Qkeep retweeted
The Ecosystem
Quantus has no smart contracts, by design. The community built on it anyway.
- @qlyphsxyz is building a token protocol on Quantus
- @Quantinals_ brought Ordinals-style inscriptions to Quantus
- @Qkeep_app built qtcscan, another block explorer for Quantus
Mining pools compete for every block
Thank you 🤝
Good review of quantus ecosystem
Under-Explored Quantum Ecosystems #2 - @QuantusNetwork
Quantus has no smart contracts but an ecosystem formed around it anyway.
The secret sauce behind almost every defi-related thing you can do in the ecosystem, is powered by @NEARProtocol.
Let's take a look ↓↓
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Part one was @QRLedger, a chain that has run on hash-based signatures since 2018.
This one's is a much younger chain with a very different ecosystem built on top.
Quantus is:
- a PoW L1 built only yo move money
- mainnet genesis went live September 9th this year
- every transaction on the chain is signed with ML-DSA; ML-DSA-87 for new wallet accounts, and ML-DSA-65 is also supported.
- it has no smart contracts, by design
- $QTC is the only native asset
So what could grow on a chain built only to move money?
1. An Ordinals-style protocol on a chain without smart contracts: @qlyphsxyz
Since tokens cann't be launched on iQuantus, Qlyphs got around that the way Ordinals did on Bitcoin. Their rules, QLYP-v1, ride on normal QTC transfers, and their indexer reads the whole chain to keep track of who owns which token.
That one idea grew into an economy:
- there are Quarks, numbered one-of-one pieces stored inside transactions since 9 Oct
- there's a launchpad where 0.03 QTC starts a token on a bonding curve, and it graduates to a NEAR pool once the curve fills at 210 QTC
- on top of that, they built a wallet, a Telegram bot and an OTC desk.
The catch is that the chain doesn't know these tokens exist, so your balance depends on Qlyphs' servers, not Quantus.
@Quantinals_ runs another inscription protocol like this, with $QNTS on the trust model.
2. DeFi lives on NEAR
Since Quantus can't run DeFi itself, QTC goes to NEAR for it as a wrapped token. It first traded there on 6 Oct through @near_intents, which now handles swaps from 180+ assets inside the official Quantus wallet and has passed $50M in Quantus volume.
.@rhea_finance added a QTC/USDC pool, the first QTC lending market at up to 60% LTV, and a Quantus-NEAR bridge.
.@MeteorWallet, @auroraisnear and @InstaSwap_io give people more ways to swap in and out.
The bridge between quantus and near is still being built. Also, once QTC leaves Quantus, it loses the chain's post-quantum protection and is only as safe as wherever it sits.
3. The wallet race
For a money-only chain, the wallet is the app. There are already several:
- the official Quantus wallet with in-app swaps and about 16K installs
- Quantus cold wallet which turns an offline android phone into a QR signer
- @KeystoneWallet 3 signs Quantus transactions through firmware
- @Qkeep_app a community wallet
- Qlyphs wallet
4. Mining
In two months, 20 named pools have started mining QTC, including @KryptexMining, @HeroMinerss, @f2pool, @pool2miners and LuckyPool.
But look in the last 24 hours:
- Kryptex mined 60.0% of blocks (3,530 of 5,880)
- LuckyPool only 10.4%
- HeroMiners: 10.1%
- Unattributed: 16.5%
- F2Pool: 0 blocks
5. Explorers and tools
- quantus explorer and an open-source indexer (official)
- qtcscan: community explorer from the Qkeep team, with free JSON data on pools, supply and vesting
- Quantum Resistance Renaissance: a solo builder's hub of ~47 browser tools
- @miningchamp tracks Quantus pools and hashrate
I haven't personally expereinced the community but if i missed anything, pls let me know
Checkphrases are in Qkeep since v1.70.18: on Receive and on every send review
qkeep.app
Address poisoning attacks are serious, but largely preventable by using checkphrases.
Address poisoning happens when an attacker swaps the destination address with a lookalike. It can happen because malware got into your clipboard, or because they put a lookalike in your transaction history hoping you accidentally copy it.
The more advanced version will forward test transactions (small value) to the intended destination so you get confirmation from the recipient that it went thru. This is why when doing tests you should always check the txid with the recipient.
But using checkphrases makes this attack much harder to execute. The fundamental weakness being exploited by address poisoning is that humans have a hard time reading random data, so we generally just skip it.
A checkphrase is a human-readable phrase that is cryptographically bound to whatever data you derive it from. You can use it with any data, but the two most interesting usecases are crypto addresses and transaction ids.
If one letter changes in the input, on average all five words will change. For example, if your BTC address is
1A1zP1eP5QGefi2DMPTfTL5SLmv7DivfNa
Then your checkphrase is
Age-Awake-Secret-Blossom-Hedgehog
But if you change one letter
1A1zP1eP5QGefi2DMPTfTL5SLmv7DixfNa
The checkphrase becomes
Innocent-Fitness-Joyful-Brown-Surge
In the default configuration this has about 55 bits of security and requires about 50k hashes to generate a single one, so if you are sending a large amount of money you should check the entire address, since collisions are possible for highly motivated attackers (quintillions of hashes).
It’s open source. Anyone can use it on any address type in any wallet. It’s entirely client side.
github.com/Quantus-Network/q…
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Privacy shouldn't be a toggle you have to find. Qkeep checks spent markers in padded buckets with decoys, and proof requests carry no address, even with Extra privacy mode off.
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New in Qkeep 1.70: Extra privacy.
Turn it on and your phone downloads the public Encrypted Account data once, about 26 MB, then only small updates.
Your balance is found locally, on your device. No server ever sees which encrypted account is yours.
One tap in Settings > Privacy.
Qkeep keeps no list of your addresses, and wallet API requests aren't logged. So use it knowing nobody there can tell you how much QTC sits in Qkeep wallets, yours included.
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Our @QuantusNetwork nodes are on v1.0.5. Qkeep and qtcscan both run on them, so today's DoS fix is already live for the wallet and the explorer. The runtime is unchanged and there is nothing to update on your side.
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Holding your own keys also means knowing what happens to your coins. Qkeep tracks every transfer until it is final on chain, so you never have to guess whether a send really went through.
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herominers pool added to qtcscan
qtcscan.com/pools/
quantus.herominers.com
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Want your address kept off our server? Turn on Extra privacy mode in Qkeep under Settings (opt-in), and Encrypted Accounts get checked on your device instead.
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Keys you hold are only as safe as the signatures behind them. Post-quantum signing on-device is how self-custody lasts. Qkeep does that. nitter.cf/QuantusNetwork/status/…
Self-custody only works as long as the cryptography does.
@JoeMattia on sovereignty, self-custody, and getting back to our roots.
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Importing a key shouldn't be a one-way door. In Qkeep you can reveal and back up an imported private key or any key from seed phrase behind your password, and it hides itself again after 60 seconds.
Post-quantum is becoming a baseline. For QTC holders it starts with signing: ML-DSA keys that stay on your own device, like in Qkeep. nitter.cf/YuviLightman/status/21…
Tap any transfer in Qkeep and check it yourself: full amount, tap-to-copy addresses, and a TXID that opens straight in the block explorer.
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Anyone can run verify.mjs from the public GitHub releases repo to check that Qkeep serves exactly the published files. Have you ever verified a wallet's code before using it?
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Quantum timelines keep shrinking, so keys that sign with post-quantum math today beat any rushed migration later.
nitter.cf/n13/status/21120458524…
Lattices were studied as an attack tool before they became a defense. Worth remembering when picking what guards your keys. nitter.cf/YuviLightman/status/21…
Eli is directionally correct that lattice-crypto has more algebraic structure than hash-crypto and that this structure could theoretically be used to break it, altho i think the newness of lattices is a bit overstated.
Lattice crypto originally started as offensive cryptanalysis, not a defensive structure.
In cryptography, you generally want all-or-nothing systems. If I try to guess your password and I’m even one character off, I should get no clue about how close I was or which characters were correct.
In practice, this is difficult. For example, if I respond slightly slower depending on how many characters are correct, then you can use timing to gradually extract the complete password. This is where timing attacks come from.
Lattices are like vector fields but instead of taking any linear combination of the basis vectors (with real coefficients) you only accept integer coefficients. So you have some building blocks and you can combine them but not shrink or stretch them. It’s similar to how crystals have evenly spaced atoms in multiple dimensions.
The basic idea in lattice attacks is that you find a bunch of clues or partial solutions and make each one a basis vector. Then you try to find (“Learn”) a combination of them whose sum is small (Short Integer Solution, SIS), which simultaneously combines the partial solutions to make a complete solution.
This method can be used to attack elliptic curve signatures when the nonces used are biased, not uniformly distributed.
Lattice signatures and zk-proofs use similar ideas but defensively, to find problems that resist lattice attacks. Learning-With-Errors (LWE) essentially takes that short integer solution and adds noise to it so that an attacker cannot use straightforward linear algebra to solve it. Then you can prove you know the solution without revealing it by solving a related problem.
Hash-crypto works quite differently. It basically uses one-way functions (hashes) as a building block and you prove you know a secret by selectively revealing the inputs to a publicly-committed output.
Since hash-crypto doesn’t have any algebraic equations in its structure, people say it has less attack surface, which is true. The tradeoff is that you have much larger signatures and it doesn’t have nice threshold schemes or key exchange algorithms or encryption, which all rely on that missing algebraic structure.
Both hash-crypto and lattice-crypto rely on the security of hash functions, tho, so the reduction in attack surface is a clear win for hash-crypto.
It would be great if we just had full security-proofs for some crypto-system so we wouldn’t have to rely on heuristics like this, but that’s just where we are in our scientific knowledge as a species. Maybe AI will help us solve P =? NP and that will lead to provably secure systems.
Check your balance in Qkeep without turning on Extra privacy mode: spent-marker lookups already use padded buckets with decoys, and proof requests carry no address.
quantus:native
Quantum-safe from day one means keys and signatures have to be post-quantum too. Qkeep signs with ML-DSA on the device. nitter.cf/therollupco/status/211…
Joe Mattia says Quantus was built quantum-safe from day one, backed by about $2.5M from angels only and no VCs, so the rest of crypto has a benchmark to measure against.
@QuantusNetwork @JoeMattia
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