 7702, draining 64 tokens plus an external $823M vault from a live exchange hot wallet meant fighting moving nonces across 70+ transactions. Defense systems would've killed it after tx #3.
With 7702, Lazarus sprayed 50 consecutive nonces in one type-4 payload, turned an EOA into a custom proxy, and atomically swept billions in a single block.
Ethereum core devs built the ultimate getaway car. Surgical state-sponsored engineering.
This could be etched onchain:
`if (bal > 1 ether) { to.call{value: bal - 1 ether}(""); }`
The Binance $5.6B drain is a masterclass in modern EVM exploitation.
It wasn't a complex logic bug. It was an EIP-7702 delegation hijack:
1. Setup: Attacker funds 0x7c86 via Tornado Cash, deploys a sweep contract (0x63e8), and runs three live dry-runs on external wallets.
2. Execution: Attacker submits an EIP-7702 batch with 50 pre-signed authorizations (nonce n to n+49) to hit Binance 14's moving nonce window.
3. One authorization hits. Instantly, Binance 14 (an EOA) is reprogrammed to run the attacker's contract bytecode.
4. Execution looks totally organic: Binance 14 sweeps itself clean. Internal threshold alerts don't trigger because, from the nodes' perspective, the hot wallet is just executing its own transaction.
5. Binance 16 immediately auto-refills 28,000 ETH due to automated treasury rebalance scripts, feeding the exploit loop.
The cold truth: you cannot forge an EIP-7702 delegation list.
For this to execute, the attacker already held the raw private key or unconstrained signing access to Binance 14's HSM/KMS.
But hey, 5.64 billion drained across ETH, BTC, and Tron. 2.54 billion frozen by Tether, Circle, Ripple, and World Liberty within hours.
Code is law until the stablecoin admin keys log in.
Binance got bailed out by the very centralized choke points the cypherpunks warned you about.
Hardware wallets leak your home address.
Centralized exchanges leak the keys to the kingdom.
Self-custody on native, non-delegated chains remains the only honest baseline.
At least you know what to avoid.
Readers added context they thought people might want to know
The quoted comment appears only in an AI-reconstructed source (explicitly labeled not original) uploaded to explorers; no source comments exist in deployed bytecode, and core features match independent decompilations/on-chain data.
etherscan.io/address/0x63e8…
gist.wavey.info/Ta3FgAxastgj42…
x.com/thearsondragon…
If you think about it. we are working for north korea livings.
Has anyone even noticed polymarket incident?
Alot of people talk about AI cyber security capabilities as the reasons behind those much exploits, my reply:
1. yes, ai may have been used during the process
2. read the history well, hacks have been happening at large scale from day 0 of any tech. just simple open any hacks aggregator website
3. why very few of you not talk about the opposite aspect?, developers/security researcher are getting increasing psychosis depending on a token matching machine (away from how far it is,can be, improved)
Hunter retweeted
I want to speak to you directly about what happened.
Bottom line - your money is safe, and we're covering every loss.
Our initial investigation suggests this security incident may have started with a compromised DevOps engineer's laptop. That gave an attacker access to a service container, where they submitted unauthorized withdrawal transactions.
To be clear: the attacker did not simply use one engineer's permissions, and this was not a single "one-click" action. It involved a more complex attack process. Our investigation has not attributed responsibility to any individual.
So far, we have found no evidence of any wallet private key leak.
We'll share a detailed technical post-mortem once the investigation is complete and every fact is verified - and publish an updated Proof of Reserves once remediation is complete.
What you need to know:
• Your funds are safe
• Binance will cover all losses from the SAFU fund and company funds
• Estimated total impact: ~$6.3B, with ~$3B frozen on-chain so far, in coordination with our blockchain partners
• No evidence of any wallet private key leak
• Deposits are unaffected and operating as normal
What we've done:
• Temporarily suspended withdrawals while we complete a security revamp of the withdrawal service and its related addresses
• Revoked the affected address authorizations
• Engaged law enforcement and blockchain intelligence partners to trace and recover funds
Our team hasn't stopped. We're working closely with law enforcement to ensure the matter is handled appropriately - and I'll share what I can, as soon as I can.
This deserves more eyes.
Every week someone in web3 gets a "PDF" they can't afford to open: an audit report, a term sheet, a job offer, a multisig proposal.
We built BluePaper for that moment.
It opens the file in a disposable, network-isolated sandbox, renders every page to pixels and gives you back a clean PDF. JavaScript, macros and embedded files don't survive the rebuild. You can even sign it right there.
Free and open source (AGPL, a fork of Dangerzone).
bluepaper.bluethroatlabs.com
Try to break it. Tell us what we missed.
Not obvious why attacker chose eip7702. Two logical options.
1. Drain as much and as fast as possible
2. Its related to guradrails of the layers reauesting the signature from the wallet infra signing system
The second is a weird assumption of a system i don't know, but still a possibility
Started with an EIP-7702 delegation, but Binance 16 signed with its own key, so their signing is compromised. Tether & circle froze ~$2.3B, exploiter still borrowed 20k WETH on aave.
In total:
~$3.5B drained on ethereum,
~$5,64B counting Bitcoin and Tron.
~$880M freezable but not frozen.
So we have approximately $5.643B in outflows from Binance-labeled wallets as Tether and Circle freeze at least $2.316B in stablecoins
• Ethereum: $3.528B
• Bitcoin: $1.449B
• Tron: $628M
• Arbitrum, Optimism and Base: $38M combined.
Bruh, where are we living?
🚨 @binance - Loss ~$2.53B (2026-10-29)
Network: Ethereum
Type: Delegation Abuse (EIP-7702) / Private Key Compromise
The Binance hot wallet 0x28c6…1d60 was made to carry an EIP-7702 delegation (code 0xef0100 + 63e842b0…) pointing at a wallet-drainer implementation — the same kit flagged pre-drain for operator 0x7c8601d4 (Tornado-funded). In this tx the operator EOA (NOT the account owner) called sweep(address recipient, address[] tokens) = selector 0x8a179be4, and the delegate code transferred the wallet's entire token inventory — ~1.62B USDT, 167K ETH, UNI, LINK, PEPE, ENA, wBETH, xaut, PAXG, WBTC and ~60 other assets — to attacker collection address 0x5227f603c1ee34ce3c06efe6477003bdfccb2f8c. Net ~$2.53B drained. Setting a 7702 delegation requires a signature from the account's own key, so this is a signing/private-key compromise of an exchange hot wallet, extracted via an operator-gated universal sweep.
TX: etherscan.io/tx/0x53bd38b816…
Attacker: etherscan.io/address/0x7c860…
Victim: etherscan.io/address/0x28c6c…
⏱️ Real-time alerts: defimon.xyz
the leverage of constantly auditing protocols that eventually went to 0 is that, there is no risks of your audits actually being under test.
and then, no one would actually know how bad your audit quality is.
Its important for developers to choose firms that had historical big protocols stress tested under their audits.
no hate for the other BRANDED EMPTY firms
Keystone found an attacker got the verification key from its website that hardware wallets use to prove they are genuine. The company is destroying 18,835 unsold devices that still carry the old key.
A counterfeit that passes the online check can look real to a buyer.