Politico-military affairs generalist, with a regional twist. On twitter in a private capacity. Retweets are not necessarily endorsements.

Stockholm, Sverige
Joined August 2016
Robert Dalsjö retweeted
Clash Report
@clashreport
Sep 23
Marco Rubio on Russia: We’ve invited President Putin to the G20. We think it’s an opportunity for him to engage not just with Trump, but with other world leaders. We hope that’s an invitation he will accept.
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Robert Dalsjö retweeted
OSINTtechnical
@Osinttechnical
Sep 24
In a major move, France will deploy soldiers and air defense systems to Saudi Arabia to help protect Yanbu’s critical oil-export facilities from Houthi attacks -French President Macron Macron did not rule out an additional French Air Force fighter deployment as well.
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Robert Dalsjö retweeted
We should all be watching #Ethiopia. What's brewing there could be a greater catastrophe than anything we've seen so far this century.
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Robert Dalsjö retweeted
Watch the final episode of Sky's "The Wargame" tonight. The most disturbing part is the British cabinet members determined to prioritise international law over national survival. It's a parable for so many of the country's self-inflicted injuries. sky.com/watch/the-wargame
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Robert Dalsjö retweeted
david D.
@secretsqrl123
Sep 22
FPV drones owning the battlefield.... the end of an era, FPV drones owning the battlefield was always going to be a short-term situation. The reason is straightforward: armored vehicles moving forward now carry enough electrical power and mounting space to field automated, optically guided kinetic anti-drone systems directly on the vehicle. These systems can be cued by early warning, so vehicles and their automated defenses know where incoming FPV drones are before they arrive. The drones themselves can be tracked optically and acoustically, picked up by the sound of their engines and motors, and with enough of these systems fielded, Third Corps has effectively mastered how to clear the sky of FPV drones in the area it's operating in, specifically the ground north of Lyman. The reason so few FPV drones are being encountered in that area comes down to a deliberate, layered air defense concept. A .50 caliber machine gun has an effective range of roughly a thousand meters, which means each air defense gun protects a radius of about two thousand meters around itself. These systems can be vehicle-mounted, trailer-mounted, or pallet-mounted, simply dropped off at the front and daisy-chained together. With four, six, or twelve of them working in concert, they move forward one piece at a time, like pieces on a chessboard, always keeping overlapping fire and mutual support between systems. Combined with electronic warfare vehicles and other anti-drone systems moving forward alongside them, this is exactly what has let Third Corps advance into a large area while encountering relatively few FPV drones, whether radio-guided or fiber-optic guided. We always knew this was coming. When large formations move forward with heavy vehicle density, combining kinetic anti-drone systems with electronic warfare sweeps the FPVs from the sky, and that's exactly what's being seen now. We saw an earlier version of this at the Battle of Kursk, where wide-spectrum jamming alone worked well for the first couple of days, until fiber-optic drones showed up and jamming alone stopped being enough. What's happening now is the second phase of that same evolution: jammers combined with kinetic air defense actually sweeping the skies clear of FPVs, rather than jamming alone trying to hold the line. FPV drones will always have a place on the battlefield going forward, but they've always been fragile, and as long as they can be seen, they can be dealt with. What's re-emerging now, as a direct result of clearing the skies, is conventional tube artillery, finally able to do what it does best at long range again, without nearly as much fear of the FPV threat hanging over it.
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Robert Dalsjö retweeted
Polen ändrar insatsreglerna för stridspiloterna vid deras motsvarighet till incidentberedskapen och IKFN.
Wojsko Polskie zmieni procedury dotyczące zestrzeliwania obcych obiektów naruszających polską przestrzeń powietrzną. Pilot myśliwca nie będzie już musiał wzrokowo identyfikować celu przed jego zestrzeleniem – zapowiedział wiceminister obrony narodowej @CTomczyk.
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Robert Dalsjö retweeted
Under Antonio Guterres: 🇨🇳 China sits on the UN Human Rights Council 🇸🇦 Saudi Arabia chaired UN Women's Rights Commission 🇮🇷 Islamic Republic of Iran chaired UN Disarmament Commission
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Robert Dalsjö retweeted
440 milj kr per fordon. Staterna är usla på att göra affärer. Försvarsindustrin är oerhört effektiva på att utnyttja omvärldsläget och den medföljande villigheten att betala utan att tänka. Så till den milda grad att vi inte ens fyller de "svarta hålen" innan pengarna tar slut.
Jeff2146🇧🇪
@Jeff21461
Sep 23
🇮🇹 Italy is allocating up to 5,14 billion € for the procurement of 132 Main Battle Tanks and an undisclosed number of support vehicles, according to a publication by the National Anti-Corruption Office's website. The vehicles, which are part of the NMBT program, will be based on Rheinmetall's KF-51 Panther main battle tank concept with first deliveries between 2029 and 2030 and program completion expected in 2033. militarnyi.com/uk/news/itali…
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Robert Dalsjö retweeted
Ta vara på gamers och jägare. Få ut 3D-skrivare på lägre förbandsnivå, klä stridsvagnen i en nätbur och utnyttja Rysslands besatthet av rutiner. Nytt reportage från Ukrainas frontlinjer av Fredrik Fahlman och Paul Wennerholm i Officerstidningen. officerstidningen.se/ganska-…
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Robert Dalsjö retweeted
Hyvä artikkeli. Johtopäätöksenä, että puolustuksen lisäksi pitää olla merkittävä iskukyky. Jos tällainen on, Pietarin läheisyys ja haavoittuvuus voi hyvinkin rauhoittaa Venäjän hyökkäyshaluja. balticsentinel.eu/8550803/an…
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Ukraine : pourquoi les blindés russes deviennent-ils plus difficiles à détruire ? Le commandant du corps ukrainien Azov, Denys Prokopenko, avertit que les chars russes sont désormais plus difficiles à neutraliser. Cette évolution ne repose pas sur un nouveau blindage révolutionnaire, mais sur l’accumulation de protections complémentaires et sur une meilleure coordination tactique. Les véhicules reçoivent davantage de blindage réactif explosif, notamment sur les flancs et les parties autrefois moins protégées. Les premières « cages » artisanales sont également remplacées par des structures mieux conçues, parfois installées directement en usine. Leur fonction est de provoquer l’explosion des charges creuses transportées par les drones FPV avant qu’elles n’atteignent le blindage principal. Certains chars sont aussi équipés du système de protection active Arena-M. Celui-ci détecte la menace et lance une contre-munition afin d’intercepter les roquettes, les missiles antichars et certains drones. Après les premiers retours du front, la Russie envisagerait de porter le nombre de ses effecteurs de 12 à 36. Des dispositifs mécaniques ou électromagnétiques de déminage complètent cette protection en déclenchant les mines avant le passage du véhicule. Mais l’évolution la plus importante est tactique. L’infanterie russe cherche à s’infiltrer jusqu’aux positions des opérateurs ukrainiens de drones, tandis que l’artillerie frappe leurs zones de lancement. Les blindés peuvent ensuite être engagés en plusieurs vagues : la première force les défenseurs à consommer leurs drones et leurs munitions antichars, la suivante tente d’exploiter leur épuisement. Lors d’un affrontement, une unité ukrainienne aurait ainsi employé près de 125 drones FPV pour arrêter seulement deux ou trois chars russes. Ce chiffre illustre les limites d’une défense reposant principalement sur ces appareils : tous n’atteignent pas leur cible, les brouillages et les protections réduisent leur efficacité, tandis que les stocks doivent être rapidement reconstitués. Le char russe n’est donc pas devenu invulnérable. Il faut simplement davantage de drones, des attaques successives ou des armes antichars plus puissantes pour obtenir le même résultat. L’idée selon laquelle les drones auraient rendu les blindés obsolètes apparaît une nouvelle fois prématurée : la Russie apprend de ses pertes et transforme progressivement ces enseignements en solutions produites en série. defence24.pl/wojna-na-ukrain…
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Robert Dalsjö retweeted
WarMonitor🇺🇦🇬🇧
@WarMonitor3
Sep 18
Belarus and Russia are currently conducting a large military exercise right next to the Suwałki gap with over 9000 soldiers NATO is keeping a close eye with AWACS aircraft up near Kaliningrad and on the Lithuanian and Polish border. They are simulating a push into Kaliningrad.
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‚Fourteen Russian spy satellites moved over a US military base in Saudi Arabia two days before a devastating attack by Iran. The timing and sequencing of the spacecraft gave them access to a large spectrum of data which, US officials and international intelligence sources say, helped Tehran conduct some of its most precise attacks against American assets. CNN’s Tamara Qiblawi reports.‘ edition.cnn.com/2026/09/16/w…
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Do the Russians have fourteen spy satellites?!!!!
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Nya bollar! "Trump announced the imminent appearance of a U.S. military base near the Russian borders. U.S. President Donald Trump announced "significant progress" in negotiations on the establishment of an American military base in Poland ...."
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Robert Dalsjö retweeted
”The crisis’s origins lie in the brief and surreal strategic climate that followed the Cold War. Western governments naively mistook a fleeting peace dividend for a permanent world order. The documentary record is remarkably candid. NATO’s 1997 Founding Act declared that NATO and Russia no longer considered one another adversaries. In two years, the last generation of Soviet intelligence scorched Chechnya and seized power by offering then President Boris Yeltsin a safe retreat from power. The European Union’s 2003 Security Strategy later judged large-scale aggression against a member state ’improbable.’” @ckasapoglu1 nationalinterest.org/feature…
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