gzeon.eth retweeted
The Arbitrum Security Council has taken emergency action to rescue the 74,559,805 ARB and 8,425 ETH being held in the address on Arbitrum One that is identified as connected to the Binance exploit. The Security Council acted by weighing its commitment to the security and integrity of the Arbitrum community and Arbitrum governance without impacting any Arbitrum users or applications.
After significant technical diligence and deliberation, the Security Council identified and executed a technical approach to move funds to safety without affecting any other chain state or other Arbitrum users.
As of October 30, 2026 time, the funds have been successfully transferred to an intermediary frozen wallet. They are no longer accessible to the address that originally held the funds, and can only be moved by further action of the Security Council or a vote of Arbitrum DAO governance, which will be coordinated with relevant parties.
gzeon.eth retweeted
Blockaid detected an exploit at 2026-07-22 21:30 UTC targeting @AFX_XYZ, a protocol on @arbitrum. The exploit was specific to a bridge that AFX operates. Approximately 24.15M USDC has been drained thus far from the protocol.
Our team has been working with the incredible folks on the Arbitrum team to respond to the incident, to engage with the affected protocol, and to help them contain the stolen funds.
Exploit tx: arbiscan.io/tx/0x50d0b3ec6c3…
We're aware of a report of a bridge hack on Arbitrum and are investigating. We can confirm that the transaction in question originated from a third party protocol, and the Arbitrum native bridge has not been hacked or exploited in any way.
We will coordinate with the third party team and will report more details when we have them.
gzeon.eth retweeted
Surely one of the most complex decisions ever made in Arbitrum governance history but a few things worth noting:
1. To all those screaming for the past few days “Arbitrum has a centralized sequencer so they can move funds”, take a few minutes to learn how Arbitrum works. The sequencer has absolutely no power to move funds and was not the one who acted here.
2. The decision to act was made entirely by the Arbitrum Security Council, a group of 12 individuals elected by the Arbitrum DAO (the annual election is currently underway — vote now!), which required 9/12 of them to agree.
The council is independent from the Arbitrum Foundation and Offchain Labs (1/12 of the elected members is an OCL engineer), and came to this decision by themselves after much deliberation.
You may not like the existence of security councils and you can form your own opinion on whether you agree with their actions, but this process was extremely distributed and coordinated by independent actors, and ina world where security councils exist, Arbitrum’s is a masterclass on how a truly independent security council should operate.
3. For many, the ultimate goal is to get rid of the security council entirely, but this is complicated.
Technically it’s easy — the security council is elected by the DAO and operates at its pleasure, and the DAO can turn it off at any time.
But the harder question is _should_ the DAO do that? L1s have the ability to hard fork. Security councils control the analogous power for the L2. If you get rid of it, you lose the ability to hard fork. You can still update the chain via DAO vote but that’s a slow process and you can no longer do fast emergency actions (which includes both actions like the security council took today as well as the ability to quickly upgrade the code in case an exploitable vulnerability in the software stack is discovered).
As I’ve said many times, the best path that I see to getting rid of security councils is for the L1 itself to take on this burden for its most important L2s (as defined by objective criteria). In that case, in the case of a vulnerability or an exploit the conversation for L1 and L2 will be identical — does this warrant an L1 hard fork. I’m hopeful that we can reopen this conversation in the coming weeks.
The Arbitrum Security Council has taken emergency action to freeze the 30,766 ETH being held in the address on Arbitrum One that is connected to the KelpDAO exploit. The Security Council acted with input from law enforcement as to the exploiter’s identity, and, at all times, weighed its commitment to the security and integrity of the Arbitrum community without impacting any Arbitrum users or applications.
After significant technical diligence and deliberation, the Security Council identified and executed a technical approach to move funds to safety without affecting any other chain state or Arbitrum users.
As of April 20 11:26pm ET the funds have been successfully transferred to an intermediary frozen wallet. They are no longer accessible to the address that originally held the funds, and can only be moved by further action by Arbitrum governance, which will be coordinated with relevant parties.
gzeon.eth retweeted
The Arbitrum Security Council has taken emergency action to freeze the 30,766 ETH being held in the address on Arbitrum One that is connected to the KelpDAO exploit. The Security Council acted with input from law enforcement as to the exploiter’s identity, and, at all times, weighed its commitment to the security and integrity of the Arbitrum community without impacting any Arbitrum users or applications.
After significant technical diligence and deliberation, the Security Council identified and executed a technical approach to move funds to safety without affecting any other chain state or Arbitrum users.
As of April 20 11:26pm ET the funds have been successfully transferred to an intermediary frozen wallet. They are no longer accessible to the address that originally held the funds, and can only be moved by further action by Arbitrum governance, which will be coordinated with relevant parties.
gzeon.eth retweeted
ICYMI: the Robinhood Chain testnet is now live for developers and users.
This launch follows @RobinhoodApp’s Stock Tokens debut on Arbitrum One and kicks off a phased roadmap towards their migration to their own Arbitrum stack chain.
Start building now: robinhood.com/chain
The Robinhood Chain public testnet is live 🛠️
Developers can now build on a financial-grade Ethereum Layer 2 built on @arbitrum— designed to support tokenized real-world and digital assets.
Start building with the core foundation of Robinhood Chain: docs.robinhood.com/chain
Learn more on our newsroom: robinhood.com/us/en/newsroom…
Arbitrum Security Council Member Election has started, looking forward to your vote!
tally.xyz/gov/arbitrum/counc…
gzeon.eth retweeted
We've acquired @zerodev!
One of the most talented teams in crypto building next-gen smart accounts.
This reinforces our commitment to solving the hardest onchain problems and building a unified development platform for all teams, regardless of their mandate. 🧵
gzeon.eth retweeted
Working with the @RobinhoodApp team has been an incredible journey.
We believe the launch of their tokenized stocks on @Arbitrum today is just the beginning of what will be the rails that powers finance all around the world with their soon to be Robinhood Layer 2 blockchain. 🧵
gzeon.eth retweeted
Robinhood is now onchain with Arbitrum!
Arbitrum will serve as @RobinhoodApp's rails to merge DeFi and TradFi in what is a 0 -> 1 moment for the entire industry.
All while onboarding millions of net-new users into crypto.
Arbitrum Everywhere. 🧵
gzeon.eth retweeted
You didn’t think we’d just announce new products, did you?
The Robinhood Chain is currently being built on @arbitrum to power the future of asset ownership.
#RobinhoodPresents rbnhd.co/ToCatchaToken
imo a lot of bad takes, you can’t design a system with single point of failure and blame that single point failed
Bounty amounts are irrelevant here, no company in the world would incentivize everyone to phish their employees 😂
gzeon.eth retweeted
2/ First up, @arbitrum BoLD.
BoLD introduces permissionless validation, which means that any node operator can submit a fraud proof to challenge the state of the chain.
This is a huge decentralization unlock that heightens the security of Arbitrum One.
nitter.cf/arbitrum/status/188971…
You would thought every organization that have a serious Safe setup would be using some tool like this, a private Safe UI instance, etc. Not sure we should blame the UX or signers should just have been more careful.
This is the biggest blind signing compromise of a multisig to date.
@Bybit_Official lost ~$1.5bn by signing a compromised tx on their safe (more details to be determined).
But FOR GOD'S SAKE if you deal with such amounts use verification tools such as the one by @pcaversaccio
