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VIA SOLUTIS works with climate ventures on two connected tasks: commercialising technology and developing first commercial projects.
For technology companies: commercial strategy, licensing, partnerships and the organisation to bring a technology to market.
For project developers: the commercial and organisational foundation for a First-of-a-Kind project, with clear responsibilities across the owner and its partners.
Founded by Melich Seefeldt.
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Developing a technology or a first commercial project? Tell us where you are and which decision comes next.
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Your 1st process license for your climate-tech project can become development work your company cannot afford.
A technology provider licensing a SAF or e-fuels process for its first commercial plant is committing before that implementation has been built and operated. Some design work and scale-up questions may remain unresolved.
Suppose, hypothetically, that further testing shows the proposed reactor design needs more engineering. The licensee expects a revised package within the agreed fee. The licensor budgeted for delivery of the existing design.
The same engineers must now investigate the issue, revise the package and respond to the customer's schedule. Even before the parties settle who owes what, that work consumes cash and capacity.
The customer has a valid need for a workable design. The provider needs obligations it can finance. Leaving the boundary unclear can damage both.
Before signing, I would secure:
🔻 A precise scope: state which development questions remain and which investigations and revisions the fee includes.
🔻 A funded work process: agree authorisation, staffing and payment for additional development, with a temporary arrangement for disputed work.
🔻 A delivery review: reassess schedule and resources when new evidence materially changes the effort required.
The commercial opportunity must come with a credible plan for delivering the commitment.
Who invests in making the first license work?
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𝗘𝗻𝗲𝗿𝗴𝘆 𝘀𝗲𝗰𝘂𝗿𝗶𝘁𝘆 𝗵𝗮𝘀 𝘁𝘄𝗼 𝗰𝗹𝗼𝗰𝗸𝘀:
1. weeks to manage a supply shock, 2. years to decades to build new low-carbon molecules, needed for #NetZero.
𝗦𝗵𝗼𝗿𝘁 𝘁𝗲𝗿𝗺 - 𝗱𝗮𝘆𝘀 𝘁𝗼 𝘄𝗲𝗲𝗸𝘀: Governments need supply that already exists: fuel stocks, available imports and coordinated action. The #IEA ’s 11 October diesel statement concerns that immediate response. A plant still awaiting an investment decision cannot put fuel into the market next week.
𝗟𝗼𝗻𝗴 𝘁𝗲𝗿𝗺 - 𝘆𝗲𝗮𝗿𝘀 𝘁𝗼 𝗱𝗲𝗰𝗮𝗱𝗲𝘀: Replacing #fossilfuels and fossil-derived feedstocks for deep #Decarbonization requires both #scaling established alternatives and commercialising new production routes in low-carbon fuels, chemicals and materials. For new #ClimateTech, the bridge from pilot to repeatable industrial production is the first-of-a-kind, #FOAK commercial plant. Developers must secure buyers, finance construction and ramp-up, prove product quality and cost, and operate reliably.
The #EnergyTransition question is not only how much these novel plants produce, but which dependencies they reduce, and which they introduce.
#Europe already has significant #policy frameworks and support mechanisms, including the #CleanIndustrialDeal, the #EuropeanHydrogenBank and national energy and #climateplan s. The strategic test is whether they help turn first plants into repeatable production capacity.
That test includes the difficult stretch from late construction to reliable operation. Completion can slip. Commissioning, product qualification and paid revenue can take longer than planned. A #loan guarantee can help raise debt; a production premium supports eligible output once it is verified. Neither automatically supplies all the cash needed before the plant becomes reliable. A robust #ClimateFinance plan must identify who provides that cash, when it can be drawn, and under what conditions.
I would judge the first clock by the speed and cost of relief. I would judge the second by
🔻 scaled-up new production routes,
🔻 established new value chains,
🔻 delivered volumes,
🔻 dependence on critical inputs, and
🔻 cost when markets tighten.
The next supply disruption, and actual production in 2030 and 2035, will show which of today’s plans became reliable industrial supply.
When the next fuel shock hits, which region will deliver low-carbon molecules, and which will buy them?
#lowcarbon #saf #efuels #greenhydrogen #advancedbiofuels #emethanol #decarbonization
𝗙𝗶𝗿𝘀𝘁-𝗼𝗳-𝗮 𝗞𝗶𝗻𝗱 𝗽𝗿𝗼𝗷𝗲𝗰𝘁𝘀 𝗶𝗻 #𝗦𝗔𝗙, #𝗲𝗳𝘂𝗲𝗹𝘀 𝗼𝗿 #𝗮𝗱𝘃𝗮𝗻𝗰𝗲𝗱𝗯𝗶𝗼𝗳𝘂𝗲𝗹𝘀 𝗱𝗼 𝗻𝗼𝘁 𝗮𝗹𝘄𝗮𝘆𝘀 𝗳𝗮𝗶𝗹 𝗯𝗲𝗰𝗮𝘂𝘀𝗲 𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝗮𝗺𝗯𝗶𝘁𝗶𝗼𝗻 𝘄𝗮𝘀 𝘁𝗼𝗼 𝘀𝗺𝗮𝗹𝗹.
They can also fail when the first commercial bet is too big to correct.
When I challenge the size of a First-of-a-Kind plant with my customers, two questions dominate:
1.) the economics of scale and
2.) the capital at risk before reliable operation.
𝗧𝗵𝗲 𝗱𝗲𝘃𝗲𝗹𝗼𝗽𝗲𝗿’𝘀 𝗰𝗮𝘀𝗲: 𝗯𝘂𝗶𝗹𝗱 𝗹𝗮𝗿𝗴𝗲. 𝗔 𝗽𝗹𝗮𝗻𝘁 𝘁𝗵𝗮𝘁 𝗰𝗮𝗻𝗻𝗼𝘁 𝗰𝗼𝗺𝗽𝗲𝘁𝗲 𝗶𝘀 𝗻𝗼 𝗰𝗼𝗺𝗺𝗲𝗿𝗰𝗶𝗮𝗹 𝘃𝗶𝗰𝘁𝗼𝗿𝘆.
Engineering, infrastructure and process equipment do not necessarily cost twice as much when we double capacity. Spread that investment over more capacity. Give the business a CAPEX advantage.
Both sizes need operators, a laboratory, management and site support. Fewer saleable tonnes carry those fixed costs in a smaller plant. We can survive commissioning and still build a business that cannot compete.
Volume gives us commercial weight. Larger orders can improve feedstock purchasing and transport terms. Substantial deliveries justify a buyer’s qualification effort and long-term offtake. Go too small and we risk paying more while offering too little.
𝗧𝗵𝗲 𝗶𝗻𝘃𝗲𝘀𝘁𝗼𝗿’𝘀 𝗮𝗻𝘀𝘄𝗲𝗿: 𝘀𝗵𝗼𝘄 𝗺𝗲 𝘄𝗵𝗮𝘁 𝗵𝗮𝗽𝗽𝗲𝗻𝘀 𝘄𝗵𝗲𝗻 𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝗙𝗢𝗔𝗞 𝗳𝗮𝗶𝗹𝘀 𝘁𝗼 𝗽𝗲𝗿𝗳𝗼𝗿𝗺.
Clariant’s sunliquid plant in Podari began producing in 2022 but missed its target operating parameters; Clariant closed the operation after concluding that continued ramp-up would require significant additional capital. St1’s Kajaani plant operated from 2017 to 2023; St1 says its best production reached about a third of its annual target and that it closed the plant as unprofitable. These are different histories. Neither proves that plant size caused the outcome. Unknown problems can emerge when the integrated plant runs.
A smaller commercial FOAK commits less capital to a design that may never deliver dependable performance.
A failed key reactor can mean redesign, months of fabrication, dismantling, reconstruction and recommissioning. The first investment is spent. Now fund the correction. Smaller equipment and installations can reduce that bill; faster recovery still depends on fabrication and access.
Feedstock contracts do not prove that the supply chain and the running plant work together. Commissioning tests deliveries, specifications, storage, preparation and conversion as one system. Smaller requirements mean less material to replace, less inventory to finance and fewer tonnes to redirect during a shutdown.
The tail-end risk: another discovery after another modification, with no firm end date. Cash keeps leaving. Reliable revenue stays out of reach. Funding runs out, or the owner refuses another attempt. Technical problems become the loss of the investment.
To reach financial close, I need both cases to survive scrutiny: competitive production and enough capital to fund a major correction.
Which risk can your business survive: higher unit costs or a 1st plant too expensive to fix?
𝗬𝗼𝘂𝗿 𝗳𝗶𝗿𝘀𝘁 #𝗦𝗔𝗙 𝗼𝗿 #𝗲𝗳𝘂𝗲𝗹𝘀 𝘁𝗲𝗰𝗵𝗻𝗼𝗹𝗼𝗴𝘆 𝗹𝗶𝗰𝗲𝗻𝘀𝗲 𝗳𝗼𝗿 𝗮 #𝗙𝗢𝗔𝗞 𝗽𝗿𝗼𝗷𝗲𝗰𝘁 𝗰𝗼𝘂𝗹𝗱 𝘁𝗿𝗶𝗴𝗴𝗲𝗿 𝘆𝗼𝘂𝗿 𝗻𝗲𝘅𝘁 𝗳𝘂𝗻𝗱𝗶𝗻𝗴 𝗰𝗿𝗶𝘀𝗶𝘀.
You have spent years developing your #lowcarbon technology. A visionary investor finally wants a First-of-a-Kind plant. This is your 1st reference as a technology provider - the #ScaleUp project that could establish your technology's #Bankability and unlock its commercial future.
Then it comes - the requirement for a #bankguarantee backing your performance obligations for #DeRisking.
The requested amount may be substantial relative to your entire #balancesheet. The bank may require cash collateral, squeezing #Liquidity. That cash cannot also pay the engineers, secure long-lead equipment or keep your commissioning team on site.
You have won the work. Can you finance the protection required to perform it?
You are committing to a novel plant that has never been built or operated at this scale. Some failure modes may only emerge during #commissioning and sustained operation. Their consequences cannot all be confidently identified, priced or bounded upfront in #ProjectFinance.
A #performanceguarantee gives the project sponsor defined protection. It cannot make those unresolved FOAK risks disappear or bridge the #ValleyOfDeath.
If acceptance slips, the guarantee may need extending. #Collateral remains tied up precisely when #troubleshooting and modifications demand more cash. Your 1st reference is consuming the resources needed to make it work.
And if the technology company becomes insolvent, a #bankguarantee may still pay against a compliant demand. But that payment does not recreate the engineering team, preserve its practical knowledge or establish a proven route to reliable operation.
Even established wind manufacturing has needed #BlendedFinance to fund guarantee capacity. In 2024, the #EIB provided #DeutscheBank with a €500m counter-guarantee supporting up to €1bn of bank guarantees for European wind manufacturers, including advance-payment and performance guarantees.
For a #technologylicensor pursuing its 1st commercial reference, this capacity belongs in the financing plan from the outset.
For the #projectdeveloper, the uncomfortable question is how much protection you can demand before the cash it consumes constrains the very supplier needed to make the plant work.
What you must do:
Before accepting the order, agree the guarantee facility with the bank. Negotiate reductions and release against verifiable milestones. Stress-test delayed acceptance and additional engineering work. Establish what #CatalyticCapital remains available if the first plant takes longer to stabilise.
#Cleantech decisions belong alongside price, margin and delivery dates.
The board question is simple:
"After providing every guarantee this license requires, do we still have enough financial capacity to deliver it?"
Ahead of the 2nd Synthetic Fuels Assembly in London, I kept coming back to one question: who should pay for the learning curve of the first commercial e-fuels plants?
Investor: Why should I finance Plant #1 when Plant #2 will probably be cheaper and less risky?
Developer: Because without Plant #1, there is no Plant #2.
True, but not sufficient.
The stronger case is that a FOAK plant must create economic value beyond its own production.
The uncomfortable truth is that a FOAK plant is not just a production asset. It is a live experiment financed with real capital, real contracts and real consequences.
So who captures the value of the lessons it creates?
Before commercial operation, many assumptions still rely on engineering models, vendor data, demonstration experience and contractual commitments.
Once the integrated plant runs, assumptions become evidence.
How do electrolysis and synthesis really interact?
Which interfaces constrain availability?
How long does stable operation take?
What modifications become necessary?
How quickly does qualified product translate into recurring revenue?
Investor: And where is the proof that this learning has value?
At the next FID.
Plant #2 should show lower CAPEX uncertainty, better-defined battery limits, stronger guarantees, more credible schedules and more realistic commissioning and ramp-up assumptions.
If none of those improve, Plant #1 may have produced molecules, but it has not created a scalable industrial platform. It has simply made the market pay for an expensive lesson.
Developer: Exactly. FOAK risk itself is not the problem. Paying for the same uncertainty twice is.
That leads to a broader question for developers, investors and public finance institutions:
Not simply:
Can this first plant work?
But:
What will this investment prove that makes the next plant materially easier to finance, build and operate?
And perhaps the sharper question:
Who gets paid for the learning, and who gets stuck paying for it?
That is where FOAK capital starts becoming scale capital.
That discussion remains open.
A first-of-a-kind (FOAK) project developer is not simply someone working on a plant which has never been built.
A developer of a FOAK project, as in sustainable aviation fuel (SAF), e-fuels or advanced biofuels, and a developer of an established renewable project, such as a solar park, wind farm or conventional bioenergy plant, own many of the same responsibilities. Both deal with sites, permits, engineering, contracts, financing and approvals.
The difference is not the activity list.
It is how much of the project and value chain already exists.
In a standard, repeated project, the technology is validated and equipment has operating references. Suppliers know their roles. Contract structures exist. Customers and lenders know what they are assessing.
A FOAK project starts with much less certainty. The technology may have worked at demo scale but not yet proved commercial duty. Suppliers may still be developing equipment. Feedstock, infrastructure, product specifications and customer qualification may still need to be established. Contract precedents may be weak. Financing may require equity, strategic investors, public support and selective debt.
These are not independent workstreams.
A technology change can affect equipment, CAPEX, schedule, product quality, customer commitments and financing. Delayed product qualification becomes a revenue and liquidity problem. A supplier unable to guarantee part of the process leaves more performance risk with the sponsor.
Someone has to keep the entire project on one consistent basis. And learning by doing is expensive.
The practical conclusion for sponsors:
Define the unresolved project system before defining the job description.
Determine which assumptions are supported, which risks can genuinely be transferred, which remain with the owner and where interfaces remain unresolved to be managed by the project developer. Then define the lead role around the integration burden left.
The title is secondary.
My view: complete FOAK developers are scarce. FOAK projects are relatively few and can take years to reach investment approval and execution. End-to-end learning opportunities are limited. Capabilities are spread across technology, engineering, commercialisation, contracting, financing and execution specialists.
People who can integrate those disciplines from the owner's side into one coherent, bankable project—with credible risk allocation and a path to final investment decision (FID)—are uncommon.
They may not carry the title “FOAK project developer”. Relevant experience can come from chemicals, refining, industrial plants, infrastructure or adjacent sectors.
That scarcity matters beyond recruitment. The next generation of low-carbon industries won't be built simply because the technology works. They will be built by organisations capable of converting technical possibility into investable, executable and repeatable industrial systems.
In the energy transition ahead, that capability may become as strategically important as the technology itself.
#FOAK #IndustrialLeadership #EnergyTransition
Can you de-risk a First-of-a-Kind (FOAK) low-carbon fuel plant before financial close?
The engineering team points to a decade of R&D and says yes. The investment committee looks at the tail-end risks and says no. The dangerous part? They are looking at the exact same data room.
The case for engineering certainty
Project sponsors present a formidable case. They don't engineer in a silo. Process developers and key original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) forge deep partnerships to co-develop critical units. They invest in rigorous front-end engineering design (FEED). Independent engineers review and stress-test the assumptions.
Where the core conversion uses technologies already proven in adjacent sectors—whether for sustainable aviation fuel (SAF), e-fuels or e-methanol—the physical laws don't change just because the cheque size increased. From the sponsor's perspective, the project has been technically de-risked. Demanding a large contingency can feel like penalising rigorous preparation.
The case for lender and EPC skepticism
Across the table, lenders and engineering, procurement and construction (EPC) contractors focus on tail-end risks. Established, repeated projects can draw on an operating reference; a FOAK plant must establish its own integrated reference. De-risking components does not eliminate the remaining risks of commercial operation.
For illustration, a 2,000-hour demo run does not establish the operating performance of an asset designed for 20 years.
At commercial scale, geometry changes. Depending on the process, slower mixing in larger vessels can create local gradients a well-mixed demo plant does not reveal. Commissioning couples previously isolated systems. Impurities can accumulate in continuous recycle streams and contribute to catalyst fouling. Feedstock variability can add further stress.
For the skeptic, mechanical completion provides the physical asset with which to demonstrate how the integrated process actually behaves. It does not prove sustained commercial performance.
The capital dilemma
This creates a structural project-finance tension.
If, for illustration, the capital stack includes a 10–20% capital-cost contingency, the economics may look highly investable. But the project can still face severe distress if a tail-end bottleneck requires a redesign lasting 12 months or more. These figures illustrate a scenario, not a universal FOAK funding rule.
If the capital stack reflects the skeptical view, the project must ring-fence substantial liquidity for tail-end discovery, modification CAPEX and the funding gap caused by delayed revenues. Pricing that additional capital into the financial model can weaken the economics. Will the project still reach financial close?
The energy transition is navigating this tension. In these projects, the discussion goes beyond whether the underlying chemistry works. It is a debate over how to capitalise the scale-up period in which decarbonisation targets require industrial plants that have never been built or operated before.
#FOAK #ProjectFinance #EnergyTransition








