David Builes (@davidalanbuiles) profile picture

Philosopher @Princeton. Time, Causality, Consciousness, Infinity, Ontology, and Rationality.

Princeton, NJ
Joined September 2022
Photo by David Builes (@davidalanbuiles)Photo by David Builes (@davidalanbuiles)Photo by David Builes (@davidalanbuiles)Photo by David Builes (@davidalanbuiles)Photo by David Builes (@davidalanbuiles)Photo by David Builes (@davidalanbuiles)Photo by David Builes (@davidalanbuiles)
New paper! I argue for "Modal Idealism", the view that it is metaphysically necessary that: (i) every fundamental entity is conscious, and (ii) every fundamental property is a phenomenal property. philpapers.org/archive/BUIMI…
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New paper! I give 8 arguments for thinking that I'm special. philpapers.org/archive/BUIEA…
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New paper in Noûs! I defend a version of the Principle of Indifference that is sensitive to one's prior metaphysical beliefs, and I use it to argue that Eternalism threatens to lead us to external world skepticism, and Modal Realism to inductive skepticism philpapers.org/archive/BUICI…
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Along the way, I talk about the Boltzmann Brain Problem and the simulation hypothesis :)
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New paper in Analysis! I develop different versions of the "grounding view of powers" under different assumptions about the metaphysics of properties. I end up arguing against a "Platonic" development of the view, which has been defended by Matthew Tugby. philpapers.org/go.pl?aid=BUI…
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If I like Idealism and Monism, does that make me an “Absolute Idealist”?
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Had an amazing time at the Princeton Metaphysics Workshop!
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Thanks to @davidchalmers42 for the (reminder) about the title! nitter.cf/davidchalmers42/status…
Replying to @davidalanbuiles
i. i remember an undergraduate years ago who called a relative of this view "modal idealism". ii. i'd think 2 needs something like "all fundamental properties are phenomenal", and 3 needs "zombie worlds" rather than "zombies". iii. transcendental idealism? (i guess it's taken.)
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What are some prominent philosophers throughout history that have held that fundamental reality is: (i) non-spatial, (ii) non-temporal, (iii) monistic (only one fundamental thing)? Maybe: Parmenides, Kant, Schopenhauer? It would be good to have a name for combining (i)-(iii)...
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My favorite paper on why free will seems to be impossible: philarchive.org/archive/KMEF…
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This might be my favorite 1-page philosophy paper
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I'm organizing my first metaphysics conference! It will be April 1st-2nd at Princeton University. All are welcome to attend, but please register beforehand if you'd like to come. For details and registration: davidbuiles.com/workshop
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My first attempt at public philosophy! Here I talk about my paper "Lawful Persistence", which is co-authored with Trevor Teitel (link: philpapers.org/go.pl?id=BUIL…). Thanks for the wonderful interview @majestyofreason!
Dr. David Builes (@davidalanbuiles) and I chat about laws of nature, the metaphysics of persistence, existential inertia, and so much more🔥👇 youtu.be/2okyHCJDxVk
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Note: this was aimed at an "advanced undergrad" audience, so not *too* public.
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New Phil Studies paper! I argue for a Non-Humean view about laws that nonetheless abides by two central Humean principles: (i) all causal/nomic facts reduce to categorical/qualitative facts, and (ii) no necessary connections between distinct existences: philpapers.org/archive/BUIAH…
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The key to (ii) is combining Endurantism (so cross-temporal causal relations don't relate wholly distinct time-slices) and Monism (so that there aren't any causal influences between wholly distinct "parts" of the universe: only the universe as a whole has causal powers)
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Towards the end, I reconsider what actually *is* the disagreement between Humeans and Non-Humeans, given that Non-Humean views can abide by central Humean principles. The picture is supposed to be an attempt at combining Hume with anti-Hume :)
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New Analysis paper! We argue that certain theories of mereology/consciousness seem to imply that it is *very* surprising that you are not part of a whale. So, the fact that you are not part of a whale seems to be strong evidence against such theories. philpapers.org/archive/BUIWA…
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By the wonders of combinatorics, *almost all* conscious beings will be in the vicinity of the largest conscious creature (e.g. a whale). Popular theories in epistemology imply that we should therefore expect to find ourselves in the vicinity of a whale.
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Given that you are not in the vicinity of a whale, that seems to be powerful empirical evidence against such metaphysical theories. The paper is co-authored with Caspar Hare from MIT, and the image is of a professor being part of a whale - courtesy of DALL-E!
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