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We are Microsoft's global network of security experts. Follow for security research and threat intelligence.

Redmond, WA
Joined November 2010
Microsoft Threat Intelligence observed an active phishing campaign exploiting the Microsoft 365 service disruption on November 12. The messages impersonate Microsoft 365 service health notifications and reference the legitimate Exchange Online incident EX1550543. Some of the phishing emails Microsoft detected on November 13 falsely claim that messages were held during the outage and will be deleted within 24 hours unless recipients click to restore them. Observed subjects follow the pattern "Outage - [six-character code]," with sender display names using organization-specific prefixes followed by "Outage Notification" or "Service Health." The campaign uses three sender domains, moments-notice[.]com, planetmaison[.]com, and newbooker[.]com, with recipient-specific SendGrid click-tracking links redirecting to reallifeaccounting[.]com, including the observed path /themelist0.html. Similar messages targeted organizations across multiple US sectors. The activity is consistent with credential phishing, although credential collection and malware delivery have not been confirmed. Security teams can use Microsoft Defender for Office 365 Threat Explorer and Microsoft Defender XDR advanced hunting (EmailEvents, EmailUrlInfo, and UrlClickEvents) to identify suspicious messages, examine embedded URLs, and investigate user clicks. Microsoft Defender for Office 365 Safe Links provides time-of-click protection against malicious URLs when properly configured. Organizations should verify their Safe Links policies, investigate potential user interactions, and confirm service disruptions directly through the Microsoft 365 admin center.
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Microsoft tracks Storm-3350, a Brazil-focused activity cluster observed since October, primarily affecting organizations in financial services, payments, banking, and digital assets. Microsoft-observed activity has also affected healthcare, transportation, and logistics. Storm-3350 uses an identity-first cloud intrusion pattern that can begin with voice phishing (vishing) or identity-focused impersonation. In confirmed activity, the actor reset an account password through Microsoft’s legitimate self-service password-reset flow, signed in within minutes, completed the account’s existing SMS or voice multifactor authentication (MFA) challenge, and registered an actor-controlled Microsoft Authenticator method. This suggests an ability to intercept or receive codes sent to the registered phone number, potentially through social engineering involving employees’ personal phones. The new method provides persistent access without continued dependence on the victim or their phone. After account takeover, Storm-3350 conducts reconnaissance and high-volume cloud-data collection across Microsoft Graph, Microsoft 365, and Azure, identifying high-value identities, applications, sites, drives, mailboxes, and sensitive content. This activity combines browser access with Python- and Node-style automation, OAuth-authenticated curl activity, and Azure CLI enumeration. Storm-3350’s observed activity also included searching SharePoint for “AKIA” and accessing .key, .pem, and .ppk files. In Azure, the actor requested storage-account keys and application publishing profiles, which could enable access to additional cloud resources. Together, these actions point to possible routes beyond the compromised account. Defenders should investigate the full sequence rather than isolated events: password reset; immediate sign-in using existing MFA; authentication-method registration; anomalous token acquisition; Microsoft Graph and Azure control-plane reconnaissance; SharePoint, OneDrive, and mailbox discovery; sensitive-content searches; credential requests; and high-volume retrieval or download. Relevant detections include: - Suspicious Azure List Keys activities related to the List Keys operation - Anomalous token acquisition followed by high-volume SharePoint file activity - Graph API activity from a Microsoft threat intelligence IP address - Mass SharePoint or OneDrive file access after an MFA method change - Automated mass SharePoint/OneDrive file access via python-httpx - Suspicious mass download from risky or unusual session Microsoft tracks Storm-3350 separately within a broader financially motivated identity-compromise and cloud-data-theft ecosystem. Because related clusters share tactics, infrastructure patterns, and operational dependencies, no single IP, domain, or lure theme should be treated as conclusive actor attribution.
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Amid conflicting reports about PHP2Shell, understanding exposure and conditions for exploitation helps defenders prioritize patching. This Microsoft Threat Intelligence Podcast episode brings together exploit research & IR perspectives on PHP2Shell. msft.it/6014aABdn Elliot Volkman speaks with Carly Sherrod, Director of Security Research at Microsoft Incident Response, and Spencer McIntyre, Director of Exploit Development at VulnCheck, about the research and response behind PHP2Shell. At the time of recording, Carly described seeing numerous malformed HTTP requests but limited evidence of successful remote code execution within her team’s incident response work, even as exploitation had been reported in the wild. Spencer explains why many early proofs of concept did not work in realistic production environments, and why an exploit that works against one application does not necessarily work against another. The discussion connects understanding PHP exposure with identifying critical business systems, reviewing telemetry for signs of compromise, and prioritizing patching. Hear more about assessing PHP2Shell risk and making evidence-based response decisions.
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Recorded live at Black Hat, part two of this episode examines how defenders respond to identity compromise, from credential theft and MFA bypasses to containment, recovery, and the emerging security challenges posed by AI. msft.it/6010aFiCs Microsoft incident response experts Adrian Hill and Terry Mee share lessons from investigating real-world attacks, offering practical insights into the visibility and controls needed to limit attacker access and reduce risk. Microsoft’s Defender Purple Team discusses recreating complete attack chains to identify detection gaps and strengthen defenses, while also exploring how AI is changing both security research and the threat landscape. Learn more on this episode of the Microsoft Threat Intelligence Podcast, hosted by Elliot Volkman.
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Microsoft Senior Security Program Manager Karina Sirota Goodley joins the Microsoft Threat Intelligence Podcast to examine the ecosystem-wide challenges of preparing certificates and trust systems for post-quantum cryptography. msft.it/6011a0zbh Karina discusses how Microsoft’s post-quantum certificate pilot brings certificate authorities together to test issuance, compatibility, performance, and lifecycle assumptions. The work shows how minor constraints or one unsupported component can disrupt an end-to-end trust chain. Organizations can begin by inventorying certificates, keys, libraries, algorithms, hard-to-update systems, and vendor dependencies. Hear why industry testing and collaboration are critical to understanding cryptographic risk and preparing for what comes next.
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Microsoft Threat Intelligence is tracking an active supply chain attack in which a threat actor compromised the trusted OAuth App of the backup application ConnectWise Cloud Backup (AppId: 506e08f9-6e9a-4da4-942b-a099a03644ae), formerly SkyKick Backup, to obtain access tokens across customer tenants. ConnectWise Cloud Backup is a multitenant vendor application; customers grant consent for the application to operate in their tenants. We assess that the threat actor likely abused permissions previously granted by customers to the application, including highly elevated permissions like Directory.ReadWrite.All. On October 15, 2026, we observed broad successful service principal authentication originating from the IP address 144.172.64[.]128. Follow-on activity included Microsoft Graph API reconnaissance and attempts to add additional credentials on the related service principal in target tenants to maintain direct access as a backdoor. Microsoft Defender detects post-exploitation activity with the following alerts: - Any alert related to "Suspicious sign-in" - Graph API activity from a Microsoft threat intelligence IP address - Verified Threat Actor IP Defenders should review service principal sign-ins from unrecognized IP addresses, app credential changes, and OAuth grant activity associated with this specific OAuth AppId. In addition, we recommend looking for Threat Intelligence alerts on matching of IP against the Graph API activity and service principal activities. We will continue to monitor this incident and will share updates as they become available. We encourage customers to check ConnectWise advisory for more information and additional guidance: msft.it/6013aQBvV. Indicators of compromise (IOCs): - App name: ConnectWise Cloud Backup - AppId: 506e08f9-6e9a-4da4-942b-a099a03644ae - Publisher name: SkyKick - Source IP: 144.172.64[.]128 - User agents: Python-urllib/3.12, python-requests/2.31, python-requests/2.34.2
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AI is accelerating familiar threats while giving defenders new ways to respond. This is a central theme of the 2026 Microsoft Digital Defense Report (MDDR), discussed in this episode of the Microsoft Threat Intelligence Podcast. msft.it/6019aoYQR Elliot Volkman speaks with Chloé Messdaghi, MDDR lead, and Karen Frost, Principal Security Researcher, about the intelligence behind the report’s findings and what they mean for security leaders. The conversation examines how AI is changing the speed, scale, and sophistication of threat actor activity, while noting that human direction still plays a meaningful role in attacks. For defenders, the discussion emphasizes the importance of connecting signals rather than simply collecting more of them. Correlating activity across identities, systems, and infrastructure can provide a fuller picture of an intrusion, while AI can help teams process threat information and detect, analyze, and respond at greater scale. For security leaders, the episode connects these findings to practical priorities, including phishing-resistant multifactor authentication, incident response plans, and governance and data access controls for AI. Listen to the podcast episode to hear more about understanding dependencies across an organization’s ecosystem and measuring security progress through risk reduction, not just the volume of security activity. Read the full 2026 Microsoft Digital Defense Report: msft.it/6010aoYQr
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Microsoft Threat Intelligence has identified a cluster of compromised websites leading to ClickFix attacks. Instead of downloading and executing remote payloads like the typical attack pattern, in this attack, the websites pre-fetch a script payload into the browser cache disguised as a PNG file. When a user is later tricked into executing the malicious command, the cached website content is already on the device, loaded, and ready to be executed. This helps to hide the payload script and helps bypass the character limit of the Run dialog. ClickFix attacks persuade users to execute attacker-supplied commands under the guise of verification or repair. In this specific campaign, a fake lure instructs users to open Windows Run, paste clipboard content and press Enter. The injected page uses browser caching to stage the larger VBScript payload separately from the Run command. The command invokes cmd.exe to recursively enumerate files whose names start with "f_” in the browser’s profile folder such as %LOCALAPPDATA%\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles. It compares each file’s byte length with an expected value. Rather than searching for a marker within the contents like previous attacks, it copies a size-matching cache entry to %LOCALAPPDATA%\Temp\t.vbs, giving the cached payload a VBScript extension, then executes it with wscript.exe. Copy output and errors are suppressed. The expected size varies across variants. The VBScript collects host information through WMI, retrieves v.ps1 from cocojambo[.]us[.]com/alfa, and launches PowerShell without a profile and with execution-policy bypass. A later PowerShell stage downloads the next-stage payload as cab.dat, then reads and executes its contents in a hidden window. The PowerShell stage triggers .NET compilation using csc.exe and cvtres.exe, then launches timeout.exe. Subsequent payloads load .NET assemblies into memory and inject code into timeout.exe to target browser and device credentials. The injected process launches PowerShell to retrieve another in-memory stage from capsysnet[.]vg and makes outbound connections to ciliabula[.]cc. The payload modifies the per-user PowerShell registry configuration to use the Bypass execution policy, then unpacks Python with tar.exe and creates a scheduled task that launches a Python payload through pythonw.exe for persistence. Microsoft Defender provides layered protection across the ClickFix attack chain. Defender SmartScreen and Defender for Office 365 help block malicious sites, links, attachments, and fake CAPTCHA lures, while Defender for Endpoint detects suspicious command execution and outbound connections through alerts like “Possible ClickFix activity”. Defender Antivirus blocks malicious command execution as Trojan:Win32/ClickFix and Trojan:Win32/TermFix. Microsoft recommends cloud-delivered, web, and network protection, application control, and PowerShell script-block logging. Hunt across browser activity, RunMRU registry key, WScript/PowerShell child processes and scheduled tasks, not download events alone. A CAPTCHA should not ask users to run code. Users shouln not paste commands from verification prompts into Run, Terminal or PowerShell and should treats such requests as potential initial access attempts.
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Recorded live at Black Hat, Andrew “Spike” Grant of Huntress shares real-world observations from incident response, stories from years of interacting directly with threat actors, and insights into identifying suspicious activity before it escalates. msft.it/6018aZiGE Cybercriminals are increasingly abusing legitimate remote monitoring and management (RMM) and remote access tools to blend into normal activity, making it harder for defenders to distinguish authorized access from intrusion. Compromised access can be maintained through multiple remote access tools and later leveraged for ransomware deployment, data theft, or other follow-on activity, while AI-assisted phishing and social engineering continue to make initial compromise easier. Learn more on this episode of the Microsoft Threat Intelligence Podcast, hosted by Elliot Volkman.
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