I’m grateful to @Princeton University for hosting me to speak about a critical dimension of the Israel and Palestine conflict and inaugurate a new speaker series. My presentation was the first in an interdepartmental effort at Princeton to promote vigorous discussions about anti-Zionism and its implications, and to dissect the subject from a pragmatic, non-academic point of view that is grounded in outcomes and consequences. The event was titled “Pro‑Palestine 2.0: Is anti‑Zionism a useful framework for activism and advocacy, or has it become a symbolic posture that no longer advances Palestinian interests?” I outlined both common framings of Zionism and the familiar anti‑Zionist narratives in Palestinian, Arab, and academic discourse, especially claims about who early Zionists were, what their national origins implied, and the reality that Zionism’s fulfillment required the displacement of a native population. For many anti‑Zionists, Palestinian identity is not a modern product of the British Mandate era but an ancient lineage stretching back to Phoenicians, Canaanites, and Romans, with all long‑standing inhabitants understood as ancestors of today’s Palestinians. From this view, Jewish self‑determination and the desire for a safe homeland to protect Jews from European antisemitism cannot be built atop a people seen as indigenous “forever,” making Zionism inherently incompatible with Palestinian permanence. On the other hand, I offered that modern Zionism came about at a time when the concept of nation-states was emerging and spreading, and is the latest expression of Jewish peoplehood – a continuation of linguistic, religious, and historical ties to the land rather than an entirely new invention. Archaeology and genetics show continuous Jewish presence and descent, such that even European Jews are direct descendants of those who maintained a presence in the land for millennia, experienced different forms of displacement, and created sprawling diaspora communities. This also includes Israeli Jews who come from Middle Eastern and North African communities, hundreds of thousands of whom were expelled in the 1950s and 1960s amid Arab nationalism. Yet anti‑Zionist slogans often say, “Go back to Poland or Ukraine,” never “go back to Egypt, Iraq, Syria, Tunisia, Lebanon, Turkey, Algeria, or Morocco,” even though those countries account for the origin of half of Israel’s Jewish population. I argued that, for pro‑Palestine activism and political strategy, anti‑Zionism is a dead‑end framework, one that offers no path to improving Palestinian realities and instead locks the conflict into perpetual, self‑defeating “forever wars.” There is no “de‑Zionizing” the Jewish people or the Israeli state. Zionism is a settled fact, and Israel is not going anywhere. Whatever intellectual value anti‑Zionism may have once had in the early decades of the conflict, nearly eight decades of Palestinian losses have made it strategically irrelevant. Seven million Jewish Israelis are not leaving, and multiple generations now see Israel as their home and their rightful place in the world. This doesn’t mean anti‑Zionists must become Zionists; it means the discourse needs to move to a post‑Zionism frame, one that doesn’t center the erasure, delegitimization, or destruction of Israel but rather focuses on confronting harmful Israeli policies, pursuing pragmatic and achievable outcomes, demanding accountability from failed Palestinian leadership, and articulating a compelling Palestinian national vision defined by what it stands, for instead of what it rejects.