We’re willing to describe computers as thinking/reasoning for the same (functional) reasons we’re willing to describe them as having memory or vision. Perception/cognition is cheap. It’s desire that’s hard, and plausibly lacking in AI.
Replying to @MaxxifiedLian
I completely agree with Geoffrey Hinton. LLMs reason, understand and think, on any reasonable reading of those words, and have done since at least GPT-4. That doesn't imply consciousness, which is weirder and much less well understood. But reasoning in the literal sense? Yes.
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I'm impressed by the video and even find it strangely moving (given how on the nose it is), but are you serious about the "couldn't have written this without AI" thing? I presume not. I presume this is a troll.
I've watched this at least five times. Impressive. I doubt a human could have written this song without AI. The themes are too complex.
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q(Alex Kiefer | everything else) retweeted
Do these look like recursive self improvement or repetitive slop injection?
Newly open-sourced project from @noumenal_labs that I worked on this year: `hybrid-aif`, a JAX library for active inference with mixed discrete-continuous and amortized factors, agent composition, model comparison, and all sorts of other things. Enjoy!:
noumenal-labs.github.io/hybr…
the hardest part about the AI era is discovering how much of human excellence can be fairly cheaply cloned -- the work is either to articulate what can't be copied, or if the functionalists are right, to value ourselves as we once did despite this. But I doubt they're right.
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q(Alex Kiefer | everything else) retweeted
Thinking a computer can become conscious because a program does the right information processing
… is equivalent to…
thinking that a piano can become conscious because someone is playing the right song on it
This is one of my prime preoccupations these days. Very excited to read it.
New #preprint reviewing and conceptually mapping the major theories in the field of aging (@LPiolopez, Navneet Jawanda)
"Theories of Aging: From Damage and Programmed Theories to Goal-Directedness"
preprints.org/manuscript/202…
"Aging is an extensive biological process characterized by morphological and functional alterations at different biological scales, resulting in a systematic decline in biological functions ultimately leading to death. Overall, two main types of theories have been proposed: damage-based theories and programmatic theories. We propose a third option, framed in the cognitive perspective on multiscale biological systems. Here, we review the different theories of aging, organize them in a conceptual hierarchy, and integrate our new model within the existing frameworks: aging as a consequence of loss of goal-directedness (in anatomical space). In this model, aging is driven by a dynamical systems-level disruption of homeostatic alignment within cellular collectives that build and repair a healthy body during development and maturation. In this model, morphogenesis is a homeostatic (goal-seeking) process; left with no goals after the developmental phase has been completed, aging can occur in the absence of damage via the functional disbanding of body components from their original aligned goal state. We suggest a roadmap with important implications for regenerative medicine and aging."
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There's gotta be a more compact and perspicuous way to say "My Claude agrees with your Claude about X".
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q(Alex Kiefer | everything else) retweeted
Neural nets were always Neurosymbolic -- have you tried to train a neural net without a symbolic harness? 😇
This is a good/interesting thread even though I don’t think “neurosymbolic” is particularly well-defined because I don’t think “symbolic” is particularly well-defined
I would have assumed it was fairly obvious, but in case it's not: a million-line codebase (also known as a "harness"), running at inference time, orchestrating thousands of calls to a neural network for any given task, is the exact definition of a "neurosymbolic architecture"
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q(Alex Kiefer | everything else) retweeted
New #preprint - @YanboZhang3
"Intelligence from Learnable Novelty"
arxiv.org/abs/2607.18433
What if we optimize Epiplexity (arxiv.org/abs/2601.03220 @m_finzi @andrewgwils ) instead of measuring it? We have derived a closed-form approximation of Epiplexity and discovered a deep connection between it and intelligence. This allows us to reinterpret Epiplexity as a form of learnable novelty, providing a brand-new understanding of what intelligence is. By maximizing Epiplexity across various systems, all of them exhibited interesting behaviors:
Cellular Automata: Maximizing Epiplexity directly generates complex soliton interactions similar to Rule 110.
Image Encoders: It automatically causes the encoding to cluster, successfully categorizing different handwritten digits without supervision.
Reinforcement Learning: Introducing Epiplexity improves the performance of PPO in sparse reward tasks.
We also explored the relationship between the theory of learnable novelty, the free energy principle, and novelty search. We hope this work helps us better understand the nature of intelligence and its origins.
hedonicescalator.substack.co…
Nice piece, in some ways very much in the spirit of what I'm trying to get at in the "deep alignment" paper -- though it's not obvious to me that one could sculpt digital intelligence by degrees into sentience.
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Every new direction I explore confirms it: physics (specifically thermodynamics) is a "theory-neutral" description interpretable as the dynamics of mind or matter or both. It's just so god damned simple.
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Must read but looks absolutely spot-on
If you’re into predictive processing and meditation, this paper pushes the Overton window. From the quantum formulation of the free-energy principle, we show that an agent cannot define its own boundary from within. The realization of this irreducible indeterminacy is a principled definition of awakening. Ultimately, this extends to the separability of any object in experience, formalizing emptiness and engendering a “post-dual agent”.
Any persisting agent must minimize surprise by gathering evidence for its generative model. But all evidence available to the agent arrives through its boundary with the world. To prove that this boundary really separates “self” from “world”, the agent would need to step outside the boundary and measure the whole self-world relation. A finite agent cannot do this, as a scissor can't cut itself.
So the self-world boundary can be useful, predictive, and necessary for action, but it can never be known as an ontological fact from within. Meditation, on this view, progressively reveals the self-world split as a modelling prior rather than a structural feature of reality. This naturally shifts the weighting of self (inside boundary) and other (outside boundary), since both are seen to be inferences rather than grounded realities by virtue of an indefinable boundary. A more even-handed and compassionate orientation can arise.
A highly principled finger pointing at the moon!
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q(Alex Kiefer | everything else) retweeted
Awesome new theme issue of Philosophical Transactions:
‘World models in natural and artificial intelligence’
Thank you @adamsafron!
royalsocietypublishing.org/r…


















