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A fascinating interview with Mahmoud Osman, a close associate and personal physician of Mullah Mustafa Barzani, offers some revealing details about how the Kurdish leadership established relations with Israel in the 1960s:
Particularly revealing is Osman’s account that relations with Israel were first established in 1963 through the KDP’s Politburo faction, led by Ibrahim Ahmad and Jalal Talabani, which later formed the core of the PUK. The contacts were established with Mullah Mustafa Barzani’s approval, but initially managed by the Politburo, which was responsible for the KDP’s foreign relations. This is a notable historical detail, given the widespread assumption that Kurdish relations with Israel were established exclusively through Barzani and his own political circle.
According to Osman, it was only after the Politburo split in 1964 that Barzani’s faction took over the relationship directly. In 1965, senior Mossad officer David Kimche visited Mullah Mustafa Barzani in Kurdistan, in a meeting also attended by Masoud Barzani, Idris Barzani and Osman himself. Then, in 1968, Osman accompanied Mullah Mustafa on a visit to Israel, where they met senior Israeli leaders, including the president, prime minister and senior Mossad officials.
But perhaps the most interesting aspect of the interview is Osman’s assessment of the relationship. He explains that Barzani’s primary objective was not Israel itself, but establishing relations with the United States. Having lived in the Soviet Union, Barzani had concluded that Moscow had no real Kurdish agenda, leaving Washington as the other superpower worth approaching. Israel was therefore seen largely as a possible route to the Americans.
However, Osman argues that the Shah of Iran was the central figure behind the relationship and that the Israelis were effectively acting according to the Shah’s wishes and priorities. In his assessment, the Kurdish leadership lost more than gained from Israel, as Israeli support was ultimately shaped by Iranian strategic interests rather than Kurdish needs.
Osman is remarkably critical of the outcome. He argues that Israel’s principal objective was to keep the Kurds fighting the Iraqi government, rather than genuinely strengthening the Kurdish movement. Neither Israel nor Iran, nor even the United States later, provided the kind of offensive weapons that could have changed the military balance. Instead, they supplied just enough support to keep the Kurdish rebellion going. He also suggests that Israel did nothing to help establish the desired relationship with Washington.
Asked whether the Kurdish leadership had seriously considered the advantages and disadvantages of relations with Israel at the time, Osman acknowledges that they had not. Their political calculations were less sophisticated, and the relationship was essentially an experiment driven by Barzani’s belief that, having failed to secure meaningful Soviet support, the Kurdish movement needed to explore the possibility of American backing.
His retrospective conclusion is noteworthy: Had they known then what they know now, he suggests, they probably would not have established those relations. In his assessment, the strategic costs outweighed the benefits: relations with Israel created numerous enemies across the region without delivering meaningful political or military gains. Ultimately, he believes Israel was more interested in using the Kurdish movement for its own regional objectives than in helping the Kurds achieve theirs.
His account offers an unusually candid insight into both the strategic calculations behind the relationship and the Kurdish leadership’s subsequent disillusionment with its results.
This is interesting: Dilshad Barzani, the KRG representative in Germany and stepbrother of Masoud Barzani, appears to have attended the Israeli embassy’s Newroz reception yesterday.
What’s even more intriguing is the apparent effort to keep his presence as low-profile as possible. Some media outlets briefly published coverage of the event before quickly deleting it—likely unintentionally revealing what was meant to stay under the radar. But in the age of social media, and with many attendees present, such things are hard to conceal. A video has also surfaced in which Dilshad can be briefly seen—we’ll post it below in this thread.
What makes this more interesting is that Iraq has a law, proposed by Muqtada al-Sadr, that explicitly prohibits any form of engagement with Israel—even absurdly going so far as to criminalize personal contact with Israeli citizens.
Petrol prices vary widely between Erbil, Sulaimani and Baghdad, and the difference has a real effect on the cost of living. Iraq has very little public transport, so most people rely on cars, and fuel prices feed directly into the price of food and other everyday goods.
In Erbil, super costs 2,395 IQD a litre ($1.43), improved 2,195 IQD ($1.31) and regular 1,295 IQD ($0.77).
Prices in Sulaimani are a little lower, with super at 1,900 IQD ($1.13), improved at 1,750 IQD ($1.04) and regular at 1,150 IQD ($0.69).
In Baghdad, the same grades cost 1,250 IQD ($0.74), 850 IQD ($0.51) and 450 IQD ($0.27), which means a litre of regular in Erbil costs almost three times as much as in Baghdad.
The KRG does offer subsidised regular petrol at 750 IQD a litre ($0.45), although that is still well above the 450 IQD paid in Baghdad.
The larger gap, however, lies in how easy it is to get. In the Kurdistan Region, subsidised fuel depends on allocation and availability, each vehicle is limited to 40 litres, and drivers have to queue and show both an electronic fuel card and a national identity card.
In Baghdad, subsidised regular at 450 IQD as well as improved and super is generally available without rationing or fuel cards, so it is the price most ordinary drivers actually pay.
In the Kurdistan Region, drivers who cannot get their allocation pay the commercial price of 1,150 to 1,295 IQD. Many cars also need improved petrol because their engines cannot run on regular, which means paying 1,750 to 2,195 IQD a litre.
The petrol crisis in the Kurdistan Region, particularly in Erbil and Duhok, has deepened significantly. Most petrol stations have completely run out of all fuel types, causing a sharp drop in movement as residents struggle to find fuel today.
The crisis began months ago but it has progressively worsened with a rapid rise in prices across all fuel types, prompting Kurdish opposition MPs in Baghdad to push the Iraqi government to subsidise Iraqi petrol, priced at 450 dinars per litre. But that would have meant halting the 50,000 bpd allocation Iraq has agreed to supply the KRG for local consumption, refined at Lanaz and KAR, both refineries tied to varying degrees to the Barzani family.
KRG Prime Minister Masrour Barzani appears to have rushed to cut prices without preparation. The subsidised price is set at 750 dinars and distributed by the KRG Ministry of Natural Resources through dedicated petrol stations in each city, but supply has been so limited it barely covers a fraction of daily demand. For commercial fuel, traders say the mandated price is so low they are forced to sell at a substantial loss. Part of the disappearance of petrol from the market appears to be a form of silent protest.
The result is becoming a big embarrassment for PM Masrour Barzani. The shortages are directly disrupting daily life on a scale that is increasingly difficult to conceal through favourable coverage by channels such as AVA and K24.
A people's smuggling dinghy en route from Belgium to the UK was seen painted in the colours of the Kurdistan flag, carrying more than 20 young men.
Smugglers from the Kurdistan Region run many of the networks that dominate people smuggling to the UK.
These networks have increasingly shifted to departure points in Belgium, moving away from the traditional route through France as policing on the French coast has tightened. Irregular migration from the Kurdistan Region to Europe has risen notably in recent months.
Several Kurds have drowned attempting the sea crossing from Turkey to Greece, and a Rudaw documentary filmed only a few weeks ago showed large numbers of Iraqi Kurds from Sulaimani, Erbil and Duhok living in makeshift camps in northern France while they wait to cross to the UK.
This video shows a dozen Kurdish migrants in Libya who have been kidnapped by a mafia demanding $4,000 for each of them to be released.
All are from the Rania area and had been planning to cross the Mediterranean from Libya to Italy, a route that has become increasingly common.
Just a week ago, around 40 other migrants returned to Kurdistan from Libya after they were kidnapped and their release was secured by the Iraqi embassy.
Three months ago, the BBC also reported that more than 300 Kurdish migrants who intended to eventually reach the UK had been kidnapped and tortured in Libya, with their captors demanding $5,000 from each and threatening to remove their organs if the money was not paid.
Since the beginning of this year, hundreds of migrants have returned, while hundreds of others have managed to reach Italy from Libya across the Mediterranean.
The route has become particularly popular among people from Rania, where several local smugglers arrange journeys in coordination with Libyan and Syrian smugglers. Others continue to travel through Turkey and Greece or use different routes into Europe.
The migration flow is therefore still ongoing. Just yesterday, there were reports that a migrant had died from the cold in a forest near Dunkirk, close to the English Channel and commonly used by people attempting to cross into Britain, while another migrant died in Paris.
The flow appears to have declined to a degree due to clampdown on human traffickers in the UK and Europe, but it has also gone increasingly underground following a series of arrests by British and European authorities targeting smuggling networks. Many smugglers and migrants now avoid filming or releasing information in order to keep a low profile.
The Iranian Consul General in Erbil visited the Kurdistan Socialist Party’s bases in the Suren Mountains, near the Iranian border, where the party maintains several bases and outposts that effectively function as border guards along this section of the border.
The "Social Democratic Party" has around 2,000 fighters and continues to maintain its own forces despite the recent so-called Peshmerga unification process.
The party’s leader, Mohammed Haji Mahmoud, has publicly expressed sympathy for the Iranian regime and frequently visited Tehran. During the 1980s Iran-Iraq War, the area served as a “shared stronghold and sanctuary” for the Socialist Party and Iranian forces, which fought together against Saddam Hussein’s Iraqi army.
According to the party’s media, the Iranian consul welcomed the modernisation of the bases, saying: “I am pleased to see that these bases have now been modernised and developed with new technologies and facilities, and that they form part of the forces protecting the area.”
In this interview with Rudaw TV, the Iranian Consul General in Erbil offers some interesting details that show how closely Iran follows the nuances of life in the Kurdistan Region.
In the first part of the clip, he refers to a statement by Socialist Party leader Muhammad Haji Mahmoud, who said, "Let the Americans go, and good riddance." He quotes the line in Kurdish, which suggests he knows the language well. He speaks Persian throughout the interview, but the way he reacts to the questions, which are put to him in Kurdish, makes it clear he understands them fluently.
Another notable moment comes when he is asked whether Iran would negotiate with Iranian Kurdish opposition groups. He firmly rules it out, calling them terrorists who kill innocent people and saying they number only a handful, a few dozen at most. Here he adds something telling: he says this is how the local people describe them. On social media, some people indeed mock these groups, saying for instance that a single pot of dolma, enough for about a dozen people, would feed all of them, or calling them "bean eaters," as if they simply sit in the region eating and doing nothing. The key point, though, is that he is aware of even these details, which is unusual for a foreign diplomat.
In arguing that these groups should not be negotiated with, he also invokes a historical episode in which the KDP, which he calls "Barzani's," fought against Iranian Kurdish groups, particularly the KDPI. He says the KDP expelled them from the Iranian Kurdish town of Shino within three days because of something they had done, but declines to give details, citing confidentiality.
On Turkey's peace process, he praised it as a positive development, which is ironic given that the PKK was once viewed the same way he now describes the Iranian Kurdish groups. He insisted it is an internal Turkish affair, but added a notable remark: "To be fair, the PKK has done everything Turkey asked of it."
He also said Iran has a security agreement with both Iraq and the KRG, and that it has been violated. According to him, Baghdad has agreed to relocate these groups, but the KRG has not. He said the KRG keeps putting Iran off with promises of "tomorrow" or "next month" and has been dragging the issue out, though he added that Iran will "hopefully" get there with the KRG too.
A giant Turkish flag was displayed on the facade of the Divan Hotel in Erbil tonight to mark the 103rd anniversary of the founding of the Turkish Republic.
The Turkish Consulate General appears to have organised an event at the hotel, as it has in recent years. However, no such giant facade flag was displayed in previous years.
Many Kurdish officials appear to have attended the event. The Divan is itself a Turkish hotel, operated by Koç Holding.
The display has caused controversy, although Turkish flags have been shown this way before, including on the Erbil Citadel, and the flags of other countries have also been similarly displayed in Erbil. Part of the reason for the backlash lies in how some Kurds perceive Turkey and, to a lesser extent, Iran.
KDP media, and now the KDP bloc in the Iraqi parliament, have turned on Ala Talabani over her allegations of KRG oil smuggling. The response is notable given her shifting political alliances in recent years.
Talabani was once close to Lahur Sheikh Jangi, the former PUK co-leader now in prison after Bafel Talabani consolidated control of the party. After her expulsion from the PUK, the KDP sought to co-opt her, appointing her to the administration of the Barzani family-owned First Iraqi Bank, and KDP leader Masoud Barzani personally greeted her at a conference. She now appears to have repaired relations with Bafel Talabani, reportedly through the mediation of Shia political figures in Baghdad.
In its latest statement, the KDP bloc said the public “knows well where the smuggling and illegal trade in medicines and oil originate, and which individuals close to Talabani are involved”. This is a clear escalation, with the KDP answering her allegations by accusing people in her own circle.
The confrontation comes as the KDP is increasingly on the defensive over the KRG's oil revenues and exports.
Repeated allegations on Iraqi media by Kurdish opposition MPs in Baghdad and figures such as Ala Talabani are adding to pressure for stricter federal oversight of the KRG's oil sector and building a political case for tougher conditions on budget transfers to Erbil as 2027 budget talks continue. For the KDP, this amounts to an increasingly coordinated political challenge that could further weaken its negotiating position with Baghdad.
A new crisis appears to be brewing between Baghdad and Erbil as negotiations over Iraq's 2027 federal budget intensify, accompanied by what looks like a political and media campaign questioning the KRG's oil production, exports and revenues.
The timing matters: Baghdad is seeking much stricter conditions on the KRG's oil sector and financial entitlements in next year's budget.
Last night, Ala Talabani, a former Iraqi MP and adviser to PM Ali al-Zaidi, told Al-Oula TV, a channel associated with Babylon Movement leader Rayan al-Kildani, that oil was still being smuggled out of the Kurdistan Region through increasingly complicated routes, possibly via Syria and Turkey. She said Zaidi had raised the issue with Ankara and floated international auditing of the KRG's production and exports.
The same evening, Qaisar al-Jorani, an MP from al-Sadiqun, the political wing of Asaib Ahl al-Haq, went further on the group's Al-Ahd TV. Citing figures he attributed to an "American company", he claimed the Region produces about 625,000 barrels per day (bpd) but hands only 180,000–185,000 bpd to Baghdad, leaving roughly 400,000 bpd unaccounted for.
Today, the KRG Ministry of Natural Resources rejected the claims. Citing Wood Mackenzie, the consultancy contracted by Iraq's federal Oil Ministry to assess the Region's output, it said current production is about 255,000 bpd and could rise to 308,000 bpd by 2027 if oil companies are paid and investment and security conditions allow. The ministry added that 42 federal Oil Ministry representatives supervise exports to Turkey, that revenues from oil marketed through Iraq's State Organization for Marketing of Oil (SOMO) go directly to the federal treasury, and that federal officials and international experts have been allowed to inspect the Region's fields and export meters.
Regardless of the allegations, current KRG crude production may be below 300,000 bpd, and some of the confusion appears to stem from trucks carrying petroleum products from the Lanaz refinery.
Nevertheless, two factors make the suspicions worth investigating. First, about a year ago, a KRG official told Reuters the Region was producing around 370,000 bpd. Why has production fallen so sharply, and what explains the gap between that figure and the KRG's current claims?
Second, before the US-backed agreement that resumed KRG exports through the federal system, the Region had exported oil by tanker through both Turkey and Iran. These tanker exports had operated for more than a decade, and it is difficult to imagine that the infrastructure behind them has simply disappeared. This does not necessarily establish that large-scale smuggling continues, but it raises legitimate questions about whether some of these networks remain active and whether all production and revenue is being accounted for.
A new crisis appears to be brewing between Baghdad and Erbil as negotiations over Iraq's 2027 federal budget intensify, accompanied by what looks like a political and media campaign questioning the KRG's oil production, exports and revenues.
The timing matters: Baghdad is seeking much stricter conditions on the KRG's oil sector and financial entitlements in next year's budget.
Last night, Ala Talabani, a former Iraqi MP and adviser to PM Ali al-Zaidi, told Al-Oula TV, a channel associated with Babylon Movement leader Rayan al-Kildani, that oil was still being smuggled out of the Kurdistan Region through increasingly complicated routes, possibly via Syria and Turkey. She said Zaidi had raised the issue with Ankara and floated international auditing of the KRG's production and exports.
The same evening, Qaisar al-Jorani, an MP from al-Sadiqun, the political wing of Asaib Ahl al-Haq, went further on the group's Al-Ahd TV. Citing figures he attributed to an "American company", he claimed the Region produces about 625,000 barrels per day (bpd) but hands only 180,000–185,000 bpd to Baghdad, leaving roughly 400,000 bpd unaccounted for.
Today, the KRG Ministry of Natural Resources rejected the claims. Citing Wood Mackenzie, the consultancy contracted by Iraq's federal Oil Ministry to assess the Region's output, it said current production is about 255,000 bpd and could rise to 308,000 bpd by 2027 if oil companies are paid and investment and security conditions allow. The ministry added that 42 federal Oil Ministry representatives supervise exports to Turkey, that revenues from oil marketed through Iraq's State Organization for Marketing of Oil (SOMO) go directly to the federal treasury, and that federal officials and international experts have been allowed to inspect the Region's fields and export meters.
Regardless of the allegations, current KRG crude production may be below 300,000 bpd, and some of the confusion appears to stem from trucks carrying petroleum products from the Lanaz refinery.
Nevertheless, two factors make the suspicions worth investigating. First, about a year ago, a KRG official told Reuters the Region was producing around 370,000 bpd. Why has production fallen so sharply, and what explains the gap between that figure and the KRG's current claims?
Second, before the US-backed agreement that resumed KRG exports through the federal system, the Region had exported oil by tanker through both Turkey and Iran. These tanker exports had operated for more than a decade, and it is difficult to imagine that the infrastructure behind them has simply disappeared. This does not necessarily establish that large-scale smuggling continues, but it raises legitimate questions about whether some of these networks remain active and whether all production and revenue is being accounted for.
For the first time, Iraq’s State Administration Coalition has invited not only the KDP and PUK but also the New Generation and Halwest Movements to its meeting on the KRG’s share of the 2027 Iraqi budget.
This is notable because parties outside the KDP and PUK have not previously been included in the coalition’s budget discussions. New Generation has three seats in the Iraqi parliament and 15 in Kudistan parliament and Halwest has five seats in the Iraqi parliament and four in the Kurdistan Parliament.
According to media reports, the Iraqi Prime Minister and Finance Minister have demanded that the KRG hand over 445,000 barrels of oil per day and adopt the ASYCUDA customs system as part of the 2027 budget deal, warning of consequences if it fails to comply. However, the KRG maintains that it lacks the production capacity to meet the oil requirement.
Halwest Movement leader Ali Hama Saleh said after the meeting that his party proposed transferring the entire KRG oil sector to the federal government rather than committing to a fixed daily oil quota. Under this proposal, Baghdad would receive whatever oil the region produces and, in return, supply the KRG with fuel, petrol and other petroleum products, as it does for other Iraqi governorates.
However, both the KDP and, interestingly, the PUK have resisted this proposal, instead advocating that a portion of crude production remain allocated to the region to supply its refineries and meet domestic demand.
Meanwhile, the KRG Prime Minister has criticised the region’s proposed budget share as insufficient. Although the draft allocates 12.7% to the Kurdistan Region, sovereign expenditures now account for roughly half the federal budget. Once these are deducted, the region’s effective allocation amounts to approximately 6% of total federal expenditure.
The budget remains a draft, discussions are continuing, and no final proposal has been submitted to the Iraqi parliament’s Finance Committee.
However, the meeting itself is politically significant. By bringing opposition parties, particularly those critical of the KDP, into federal budget discussions for the first time, Baghdad is increasing pressure on the KRG leadership, especially the KDP, and further narrowing its room for manoeuvre.
DNO reported record Q3 results today, and much of the jump came from the Kurdistan Region.
The company’s net production rose 61% on the previous quarter to 142,800 boepd after it restarted the Tawke licence in mid-2026, ending a four-month precautionary shutdown prompted by drone and missile attacks across the region amid the Iran war. Kurdistan supplied 54,900 boepd, about 38% of the group total, alongside 85,400 boepd from the North Sea and 2,500 boepd from West Africa. Gross operated output at Tawke, where DNO holds a 75% stake, averaged 73,200 bpd over the quarter.
On revenue, DNO received $38.5 per barrel in Kurdistan against $106.7 per boe in the North Sea, so each KRG barrel earned roughly a third of a North Sea one. Applying those prices to the quarter’s volumes puts Kurdistan’s contribution at around $195 million of the record $1 billion in revenue, about a fifth of the total, while the North Sea brought in more than $800 million. Group operating profit for the quarter reached $641 million and net profit $101 million.
The KRG price is still the highest DNO has recorded since it moved to domestic sales in 2023, and it rose again to $45 per barrel in October, nearly 50% above what the company was getting at the start of the year. The increase has coincided with fuel shortages across the region. Buyers pay in advance of delivery, with the money going directly into DNO’s international bank accounts, which keeps the company clear of the payment disputes between the KRG and Baghdad that have hit other producers. The trade-off is a price that remains far below international benchmarks.
DNO is still expanding in the Kurdistan Region despite the discount. It added a second contracted rig in the third quarter for an eight-well programme launched at the end of 2025, is considering a third large rig for 2027, and plans exploration drilling beyond Tawke’s current production boundaries. The company expects gross operated production in Kurdistan to average about 50,000 bpd for 2026 as a whole, while its main stated growth target remains Norway, where it aims to reach 100,000 bpd by 2030.
As irregular migration from the Kurdistan Region to Europe continues, the body of Said Botan, who is from Erbil, has been recovered from the Aegean Sea after he attempted to cross from Turkey to Greece.
His death comes days after several other migrants, including three children, drowned in the same waters.
Meanwhile, six young men from Ranya district in northern Sulaimani governorate returned to the Kurdistan Region today after being kidnapped by a criminal gang in Libya while trying to reach Italy across the Mediterranean. They were freed with the help of the Iraqi embassy in Libya.
In another tragic incident, three children from Sulaimani have died while travelling with their parents from Adana, Turkey, to Greece via irregular migration routes. Both parents survived.
The family was travelling alongside three other Kurds, two from Erbil and one from Chamchamal, in an attempt to reach Greece and eventually Germany. All five adults survived, while the three children - aged 5, 10 and 12 - lost their lives.
Migrants from the Kurdistan Region typically obtain visas to enter Turkey, where smugglers, often with close connections to the Kurdistan Region, arrange their passage to Greece across the Aegean Sea.
The family reportedly paid between $40,000 and $50,000 to smugglers who promised to get them to Germany.
Despite fewer reports in recent months, migrant smuggling from the Kurdistan Region to Europe continues. However, intensified crackdowns on smuggling networks have pushed these operations further underground, with smugglers increasingly keeping a low profile.
Iraqi PM Ali al-Zaidi visited Damascus and greeted Syrian President Ahmad al-Sharaa with an embrace and a kiss on the cheek, a deliberately warm signal of closeness. He prayed at the Umayyad Mosque and pledged $5 million for its renovation, a sensitive gesture given that Shias revile the Umayyad dynasty for the killing of Imam Hussein at Karbala.
He also prayed at the Sayyida Zainab shrine, a major Shia pilgrimage site south of Damascus, and pledged a matching $5 million there. Zaidi, a billionaire businessman, presented both donations as personal gifts from his own fortune.
The visit had institutional backing. Zaidi is close to Faiq Zaidan, head of Iraq's Supreme Judicial Council and widely seen as the most powerful figure in the country. Zaidan met al-Sharaa in Damascus two weeks earlier, paving the way for the trip.
Iraq's Shia ruling establishment has three motives for this opening: to secure the border against ISIS, to find an alternative oil export route after the disruption in the Strait of Hormuz, and to head off any regional alignment that could expose Iraq's western flank. Iraq is now bordered by Sunni-led states on every side except the east, from Turkey and Syria to Jordan and the Gulf. Its only Shia neighbour, Iran, is isolated and fighting for its survival - for now.
The ruling Shia factions have taken these pragmatic steps without paying a significant political price or retreating from their hardline sectarian rhetoric.
Around the world, political interests usually find a way to prevail. In the Kurdistan Region, however, resentment, hostility and old grievances remain major obstacles to rational, interest-based cooperation.
Has the KDP Been Sidelined in Sinjar?
KRG Interior Minister Rebar Ahmed, a close confidant of Prime Minister Masrour Barzani, said today that the KRG was not consulted on the integration of the YBŞ (Sinjar Resistance Units), a PKK-aligned Yazidi force, into Iraqi security forces, or on the Iraq-Turkey agreement to hand over the Bashiqa-Zilkan military camp. He said both developments fall outside the 2020 Sinjar Agreement and warned that arrangements made without consulting and coordinating with the KRG "would not succeed".
The KDP appears to have been sidelined, and the 2020 Sinjar Agreement, reached between the KRG and Baghdad with the involvement of the US and Turkey, has been effectively abandoned.
In its place is a direct Iraq-Turkey arrangement tied to the broader PKK peace process. Under it, Turkey would withdraw from its military camp near Bashiqa and hand it to Iraqi security forces. In return, the YBŞ would be integrated into Iraqi security forces, and control of Sinjar Mountain and other parts of the district would pass to Baghdad.
The KDP’s exclusion is notable. The Zilkan camp is officially within KDP-controlled territory, though close to the current line of contact between the Kurdistan Region and federal forces. Yet it would go to Iraqi security forces rather than the Peshmerga.
In practice, this leaves the 2020 agreement, to which the KDP was effectively a party through the KRG, largely obsolete.
The appointment of a new mayor for Sinjar points the same way. The district has had no permanent, broadly accepted mayor since KDP Peshmerga withdrew in October 2017 and has been run through acting arrangements. After the December 2023 provincial elections, disagreements between the KDP and Baghdad blocked a new mayor from taking office, even though the Nineveh Provincial Council selected a candidate in July 2024. An appointment is now under discussion as part of the wider changes, though the process remains politically and legally contested.
The PUK appears to have gained from these understandings at the KDP’s expense. The new director of Sinuni subdistrict in Sinjar appears to be a PUK-affiliated Yazidi figure.
KRG Interior Minister Reber Ahmed - who is a close Masrour Barzani confidant - says there was an agreement for the Peshmerga to withdraw from Sinjar in 2017 and for the Iraqi army to replace them. However, what complicated the situation later was the entry of both the Hashd Al-Shaabi and the PKK into Sinjar.
What is remarkable here is that he publicly acknowledges an agreement to withdraw from Sinjar, even though the KDP has repeatedly accused the PUK of “betrayal,” claiming it had agreed to withdraw from Kirkuk in October 2017.
But this raises an important question: What is the difference between the two cases? Does one territory hold greater value than another when both are claimed as disputed territories claimed by the KRG?
This raises serious questions about the value the KDP places on Sinjar and the politicisation of the issue. It also further undermines the KDP’s argument that the October 2017 withdrawal from Kirkuk was a mere unilateral PUK decision.
When you look at how the regional PKK network is being integrated into states across the region, a rather remarkable picture emerges:
In Iraq, the YBŞ is joining the Hashd al-Shaabi, an umbrella organisation dominated by Iran-aligned factions. In Syria, SDF commander Mazloum Abdi has become an adviser to President Ahmad al-Sharaa, who once led al-Qaeda’s Syrian affiliate, Jabhat al-Nusra. In Turkey, Ocalan is negotiating with MHP leader Devlet Bahceli and with Erdogan, a conservative and a Turkish nationalist. There is even talk of back-channel contacts with the Iranians.
The mix is almost unbelievable.
What remains unclear is how sustainable this integration will be in the long term, given that the PKK’s regional networks largely remain intact as a bloc, with Ocalan as their unifying figure and recognised leader.
Sinjar Integration Deal: 4,165 Fighters Confirmed, but Total Could Reach 6,000
More details are emerging about the integration of the YBŞ into Iraq's security forces, including their numbers, where they will be deployed and the future of their female fighters.
The group officially announced today that 4,165 male and female fighters would be integrated into Iraq's security institutions, ending their status as independent armed formations. Statements from their commanders, however, suggest the final number could be higher.
YBŞ spokesperson Hadi Elias said integration would take place in two phases, with 2,500 personnel joining first and a further 1,700 later, for a total of around 4,200.
A senior YBŞ commander gave Rudaw, a different account, saying 2,000 fighters would join in the first phase, followed by another 3,000 to 4,000 local fighters in later phases. That would bring the eventual total to between 5,000 and 6,000, although no agreement covering those numbers has been confirmed.
On deployment, Dakhil Murad Hassan, head of the YBŞ-affiliated Sinjar Tribal Forces, told Rudaw that around 1,000 fighters would join the Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF). Of these, 500 would secure southern Sinjar and 500 the northern side of Mount Sinjar.
A further 3,300 would be incorporated into the Iraqi army and police and given responsibility for the mountainous areas. Iraqi forces have already begun taking over YBŞ positions on Mount Sinjar, while the integrated local fighters are expected to remain in the area under federal authority.
Female fighters from the YJŞ are expected to join the Nineveh Police's women's division rather than the Iraqi army, according to the head of the Nineveh Provincial Council's Security and Defence Committee.
This closely mirrors developments in Syria, where Damascus rejected a bid by the Kurdish Women's Protection Units (YPJ), the all-female force within the SDF, to join the Syrian army. The YPJ has since been negotiating integration into the Interior Ministry, while seeking to retain an organised combat role rather than become an ordinary police force.
Another unresolved question is the future of the Êzîdxan Asayish, the internal security body associated with the YBŞ. Later reporting by Rudaw today indicated that it would also be integrated into Iraqi security forces, although the agreement's figure of 4,165 explicitly referred only to the YBŞ and YJŞ. It remains unclear whether Asayish personnel are already included in that figure or would be counted separately.
Hassan also said that around 1,200 civilian staff associated with the organisation could be absorbed into government institutions, while non-Iraqi fighters would be excluded from the security integration.
For now, 4,165 remains the formally announced figure, while estimates of eventual integration range from around 4,200 to as many as 6,000. The final number, the split between the army, police and PMF, and the status of the Asayish have yet to be clarified.
The significance of the agreement is that it could absorb much of Sinjar's PKK-linked military and internal security apparatus into Iraqi state institutions while leaving many of its personnel deployed in their existing areas. How far their command structures will change under federal authority remains a central question.
Video: one of the YBS tunnels on Mount Sinjar.
Sinjar Integration Deal: 4,165 Fighters Confirmed, but Total Could Reach 6,000
More details are emerging about the integration of the YBŞ into Iraq's security forces, including their numbers, where they will be deployed and the future of their female fighters.
The group officially announced today that 4,165 male and female fighters would be integrated into Iraq's security institutions, ending their status as independent armed formations. Statements from their commanders, however, suggest the final number could be higher.
YBŞ spokesperson Hadi Elias said integration would take place in two phases, with 2,500 personnel joining first and a further 1,700 later, for a total of around 4,200.
A senior YBŞ commander gave Rudaw, a different account, saying 2,000 fighters would join in the first phase, followed by another 3,000 to 4,000 local fighters in later phases. That would bring the eventual total to between 5,000 and 6,000, although no agreement covering those numbers has been confirmed.
On deployment, Dakhil Murad Hassan, head of the YBŞ-affiliated Sinjar Tribal Forces, told Rudaw that around 1,000 fighters would join the Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF). Of these, 500 would secure southern Sinjar and 500 the northern side of Mount Sinjar.
A further 3,300 would be incorporated into the Iraqi army and police and given responsibility for the mountainous areas. Iraqi forces have already begun taking over YBŞ positions on Mount Sinjar, while the integrated local fighters are expected to remain in the area under federal authority.
Female fighters from the YJŞ are expected to join the Nineveh Police's women's division rather than the Iraqi army, according to the head of the Nineveh Provincial Council's Security and Defence Committee.
This closely mirrors developments in Syria, where Damascus rejected a bid by the Kurdish Women's Protection Units (YPJ), the all-female force within the SDF, to join the Syrian army. The YPJ has since been negotiating integration into the Interior Ministry, while seeking to retain an organised combat role rather than become an ordinary police force.
Another unresolved question is the future of the Êzîdxan Asayish, the internal security body associated with the YBŞ. Later reporting by Rudaw today indicated that it would also be integrated into Iraqi security forces, although the agreement's figure of 4,165 explicitly referred only to the YBŞ and YJŞ. It remains unclear whether Asayish personnel are already included in that figure or would be counted separately.
Hassan also said that around 1,200 civilian staff associated with the organisation could be absorbed into government institutions, while non-Iraqi fighters would be excluded from the security integration.
For now, 4,165 remains the formally announced figure, while estimates of eventual integration range from around 4,200 to as many as 6,000. The final number, the split between the army, police and PMF, and the status of the Asayish have yet to be clarified.
The significance of the agreement is that it could absorb much of Sinjar's PKK-linked military and internal security apparatus into Iraqi state institutions while leaving many of its personnel deployed in their existing areas. How far their command structures will change under federal authority remains a central question.
Video: one of the YBS tunnels on Mount Sinjar.
The Sinjar Resistance Units (YBS), the PKK-aligned Yazidi militia, today officially announced its integration into the Iraqi security forces.
According to the YBS, 4,165 male and female fighters will join. This figure does not include the Ezidxan Asayish, the group’s internal security force.
That is a large number. For comparison, the SDF integrated only 3,900 fighters into the Syrian army in Hasakah, even though Sinjar is significantly smaller than Hasakah.
Two questions remain open. The first is what will happen to the Ezidxan Asayish, which has an estimated 2,000 personnel. The second is whether the 4,165 figure includes YBS fighters who have served for years within the Popular Mobilisation Forces (Hashd al-Shaabi) and are paid by the Iraqi government. It appears that it does not, which would make the force larger still.
The PKK-aligned administration in Sinjar also said the integration will extend to civilian institutions as well as military forces. That makes its model essentially the same as the SDF’s.
PUK Founder Omar Sheikhmous Sparks Controversy After Telling Female Journalist to Remove Her Headscarf
Omar Sheikhmous, one of the founders of the PUK, who is originally from the Syrian Kurdish city of Amuda, has sparked controversy after an unusual exchange with a headscarf-wearing journalist in Sulaimani.
The incident took place at the University of Sulaimani, when Shaheen Wahab, a journalist for the Kurdish news website Xendan, approached Sheikhmous to ask about the political situation in Kurdistan.
According to Wahab, Sheikhmous replied: “First, take off your headscarf. Then I’ll speak to you.”
When she asked why, he said: “You’re a woman. You’re free. What do you need a headscarf for?”
Wahab asked what distinguished her from a woman who was not wearing a headscarf, adding: “My questions concern the people, not the headscarf on my head.”
Sheikhmous reportedly responded: “You’re a beautiful woman. Be brave. You don’t need a headscarf. All right, go ahead.”
Wahab declined to continue the interview, telling him she was happy with her freedom and that her headscarf had never caused her any problems.
The exchange went viral and drew considerable controversy. It exposed a divide between a more elitist, often diaspora-based camp that has defended Sheikhmous and the conservatives who dominate inside the Kurdistan Region.
Sheikhmous later acknowledged and defended the exchange. He said he had wanted to treat the journalist as an equal and had not intended to insult her. He described the headscarf as a symbol of "women’s oppression", arguing that she was free to wear it just as he was free to reject it.
Some staunch secularists defended Sheikhmous. They argued that the headscarf symbolises women’s oppression and reflects an Arab-Islamic cultural influence imposed on Kurdish society, particularly through Islamist movements such as the Muslim Brotherhood and Salafist currents.
Others strongly condemned his remarks as insulting to women who wear headscarves and disrespectful of the religious and cultural beliefs of a substantial part of Kurdish society. The controversy has also prompted calls for legal action.
The row intensified further after Saed Kakei, a former prominent figure in the Gorran (Change) movement, posted a caricature on Facebook in support of Sheikhmous. The cartoon shows a woman in a headscarf with a black eye, a bloodied nose and missing teeth, raising her hand to refuse a brain held out to her and saying: “No thanks! I’m a Muslim.” In the accompanying post, Kakei described Sheikhmous as his lifelong friend and dismissed the backlash as an uproar stirred up by Muslim Brotherhood-aligned Islamists, adding that he had nothing to say beyond sharing the caricature. By depicting a woman in a headscarf as both abused and unwilling to think, the image extended the insult from one journalist to women who wear the headscarf in general.
The most notable aspect of the incident, however, is its ordinary professional context. Wahab approached Sheikhmous as a journalist asking a prominent political figure about the situation in Kurdistan, with no intention of discussing Islam, secularism, women’s liberation or the headscarf.
It was Sheikhmous who turned a routine professional interaction into an ideological confrontation by making the journalist’s appearance and personal choice the subject of discussion.
This raises a more fundamental question about his understanding of freedom and equality. Whatever one’s position on the headscarf, treating a woman as an equal would ordinarily mean engaging with her as a professional, whether or not she wears one.
There is also a clear distinction between opposing compulsory headscarves and demanding that a woman remove hers in the name of liberation.
It is also worth noting that some of the Islamists who have turned on Sheikhmous hold a similar position in reverse. Munira AbdulAziz, a female Islamist figure, went beyond criticising Sheikhmous and extended her attack to Syrian Kurds as a whole, allegedly saying: “We know the Kurds of Rojava (mostly referring to the pro-PKK camp) very well. They are shameless and far removed from religion.” She had previously attacked Iranian Kurdish activists during the 2022 Jina Amini protests for being against religion.
The Sinjar Resistance Units (YBS), the PKK-aligned Yazidi militia, today officially announced its integration into the Iraqi security forces.
According to the YBS, 4,165 male and female fighters will join. This figure does not include the Ezidxan Asayish, the group’s internal security force.
That is a large number. For comparison, the SDF integrated only 3,900 fighters into the Syrian army in Hasakah, even though Sinjar is significantly smaller than Hasakah.
Two questions remain open. The first is what will happen to the Ezidxan Asayish, which has an estimated 2,000 personnel. The second is whether the 4,165 figure includes YBS fighters who have served for years within the Popular Mobilisation Forces (Hashd al-Shaabi) and are paid by the Iraqi government. It appears that it does not, which would make the force larger still.
The PKK-aligned administration in Sinjar also said the integration will extend to civilian institutions as well as military forces. That makes its model essentially the same as the SDF’s.
A lot has been happening in Sinjar since last year, with far-reaching implications:
There is now a convergence between the pro-PKK YBŞ and the Yazidi Cause Alliance as well as other Yazidi figures, particularly among those who regard Sinjar as Iraqi and Yazidis as a distinct ethnic group.
YBŞ is a Yazidi militia with significant influence in pockets in Sinjar and is part of the PKK’s regional network.
This is significant because, for the first time since the fall of Saddam Hussein in 2003, a grassroots Yazidi political movement has emerged that is outperforming the KDP, which has dominated Sinjar in post-Saddam Iraq.
The Yazidi Cause Alliance, formed by several prominent Yazidi activists ahead of the 2025 elections, was a new political project that many influential figures did not initially take seriously. Yet it managed to secure more than 50,000 votes in its first electoral test. This suggests it could perform even better in future elections, particularly as its success may attract more prominent and popular Yazidi figures.
What makes this alliance particularly important is several developments.
First, there was recently a disagreement between Murad Ismail, its MP and parliamentary faction leader, and the leadership of the alliance’s political wing. Remarkably, they managed to resolve their differences and are now working together. This is an important sign that the project may be more serious and sustainable than previous attempts, which often collapsed over internal disagreements. It may also suggest that more influential figures are backing it.
Second, and perhaps more fascinating, the Yazidi Cause Alliance has been negotiating politically on behalf of the YBŞ over its integration into Iraq’s security establishment. This includes an agreement for the YBŞ to withdraw from Mount Sinjar and hand over its positions to the Iraqi army in exchange for integrating its estimated 2,000 to 4,000 fighters into the Hashd al-Shaabi, as the Iraqi prime minister said yesterday (videoed).
This is notable because it means Yazidis are increasingly developing their own political representation, independent of Kurdish parties, especially the KDP. This could have far-reaching implications for Sinjar’s political future and the prospects of its return to the Kurdistan Region’s administration.
Third, this may be the first time in decades that Yazidi civilian figures and activists, rather than traditional tribal leaders, are at the forefront of such a political movement.
Historically, there have been prominent Yazidi movements independent of traditional Kurdish parties, but these were often led by tribal figures, given that Yazidis, much like Kurds, have a strongly tribal social structure.
This time, however, the Yazidi Cause Alliance is essentially a civilian, non-tribal political coalition. That makes it potentially more significant than previous attempts to establish an independent Yazidi political movement.
Some opposition figures are filing lawsuits without checking established legal precedent, apparently more interested in social media engagement than in the outcome. The populism is reaching absurd levels.
Take this below lawsuit filed by Ali Hama Saleh, head of the Halwest movement, which was dismissed today. The outcome was easy to anticipate. Clear precedents involving both the Iraqi and Kurdistan parliaments establish that the Federal Supreme Court has no jurisdiction to dissolve an elected parliament that is still within its constitutional term.
In fact, little more than a year ago, the court dismissed a nearly identical lawsuit against this same parliament for lack of jurisdiction. So why file essentially the same case again? It is hard to see what this achieves beyond a few Facebook likes and comments.
The lawsuit over the KRG’s caretaker status, by contrast, has a much stronger legal foundation. The court has established precedents supporting its authority to examine restrictions on caretaker governments, and there is a substantial basis for expecting a ruling on the merits.
Repeatedly filing lawsuits that have already been dismissed on clear jurisdictional grounds makes little sense, particularly when the precedents are readily available with a five minute google search.
Iraq’s Federal Court Dismisses Bid to Dissolve Kurdistan Parliament, Defers Ruling on KRG Caretaker Status
Iraq’s Federal Supreme Court today dismissed a lawsuit seeking to dissolve the 6th Kurdistan Parliament, ruling that it lacked jurisdiction. More significantly, it postponed until 14 December 2026 a separate case seeking to have the KRG formally recognised as a caretaker administration with restricted executive powers.
The dismissal is consistent with the court’s previous rulings. Article 93 of the Iraqi Constitution empowers the Federal Supreme Court to review the constitutionality of laws and regulations and to interpret the Constitution, but grants it no explicit power to dissolve an elected parliament.
The court drew this distinction in September 2022, when it rejected lawsuits seeking to dissolve the federal parliament during the deadlock that followed the 2021 election, and applied the same reasoning in July 2025 when it dismissed two similar lawsuits against the Kurdistan Parliament.
The same logic explains why the court was able to invalidate the extension of the fifth Kurdistan Parliament in May 2023. In that case it was reviewing the constitutionality of a specific law, Law No. 12 of 2022, which had extended the parliament’s expired mandate. That is a different matter from dissolving a newly elected parliament whose constitutional term has not expired.
The caretaker case is more consequential, because here the court has a much stronger jurisdictional basis and several relevant precedents.
The court has repeatedly ruled that an Iraqi government whose parliamentary mandate has ended cannot exercise unrestricted executive powers. In May 2022 it defined the limits of caretaker authority, and in November 2023 it invalidated decisions by the caretaker administration of former Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi that exceeded those limits.
Most significantly, in Decision 213/Federal/2025 of 17 November 2025, the court ruled that Iraq’s parliamentary election ended the outgoing parliament’s mandate, restricting the federal government to essential day-to-day administration until a successor government was formed.
This reasoning is particularly relevant to Kurdistan. The ninth KRG cabinet won a parliamentary vote of confidence on 10 July 2019. Its four-year mandate ended in July 2023 and new parliamentary elections were held in October 2024, yet the same cabinet continues to exercise extensive executive powers without renewed parliamentary confidence.
The Iraqi Constitution also establishes the supremacy of federal constitutional law across Iraq. Article 13 invalidates any legislation that conflicts with the Constitution, and Article 141 preserves Kurdistan’s pre-2005 legislation only insofar as it does not contradict it.
On 13 October 2026, the Federal Supreme Court invalidated Kurdistan Law No. 21 of 2003, which suspended provisions of Iraq’s Penal Code on state security. The ruling showed that regional legislation enacted before the current Constitution remains subject to federal constitutional review.
Kurdistan’s 1992 Council of Ministers Law, which allows ministers to continue performing their duties until a successor cabinet is formed, therefore cannot necessarily be read as authorising unlimited executive powers. Staying in office to ensure administrative continuity is legally distinct from exercising the full authority of a government with an active parliamentary mandate.
A 2024 US government inspector-general report, drawing on State Department assessments, had already described the KRG’s position after the invalidation of the previous parliament’s extension as a “caretaker period”. The report acknowledged that the KRG could continue negotiating with Baghdad but noted the limits imposed by the absence of a functioning parliament.
The litigation also has a political dimension. According to some reports, there have been behind-the-scenes contacts between KDP leaders and Faiq Zaidan, head of Iraq’s Supreme Judicial Council, aimed at avoiding or delaying a ruling that would restrict the KRG’s powers.
The argument reportedly made against such a ruling is that restricting the KRG’s authority, with no immediate prospect of agreement on a new cabinet, could deepen political and administrative uncertainty in Kurdistan and potentially across Iraq, particularly amid the war involving Iran and the wider regional security crisis.
The court has already set the constitutional limits of caretaker governments at the federal level and has repeatedly asserted its authority to review Kurdistan legislation against the Iraqi Constitution. The open question is whether those precedents apply directly to the KRG and, if so, from what date its powers should be considered restricted. The lawsuits also raise the possibility of challenges to major decisions taken since July 2023, particularly on electricity tariffs, taxation, oil contracts and other long-term financial commitments.
Iraq’s Federal Court Dismisses Bid to Dissolve Kurdistan Parliament, Defers Ruling on KRG Caretaker Status
Iraq’s Federal Supreme Court today dismissed a lawsuit seeking to dissolve the 6th Kurdistan Parliament, ruling that it lacked jurisdiction. More significantly, it postponed until 14 December 2026 a separate case seeking to have the KRG formally recognised as a caretaker administration with restricted executive powers.
The dismissal is consistent with the court’s previous rulings. Article 93 of the Iraqi Constitution empowers the Federal Supreme Court to review the constitutionality of laws and regulations and to interpret the Constitution, but grants it no explicit power to dissolve an elected parliament.
The court drew this distinction in September 2022, when it rejected lawsuits seeking to dissolve the federal parliament during the deadlock that followed the 2021 election, and applied the same reasoning in July 2025 when it dismissed two similar lawsuits against the Kurdistan Parliament.
The same logic explains why the court was able to invalidate the extension of the fifth Kurdistan Parliament in May 2023. In that case it was reviewing the constitutionality of a specific law, Law No. 12 of 2022, which had extended the parliament’s expired mandate. That is a different matter from dissolving a newly elected parliament whose constitutional term has not expired.
The caretaker case is more consequential, because here the court has a much stronger jurisdictional basis and several relevant precedents.
The court has repeatedly ruled that an Iraqi government whose parliamentary mandate has ended cannot exercise unrestricted executive powers. In May 2022 it defined the limits of caretaker authority, and in November 2023 it invalidated decisions by the caretaker administration of former Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi that exceeded those limits.
Most significantly, in Decision 213/Federal/2025 of 17 November 2025, the court ruled that Iraq’s parliamentary election ended the outgoing parliament’s mandate, restricting the federal government to essential day-to-day administration until a successor government was formed.
This reasoning is particularly relevant to Kurdistan. The ninth KRG cabinet won a parliamentary vote of confidence on 10 July 2019. Its four-year mandate ended in July 2023 and new parliamentary elections were held in October 2024, yet the same cabinet continues to exercise extensive executive powers without renewed parliamentary confidence.
The Iraqi Constitution also establishes the supremacy of federal constitutional law across Iraq. Article 13 invalidates any legislation that conflicts with the Constitution, and Article 141 preserves Kurdistan’s pre-2005 legislation only insofar as it does not contradict it.
On 13 October 2026, the Federal Supreme Court invalidated Kurdistan Law No. 21 of 2003, which suspended provisions of Iraq’s Penal Code on state security. The ruling showed that regional legislation enacted before the current Constitution remains subject to federal constitutional review.
Kurdistan’s 1992 Council of Ministers Law, which allows ministers to continue performing their duties until a successor cabinet is formed, therefore cannot necessarily be read as authorising unlimited executive powers. Staying in office to ensure administrative continuity is legally distinct from exercising the full authority of a government with an active parliamentary mandate.
A 2024 US government inspector-general report, drawing on State Department assessments, had already described the KRG’s position after the invalidation of the previous parliament’s extension as a “caretaker period”. The report acknowledged that the KRG could continue negotiating with Baghdad but noted the limits imposed by the absence of a functioning parliament.
The litigation also has a political dimension. According to some reports, there have been behind-the-scenes contacts between KDP leaders and Faiq Zaidan, head of Iraq’s Supreme Judicial Council, aimed at avoiding or delaying a ruling that would restrict the KRG’s powers.
The argument reportedly made against such a ruling is that restricting the KRG’s authority, with no immediate prospect of agreement on a new cabinet, could deepen political and administrative uncertainty in Kurdistan and potentially across Iraq, particularly amid the war involving Iran and the wider regional security crisis.
The court has already set the constitutional limits of caretaker governments at the federal level and has repeatedly asserted its authority to review Kurdistan legislation against the Iraqi Constitution. The open question is whether those precedents apply directly to the KRG and, if so, from what date its powers should be considered restricted. The lawsuits also raise the possibility of challenges to major decisions taken since July 2023, particularly on electricity tariffs, taxation, oil contracts and other long-term financial commitments.
Iraq's Federal Court has scheduled three potentially consequential cases for September 20 concerning the legal status of the Kurdistan Region's parliament and government.
In case 193/2026, filed by Rebwar Abdulrahman, head of the New Generation bloc in the Iraqi parliament, against KRG Prime Minister Masrour Barzani, the plaintiff argues that the current KRG's legal term expired on July 10, 2023, and that it should have been treated as a caretaker government since that date.
The lawsuit seeks to restrict the KRG to routine and urgent administrative matters, bar it from taking strategic decisions or entering, amending or cancelling long-term contracts, particularly in oil, gas, electricity and natural resources, and annul decisions taken after July 10, 2023 that exceeded caretaker powers. These include decisions on electricity prices, taxes, fees and strategic energy contracts.
In case 211/2026, Kurdistan Parliament member Ali Hama Salih is challenging the continued existence of the parliament's sixth and current term, asking the court to rule its continuation unconstitutional and to impose the resulting legal consequences. The parliament has remained inactive since the October 2024 elections, apart from a brief session in January 2025 that technically remains unconcluded: the speakership must legally be elected in the first session, and no speaker has yet been chosen.
In case 212/2026, also filed by Hama Salih against the KRG prime minister, he asks the court to rule that a government whose political mandate has expired, and which has not been replaced by a new cabinet, must operate in a caretaker capacity, with powers limited to necessary and routine affairs and no authority to take strategic decisions or create new long-term legal obligations.
The three cases could carry significant implications but an immediate question is whether the court accepts them and then rules the KRG a caretaker government. The larger question is whether it finds the KRG to have been in a caretaker capacity since July 2023, given the number of consequential decisions taken since then that go well beyond what a caretaker cabinet may do.
New Generation’s Shaswar Abdulwahid has reiterated that his party's agreement with the PUK on forming the next KRG cabinet rests on genuine power-sharing, with power divided equally between the KDP and a PUK that now has New Generation's seats behind it.
He says New Generation will not be part of the deal if the PUK again accepts the deputy prime ministership and the posts it held before, given that its combined seats now rival the KDP's. New Generation holds 15 seats and the PUK 23, giving the two parties 38 against the KDP's 39.
He argues that KRG Prime Minister Masrour Barzani has been in power for eight years despite receiving a vote of confidence for a four-year term, and that New Generation no longer wants him in the post.
According to Abdulwahid, the agreement has two main objectives: restoring the balance of power in the Kurdistan Region, and improving public services, cutting taxes and committing to pay outstanding public-sector salaries.
He says New Generation has not demanded any specific posts but insists the PUK must secure a genuine redistribution of power and refuse a return to the previous arrangement. This means equal sharing of key institutions and senior positions, including the prime ministership, the presidency, the judiciary, the Department of Foreign Relations and the Board of Investment.
Yesterday, Shaswar Abdulwahid, leader of the New Generation Movement, which holds 15 seats in the Kurdistan Parliament and is now aligned with the PUK, responded to recent reports that the PUK and KDP could reach an agreement to form the next KRG cabinet without New Generation. Those reports were later denied.
Abdul Wahid restated the position he says New Generation has held from the start, that the party is not seeking ministries in the next KRG cabinet. What it wants, he said, is a set of policy commitments: a budget settlement, lower taxes, and measurable improvement in service delivery. He played a recording from February in which he had made the same argument, offering it as evidence that the position predates the current round of negotiations and was not adopted once posts began to look unavailable.
His press conference was particularly interesting in two respects:
First, he indirectly put the ball in the PUK's court. Abdulwahid repeatedly said the purpose of New Generation's alliance with the PUK was to create a genuine balance of power against the KDP. His argument was effectively that if the PUK now negotiates separately with the KDP and reaches an agreement without using the combined parliamentary strength of the PUK and New Generation to establish such a balance, the PUK itself would be giving up that leverage.
This appeared to reflect concern that the PUK could eventually reach an agreement with the KDP under regional pressure, although there is so far no clear evidence that such an agreement has been reached.
Second, Abdulwahid sharply attacked the other opposition parties. He argued that they repeatedly criticise the KDP-PUK monopoly and the Kurdistan Region's political problems but have failed to develop a practical strategy for changing the balance of power. He presented New Generation's alliance with the PUK as such an attempt and accused other opposition groups of effectively helping the KDP by refusing to support it.
He singled out the Halwest Movement and its leader, Ali Hama Saleh, accusing Halwest of acting as a KDP proxy and pointing to Hama Saleh's appearances on KDP-affiliated media.
Hama Saleh responded with a video accusing Abdulwahid of being motivated by personal financial interests. He alleged that the PUK had facilitated major commercial benefits for Abdulwahid's German Village project in Suleimani, including further expansion, construction on green spaces despite legal restrictions and several new commercial developments. Hama Saleh claimed the total value of these benefits could reach around $250 million and described them as the price of New Generation's alliance with the PUK.
Abdulwahid addressed the same allegation last night, dismissing it as fabricated. He argued that if his objective were simply obtaining commercial projects, Baghdad offers a much larger and more lucrative market, where he already has business interests and could pursue projects legally.
A senior Halwest figure appearing on Rudaw this morning went further, implying that Abdulwahid himself has links with Parastin, the KDP's intelligence service. He referred to a reported secret meeting between Qubad Talabani and Masrour Barzani, arguing that Qubad had not told anyone about the meeting because he did not want it to become public, yet Abdulwahid somehow already knew about it. He then asked who had informed Abdulwahid, implicitly suggesting that the information came from Parastin.
New Generation is portraying its alliance with the PUK as a strategy to change the balance of power and accusing other opposition parties of indirectly serving the KDP. Halwest, in turn, is portraying the alliance as commercially motivated and is now questioning Abdulwahid's relationships with both the PUK and KDP-linked networks.
A remarkable and heated exchange on Nuce TV, a pro-PKK Kurdish channel, between Riham Hassan, a representative of the pro-PKK Yazidi women’s movement in Sinjar, and Remezan Kerim, a Kurdish nationalist from Erbil.
Hassan insists that Yazidis are a distinct ethnic group, separate from Kurds. Kerim rejects this, repeatedly calls her Kurdish and accuses her of national treason.
Most notably, Kerim invokes the epic of Dewresh Evdi, a legendary Yazidi warrior who, in one documented version of the oral tradition, declares:
"I am neither Kiki nor Milan. I have been Yazidi for seventy generations."
Kerim then renders the line as: "I am Yazidi and I am Kurd."
Academic research firmly establishes Dewresh's Yazidi identity but does not record Kerim's formulation as a direct quotation from Evdi.
However, the epic survives in many oral variations, some of which explicitly place Yazidis within a broader Kurdish identity. A 2022 academic study comparing six versions found that those preserved by Yazidi communities often emphasise both a distinct religious identity and a shared Kurdish identity, while versions among Muslim Kurdish communities focus more on tribal relationships.
The epic is therefore more complicated than either side suggests. Dewresh's Yazidi identity is well established, and his association with Kurdishness also has a basis in the wider tradition.
The exchange is particularly revealing because Hassan herself belongs to the PKK-aligned network and embraces the ideology of jailed PKK founder Abdullah Ocalan, while asserting a distinct Yazidi ethnic identity.
This may reflect a strand of Ocalan's thought that emphasises plural identities and the right of communities to define themselves, leaving room for Yazidis to identify as a distinct people rather than necessarily as Kurds. Kerim represents the more conventional Kurdish nationalist position, which regards Yazidis as an integral part of the Kurdish nation regardless of how individuals identify.
The confrontation exposes a basic difference in how the two approach identity: Hassan insists on the right to define her own, while Kerim insists on defining it for her. Even a shared epic becomes a vehicle for competing claims.
A lot has been happening in Sinjar since last year, with far-reaching implications:
There is now a convergence between the pro-PKK YBŞ and the Yazidi Cause Alliance as well as other Yazidi figures, particularly among those who regard Sinjar as Iraqi and Yazidis as a distinct ethnic group.
YBŞ is a Yazidi militia with significant influence in pockets in Sinjar and is part of the PKK’s regional network.
This is significant because, for the first time since the fall of Saddam Hussein in 2003, a grassroots Yazidi political movement has emerged that is outperforming the KDP, which has dominated Sinjar in post-Saddam Iraq.
The Yazidi Cause Alliance, formed by several prominent Yazidi activists ahead of the 2025 elections, was a new political project that many influential figures did not initially take seriously. Yet it managed to secure more than 50,000 votes in its first electoral test. This suggests it could perform even better in future elections, particularly as its success may attract more prominent and popular Yazidi figures.
What makes this alliance particularly important is several developments.
First, there was recently a disagreement between Murad Ismail, its MP and parliamentary faction leader, and the leadership of the alliance’s political wing. Remarkably, they managed to resolve their differences and are now working together. This is an important sign that the project may be more serious and sustainable than previous attempts, which often collapsed over internal disagreements. It may also suggest that more influential figures are backing it.
Second, and perhaps more fascinating, the Yazidi Cause Alliance has been negotiating politically on behalf of the YBŞ over its integration into Iraq’s security establishment. This includes an agreement for the YBŞ to withdraw from Mount Sinjar and hand over its positions to the Iraqi army in exchange for integrating its estimated 2,000 to 4,000 fighters into the Hashd al-Shaabi, as the Iraqi prime minister said yesterday (videoed).
This is notable because it means Yazidis are increasingly developing their own political representation, independent of Kurdish parties, especially the KDP. This could have far-reaching implications for Sinjar’s political future and the prospects of its return to the Kurdistan Region’s administration.
Third, this may be the first time in decades that Yazidi civilian figures and activists, rather than traditional tribal leaders, are at the forefront of such a political movement.
Historically, there have been prominent Yazidi movements independent of traditional Kurdish parties, but these were often led by tribal figures, given that Yazidis, much like Kurds, have a strongly tribal social structure.
This time, however, the Yazidi Cause Alliance is essentially a civilian, non-tribal political coalition. That makes it potentially more significant than previous attempts to establish an independent Yazidi political movement.
For the first time, Iraq’s State Administration Coalition has invited not only the KDP and PUK but also the New Generation and Halwest Movements to its meeting on the KRG’s share of the 2027 Iraqi budget.
This is notable because parties outside the KDP and PUK have not previously been included in the coalition’s budget discussions. New Generation has three seats in the Iraqi parliament and 15 in Kudistan parliament and Halwest has five seats in the Iraqi parliament and four in the Kurdistan Parliament.
According to media reports, the Iraqi Prime Minister and Finance Minister have demanded that the KRG hand over 445,000 barrels of oil per day and adopt the ASYCUDA customs system as part of the 2027 budget deal, warning of consequences if it fails to comply. However, the KRG maintains that it lacks the production capacity to meet the oil requirement.
Halwest Movement leader Ali Hama Saleh said after the meeting that his party proposed transferring the entire KRG oil sector to the federal government rather than committing to a fixed daily oil quota. Under this proposal, Baghdad would receive whatever oil the region produces and, in return, supply the KRG with fuel, petrol and other petroleum products, as it does for other Iraqi governorates.
However, both the KDP and, interestingly, the PUK have resisted this proposal, instead advocating that a portion of crude production remain allocated to the region to supply its refineries and meet domestic demand.
Meanwhile, the KRG Prime Minister has criticised the region’s proposed budget share as insufficient. Although the draft allocates 12.7% to the Kurdistan Region, sovereign expenditures now account for roughly half the federal budget. Once these are deducted, the region’s effective allocation amounts to approximately 6% of total federal expenditure.
The budget remains a draft, discussions are continuing, and no final proposal has been submitted to the Iraqi parliament’s Finance Committee.
However, the meeting itself is politically significant. By bringing opposition parties, particularly those critical of the KDP, into federal budget discussions for the first time, Baghdad is increasing pressure on the KRG leadership, especially the KDP, and further narrowing its room for manoeuvre.