Six days after my initial assessment, the Houthis appear more focused on reaching understandings with the US, an ally of Israel, than on turning their territorial gains into a renewed campaign against them. As it stands, no sign of Axis revival is present and it appears the Houthi expansion is creating opportunities for separate agreements and greater independence from Iran. American officials met Houthi representatives in Oman after the coastal advance. Houthi representatives reportedly reaffirmed that they would not attack American vessels. That assurance extended to Israeli and other commercial vessels, with Saudi shipping excluded. This would typically constitute a betrayal of the highest order to the Palestinian cause by the Axis supporters. Obviously when you have Houthi leadership negotiating protection for Israeli shipping, that means interests have extended beyond the commitments associated with the Axis. The US also has a reason to deal directly with the authorities controlling the coast. A commitment obtained from the Houthis themselves identifies who is responsible for compliance. American nonintervention then becomes compatible with private sector interests if shipping remains protected and the group observes agreed restrictions. Which is the goal. Saudi Arabia’s position belongs within that wider negotiation. The exclusion of Saudi vessels suggests that Houthi leaders are preserving pressure on KSA while seeking reassurance from the US. They are separating the agreements they want from different governments. Makes sense. I continue to suspect that Saudi appeals for American intervention was merely a stunt to prepare the public explanation for eventual accommodation. KSA can demonstrate that it requested assistance before accepting negotiations over Houthi control. For the Houthis, the long term play now is recognition, reliable revenue, trade access, and reconstruction. Those benefits would only come at a trade off of shedding their axis posture, which clearly, it’s appearing to be the case. Leadership priorities, similar to Iran, have shifted towards survival, protection of commercial activity and restrict military commitments that threaten its income. Greater territorial authority would then bring obligations that participation in regional resistance campaigns makes harder to fulfill. Gulf governments would require those obligations in return for economic support. Financing an administration that remains free to attack its investors and trading partners would undermine the purpose of a settlement. Houthi rebranding would and must follow that change in responsibilities. Leaders would increasingly justify their authority through Yemeni sovereignty, reconstruction, and public services. Resistance language might survive longer than the military commitments, but preserving recognition and income would require behavior consistent with the agreements. Houthi gains would then serve a separate Yemeni settlement, with the US negotiating maritime protection and KSA negotiating regional security. I said that the Houthis would have to go through a rebrand since last year. These events tell me that we are exactly on that trajectory.