Macharia Runo

I have come across a National Treasury approval letter showing that, in February 2025, the government approved a $550 million electricity and fertilizer plant in Olkaria through "specially permitted procurement." The decision is significant. It allowed a Chinese investor to enter a strategic public-resource value chain—geothermal steam, power generation, green ammonia, and fertilizer—without the competitive process ordinarily used to test price, technical capacity, and value for money. The letter does not prove corruption; it proves discretion. It shows that Kenya’s Treasury used an exceptional procurement route to admit Kaishan into a value chain built on publicly owned steam and prospective public purchases. The question for Parliament, the Auditor-General is simple: if this project was so exceptional that competition was unnecessary, why was that conclusion not tested openly before the state committed its steam, its purchasing power, and its fiscal credibility? Kaishan’s journey in Kenya is notable: Initial Foothold: Entered as the EPC contractor to Gideon Moi-owned Sosian Energy for its 35 MW Menengai plant ($65M EPC + $18.05M O&M contract). Sosian was one of three IPPs competitively selected by GDC in 2013, with the plant synchronized to the grid in 2023. (Control of Sosian briefly shifted to Devki Raval before reverting to the Moi family). Direct Ownership: Kaishan then acquired OrPower22—the American-linked IPP that was developing Menengai III. This transformed Kaishan from a equipment vendor into an asset owner with long-term interests in Kenyan geothermal generation. Downstream Integration: Through its subsidiary, Kaishan Terra Green Ammonia Ltd, the firm signed a 30-year steam-supply agreement with KenGen for a planned 165.4 MW plant using steam from 18 existing wells. According to disclosures, the plant will produce green ammonia for fertilizer, with Kenya’s Ministry of Agriculture expected to buy the output under Treasury payment support. This represents a major political-economy shift: a private Chinese investor gaining direct access to a public natural resource while securing a long-term public purchasing commitment and fiscal backing. Specially permitted procurement is legally reserved for truly exceptional cases where competition is infeasible. Using it here makes governance the central issue: was competition genuinely impossible, or was an exceptional route used to bypass public scrutiny?