The funny thing about One Country Two System is it's not a one-size-fits-all deal. The system for Macau is different from the system for Hong Kong. So why is it that we are arguing about whether or not we are FOR or AGAINST 1C2S without first discussing what the system would look like for Taiwan? A professor in Taiwan is bravely stepping into the breach. He wrote a very, very lengthy proposal that was carried by "The Stone of Righteousness" (正當石) a weibo account discussing cross-straits issues. I've machine-translated an op-ed he wrote summarizing his proposals below. This is the kind of discussion we should be having in order for Taiwan to take a more pro-active role in shaping its future. And it's starting to happen...very very slowly. Professor Li Chi-tze is for sure facing a huge backlash including condemnation from the government. But this is the way these sort of things always start. Eventually the Overton window starts to move. What should Taiwan seek from "One Country Two Systems" by Prof Li Chi-tze. AI translation by Gemini: The "One Country, Two Systems" framework is almost a term that defies calm discussion. The doubts left by the Hong Kong experience cause many people in Taiwan to intuitively feel that touching this concept is equivalent to accepting all the conditions put forward by Beijing. However, institutional research cannot stop at mere approval or opposition. In 2019, Xi Jinping proposed exploring a "Taiwan formula" for "two systems," expressing willingness to absorb opinions from all walks of life across the strait and to care for the interests and sentiments of Taiwan compatriots. Since Beijing has proposed this exploration, we might as well turn the question around: What kind of institutional guarantees does Taiwan need? This is not an argument for Taiwan to accept "One Country, Two Systems," nor does it presume that Taiwan's society has reached a consensus. Rather, it is a conditional institutional deduction: If cross-strait relations enter peaceful political negotiations in the future involving arrangements for national unification, what conditions should Taiwan propose to maximize the preservation of its democratic system, final judicial adjudication, basic rights, economic and financial systems, and self-protection capabilities? And to what extent is Beijing willing to make concessions? If Beijing is unwilling to even offer autonomy guarantees sufficient to gain the trust of the Taiwanese people, the "Taiwan formula for two systems" naturally lacks persuasiveness. Conversely, if Beijing is willing to accept institutional arrangements that limit central government authority, there is room for further discussion. Sovereignty and administrative power must be discussed separately. "One Country" deals with the overall national arrangement, while "Two Systems" truly needs to answer how the people of Taiwan will live, who will govern them, and whether the central government can arbitrarily alter Taiwan's system. Therefore, the maximum institutional demands Taiwan can put forward are: one country, one sovereignty; two systems, two legal jurisdictions; central government powers positively enumerated, with unenumerated powers exercised in principle by Taiwan; Taiwan retains democratic elections, final judicial adjudication, financial and social systems, and necessary self-defense capabilities; and any major changes that diminish autonomy must obtain the consent of the Taiwanese people. Beijing has not lacked relatively loose conditions in the past. The 1993 white paper, The Taiwan Question and China's Reunification, proposed that after unification, Taiwan could possess administrative management power, legislative power, independent judicial power, and final adjudication power. Its party, government, military, economic, and financial affairs would be managed independently, and it could maintain its own military, with the mainland dispatching neither troops nor administrative personnel to be stationed in Taiwan. The 2000 white paper further stated that Taiwan's implementation of "One Country, Two Systems" could be even more lenient than that of Hong Kong and Macau. However, after Xi Jinping proposed exploring the "Taiwan formula" for "two systems" in 2019, Beijing placed greater emphasis on national sovereignty, security, and developmental interests; the 2022 white paper also did not reiterate all the specific commitments of 1993 item by item. Therefore, what is truly worth testing is whether Beijing is willing today to re-confirm what it said in the past and transform it into enforceable, remediable institutional clauses that cannot be easily altered unilaterally. What truly deserves to be discussed is not the name, but six core groups of powers that affect people's lives. First, the democratic system must not regress. Taiwan's administrative head, legislative body, and local heads should continue to be directly elected by residents; multi-party competition, rotation of power, and opposition parties should all be preserved. If qualifications for public office are restricted, there must be clear legal requirements and subject to judicial review in Taiwan, preventing political organs from arbitrarily overturning election results. Second, judicial adjudication must remain final in Taiwan. Cases occurring in Taiwan should, in principle, be tried by Taiwan's courts, and mainland public security, national security, and procuratorial organs may not independently arrest, search, or investigate in Taiwan. Even if national security is involved, it should be handled by Taiwan according to its own legal procedures; crimes must be clearly defined with no retroactive effect, and peaceful political speech, journalism, academia, and normal electoral activities cannot be arbitrarily criminalized. Third, basic rights must set a "non-regressive" floor. Freedom of speech, press, publication, internet, academic pursuit, religion, assembly, association, privacy, property, and existing social rights should all take the level of protection Taiwan already possesses at the time of institutional transition as the minimum standard. More importantly, when people's rights are violated, they must be able to obtain relief through Taiwan's judiciary. Rights protection without judicial relief is ultimately just a political promise. Fourth, establish two-way security guarantees. Taiwan can promise in the political arrangement not to join foreign military alliances, not to host foreign bases, and not to deploy strategic weapons that threaten the mainland. Beijing should promise that the People's Liberation Army will not be stationed on a regular basis in Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen, and Matsu, and that Taiwan will retain regional defense forces with local manning, budgets, and command. The basic principle should be: Taiwan's military power does not threaten the mainland, and the mainland's military power does not become a tool to control Taiwan. Fifth, economic, financial, and demographic systems must not be absorbed. Taiwan should retain the New Taiwan Dollar, its central bank, foreign exchange reserves, independent tax system, budget, financial supervision, land system, National Health Insurance, pensions, and social welfare. The central government will not directly levy taxes in Taiwan, nor will it force the adoption of the RMB. Mainland residents moving to Taiwan to settle, obtain household registration, land, and voting qualifications should still be managed according to Taiwan's own laws. This concerns not only the economy, but whether Taiwan's social structure can survive. Sixth, diplomacy can be integrated, but international functions cannot be reduced to zero. If entering a One-China political arrangement, national representation will inevitably be re-handled, but Taiwan should still retain overseas economic, trade, and cultural institutions, travel documents, existing visa-free arrangements, and functional international ties in trade, aviation, shipping, technology, and culture, while maintaining appropriate participation in international organizations. However, the most difficult problem is not how much Beijing is willing to give now, but whether it can take it back in the future. This is precisely where the greatest doubt brought by the Hong Kong experience lies for Taiwan. If the central government simultaneously holds the ultimate power to formulate, interpret, and modify the system, even the most beautiful autonomy promises may face a "credible commitment" problem. Therefore, what the "Taiwan formula for two systems" truly needs to break through is whether Beijing is willing to accept institutions that restrict its own power. Directions for study could include: the two sides jointly signing a peace and autonomy agreement; establishing Taiwan's special status within the national constitutional framework; formulating a Taiwan Basic Law that explicitly lists the central government's exclusive powers and national laws applicable in Taiwan; and Taiwan adopting an autonomous constitutional framework to inherit its existing democratic, judicial, and rights systems. Any major changes involving democratic elections, final judicial adjudication, basic rights, military arrangements, fiscal autonomy, and the division of powers between the central government and Taiwan should be set with extremely high thresholds and obtain the consent of the people of Taiwan. Political arrangements should also not be rushed all at once. A more reasonable approach is for both sides to exchange performance in stages: Beijing gradually reduces military pressure, establishes political reconciliation and rights guarantees, and Taiwan then gradually completes corresponding arrangements according to bilateral agreements and legitimate democratic procedures. Every step must be verified, and if a major breach of contract occurs, subsequent stages can be halted. Peace cannot be built on the basis of either party "surrendering everything first and waiting for the other party to fulfill the contract." Of course, no amount of institutional deduction can replace Taiwan's current constitutional and legal procedures. Major changes involving Taiwan's political status and its free and democratic constitutional order are subject to strict limitations under the current legal system. What this article discusses is public policy and institutional research on possible future political arrangements; any actual political agreement must be handled in accordance with the constitution and legal procedures effective at that time, and the free and informed democratic decision of the people of Taiwan cannot be excluded. At the end of the day, the true watershed of the "Taiwan formula for two systems" lies not in whether Beijing is willing to say "high degree of autonomy" once more, but in whether it is willing to accept a set of institutions that restricts central power and protects the people of Taiwan. If "One Country" possesses coercive power, while "Two Systems" can only rely on the goodwill of the central government to maintain, it is naturally difficult for Taiwan's society to trust it. Conversely, if Beijing is willing to guarantee that Taiwan's democracy will not regress, its judiciary will adjudicate finally in Taiwan, basic rights will not be curtailed, financial and economic systems will remain autonomous, and reliable security arrangements and institutional guarantees will be established, then the "Taiwan formula for two systems" can possibly transform from a political slogan into an institutional proposal that can be examined clause by clause. Since Beijing has proposed exploring a "Taiwan formula" for "two systems," it should allow Taiwan to put forward its own conditions. The standard for measuring sincerity is not only how much autonomy Beijing is willing to give Taiwan, but whether it is willing to bind its own power to retract that autonomy in the future.

It's a very funny piece. In essence, it's no longer China vs America. Dario Amodei, in his personal libshit crusader capacity, has succeeded in radicalizing by-default-apolitical Chinese AI researchers into an existential AGI race. One must imagine @tenobrus happy

Weighing the ‘disastrous, cascading consequences’ if China takes Taiwan wapo.st/4j4WGmo Here we see clearly the dangers of pundits speculating about what preserves stability across the Taiwan Street. In this case, as in almost every case for an American observer, the issue is about military deterrence, pure and simple. In fact, the Taiwan issue, and peace, is not primarily about the military. It’s about political calculations, but Will doesn’t mention political calculations and reassurances on both sides because frankly, he doesn’t understand the problem. God save us from the pundits pontificating on this issue.

Young Chinese AI researchers have long admired their US counterparts. But now they’re starting to see things as a giant anti-China plot. This will deepen distrust and make AI cooperation harder. Brilliant piece by Irene Zhang for ChinaTalk chinatalk.media/p/how-anthro…