
in-between somewhere | wandering @iaeroprotocol @ethereum and @base | growth @forestroadvault
theblockchain
Joined June 2024
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My wallet has been hacked and I just lost $3000 dollars!
This could have been my story if i didn't take precautions before crediting my wallet on the 17th of October.
I had just received some money in a new wallet I created a few days back and was about to split some of it into my main wallet which i normally use for most DeFI interactions. Never encountered an issue with it before.
I already copied the wallet address and was about to send money in it when i thought to cross-check the wallet's safety. I sent 2 USDC as test to make sure my wallet wasn't compromised and lo' and behold, it got debited instantly. I was shocked by how fast it happened and I started laughing.
Immediately, i dashed to basescan.org to scan my wallet and found that the funds was sent into this wallet 0x586a5d4d659d870e392caba1fe88229c9a27d20e. I did not have the luxury of time to dig deep because of my busy schedule so i postponed my investigation until today when i found that the wallet address is owned by this X user @bithibachar1.
I paid attention and noticed the activity on the wallet looked very sketchy. It followed a pattern of quickly stacking up funds from different wallets and sending them out.
How my wallet phrase got leaked is still a mystery to me as I don't even know this X user. All i was happy about was that i didn't send a large sum into that wallet, else this story would have been different.
The attack felt bot-like, automated. And if it was, there's no amount of speed that could have saved me even if i tried to compete.
Lesson?
➡️Always send bits into your destionation wallets to confirm if its safe
➡️Keep your phrases offline
➡️Never connect your storage wallet to any website
➡️Always remember to disconnect your connected wallets and revoke access using revoke.cash
Best advice: get a cold wallet (like @safepal) and keep your crypto off the internet.
Stay SAFU!
Something pretty interesting happened with @keplrwallet over the weekend.
A vulnerability in Web3Auth, the service that allows users to create wallets using Google or Apple login, exposed the private keys of some Keplr users.
And apparently, @Web3Auth had to move approximately $5.6 million from vulnerable wallets into recovery addresses before attackers could get to those funds.
Now, I think there's something worth discussing here.
One of the biggest problems with crypto adoption has always been wallet management.
Not everyone wants to write down 12 or 24 recovery words, worry about losing them or figure out how private keys work.
So wallet providers introduced simpler onboarding methods.
You can sign in with Google or Apple, create a wallet and start using crypto without dealing with the traditional seed phrase experience.
That's convenient.
But the important question is what actually happens behind that login.
Your Google account isn't necessarily holding your private key.
Depending on the wallet's architecture, an authentication provider may help reconstruct or authorize access to cryptographic key material using different authentication and recovery mechanisms.
If a vulnerability in that infrastructure exposes enough information to recover a private key, an attacker could potentially control the wallet.
And once someone has the actual private key, changing your Google password doesn't necessarily protect the assets.
The attacker may already have everything needed to sign transactions independently.
That's what makes this incident interesting.
Web3Auth reportedly used the same vulnerability to access exposed wallets and transfer funds into recovery addresses.
The company says those funds are safe and will be returned.
But think about what that means.
A service designed to simplify wallet access apparently had a vulnerability serious enough that it could be used to move customer funds without their normal authorization.
Of course, the exact technical details still matter, and I wouldn't assume every social-login wallet has the same weakness.
But I'd want to understand how the key-recovery architecture allowed this to happen.
Was the vulnerability isolated to a particular implementation?
Could other applications using similar authentication infrastructure have been exposed?
And what prevents a compromised provider from becoming a single point of failure for thousands of wallets?
I actually like the idea of making crypto wallets easier for ordinary people.
But simplifying onboarding shouldn't mean users have no idea who or what can reconstruct the keys controlling their assets.
Because if a wallet provider can recover your funds during an emergency, understanding the conditions under which that access is possible becomes extremely important.
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JΛYBHΞE💎 retweeted
iAERO Staking Migration Is Coming
New staking contracts. USDC rewards. Automatic compounding.
We're moving iAERO staking to a new reward system, introducing two staking options: xiAERO and aXiAERO.
If you're currently staking iAERO or using the legacy AutoVault, you'll need to migrate your position to continue earning new staking rewards after the cutover.
Important Dates
November 5, 2026 | Migration Opens
The weekly harvest begins at 00:01 UTC.
Legacy stakers receive their usual reward distribution.
Migration opens once the harvest and distribution are successfully completed.
November 5–12 | Migration Window
Move your legacy position into the new staking contracts.
Your new position will be ready for the upcoming reward cycle.
November 12, 2026 | Migration Deadline
Complete migration BEFORE 00:01 UTC.
New-pool rewards are scheduled to begin after the weekly harvest and cutover.
Legacy staking will stop receiving new weekly reward allocations.
What's Changing?
The new system introduces USDC-denominated staking rewards with two options:
xiAERO | Claim Your Rewards
Stake iAERO and claim your earned USDC separately as it accrues.
aXiAERO | Automatic Compounding
Hold vault shares that automatically compound rewards into your position.
Newly funded rewards will stream over 3 days, rewarding eligible staking participation over time rather than allocating everything at a single payout instant.
How to Migrate
Visit app.iaero.finance and connect your wallet on Base.
Select Migrate Your Stake from the migration banner.
Withdraw your legacy stake or AutoVault shares into liquid iAERO.
Navigate to Earn and select xiAERO or aXiAERO.
Complete the required approvals and staking transactions.
Confirm your new staking position is visible.
Keep some ETH on Base for transaction fees. Joining an existing aXiAERO pool may also require a proportional USDC contribution, which will be shown for review before approval.
What Happens If You Don't Migrate?
Your funds are not forfeited.
Your iAERO principal remains yours.
Previously earned eligible rewards remain claimable, including AutoVault USDC awaiting processing.
However, legacy positions will no longer earn new weekly reward allocations after cutover.
Any new rewards distributed before you join the new pool will not be backdated.
Important: Claiming rewards, compounding, sweeping, or withdrawing alone does not complete migration. You must finish staking into xiAERO or aXiAERO.
Final Reminder
Deadline: November 12, 2026, 00:01 UTC
We recommend migrating early to avoid missing the start of the new reward cycle. Moving early does not activate new-pool rewards before cutover.
We'll announce once the migration page is live.
Official App: app.iaero.finance
I don’t think this necessarily means these companies are against tokenization. There’s a big difference between supporting blockchain settlement and allowing someone else to create a new market for your shares. The custody, redemption and shareholder-rights arrangements matter.
🚨UPDATE: The list of issuers objecting to @okx/@ICE_Markets tokenizing their shares on its TSV has grown to 50. New additions include Nike, Costco, Micron, Reddit and Nvidia.
The venture initially proposed tokenizing shares from 62 companies.
Full list of objectors here:
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50 companies have now objected to OKX and ICE’s plan to offer tokenized versions of their shares.
Nvidia, Nike, Costco, Microsoft, JPMorgan and several others are on the list.
And I think this is an interesting development for the RWA industry.
The idea behind the platform is pretty straightforward.
Take traditional stocks, represent ownership interests onchain and allow eligible investors to trade them around the clock using stablecoins.
The proposed system would use Uniswap v4 liquidity pools on XLayer, with access restricted to approved wallets.
The underlying shares would be held through a regulated custody arrangement, with tokens backed one-for-one and designed to preserve the rights attached to the original shares.
Technically, there’s a lot to like about that structure.
You could potentially trade outside normal market hours, settle transactions using stablecoins and move securities through blockchain infrastructure.
But the companies whose shares are being tokenized aren’t necessarily interested.
And I don’t think we should automatically interpret that as traditional finance being against blockchain.
There’s a difference between supporting tokenization and allowing an unaffiliated company to create a new trading market for your shares.
For example, who handles corporate actions?
How are voting rights exercised?
What happens when dividends are distributed?
And if the underlying stock market is closed while the token continues trading, how do liquidity providers manage the risk of prices moving before the traditional market reopens?
These are practical questions.
The proposed venue has procedures addressing several of them, including custody, redemption and shareholder rights.
But that doesn’t mean every issuer will immediately be comfortable participating.
From a user’s perspective, I wouldn’t want to buy something simply because it’s described as a tokenized stock.
I’d want to know whether I actually hold enforceable rights to the underlying security, who maintains custody and how redemption works.
I also think the tokenization industry needs to understand that putting an existing asset onchain doesn’t automatically create demand for it.
There has to be a reason for investors, issuers and liquidity providers to participate.
The 50 objections don’t mean tokenized equities are finished.
But they do show that building the technology might be easier than convincing everyone involved in the traditional market to use it.
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12 DeFi websites were hijacked over the weekend, and there’s something about this attack that I find particularly worrying.
Some users were visiting the actual websites of the protocols they wanted to interact with.
Not fake links from Telegram. Not some random phishing website pretending to be a legitimate project.
The actual domains.
But those domains had been redirected to malicious infrastructure serving wallet-draining software.
According to The Block, around $138,000 has already been traced to attacker-controlled wallets on EVM networks, and that doesn’t include potential losses on Solana or Aptos.
Now, here’s what interests me.
Several affected projects said their smart contracts weren’t compromised.
And that’s entirely possible.
Because when you interact with a DeFi protocol, you’re usually accessing its contracts through a website.
Your browser uses DNS to determine where that website is hosted.
If an attacker manages to manipulate the domain’s routing, you could type the correct address and still end up interacting with a malicious frontend.
The attacker doesn’t necessarily need to exploit the protocol’s contracts.
They just need to convince you to sign something dangerous.
For example, a malicious token approval or permit could authorize another address to transfer your assets.
Simply connecting your wallet generally isn’t enough to give someone permission to drain it. What you sign matters.
But think about this from an ordinary user’s perspective.
We’re constantly telling people to verify URLs, avoid suspicious links and use official websites.
What happens when the official website itself becomes the problem?
And from a protocol operator’s perspective, I think this raises another important question.
How much attention are teams paying to the infrastructure surrounding their smart contracts?
You could spend thousands auditing your contracts, but if someone gains control of your domain or frontend deployment, users could still lose money.
That doesn’t make smart-contract audits useless. It means they address a different part of the security problem.
Teams should also be thinking about domain access controls, DNS change monitoring, frontend integrity and how quickly they can warn users when something goes wrong.
Name.com has confirmed that 15 customer domains were affected, while Vercel says 10 associated domains have been restored. The exact cause is still being investigated, so I wouldn’t start blaming either provider without the technical findings.
But I’d like to see more DeFi projects explain how they’re protecting users beyond their audited contracts.
Because if I verify the URL, connect to the correct website and still end up interacting with something malicious, what additional protection is supposed to exist between me and that transaction?
In addition to our earlier alert, the same attack has now been identified on additional sites. These are actively serving the Step Drainer:
• stonkfun[.]xyz
• pickle[.]finance
• echelon[.]market
• origami[.]finance
• fluxbeam[.]xyz
• stakepoint[.]app
• supswap[.]xyz
• longbow[.]cash
• shprd[.]finance
• apexdefi[.]xyz
We’re actively investigating and gathering more data.
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Binance says it has now replenished about 90% of the assets stolen in the $6.3 billion hack.
That’s a significant recovery, especially considering the scale of what happened.
But there’s something interesting about the remaining 10%.
According to Binance, those assets are less liquid, meaning it could take longer to acquire the quantities needed to replace what was stolen.
And I think that tells us something important about how exchanges manage reserves.
Imagine an exchange owes its users $100 million worth of different cryptocurrencies.
Even if the company has $100 million sitting somewhere else, that doesn’t automatically mean it can replace every asset immediately.
If users deposited BTC, ETH and several smaller tokens, the exchange needs access to those specific assets to meet withdrawals in kind.
Having enough money on paper is one thing. Being able to obtain the actual tokens without moving the market significantly is another.
Take a token with relatively thin order-book liquidity.
If an exchange suddenly needs to purchase millions of dollars worth of it, buying everything immediately could push the price up, increase slippage and make the replacement considerably more expensive.
So the exchange might need to source liquidity gradually, through different venues or counterparties.
Now, Binance says it has allocated approximately $6.34 billion of company funds to cover the losses, which is reassuring.
But as a user, I’d still want to understand a few things.
Are the replacement assets actually available in the required quantities?
Can customers withdraw their balances without restrictions once withdrawals resume?
And what does the updated proof of reserves tell us about the exchange’s position?
Because proof of reserves is useful, but it has limitations.
Showing that certain customer assets are backed at a particular point in time doesn’t automatically provide a complete picture of every liability, obligation or liquidity constraint the company might have.
I’m not suggesting Binance is insolvent. The company has publicly committed substantial funds to covering the losses.
My point is that there are different stages to recovering from an incident like this.
Committing funds, replenishing reserves and restoring normal withdrawal operations aren’t exactly the same thing.
I think Binance deserves credit for moving quickly to cover the losses.
But I’d be more interested in seeing what happens when withdrawals resume and users can independently verify the updated reserve information.
That’s when we’ll have a much clearer picture of how effective the recovery has been.
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I came across something interesting involving Uber, HSBC and Franklin Templeton.
Uber just completed a pilot that allowed it to use tokenized bank deposits to purchase money market fund shares, with the ability to liquidate those investments even outside traditional market hours.
And I think this is a good example of what RWA adoption should actually look like.
Think about how much money a company like Uber has to manage.
There are drivers to pay, operational expenses, settlements across different countries and other obligations that require money to be available when needed.
Now, imagine having millions sitting in accounts because you need that liquidity available over the weekend.
You could invest some of that money in short-term instruments to earn a return, but traditional market hours and settlement processes can make it difficult to access the funds exactly when you need them.
That’s the problem this pilot was trying to address.
The technical structure is quite interesting too.
HSBC provided tokenized deposits representing commercial bank money. Franklin Templeton provided tokenized money market fund shares, and the transactions were settled on Canton using delivery-versus-payment.
Essentially, the cash and investment sides of the transaction could settle together, reducing the risk of transferring one asset while waiting for the other.
And because the infrastructure supports transactions outside normal market hours, companies can potentially keep more of their available cash invested without sacrificing as much flexibility.
Of course, this was a pilot, not evidence that every company can now access this infrastructure or that all the operational risks have disappeared.
The actual investment amount and returns weren’t disclosed either.
But I like the direction.
We spend so much time discussing how much value has been tokenized, how many institutions have announced partnerships, and how large the RWA market could become.
I’d rather see more examples of what companies are actually doing with these assets.
Are they reducing settlement delays? Improving access to liquidity? Lowering operational costs? Making capital more productive?
Because putting a financial asset onchain is one thing. Making that asset more useful than it was before is where the interesting work begins.
And I think this Uber pilot is worth paying attention to for exactly that reason.
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I’ve been thinking about the industry’s response to the Binance hack, especially the proposal to create a real-time system that allows exchanges and stablecoin issuers to coordinate and freeze stolen funds.
On paper, I think it makes sense.
When billions of dollars are stolen, the attackers don’t exactly sit around waiting for investigators to finish their reports. They start moving funds across wallets, chains and liquidity pools, trying to make recovery as difficult as possible.
And considering how quickly transactions settle onchain, responding several hours later might already be too late.
But there’s something else I think we need to consider.
Who decides which funds should be frozen?
Take USDC and USDT, for example. Both have issuer-controlled mechanisms that can restrict certain addresses. That’s partly why Circle and Tether were able to freeze significant amounts connected to the Binance incident.
Now imagine you’re a regular user who unknowingly receives funds that previously passed through a compromised wallet.
Maybe you received payment for a service, traded through a liquidity pool, or accepted funds from someone who had no connection to the original exploit.
Should your funds automatically become eligible for freezing because of that transaction history?
And if that happens, how exactly do you prove you’re not involved?
From a technical perspective, identifying suspicious addresses is one problem. Determining whether every subsequent recipient is actually involved in criminal activity is another.
Blockchain analytics can trace transactions and identify patterns, but transaction history alone doesn’t always establish ownership, intent or wrongdoing.
I think an industry-wide security response system could be genuinely useful, especially when dealing with attacks that unfold within minutes.
But there need to be proper safeguards.
Clear evidence requirements, defined authority, transparent procedures, reasonable limits on temporary freezes and an actual process for innocent users to challenge restrictions.
There’s also an important distinction between freezing a token through its issuer and freezing assets at the blockchain level. Bitcoin and ETH don’t have the same issuer-controlled freezing mechanisms as USDC and USDT.
So even the technical capabilities differ depending on the assets involved.
I’m interested in seeing how the industry approaches this.
Because protecting users from hackers is important, but protecting legitimate users from wrongful restrictions matters too.
If we’re building financial infrastructure that people are supposed to trust with their money, we need to get both sides right.
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There’s something interesting in CoinDesk’s latest stablecoin report that I think people should pay attention to.
Stablecoin supply grew by just 1% to around $306B through September this year, but adjusted monthly transfer volume increased from $230B in January to $325B in September.
Monthly payment volume also went from $33.2B to $54.1B.
Now, I wouldn’t look at these numbers and immediately conclude that stablecoin adoption is growing at the same rate. A lot of these transfers still involve exchanges, protocols, liquidity movements between chains, and other onchain activities.
The same dollar can move around several times, so higher transaction volume doesn’t necessarily mean more people are using stablecoins.
But here’s what I find interesting.
If you’re actually using stablecoins to make payments, you probably don’t care how much new USDC or USDT was minted this month.
You care about whether your payment arrives, how much you lose to fees, whether the recipient can easily convert it to their local currency, and how reliable the entire process is.
Imagine sending $5,000 to a supplier in another country. The transaction settles onchain in seconds, but the supplier struggles to convert the funds into spendable money.
Technically, the blockchain did its job. But did the payment experience actually solve the user’s problem?
And from the technical side, this is where things get more complicated.
Fast and cheap transactions are only one part of the infrastructure. You still need sufficient liquidity, efficient routing between networks, reliable issuers, redemption mechanisms, and off-ramps that can handle actual demand.
A stablecoin can process billions in transfers while the average person still struggles to use it for everyday transactions.
I think we’re getting to a point where measuring stablecoin growth by market capitalization alone isn’t enough.
I’d be more interested in seeing how many people are making recurring payments, how much it costs them to complete those payments, and how many transactions successfully reach the intended recipient in a usable form.
Because if we’re talking about stablecoins becoming an alternative to traditional payment infrastructure, those are the things that should matter.
Not just how much money is moving around onchain, but how useful that movement actually is to the people using it.
Source: CoinDesk Research, October 30, 2026
coindesk.com/research/global…
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Binance says users will be made whole after the hack. That’s good.
But what happens if you needed to move funds to cover a position elsewhere and withdrawals were frozen?
Getting your money back later won’t undo a liquidation.
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JΛYBHΞE💎 retweeted
📢 iAERO’s upgrade to Aero has begun.
Aerodrome becomes Aero on 22 October at 00:00 UTC. iAERO’s backing position of permanently locked veAERO will move to Aero as part of the upgrade.
Today, we activated migration mode and started the 48-hour timelock.
What changes now?
• Minting new iAERO through AERO or veAERO deposits is paused, including the associated LIQ issuance.
• The veAERO position remains in the current vault and continues voting until launch.
Holding and trading iAERO, staking, unstaking, claiming, and the AutoVault remain unaffected at this stage. This week’s vote and rewards also continue as usual.
What happens next? All times UTC:
• 18 October: the timelock completes. Nothing moves yet.
• 21 October: the final Aerodrome vote.
• 22 October, 00:00: Aero launches.
• 22 October, from 01:00: we claim the final epoch’s rewards, upgrade the position to Aero, and deposit it into iAERO’s new vault.
Following the upgrade, new staking rewards will go to a new staking contract. We’ll publish a step-by-step guide, including instructions for AutoVault users, and announce when minting reopens.
The old staking contract will remain open for unstaking and claiming.
No action is needed from holders now. iAERO remains the same token. You do not need to claim, swap, sign, or unstake anything for this initial step.
⚠️ There is no holder token migration, replacement token, or airdrop associated with this upgrade. We will never DM you. Anyone asking you to connect a wallet to “migrate” your iAERO is a scammer.
Transaction:
basescan.org/tx/0xd54e8c2e0d…
















