Q2 2026 Becomes the Most-Hacked Quarter in Crypto
Despite total losses remaining below previous peaks in dollar terms, Q2 recorded 85 hacks, making it the most active quarter so far.
Which likely weighed on user confidence and added fuel to capital outflows from DeFi
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Case B – Blockchain Security Service retweeted
#PeckShieldAlert Specter has reported that a #phishing campaign appears to be targeting #Polymarket users, with ~$3M worth of $PUSD drained.
The attacker bridged the stolen funds from #Polygon to #Ethereum and swapped them into ~1,893 $ETH.
🚨 Your clipboard is lying to you.
@Microsoft found CryptoBandits.A - a clipper routing traffic
🔹 Spreads via USB disguised as .lnk docs
🔹 Scans clipboard every 500ms to swap crypto addresses
🔹 Takes screenshots & runs remote code
Check your wallet addresses before sending
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A smart contract bug just cost a DeFi project ~$111K
The attacker exploited a flaw that allowed certain @PancakeSwap transactions to be processed twice, manipulated the pool price, and drained liquidity
Another trend worth watching:
AI is no longer just writing smart contracts
🚨SlowMist TI Alert🚨
💸 Loss: 111,097.596667856001191208 USDC (~$111,097.6)
🔍 Root Cause: DIP token `_transfer()` function has a missing `return` statement in the router branch (when `from` or `to` is PancakeSwap Router). This causes the same transfer to be executed twice when `skim(router)` is called on the Pancake Pair. The attacker exploited this by calling `skim(router)` to trigger double DIP transfers, then `sync()` to set the DIP reserve to an extremely low value, manipulating the AMM price to drain the pool.
📌 Attacker: 0x0d4024cd27538350a911d9b7ee90811fa4875ba3
📌 Victim Pair: 0xf7d8267d01d1104da2dd30828aa9c0e1647919ef
📌 Vulnerable Token: 0x6c60bf5db0670ae94489d3dde2c60f271625db50
Impact: The attacker drained 111,097.6 USDC from the PancakeSwap DIP/0x524c... liquidity pool by exploiting a double-transfer bug in the DIP token contract.
Powered by #SlowMist.AI
Never trust a public charger
- An unknown USB port is not just power
- It can also be a device you don’t control
- Use your own charger, carry a power bank, or use a USB data blocker
And never approve unexpected data transfer requests
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Your SSD may leak more than you think.
A new research attack called FROST shows that a website could infer user activity by measuring tiny SSD timing delays.
No malware. Just side-channel behavior.
Modern attack surfaces now include hardware behavior
Case B – Blockchain Security Service retweeted
The landscape of decentralized AI in 2026 🧠
AI will continue to dominate the tech narrative over the next few years. But crypto won't fade away.
Instead, we're seeing the rise of the intersection between AI and crypto:
- Crypto apps optimized for AI. Agents take part in trading and DeFi
- Open frameworks, coordination layers, and networks for AI agents
- Decentralized infrastructure for compute, inference, model training, and data
AI creates intelligence. Blockchain creates trust.
AI creates value, and blockchain makes that value open, verifiable, and accessible.
This is a normie-friendly starter pack for decentralized AI. Hope you enjoy it.
Case B – Blockchain Security Service retweeted
Q2 2026 is already the most-hacked quarter on record: ~70 hacks, 2X the record
But the total amount hacked ($746M) is a fraction of the previous peaks.
Rather than a few giga exploits, it's been a constant stream of smaller attacks.
👀Sometimes attackers get hacked by their own mistakes
A malicious @cursor_ai extension was found with deployment files still inside. Researchers uncovered:
• attack plans
• download boosting instructions
• infrastructure notes
• clear-text payloads
• a fake download script
How not to lose crypto:
Most losses don’t happen because someone “breaks the blockchain.”
Basic rules:
• protect your seed phrase
• verify every app and link
• never rush transactions
• use 2FA and hardware wallets
Crypto security is a habit, not a one-time setup.
Cybercriminals are now abusing @Google AppSheet to send phishing emails from legitimate Google-linked infrastructure
Fake job offers, account alerts, verification requests are being used to steal credentials and personal data
Stablecoins don’t break only because of reserves.
A reported $10M exploit hit EURR and USDR, pushing both more than 20% off peg. @StablREuro
Early signs point to compromised multisig access, not a smart contract bug.
In crypto, operational security is part of the peg.
Privacy-focused P2P exchange @RetoSwap just lost ~7,000 XMR ($2.7M) to a protocol-level exploit.
By impersonating an arbitrator with fake protocol messages, the attacker tricked the system into swapping the legitimate wallet address for their own.
Case B – Blockchain Security Service retweeted
#PeckShieldAlert The @veruscoin Bridge exploiter has returned 4,052.4 $ETH (~$8.5M) to the team address: 0xF9AB...C1A74.
The returned funds represent 75% of the stolen total, leaving a 25% bounty (1,350 $ETH, ~$2.8M) in the exploiter's wallet.
To the Verus<->Ethereum Bridge Exploiter:
Members of the Verus community and its developers have discussed a set of terms, detailing the size of the bounty, obligations from your side and ours, and how the funds can be returned.
1. We have agreed that the bounty amount will be 1350 ETH. If you adhere to these terms, we will consider these 1350 ETH a reward for your exposing of a vulnerability, and we would publicly request to all interested parties that the 1350 ETH be considered your legitimate bounty.
2. If the funds are returned to the address 0xF9AB28cB7b72B518e6a351FbdaBe69362cBC1A74, minus 1350 ETH, meaning a total return of 4052.4 ETH within 24 hours after this post, Verus community members and developers, and everyone we currently know to be involved in investigating the event, will halt any existing investigations into you to the best of our ability, and we will not press charges or pursue extralegal consequences. We will consider the address that holds 1350, either as change or if still in the source as the bounty address.
If you return a total of 4052.4 ETH to the address 0xF9AB28cB7b72B518e6a351FbdaBe69362cBC1A74 within the 24 hours specified above, we will understand that as your agreement to these terms, and we will uphold our stated agreement to cease further investigation into you, not initiate new investigation of you, not press charges, and not seek additional consequences. We will also post a public acknowledgement, referencing the 1350 ETH and publicly state that we consider those funds to be your bounty. If further communication is required to come to an agreement, please refer to the following contact points, as mentioned in previous messages:
email: [email protected]
z-address on Verus (for encrypted memo communication): zs1wl6e6qe8z8n8t8jp4qxek5ey53t9xajzwxc75gj72wrcwuq6ha4mdg0v8p6z8wpkz2fhxrqlayc
For confirmation that this offer is coming from the Verus Community, you can see the same message posted on the Verus Discord, in the announcements channel.
GitHub was reportedly breached after an employee installed a malicious VS Code extension.
Around 3,8K internal repos were accessed
User repos & customer data were reportedly not affected
Dev tools are now high-value attack surfaces.
Be careful with “useful” plugins
1/ We are sharing additional details regarding our investigation into unauthorized access to GitHub's internal repositories.
Yesterday we detected and contained a compromise of an employee device involving a poisoned VS Code extension. We removed the malicious extension version, isolated the endpoint, and began incident response immediately.
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Another “unhackable” bridge got exploited
@VerusCoin-Ethereum Bridge reportedly lost ~$11.5M
It was promoted as having “no smart contract risk” and being validated by protocol rules
Cross-chain systems always have trust assumptions
Bridges remain DeFi’s weakest link



























