ISW is a policy research organization focused on U.S. national security. Email: [email protected]. https://nitter.cf/t.co/FO1PVyOnYB
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NEW | SPECIAL REPORT: The Kremlin is conducting a coordinated series of kinetic campaigns targeting Europe, and NATO states must understand and forthrightly discuss both these ongoing Russian campaigns against Europe and the evolving character of the near-term Russian conventional threat.
The Russian government has long considered itself to be in a long-term conflict with the West — a conflict it has recently escalated through a coordinated series of kinetic campaigns against European targets beyond Ukraine.
European states must both understand internally and publicly name these campaigns for what they are: coordinated kinetic and non-kinetic attacks against NATO military and civilian targets, not isolated incidents or “provocations.”
European officials’ increased willingness to publicly discuss Russia’s kinetic campaigns is positive, but much of the language NATO and individual European states use to discuss the ongoing Russian campaigns still obfuscates the coordinated and coherent nature of the Russian efforts.
NATO must additionally prepare for the possibility of near-term conventional Russian attacks that would not be militarily existential to NATO but could be politically existential by dividing NATO, and on a timeline faster than those that many European officials currently orient themselves on.
NATO and European states require a shared understanding of the problem to design and execute coordinated policies to defeat ongoing Russian kinetic campaigns and deter the Russian conventional threat. NATO and European states have three overall tasks.
First, NATO and Europe must understand and respond to the ongoing Russian kinetic campaigns against Europe, and must use clear language when communicating about Russian actions to facilitate prompt and meaningful responses.
Second, NATO and Europe must rapidly accelerate efforts to forecast and prepare for the risk of a potential near-term limited Russian conventional attack that NATO is not yet sufficiently taking into account
Third, NATO and Europe must improve ongoing efforts to leverage lessons from Ukraine and forecasts of the changing character of war and strengthen NATO’s ability to deter or defeat the evolving conventional Russian military threat.
These three challenges are interlinked and must be taken as a whole. Open, clear-eyed, and prompt discussion of potential European policy responses are essential to respond to the ongoing Russian threat and the risk of further Russian actions to test or directly attack NATO. (1/2)
ISW is seeking a full-time Russia Researcher to join the Russia Team, which produces daily open-source analysis of the war in Ukraine, the geostrategic dynamics of Russian domestic and foreign policy, and how those dynamics affect U.S. national security interests. The role requires flexible and, at times, unpredictable hours, including weekend and holiday coverage as needed.
Qualifications include a bachelor's degree in a related field, with a master's degree preferred, as well as professional working proficiency in Russian. Ideal candidates will have strong open-source research, analytical, and writing skills, along with a solid understanding of Russian political dynamics and military operations. The role also involves collaborating across research teams, mentoring interns, and publishing findings through written, graphical, and oral briefings. (1/2)
2/ Interested in helping our Russia Team produce objective, real-time, unbiased analysis? Apply now: understandingwar.bamboohr.co…
MORE: ISW has long assessed that the Kremlin considers itself to be in an overt conflict with Europe and the United States. ⬇️
The Kremlin has conducted a campaign of irregular actions, military posturing, and nuclear saber rattling against Europe for years, and individual Russian actions are not inherently new.
The Kremlin has increased the intensity of its kinetic actions and statements since Summer 2025, however, such as with the September 9-10, 2025 Russian drone incursion into Polish airspace — and the Kremlin has become even more brazen in Summer 2026.
The Kremlin is conducting a series of coordinated kinetic campaigns against NATO member states, and European states must both understand internally and publicly name these campaigns externally for what they are: coordinated kinetic and non-kinetic attacks against NATO military and civilian targets, not isolated incidents or “provocations.” Read more ⬇️
MORE: The Russian military could conduct air, missile, or drone strikes or a limited ground incursion against one or more Baltic states to test and seek to break NATO’s resolve to invoke Article 5 and respond effectively on its basis. ⬇️
A limited Russian attack would aim to create a situation in which NATO is unable to agree how, or if at all, to respond to a Russian attack. Any near-term Russian conventional attack would be tailored to maximize the possibility that NATO states would fail to unify and provide military assistance as an alliance to an attacked member state.
A scenario in which NATO does not unanimously vote to honor an invocation of the Article 5 mutual defense clause, or in which a state under Russian attack declines to invoke Article 5 at all out of concern that it would not receive unified support, would significantly damage NATO’s credibility and unity — an outcome that would achieve a longstanding Russian objective and immensely expand Putin’s space to maneuver and plan future attacks against a divided alliance.
MORE: Russian denials of mobilization do not indicate that Russia will not conduct mobilization, as Putin has shown no inclination to accept a ceasefire or lower the objectives he has given the Russian military to accomplish. These denials instead signal Putin’s concerns about the likely reaction of Russian society to involuntary mobilizations. It remains unclear when or what form of mobilization Putin may choose to order.
NEW: The Kremlin continues to deny that Russia will conduct mobilization after its September 18-20 State Duma elections, likely in an effort to dissuade Russian citizens from fleeing abroad. (1/2)
Other Key Takeaways:
The Kremlin will have to change its recruitment practices and likely conduct some form of involuntary reserve call-up in order to sustain its war effort in Ukraine over the mid- to long-term if it continues operations that generate casualties at the current rate.
Poland has changed its air defense posture in response to increasing Russian strikes against border infrastructure and drone and other incursions into the territories of states neighboring Ukraine.
Russian President Vladimir Putin seized several prominent foreign enterprises under the pretext of defending Russian national security as he continues to expand and exercise his power to nationalize foreign and Russian assets.
The details of Ukraine’s restructuring of the military command arrangements in and around Donetsk Oblast are becoming clear as the new organizations come formally into operation.
Ukraine is attempting to increase the resilience of its energy system in preparation for Russia’s anticipated intense winter strike campaign targeting Ukraine’s energy grid.
Russia launched 93 drones against Ukraine overnight.
Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian military assets and energy infrastructure on the night of September 17 and 18.
Neither Ukrainian nor Russian forces advanced.
Institute for the Study of War retweeted
NEW: The Houthis exploited a window of opportunity in July 2026 to resume their war with Saudi Arabia and secure concessions from Saudi Arabia that would alleviate the group’s dire economic situation. The Houthis, with Iranian backing and encouragement, sought to impose economic pressure on Saudi Arabia to accomplish their objectives because the group sees economic pressure as a useful lever that has previously forced Saudi capitulation to Houthi demands. (1/2)
Other Key Takeaways:
The Houthis may decide to cease their present offensives in exchange for Saudi economic concessions. Addressing these concerns will not, however, satiate or moderate the Houthis. The Houthis view solidifying control over northern Yemen as a prerequisite to controlling at least all of Yemen.
Pakistan may seek to exert leverage over Iran to restrain Houthi offensive activity against Saudi Arabia. The Houthis are an independent partner of Iran and may resist potential Iranian pressure to halt their campaigns, however.
The Houthis likely seek to capture Marib Governorate in order to extract and export oil through the Red Sea, which could fund Houthi political and military activities, assuming export is possible.
Iran has continued its efforts to disrupt regional shipping and pressure the global economy to impose costs on the United States and its allies, even as transits through the strait have increased relatively and oil prices remain low relative to Iranian hopes.
MORE | Russian Air, Missile, & Drone Campaign (1/2)⬇️
- Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of September 17 to 18.
- Ukraine will likely be able to deploy interceptors against Russia’s new jet-powered drones before Russia builds out the infrastructure required to launch very large numbers of the drones in a single strike package.
NEW: The Kremlin continues to deny that Russia will conduct mobilization after its September 18-20 State Duma elections, likely in an effort to dissuade Russian citizens from fleeing abroad. (1/2)
Other Key Takeaways:
The Kremlin will have to change its recruitment practices and likely conduct some form of involuntary reserve call-up in order to sustain its war effort in Ukraine over the mid- to long-term if it continues operations that generate casualties at the current rate.
Poland has changed its air defense posture in response to increasing Russian strikes against border infrastructure and drone and other incursions into the territories of states neighboring Ukraine.
Russian President Vladimir Putin seized several prominent foreign enterprises under the pretext of defending Russian national security as he continues to expand and exercise his power to nationalize foreign and Russian assets.
The details of Ukraine’s restructuring of the military command arrangements in and around Donetsk Oblast are becoming clear as the new organizations come formally into operation.
Ukraine is attempting to increase the resilience of its energy system in preparation for Russia’s anticipated intense winter strike campaign targeting Ukraine’s energy grid.
Russia launched 93 drones against Ukraine overnight.
Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian military assets and energy infrastructure on the night of September 17 and 18.
Neither Ukrainian nor Russian forces advanced.
NEW: The Kremlin continues to deny that Russia will conduct mobilization after its September 18-20 State Duma elections, likely in an effort to dissuade Russian citizens from fleeing abroad. (1/2)
Other Key Takeaways:
The Kremlin will have to change its recruitment practices and likely conduct some form of involuntary reserve call-up in order to sustain its war effort in Ukraine over the mid- to long-term if it continues operations that generate casualties at the current rate.
Poland has changed its air defense posture in response to increasing Russian strikes against border infrastructure and drone and other incursions into the territories of states neighboring Ukraine.
Russian President Vladimir Putin seized several prominent foreign enterprises under the pretext of defending Russian national security as he continues to expand and exercise his power to nationalize foreign and Russian assets.
The details of Ukraine’s restructuring of the military command arrangements in and around Donetsk Oblast are becoming clear as the new organizations come formally into operation.
Ukraine is attempting to increase the resilience of its energy system in preparation for Russia’s anticipated intense winter strike campaign targeting Ukraine’s energy grid.
Russia launched 93 drones against Ukraine overnight.
Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian military assets and energy infrastructure on the night of September 17 and 18.
Neither Ukrainian nor Russian forces advanced.
2/ Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 18, 2026: isw.pub/UkrWar091826
NEW: The Houthis exploited a window of opportunity in July 2026 to resume their war with Saudi Arabia and secure concessions from Saudi Arabia that would alleviate the group’s dire economic situation. The Houthis, with Iranian backing and encouragement, sought to impose economic pressure on Saudi Arabia to accomplish their objectives because the group sees economic pressure as a useful lever that has previously forced Saudi capitulation to Houthi demands. (1/2)
Other Key Takeaways:
The Houthis may decide to cease their present offensives in exchange for Saudi economic concessions. Addressing these concerns will not, however, satiate or moderate the Houthis. The Houthis view solidifying control over northern Yemen as a prerequisite to controlling at least all of Yemen.
Pakistan may seek to exert leverage over Iran to restrain Houthi offensive activity against Saudi Arabia. The Houthis are an independent partner of Iran and may resist potential Iranian pressure to halt their campaigns, however.
The Houthis likely seek to capture Marib Governorate in order to extract and export oil through the Red Sea, which could fund Houthi political and military activities, assuming export is possible.
Iran has continued its efforts to disrupt regional shipping and pressure the global economy to impose costs on the United States and its allies, even as transits through the strait have increased relatively and oil prices remain low relative to Iranian hopes.
2/ Iran Update, September 18, 2026: isw.pub/IranUpdate091826
Institute for the Study of War retweeted
Russian cognitive warfare spans generations. Explore our interactive map laying out Russia's cognitive warfare infrastructure. The Kremlin’s growing effort to co-opt media professionals and influencers globally coupled with expansion of Russian state media partnerships with foreign outlets is critical to Russia’s ability to shape narratives over the coming decades. The US and partners need to monitor and disrupt Russia’s efforts to expand its media conglomerate or risk facing a growing Russian capability to spread false narratives and shape decisions around the globe and over time.
ISW is releasing a new version of its interactive map displaying the pillars of Russia’s cognitive warfare infrastructure. Russia uses cognitive warfare to shape the decisions and will of its opponents. The Kremlin is expanding its network of global media partnerships, state-run international journalism training initiatives, and building a global media recruitment pipeline targeting young media professionals abroad. The Kremlin seeks to shape global narratives for decades to come. (1/2)
The map includes Russian state media partnerships, state journalism training programs, and the Russian House cultural centers, which the Kremlin uses to project influence abroad. ISW will regularly update this interactive map.
Institute for the Study of War retweeted
NEW | SPECIAL REPORT: The Kremlin is conducting a coordinated series of kinetic campaigns targeting Europe, and NATO states must understand and forthrightly discuss both these ongoing Russian campaigns against Europe and the evolving character of the near-term Russian conventional threat.
The Russian government has long considered itself to be in a long-term conflict with the West — a conflict it has recently escalated through a coordinated series of kinetic campaigns against European targets beyond Ukraine.
European states must both understand internally and publicly name these campaigns for what they are: coordinated kinetic and non-kinetic attacks against NATO military and civilian targets, not isolated incidents or “provocations.”
European officials’ increased willingness to publicly discuss Russia’s kinetic campaigns is positive, but much of the language NATO and individual European states use to discuss the ongoing Russian campaigns still obfuscates the coordinated and coherent nature of the Russian efforts.
NATO must additionally prepare for the possibility of near-term conventional Russian attacks that would not be militarily existential to NATO but could be politically existential by dividing NATO, and on a timeline faster than those that many European officials currently orient themselves on.
NATO and European states require a shared understanding of the problem to design and execute coordinated policies to defeat ongoing Russian kinetic campaigns and deter the Russian conventional threat. NATO and European states have three overall tasks.
First, NATO and Europe must understand and respond to the ongoing Russian kinetic campaigns against Europe, and must use clear language when communicating about Russian actions to facilitate prompt and meaningful responses.
Second, NATO and Europe must rapidly accelerate efforts to forecast and prepare for the risk of a potential near-term limited Russian conventional attack that NATO is not yet sufficiently taking into account
Third, NATO and Europe must improve ongoing efforts to leverage lessons from Ukraine and forecasts of the changing character of war and strengthen NATO’s ability to deter or defeat the evolving conventional Russian military threat.
These three challenges are interlinked and must be taken as a whole. Open, clear-eyed, and prompt discussion of potential European policy responses are essential to respond to the ongoing Russian threat and the risk of further Russian actions to test or directly attack NATO. (1/2)
Institute for the Study of War retweeted
MORE: Arguments that NATO runs the risk of “war enthusiasm” and inducing a Russian attack by preparing for its own defense mistakenly accept the Kremlin’s framing that Russia was or will be provoked into illegally invading its neighbors.
Pragmatic responses to Russian threats — such as shooting down Russian drones in NATO airspace, increasing NATO’s conventional presence in frontline states, or hardening critical infrastructure against the threat of Russian strikes or sabotage — are not escalatory actions by NATO, no matter how often the Kremlin frames them that way.
They are necessary and justified responses to Russian threats and attacks. Preparing better defenses against and responding appropriately to escalating attacks is not escalation; it is prudence.
Concerns expressed by some policymakers in frontline NATO states that they do not want to overly alarm their populations or drive away economic investment by moving to a war footing or publicly discussing Russian threats are understandable on the surface but impede necessary efforts. Europe may not need alarmed populations, but it needs informed populations and certainly does need alarmed governments.
NEW | SPECIAL REPORT: The Kremlin is conducting a coordinated series of kinetic campaigns targeting Europe, and NATO states must understand and forthrightly discuss both these ongoing Russian campaigns against Europe and the evolving character of the near-term Russian conventional threat.
The Russian government has long considered itself to be in a long-term conflict with the West — a conflict it has recently escalated through a coordinated series of kinetic campaigns against European targets beyond Ukraine.
European states must both understand internally and publicly name these campaigns for what they are: coordinated kinetic and non-kinetic attacks against NATO military and civilian targets, not isolated incidents or “provocations.”
European officials’ increased willingness to publicly discuss Russia’s kinetic campaigns is positive, but much of the language NATO and individual European states use to discuss the ongoing Russian campaigns still obfuscates the coordinated and coherent nature of the Russian efforts.
NATO must additionally prepare for the possibility of near-term conventional Russian attacks that would not be militarily existential to NATO but could be politically existential by dividing NATO, and on a timeline faster than those that many European officials currently orient themselves on.
NATO and European states require a shared understanding of the problem to design and execute coordinated policies to defeat ongoing Russian kinetic campaigns and deter the Russian conventional threat. NATO and European states have three overall tasks.
First, NATO and Europe must understand and respond to the ongoing Russian kinetic campaigns against Europe, and must use clear language when communicating about Russian actions to facilitate prompt and meaningful responses.
Second, NATO and Europe must rapidly accelerate efforts to forecast and prepare for the risk of a potential near-term limited Russian conventional attack that NATO is not yet sufficiently taking into account
Third, NATO and Europe must improve ongoing efforts to leverage lessons from Ukraine and forecasts of the changing character of war and strengthen NATO’s ability to deter or defeat the evolving conventional Russian military threat.
These three challenges are interlinked and must be taken as a whole. Open, clear-eyed, and prompt discussion of potential European policy responses are essential to respond to the ongoing Russian threat and the risk of further Russian actions to test or directly attack NATO. (1/2)
NEW: People’s Republic of China (PRC) entities likely linked to the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) reportedly sold Iran satellite images of a US air base in Jordan that Iran later used to kill three US soldiers and injure another four. Private-sector PRC entities, many of which have ties to the PLA, have reportedly been increasing the sale of geospatial analysis discussing US military activity to third-party actors, risking the safety of US officers. (1/2)
Other Key Takeaways:
PRC Foreign Minister Wang Yi met with Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi on September 16 to discuss the ongoing conflicts in the Middle East. Wang used much more forceful language, urging Iran to limit the spread of conflict and possibly pressuring Iran to restrain Houthi activity in Yemen at the request of Saudi Arabia, according to anonymous sources. The PRC is likely concerned that conflict escalation will harm its energy access, Middle East trade interests, and relations with the Gulf States.
Satellite imagery from spatial intelligence firm Vantor revealed that the PLA is constructing what analysts believe is the world's first unmanned submarine mothership. The mothership could increase the operational range of PLA unmanned underwater vehicles, which the PLA could use to conduct undersea reconnaissance, lay sea mines, or attack enemy targets in a conflict scenario.
2/ China & Taiwan Update, September 18, 2026: isw.pub/ChinaTaiwanUpdate091…
Institute for the Study of War retweeted
NEW | Littoral African countries, almost all of which recently joined a Saudi-led naval coalition, have not yet signaled interest in directly joining any military action against the Yemeni Houthis after the group captured the northern entrance to the Bab al Mandeb Strait, demonstrating the limits of emerging regional coalitions and partnerships.
The African countries are likely accepting Houthi statements that the group does not intend to target international shipping or close the Bab al Mandeb, although there is no guarantee that the Houthis will perpetually refrain from leveraging their improved coastal positioning to attack or threaten international shipping as it pursues greater regional influence. 🧵⬇️
Institute for the Study of War retweeted
ISW is releasing a new version of its interactive map displaying the pillars of Russia’s cognitive warfare infrastructure. Russia uses cognitive warfare to shape the decisions and will of its opponents. The Kremlin is expanding its network of global media partnerships, state-run international journalism training initiatives, and building a global media recruitment pipeline targeting young media professionals abroad. The Kremlin seeks to shape global narratives for decades to come. (1/2)
The map includes Russian state media partnerships, state journalism training programs, and the Russian House cultural centers, which the Kremlin uses to project influence abroad. ISW will regularly update this interactive map.
Institute for the Study of War retweeted
NEW: Russian inaction and mismanagement have blockaded thousands of people in occupied Oleshky, Kherson Oblast and surrounding areas.
Other Key Takeaways:
Russia continues its illegal deportation of female Ukrainian political prisoners to penal colonies thousands of kilometers away from Ukraine. Russia’s harsh sentencing and frequent deportation of Crimean political prisoners, particularly women, have significant ramifications for the families and communities left behind.
Russian state-owned television channel Rossiya-1 recently interviewed a teenager from occupied Kherson Oblast who is now fighting in the Russian army.
Russia continues efforts to engrain military-patriotic programming in preschools in occupied Ukraine.
The first stages of voting in the Russian State Duma elections have concluded in occupied Ukraine as occupation administrators continue to set conditions for a controlled and coerced United Russia victory.
A prominent Crimean occupation official publicly advocated for using forced military service to punish residents for the perceived expression of pro-Ukrainian views.
The Sevastopol occupation administration is expanding the institutionalization of punitive nationalization.
Russia continues to expand the reach of state-controlled public broadcast media into occupied Ukraine.
