Coffer

RWA Indexes with Yield are live on Solana 🪎 RWA is now the core of what we build, and we’re taking it to Crypto World’s Fair, the new @colosseum hackathon. An index is one pool with 2 to 10 tokenized stocks inside, held as one LP token. Every stock in the pool trades against every other, and each trade pays a fee to LPs. That fee is your yield. The first index live on Coffer holds NVDAx, GOOGLx, TSLAx, MSTRx and CRCLx, which makes 10 trading pairs in a single pool. This pool runs on a new version of the smart contracts that hasn’t been audited yet, and it’s marked with a flag in the app. Until the audit is complete, providing liquidity to this specific pool, trading in it or creating new RWA pools is at your own risk. All other pools remain on the audited version. The Coffer submission for Crypto World’s Fair is in. Check it out, share it around, and thanks for backing us along the way. Links below 👇

Mom, we’re on TV Thank you @EcosystemCall for featuring Coffer!

$550 @Solana Breakpoint Ticket Giveaway To enter: - Follow @coffer_so - Reply with your Solana wallet and tag a friend - Hold $10+ in any Coffer pool from that wallet for 3 days Winner announced 5 Nov.

Yesterday @sepezho joined @rajkaria_ live to talk about Coffer and RWA indexes with yield on Solana Full replay 👇

Meet @sepezho, the founder of Coffer, in a short video for the @colosseum hackathon

Incident report On Oct 18 at 20:37 UTC our alerting system flagged unusual activity in the BTC pool. We immediately froze all of our pools. LP removals / deposits / swaps were suspended in every pool at 22:05 UTC. After pausing the contracts, we developed a fix for this bug in our pools and tested everything locally to confirm the attack is no longer reproducible. Then we updated the contract code of all pools, deployed the fix, and reactivated the contracts on Oct 19 at 11:20 UTC. Since then everything has been operating normally. Also, we studied the attacker's behavior and all of their addresses in detail (details on them at the end of the post). Only the BTC pool (~$10k TVL) was at risk. In total the attacker minted about $18 of illegitimate LP tokens and withdrew about $0.70. Thanks to the team's quick response and the immediate pause of the pool smart contracts, the attacker couldn't extract anything more from the BTC pool's TVL. How the exploit worked * The attacker sent the smallest possible deposits into the BTC pool (1 unit of each coin), around 1,200 transactions a minute. * For each deposit the smart contract minted the smallest unit of LP, but because of rounding, our smart contract charged the attacker’s address 0 BTC tokens (instead of 1 base unit of the BTC token). The attacker got 1 unit of LP token for free, and every transaction (and they ran thousands of them) diluted the share of the LPs already in the pool. * In all other pools this was unprofitable: one transaction mints a single LP unit, and Solana gas costs more than that unit is worth. The BTC pool was the exception. Bitcoin is expensive and the BTC wrappers have fewer decimals (8) than the LP token (9), so a 1-satoshi deposit minted ~11 LP units for free - worth about one satoshi each time, ~14× the gas per transaction. * This rounding behavior was identified in our v5 audit, and we assessed it as low risk, since it wasn’t economically viable to exploit. At least that’s what we thought. That’s why we decided to fix it only in the next version of the contracts and not in the current one. The fix was already part of our v6 contracts, which power the RWA pools and to which we planned to migrate all production pools in a couple of months. The BTC pool turned out to be the one case where the economics worked differently. Our mistake was that we didn’t double-check and underestimated the severity of even such small details as 1-unit rounding in the wrong direction. At first glance it looks economically unviable, but as usual, life teaches us a lesson. We will take this as a lesson and fix it in our development flow. We also learned that it’s essential to invest time and effort into alerting systems and rapid-response systems for pausing the protocol. We have already added a supervisor role to our contracts to speed up our response time, ideally to under 10 minutes. Once again, everything is under control. All user funds are safe. Thanks to the quick response, no harm was done. We will strive to react even faster and be even more careful about every detail. All pools have been upgraded to the new version of the contracts (v5.1) with the fix for this issue. BTC pool LPs lost nothing and no user needed to do anything. Everything is operating normally, and you got an interesting story from us. All's well that ends well. ---- About the attacker Now, the information about the attacker that we were able to find. If you can reach out to the exchanges or give us a contact at the exchanges to identify this person, we would be grateful. Attacker’s address (from which they sent thousands of transactions to our pools, trying to steal our protocol’s TVL): E5hNb7FpLHGum5ZVw5ZUKwSF97LHyNZeSVg6EQpatyhV From this address they then moved funds here: 9ZJRUz3oedNTdEZtzxGoiXVHmwBWc4bvpFvNrXVDSEnX - it received 320 SOL, 27,126.99 USDC and 2,227.94 USDT. Potentially all of this is money stolen from other projects. Research is needed. From that address they then moved funds to exchanges: * @Bybit_Official deposit address: Fg4wTBJxDB4KMK4uBCGHe7QYfjqcitn5ef3LbDXLR4b3 * @binance deposit addresses: GcqwXjKzQXXYL4hBdNv6iSbZb71rqbUn5JjjioF3EaV7, HiHaKoKM1vqmydSKwPsxZrWJSLzcif9ZxpSHuR21SCkk * @hitbtc deposit addresses: E1H8FpoLLyMPfyVRimMGSsz4w4cVEpX6zWs8zhyPFVeY, 2FC5dcR2Zi7keLwmt88qjLEUZsmsAwCDNJkBLJok2bzc, AfZM5T8jQzWtsqkMsK34txta8dVctpjGtwZTJbno27W7 * @ChangeNOW: Dc4CjRyjW5t8mLdu6srnXBA8ZEezkU7Gf6Kvz4jLpD1v, Ektu3B88st6ezdDwjg21AVTShaA1ayzZcHmRhGBjnKnX, B48kNVXs4YK4amkBCH2XokQiv1SeiVQGHDR17xDeKAAn (these addresses funded the attacker's address) If you are from one of these exchanges or know someone there, we would appreciate it if you reached out to us and helped us identify the perpetrator and, at a minimum, freeze the accounts they are moving the stolen funds to. These addresses were funded directly by the wallet that tried to steal $10k from us and failed.

GM. We've identified and fixed the vulnerability, and all pools are now unpaused. The protocol is operating normally again. We'll publish a full incident report soon, including what we've uncovered about the attacker.