還鄉團團長 retweeted
I am not accusing Zoomer Historian of having Jewish ancestry, but I will say that I have seen his pattern of thinking in a number of confused or mentally ill half Jews who join white nationalist or even NS groups.
Some "Mischling Nationalism" tendencies to look out for:
--Convert to Catholicism, especially when they live in a non-Catholic country
--Despite superficially embracing philosophies incompatible with post Victorian era Anglo-Saxon culture like Catholicism and German Nazism, their schizophrenia also has them embracing cartoonish Anglophilia
--Deploy NS for aesthetic or shock value/trolling reasons and are confused or even offended when real National Socialists speak of Hitler as the morally righteous and honorable force for justice he actually was
--They don't want to just stop immigration/get non-white migrants out, which is a feasible and highly defensible position. Instead they go off the deep-end with genocidal or imperialist fantasies and Israeli style sadism that alienates most normal white people and only appeals to mental patients and school shooters.
--They are always strongly anti-Russia and anti-Palestinian
--Despite all their edgelordism and seemingly unapologetic "white supremacism," at the end of the day their only political action is to lie and pretend the local cuckservative or Trumptarded Jew owned right wing party they work for is secretly Nazi or "moving the overton window."
I know many examples anecdotally and there are some well-known ones like Weev and "Zoomer Woman" who fit the mold.
還鄉團團長 retweeted
The Anti-Semitism Spectrum
Low-IQ: Bolsheviks (1908)
Mediocre-IQ: Zionists (1897)
Average-IQ: Talmudists (600, Vilna Shas 1886)
High-IQ: Jews (before, during, & after these dates)
Genius-IQ: Every Single Time. Every Single Place. Every Single Jew—each in his own single way.
還鄉團團長 retweeted
Pourquoi l’écrasante majorité des étudiants vote à gauche ? Décryptage par un étudiant.
Je l’ai observé pendant tout mon parcours, au lycée comme dans le supérieur. Voici les 4 raisons.
Les profs. C’est la raison la plus puissante. Pendant toute la scolarité, des professeurs donnent leur opinion politique en cours, même quand le cours n’a rien à voir avec la politique. Et la majorité des professeurs sont de gauche. Douze ans à entendre la même petite musique, ça laisse des traces.
Les réseaux et les médias. Ils penchent majoritairement à gauche, et les jeunes y passent des heures chaque jour.
La morale. Être de gauche, c’est le confort moral. On n’a rien à se reprocher quand on veut accueillir toute la misère du monde, tous les migrants et donner des allocations à tous les pauvres. On a le beau rôle, sans jamais se demander qui paie.
Zéro éducation financière. Pas une seule seconde dans tout le parcours scolaire. La plupart des étudiants ne savent pas ce qu’est la dette ou le déficit. Alors le repas à 1 €, le pass Culture, les allocations pour tout le monde, tout leur paraît normal, comme si l’argent était illimité.
Et c’est la quatrième raison qui nourrit la troisième. Quand on ne sait pas d’où vient l’argent, il est très facile d’être généreux avec celui des autres.
還鄉團團長 retweeted
分享博客文章《关于满蒙价值观》。2025年10月29日发布，到今天刚好一周年。
早上我讲因为姆巴佩道歉，所以汗八里政府反而大肆批判，如果不道歉反而没事，这就是满蒙价值观。很多人问什么是满蒙价值观，刚好转载这篇文章解释一下。
原文地址：sinyalee.com/blog/?p=1065
還鄉團團長 retweeted
It’s not even just so much a European problem even or East Asian
Human intelligence isn’t replicating anymore
還鄉團團長 retweeted
Europe’s demographic crisis pales in comparison with East Asia’s fertility collapse. South Korea (~0.8), Taiwan (~0.7), Singapore (~0.87), China and Thailand (~1.0) lie far below the 2.1 replacement level, so each generation is roughly one-third to half the size of the previous one. The effect compounds, after just two generations many of these populations would retain only 10–20% of their starting numbers, after three, single digits. Has something similar ever happened before?
What disappears is not merely headcount but the continuity of language, family forms, local memory, and the economic base supporting dense urban life, pensions, and national capacity. Japan has already lived the early chapters, empty schools, rural depopulation, rising dependency ratios. The rest of East Asia is entering the same trajectory, just faster, with less time to adapt and, in some cases, stronger cultural resistance to large-scale immigration that might otherwise offset the decline.
Without sustained significant fertility recovery or open immigration on a scale most of these societies have not contemplated, the region’s countries will become markedly older, smaller, and different from those that defined the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. This will have massive economic and geopolitical consequences many still do not realize.
Europe’s fertility crisis is already reshaping its societies, and most people still underestimate how fast the arithmetic compounds. Just take a look at these numbers.
In 2024 the EU total fertility rate hit a record low of 1.34. Italy stood at 1.18, Spain and Poland around 1.10, Germany near 1.36, and France at 1.61. Replacement is roughly 2.1. When each generation is half to two-thirds the size of the one before it, shrinkage is exponential. Without migration, native populations in the lowest-fertility countries could contract by two-thirds or more after just two generations and by 80%+ after three. Migration has masked this in headline numbers, it has not erased the generational imbalance.
Fewer workers will support more retirees, raising the share of GDP needed for pensions and healthcare while eroding the tax base and growth potential. Public finances face persistent pressure. Rural depopulation is already advanced, Italy has around a thousand ghost towns, and Spain’s countryside has lost nearly 30% of its population in half a century. Schools close, services thin, and housing markets in non-metropolitan areas face structural oversupply. Society overall grows older, with fewer children and a larger share of voters whose interests diverge from the young. The intergenerational bargain underpinning the welfare state becomes harder to sustain when the young are simply fewer. Slowly, year after year, not suddenly in 20 years.
The severity is not about “running out of people” tomorrow, it is the quiet, compounding erosion of the working-age base that finances pensions, staffs hospitals, sustains communities, and underpins the fiscal and social stability Europeans take for granted.
