For Jensen Huang — Come Back, Jensen
If you feel Jensen was treated unfairly, if it makes you angry, this song is for you.
#ComeBackJensen #standwithjensen #bringjensenback #NVIDIA #OpenSourceAI
🤖 Made with AI
Nvidia isn't the Commerce Department, customs, or the FBI.
Once a chip is sold, how can it stop resale or theft?
After the sale, buyers have endless ways to take a chip out of Nvidia's sight: resell it, reship it, pull it from a server, rent it out. Many of them perfectly legal.
When a gun is used to kill, US law doesn't hold the gun maker liable. Why should Nvidia answer for smuggled chips?
34
As long as the price gap is big enough, someone will find a way to get Nvidia chips into China.
The US can't stop drugs from crossing its borders. China executes drug traffickers, and still can't stop them.
Smuggling chips pays even better than smuggling drugs.
So why should Nvidia alone be expected to stop it?
33
Andy Guo retweeted
In October, Jensen Huang said he stuck his neck out to defend open models because closed models like Anthropic and OpenAI are dangerous.
Next thing you know, what happened to his neck?
Jack Clarke of Anthropic was reportedly the one who leaked the Jensen Huang spy story to The New York Times.
The New York Times is controlled by the Jewish Ochs-Sulzberger family through the Ochs-Sulzberger Trust. As of March 2026, the trust holds approximately 94.6% of the Class B stock.
During Jensen Huang's recent October tour he publicly voiced support for open weight, locally run AI models, which was a direct threat to Anthropic and OpenAI.
This was also a threat to Israel's control over the entire AI industry, since they have their people in place at the head of Antropic, OpenAI and Palantir.
The media is already preparing the public by announcing "Meet the 3 Israelis who could inherit Nvidia's AI empire"
This was an Israeli psyop to oust Jensen from $NVDA and take control of the one company that threatened their control over the entire AI industry.
Andy Guo retweeted
墨尔本骑手冯建明被杀十天后,今天又有人拍到另一名熊猫外卖骑手在市中心被无家可归者袭击,并被抢走一包外卖
冯建明当时遭遇的,大概率也就是类似的袭击,只是运气不好,碰到一个带刀子的神经病
Andy Guo retweeted
Victoria is the greatest place on Earth because you can have 3 people break into your home (regular occurrence in Vic) and then the next day the cops come around and arrest you because one of them died from injuries sustained while robbing you.
为什么黄仁勋是对的:禁售英伟达的旧款芯片,可能把 AI 硬件的未来拱手让给中国
支持英伟达向中国出售上一代 GPU,最有力的理由和英伟达赚多少钱关系不大,关键在于守住美国的技术主导地位。
黄仁勋明白一件许多主张严格出口管制的人低估了的事:遏制一个技术竞争对手,最有效的办法不一定是把它挡在你的市场之外,而是让它继续在你主导的生态里竞争。
美国目前在 AI 算力上拥有巨大优势。英伟达领先,不只是因为它设计出了强大的 GPU,更因为它围绕 CUDA、网络互联、开发工具、软件库和数以百万计的开发者,建起了一整套生态。
可以说,这套生态的战略价值,比任何一代芯片都高。
然而,华盛顿连旧款英伟达 GPU 都限制进入中国,可能正在削弱这一优势。
出口管制可能变成对竞争对手的产业补贴
想一想,英伟达被挡在中国市场之外会发生什么。
中国的 AI 公司仍然需要算力。它们不可能就此停止训练模型、停止提供 AI 服务,只能越来越多地转向国产替代,尤其是华为的昇腾平台。
在正常的市场条件下,这些替代品得在性能、价格、能效、可靠性和软件兼容性上与英伟达正面竞争。
出口限制改变了这道算术题。
它造出了一个受保护的市场:即使产品竞争力较弱,中国芯片厂商也能拿到客户。这些客户带来收入、工程反馈、部署经验,以及改进技术所需的规模。
实际上,美国的出口管制可能变成了对中国本土半导体产业的产业补贴,而美国纳税人一分钱都没花。
在计算领域,这一点的后果尤其严重,因为硬件和软件是一起进步的。每一家被迫把模型适配到昇腾上的中国 AI 公司,也都在帮忙打造一个 CUDA 的替代品。
真正的竞争在于生态,而不是单颗芯片
英伟达最强的竞争优势,并不只是晶体管性能,而是它的软件生态造成的巨大迁移成本。
只要中国开发者继续用英伟达的硬件,他们就有很强的动力围绕 CUDA 来开发。他们在软件上的投入、积累的技术能力和基础设施上的决策,都在加固一个由美国掌控的平台。
但如果美国的政策把这些开发者逼到国产加速器上,就会催生对替代编译器、软件库、框架和优化工具的需求。
起初,这些替代品可能不如人。但随着时间推移,大规模采用会让它们越来越有竞争力。
而一旦一个独立的生态成熟起来,它就可能走出中国,扩散到那些需要平价 AI 基础设施的新兴市场。
美国最后可能亲手把一个硬件竞争者,变成一个全球性的平台竞争者。
那将是一个严重得多的长期挑战。
黄仁勋不便公开说出的理由
黄仁勋的立场还有另一层值得关注。
中国并不是一个利益完全一致的单一经济体。
国产芯片厂商受益于鼓励中国企业替换英伟达硬件的政策。而 AI 模型开发者、云服务商和其他算力密集型企业的动机不同:他们想要的是能拿到的、性能最强又最划算的算力。
这些利益可能互相冲突。
允许英伟达在中国竞争,会给国产 GPU 供应商带来持续的商业压力。它们必须靠真正的竞争力赢得市场份额,而不是主要依赖外国产品被限制进入。
这正是保持英伟达在华存在可能符合美国战略利益的原因。
但黄仁勋很难把自己的理由说成是为了压制华为的发展。
这样的说法反而会在中国国内强化彻底排除英伟达的政治理由。
所以他强调的是创新、竞争、市场准入,以及美国技术领导地位的重要性。
这些理由是真心的。但更深一层的战略逻辑是:让中国的 AI 发展继续绑定在美国的计算平台上,可能比逼中国发展出独立平台更有价值。
这是对黄仁勋动机的一种解读,并不是声称知道他私下的真实意图。
中国制造业历史的教训
中国一再证明,它能把国内规模、持续投入、工程迭代和供应链建设,转化为强大的产业竞争力。
光伏板、电池和电动车,都是重要的例子。
先进 AI 芯片面临的挑战不同,尤其是在半导体制造设备、尖端制程、高带宽内存和软件方面。
因此,成功并不是必然的。
尽管如此,把外国竞争者排除在外,会通过创造确定的需求来加速国产替代。
美国应该警惕重复一个熟悉的模式:替竞争对手保护好它的国内市场,直到它的厂商强大到可以在国际上竞争。
更聪明的区分:守住前沿,其余地方都去竞争
这一切都不要求美国把最先进的 AI 加速器卖给中国。
守住技术前沿,和放弃整个市场,是有实质区别的。
华盛顿可以限制最新、战略上最敏感的芯片,同时允许有管控地出口仍有商业竞争力的旧款产品。
这样的政策既能保住美国的技术领先,又能让中国开发者继续投入在美国的平台上。
安全方面的反对意见是有道理的。大规模的上一代 GPU 集群仍然能为先进 AI 研发提供可观的算力。因此出口政策需要审慎的限额、最终用户审查,以及对总算力的评估,而不能只看单颗芯片是哪一代。
但这些风险,必须和"为另一套计算生态造出受保护市场"的长期后果放在一起权衡。
结论:竞争可能是比禁令更有力的战略武器
黄仁勋的立场常被说成只是为了保住英伟达的营收。
英伟达在中国当然有巨大的商业利益。但商业动机和美国的战略利益未必对立。
关键问题是:美国希望中国继续做美国计算技术的客户,还是成为一套完全独立的全球替代方案的缔造者?
连有商业竞争力的旧款芯片都禁售,华盛顿可能恰恰在加速它想阻止的技术独立。
最大的战略失误,是为了短期限制硬件获取,而牺牲美国长期的生态主导地位。
黄仁勋的观点值得认真对待,因为技术领导地位不能只靠把竞争对手挡在市场之外来维持。
还要靠让全世界继续选择你的技术。
Why Jensen Huang Is Right: Banning Nvidia’s Older Chips Could Hand China the Future of AI Hardware
The strongest argument for allowing Nvidia to sell previous-generation GPUs to China has little to do with Nvidia’s profits. It is about preserving American technological dominance.
Jensen Huang understands something that many American export-control hawks underestimate: the most effective way to contain a technological competitor is not always to exclude it from your market, but to keep it competing within an ecosystem you dominate.
The United States currently enjoys an extraordinary advantage in AI computing. Nvidia leads not merely because it designs powerful GPUs, but because it has built an entire ecosystem around CUDA, networking, development tools, software libraries, and millions of developers.
That ecosystem is arguably more strategically valuable than any individual generation of chips.
Yet Washington risks undermining this advantage by restricting even older generations of Nvidia GPUs from reaching China.
Export controls can become industrial subsidies for competitors
Consider what happens when Nvidia is excluded from the Chinese market.
Chinese AI companies still need computing power. They cannot simply stop training models or deploying AI services. Instead, they must increasingly turn to domestic alternatives, particularly Huawei’s Ascend platform.
Under normal market conditions, these alternatives would have to compete against Nvidia on performance, price, energy efficiency, reliability, and software compatibility.
Export restrictions change that equation.
They create a protected market in which Chinese chipmakers can secure customers even when their products are less competitive. Those customers provide revenue, engineering feedback, deployment experience, and the scale needed to improve the technology.
In effect, American export controls can function as an industrial subsidy for China’s domestic semiconductor industry—without American taxpayers spending a dollar.
This is especially consequential in computing, where hardware and software improve together. Every Chinese AI company forced to optimize its models for Ascend is also helping build an alternative to CUDA.
The real competition is over ecosystems, not individual chips
Nvidia’s strongest competitive advantage is not simply transistor performance. It is the enormous switching cost created by its software ecosystem.
As long as Chinese developers continue using Nvidia hardware, they have strong incentives to build around CUDA. Their software investments, technical expertise, and infrastructure decisions reinforce an American-controlled platform.
But if American policy forces those developers onto domestic accelerators, it creates demand for alternative compilers, libraries, frameworks, and optimization tools.
Initially, these alternatives may be inferior. Over time, however, widespread adoption can make them increasingly competitive.
And once an independent ecosystem becomes mature, it may spread beyond China into emerging markets seeking affordable AI infrastructure.
America could end up transforming a hardware competitor into a global platform competitor.
That would be a much more serious long-term challenge.
The argument Huang cannot easily make publicly
There is another dimension to Huang’s position that deserves attention.
China is not a single economic actor with perfectly aligned interests.
Domestic chipmakers benefit from policies encouraging Chinese companies to replace Nvidia hardware. AI model developers, cloud providers, and other computing-intensive businesses have a different incentive: they want the most capable and cost-effective computing resources available.
These interests can conflict.
Allowing Nvidia to compete in China would put continuous commercial pressure on domestic GPU suppliers. They would have to earn market share through genuine competitiveness rather than relying primarily on restricted access to foreign alternatives.
This is precisely why maintaining Nvidia’s presence could serve American strategic interests.
But Huang cannot easily frame his argument as an effort to constrain Huawei’s growth.
Such a statement would strengthen the political case inside China for excluding Nvidia altogether.
Instead, he emphasizes innovation, competition, market access, and the importance of American technology leadership.
Those arguments are genuine. But the deeper strategic logic is that keeping Chinese AI development tied to American computing platforms may be more valuable than forcing China to develop independent ones.
This is an interpretation of Huang’s incentives, not a claim to know his private intentions.
The lesson from China’s manufacturing history
China has repeatedly demonstrated an ability to turn domestic scale, sustained investment, engineering iteration, and supply-chain development into formidable industrial competition.
Solar panels, batteries, and electric vehicles provide important examples.
Advanced AI chips present different challenges, particularly in semiconductor manufacturing equipment, leading-edge fabrication, high-bandwidth memory, and software.
Success is therefore not guaranteed.
Nevertheless, excluding foreign competitors can accelerate domestic substitution by creating assured demand.
The United States should be cautious about repeating a familiar pattern: protecting a competitor’s domestic market until its manufacturers become strong enough to compete internationally.
A smarter distinction: protect the frontier, compete everywhere else
None of this requires the United States to export its most advanced AI accelerators to China.
There is a meaningful distinction between protecting the technological frontier and abandoning entire markets.
Washington can restrict its newest, most strategically sensitive chips while allowing controlled exports of older-generation products that remain commercially competitive.
Such a policy would preserve an American technological lead while keeping Chinese developers invested in American platforms.
There are legitimate security objections. Large clusters of previous-generation GPUs can still provide substantial computing power for advanced AI development. Export policy therefore requires careful limits, end-user screening, and an assessment of aggregate computing capacity—not merely the age of individual chips.
But these risks must be weighed against the long-term consequences of creating a protected market for an alternative computing ecosystem.
Conclusion: Competition can be a more powerful strategic weapon than prohibition
Jensen Huang’s position is often dismissed as an attempt to protect Nvidia’s revenue.
Certainly, Nvidia has enormous commercial interests in China. But commercial incentives and American strategic interests are not necessarily opposed.
The critical question is whether the United States wants China to remain a customer of American computing technology or become the architect of a completely independent global alternative.
By banning even commercially competitive older chips, Washington risks accelerating precisely the technological independence it seeks to prevent.
The greatest strategic mistake would be to sacrifice America’s long-term ecosystem dominance in pursuit of short-term restrictions on hardware access.
Huang’s argument deserves to be taken seriously because technological leadership is not maintained by keeping competitors out of the market alone.
It is also maintained by making sure the world continues to choose your technology.
1
3
145
Andy Guo retweeted
I see a lot of people highlighting this section in the Singapore government's statement to "prove" that the WSJ lied about Singapore investigating Alice Huang as a Chinese intelligence asset.
That is technically correct! The Ministry of Home Affairs has stated that she was never investigated for ESPIONAGE (this is key and I will explain why later).
However, don't leave the other part out.
Singapore *did* investigate Alice Huang and Megaspeed over false declarations related to the purchase of servers and other related matters in Feb 2025.
At the time, the Singapore Police Force and Customs launched an independent probe into several companies, including Megaspeed. Alice Huang was examined specifically because of her role as then-CEO, chairperson and a key controller of the firm.
Authorities later found insufficient evidence, noting how unhelpful and unresponsive the US government was when queries were submitted.
So while they didn't have enough evidence that she had committed those offenses, they did conclude she had knowingly provided inaccurate information to police to downplay her role. In other words, she was being so evasive and shady that she received a stern warning and was barred from re-entering Singapore. Local investigations into Megaspeed and six other individuals remain ongoing.
Let me explain why this is complicated for Singapore and why even if they were suspicious of her spying activities, they wouldn't announce such an investigation.
The small city-state has to a walk a fine line between protecting its security relationship with Washington without triggering an economic backlash from China that would follow any perception that it has become an instrument of American policy to uphold the global trading order. The Chinese see these trade rules are designed to "contain China's rise."
So Singapore takes this hedging posture not because of a Swiss-like preference for neutrality, but as a matter of risk management imposed by geography and demography. It is right smack in the middle of a region where China is the predominant power, and roughly 70% of its resident population is ethnically Chinese which means some have sentimental ethnic ties that China can inflame as a matter of divide-and-conquer if it wanted to.
The result is a permanent tightrope.
Singapore can and does investigate commercial fraud, false declarations, or activities that threaten its hard-won reputation as a clean international business hub. This is framed as protecting the rules-based international order that underpins its own prosperity. What it cannot easily do is pursue investigations that look like hunting for Chinese spies or that appear to enforce Washington’s broader strategic agenda against Beijing.
Such a step would risk economic retaliation from China and domestic political complications among a majority-Chinese population that, while firmly Singaporean, retains cultural and family ties across the strait
Andy Guo retweeted
This is very irresponsible of the NYT. They claim that @DavidSacks is “spreading conspiracy theories,” but when u click through and see what this alleged conspiracy theory is it’s literally just him accurately citing CNN’s reporting.














