Phil Gordon

If striking 11,000 targets and a months-long blockade failed to produce Iranian collapse or capitulation, what would a “short, intense” military campaign produce—other than Iranian and Houthi retaliation against shipping, pipelines, and airports, another oil price spike, more casualties, and further erosion of public and regional support for the war? If reports like this are just the umpteenth time since the April ceasefire that Trump has threatened escalation to get a “better deal,” more power to him. But if it’s an actual operational plan, it’s likely to prove as counterproductive as the previous rounds.

Rob, the hypocrisy is touting that Arab citizens can vote as a sign of democracy and inclusivity while treating their chosen representatives—even those who sat in the government only a few years ago—as unacceptable even as outside supporters of an alternative coalition…when the alternative is a government that includes racists and extremists and a national security minister who was convicted of supporting a terrorist organization; parties that want to annex the West Bank, settle Gaza, and expel Palestinians; and non-Zionist Haredi parties whose constituents largely refuse to serve in the military even in wartime. Obviously opposition leaders have every right to judge such a coalition as the “lesser evil”—but if that’s their choice, it is hard to point to Arab citizens’ right to vote as evidence of their meaningful political inclusion. I did not say this was an easy decision but if it's the one they make it would be a telling one.

All the proud declarations that Israel’s democracy gives 2 million Arab citizens the vote will ring increasingly hollow if the opposition refuses to govern with their support — even if that means leaving Netanyahu in power.

I spoke with @RavivDrucker about the debate over Netanyahu's role in the failure to secure a ceasefire/hostage deal before January 2025.

Quite the closing argument for Netanyahu to acknowledge his legacy is the end of US military aid and his re-election would mean sanctions, isolation and reliance on cryptocurrency. No illusions about opposition but they would at least try to avoid this future.

One of many critical points in Jon Finer's excellent post-elections Israel policy agenda for Democrats: "A new approach should also start from the principle that U.S. policy will distinguish occupied territory and Israel proper." nytimes.com/2026/10/23/opini…

Congrats to @gideonrachman on important new book, and impeccable sense of timing...

Colby demanding allies pass a loyalty test to keep US troops in Europe while Hegseth doing all he can to alienate the allies they are trying to recruit.

It was indeed a good and well-received speech but difficult for SACEUR to deliver reassurance/ deterrence message when Trump is doing deals with Putin, lashing out at Ukraine, and floating possible force posture reductions in Europe. Deep and costly disconnect.

“Neither doubling down nor walking away offers a way out of the cycle that has trapped every recent president. A more disciplined and pragmatic middle course might.” My new @ForeignAffairs essay on the way ahead in the Middle East.

Netanyahu supporters seem to be taking advantage of @Brett_McGurk’s book and interviews to claim vindication for Netanyahu’s conduct of the war in Gaza. But while Brett’s front-row account is valuable, that doesn’t mean it is definitive or its perspectives widely shared—including among former members of the Biden administration. I would say most of my former colleagues think that President Biden should have put more pressure on Israel to conduct the war differently and end it sooner, and few think that the biggest mistake Biden made was to show daylight with Israel. And even Brett’s account makes clear that hostages were not the top priority for Netanyahu and that when U.S. pressure actually was applied—as after the World Central Kitchen strike—it worked. Brett tells the story of the Biden phone call after that tragedy, but not the story of how Biden called Netanyahu on July 4, 2024 to press him to conclude the hostage deal after Hamas had finally accepted the basic framework, dropping its demand that Israel commit to a permanent ceasefire before any hostages were released. Netanyahu instead added so many of his own conditions—against the advice of his own security chiefs—that the deal became impossible for another six months, during which nearly 9,000 more Palestinians were killed and more Israeli hostages died, including the six that Hamas executed in August. The Israeli changes included a demand that Israel retain forces along Gaza’s entire border with Egypt, which the IDF had seized only after the original proposal, and a new enforcement mechanism to screen Gazans who were returning home to the north which would have required Israeli troops to remain in central Gaza. Both of those new conditions were dropped in the deal ultimately concluded in January 2025. Nothing in the book or elsewhere changes the reality that October 7 happened on Netanyahu’s watch; that he prioritized “total victory” and the maintenance of his coalition over a hostage deal or an end of the war; that his conduct of the war and management of its humanitarian consequences catastrophic; that it has left Israel more isolated and insecure; and that it has deeply damaged, perhaps irreparably, Israel’s relationship with the United States—which should have done more to change Israel’s conduct rather than enable it. There was never an easy way forward in Gaza, but no version of the story vindicates Netanyahu.

Don't miss important piece by @Julie_C_Smith on growing Russian hybrid attacks and NATO's insufficient response. Instead of turning a blind eye and offering Russia energy deals, Trump admin should pause proposed troop withdrawals from Europe, resume direct military aid to Ukraine, sanction more of Russia's shadow fleet and its enablers, and respond to cyber attacks in kind. Europe in turn should accelerate the end of remaining purchases of Russian energy, better enforce the oil price cap, seize ships suspected of cutting undersea cables, expel Russian spies under diplomatic cover, enhance anti-drone capabilities, harden critical infrastructure, and begin to transfer not just the interest but the principal of frozen Russian assets to Ukraine. The goal of both should be to make clear that the response to these Russian attacks is not a "better deal" but greater resilience and imposition of costs. foreignaffairs.com/russia/ru…