LIAC at EPFL

This paper from Harvard and MIT quietly answers the most important AI question nobody benchmarks properly: Can LLMs actually discover science, or are they just good at talking about it? The paper is called “Evaluating Large Language Models in Scientific Discovery”, and instead of asking models trivia questions, it tests something much harder: Can models form hypotheses, design experiments, interpret results, and update beliefs like real scientists? Here’s what the authors did differently 👇 • They evaluate LLMs across the full discovery loop hypothesis → experiment → observation → revision • Tasks span biology, chemistry, and physics, not toy puzzles • Models must work with incomplete data, noisy results, and false leads • Success is measured by scientific progress, not fluency or confidence What they found is sobering. LLMs are decent at suggesting hypotheses, but brittle at everything that follows. ✓ They overfit to surface patterns ✓ They struggle to abandon bad hypotheses even when evidence contradicts them ✓ They confuse correlation for causation ✓ They hallucinate explanations when experiments fail ✓ They optimize for plausibility, not truth Most striking result: `High benchmark scores do not correlate with scientific discovery ability.` Some top models that dominate standard reasoning tests completely fail when forced to run iterative experiments and update theories. Why this matters: Real science is not one-shot reasoning. It’s feedback, failure, revision, and restraint. LLMs today: • Talk like scientists • Write like scientists • But don’t think like scientists yet The paper’s core takeaway: Scientific intelligence is not language intelligence. It requires memory, hypothesis tracking, causal reasoning, and the ability to say “I was wrong.” Until models can reliably do that, claims about “AI scientists” are mostly premature. This paper doesn’t hype AI. It defines the gap we still need to close. And that’s exactly why it’s important.