Thomas Pierret (@ThomasPierret) header
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Senior Researcher at CNRS-IREMAM, Aix-en-Provence. Tweet in private capacity. RT not endorsement. Header: A l'Est de Damas by Majd al-Dik & Nathalie Bontemps

Aix-en-Provence, France
Joined December 2011
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Most of the western and Asian tourists who bring in real cash (i.e., not backpackers) would come with tour operators anyway, but it would be crazy (economically speaking) to treat neighbours and Gulf people the same way.
These new Syrian visa requirements were rolled out without any prior notice and left hundreds of passengers stranded or turned away. I’ve been hearing from people who work in tourism all day that they are incredibly concerned about how much this will hurt a sector that is only just starting to recover.
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Notably because tourists from the region are more likely to come in spite of persistent local and regional instability.
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Before 2011, no approved tour operator was needed for EU citizens to get a Syrian visa. You just had to apply beforehand at your homeland's Syrian embassy. The process used to take a dozen days if I remember correctly.
Syria’s abrupt visa pre-approval rule itself isn’t inherently bad but the nature in which it was announced so suddenly and the need for an approved tour operator is very reminiscent of the Assad regime, North Korea and Turkmenistan. This is not good optics.
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Interesting take
The narrative around Liwa al-Baqir pushed by some government figures and outsiders was exaggerated from day one in a very transparent attempt to prevent post-war violence between parts of the Aleppo Sunni community. Ask any opposition fighter from Aleppo city and they will tell you what happened. Some Liwa al-Baqr fighters stayed home during the battle while others continued to fight for the regime. But going home was the extent of their 'support' - they were not some secret fifth column that participated in the liberation of Aleppo. The Liwa al-Baqir story is no different than the tens of thousands of Sunni and Alawi soldiers who deserted during the final offensive, yet these men are not lauded by government leaders. The Sunni base easily sees through this political rhetoric and has not forgiven Liwa al-Baqir for their crimes during the revolution, nor any of the other Sunni militias and shabiha who fought for the regime.
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"Easily"? First requirement is to bring down IS cells activity to zero, because a single attack against tourists could destroy the industry overnight. They're still far from achieving it. Second, a significant part of pre-2011 tourists were Shia pilgrims who aren't coming back.
Syria can easily generate +25% of its entire GDP from tourism in the next 5 years if the gov focuses on this sector. In 2010, tourism industry was generating ~$6bln, despite all the neglect from the 60 year old Baathi dictatorship. +5000 years of civilizations, mountains, forests, beaches, 6 UNESCO World Heritage sites and some of the oldest mosques, churches and world historic sites... all neglected. Syria has 20,000 hotel rooms. For perspective: Charleston, South Carolina has more. This is the quickest win that can come after stabilizing the country & investing in this sector.
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Some noticeable figures here: - 78% of the respondents (thus excluding non-respondent surveyed persons) support a democratic system defined as political pluralism and government accountability - only 9% support a non-competitive Islamic regime
What seems to be the largest public opinion survey in #Syria’s history just dropped. 3,600 Syrians. Every governorate. 500+ questions. Fieldwork Sept 28 to Oct 15, 2026. Margin of error ±2-3%. What Syrians actually want, in their own numbers 🧵 damascusinstitute.org/wp-con…
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- 66% consider a democratic system does not contradict Islam - 74% would not joint a political party established by current incumbent - 67% support the separation of religion from politics (but no further details on what this practically entails)
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Whoever made this (up) wanted to implicate the Turks (red flag) and Hamas (it is signed by "Abu Mu'adh Aknaf", a probable reference to the Hamas-linked former Syrian rebel group Aknaf Bayt al-Maqdis)
New jihadi group Saraya Nuzza’ al-Qaba'il announced to confront Israel’s incursions in southern Syria
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Maybe because de facto, they're a state rather than an "armed group"?
Houthis experiment with 'weapons no other armed group possesses' thenationalnews.com/news/men…
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Fairly clear pattern here: most big names among signatories are either Salafis (haraki/activist type) or Ikhwan. Not many Sufi/traditionalists. – at Aix-en-Provence, France
Several dozen Syrian Islamic scholars and conservative figures, including a few ex-rebels and a parliamentarian (Kinan Nahhas, ex-Ahrar) urge the state to protect Syria’s Islamic identity, which, they imply, is threatened by an overly permissive attitude to secular public events.
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Not because the latter are fonder of Asala Nasri, but maybe because they feel more vulnerable and/or don't want to jeopardise a relationship with the new regime, which has proven better than initially expected. – at Aix-en-Provence, France
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Je publie "Le Conseil islamique syrien, ou l’unité dans l’exil" dans l'ouvrage collectif "Autorités religieuses en mouvement" (dir. K. Boisseveain, M.-L. Boursin, S. Gabry-Thienpont & N. Neveu, chez Diacritiques Editions). lcdpu.fr/books/09DD6309-DB5A…
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Créé en 2014 à Istanbul et dissous en 2025, le Conseil islamique syrien était une tentative inédite d'institutionnaliser une autorité musulmane sunnite indépendante du pouvoir politique.
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I wrote the chapter on Syria in the newly published 10th edition of Government and Politics of the Middle East and North Africa: Development, Democracy, and Dictatorship (edited by Sean Yom).
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I argue that the historical narratives promoted by mainstream Syrian Sunni ulama focus less on periods emblematic of Islam’s bygone grandeur (e.g. Umayyad/Ottoman empires) than on the era of parliamentary rule spanning the late French Mandate through the early independence.
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Le chiffre de 200.000 yézidis en Syrie avant la guerre semble très excessif. En 2007 le démographe Youssef Courbage estimait leur population à environ 14.000 personnes.
Le calvaire continue pour les Yézidis. Ils étaient près de 200 000 en Syrie avant la révolution de 2011, mais une bonne partie a fui depuis. Le point sur leur situation aujourd’hui, au nord-est de la Syrie. Un reportage de D. Arnold.
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Le seul chercheur à travailler spécifiquement sur la question à l'époque (Sebastian Maisel) donnait un chiffre encore inférieur (moins de 10.000) onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/…
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There's arguably no serious plan to do so: threat of impending Syrian invasion has been agitated by Hezbollah to bolster communal Shia support. Nahhas' take is interesting still as it probably reflects broader popular mood.
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This means HTS members command only one third of the SAA's existing divisions. What about appointment patterns at brigade/regiment levels?
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Ahmad Al-Charaa ou la hantise du putsh. Mon portrait du président syrien pour @OrientXXI
Tout au long de son parcours, le chef de #HTC et actuel président #syrien par intérim Ahmed #AlCharaa a joué sur les forces en présence et les nominations pour atteindre le sommet d’un pouvoir personnel, qu’il entend bien désormais garder. ✍️🏽@ThomasPierret orientxxi.info/magazine/syri…
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What strikes me: no ex officio membership for armed forces commanders (unlike in Turkey's NSC e.g.). Suggests al-Shar'a wants to limit military interference. Consistent with broader policies.
Ahmad al-Shar'a announces the formation of a National Security Council: 1. The National Security Council shall be formed under the chairmanship of the President of the Republic and its purpose shall be to coordinate and manage security and political policies. 2. The National Security Council consists of the following members: -Minister of Foreign Affairs -Minister of Defense -Director of General Intelligence -Minister of Interior -Advisory seats, appointed by the President of the Republic based on competence and experience -A specialized technical seat, appointed by the President of the Republic, to follow-up on technical and scientific affairs related to the minutes of the session. 3. The National Security Council holds meetings periodically or upon invitation of the President of the Republic, and makes decisions related to national security and the challenges facing the state in consultation among the members. 4. The tasks and working mechanisms of the National Security Council shall be determined by directives from the President of the Republic in a manner consistent with the supreme national interest and ensuring effective coordination between various agencies and institutions. 5. This decision shall be effective from the date of its issuance and shall be communicated to the relevant authorities for implementation.
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That's lazy, poorly-informed analysis. First, army/security weren't "dissolved": they disintegrated on December 7-8. Second, there was no "healthy" part in the former armed forces that was remotely separable from Assad's murder machine. They had to disappear anyway.
This quoted post is unavailable.
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Third, no credible/legitimate transition was possible while keeping the Baath party-state in existence. Fourth, useful parts of civilian state institutions were preserved by the new regime. Current sectarian violence can't be explained by the one-fit-all "Bush in Iraq" narrative.
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