jefke (@jefke00) header
jefke (@jefke00) profile picture

Retail trying to not be fooled by randomness. https://nitter.cf/t.co/m37W9DgPwF - better insider transactions for .be/.nl/.fr

Joined June 2020
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Dodge & Cox filing below 5% end of Sept with a 2.2% stake. So in these six weeks there has been 1. Index rebal/index selling 2. Dodge direction of travel is prob to near zero around the filing and prob not price sensitive. 3. Atlas absent from buying since 25 Sept. $TIGO
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Gator on French Banks $GLE.PA $BNP.PA - France's problems are real - The banks have become trading vehicle to express the bet against France - Believes investors overestimate the dependence of these banks on French economy or exposure to debt
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I couldn't help myself and nibbled more $TIGO
AI-Jesus får sparken under geopolitiskt snåriga omständigheter: -5% Index kastar ut bolag som det inkluderade i våras och de vill göra ett mindre förvärv (kända för helt briljanta förvärv) precis efter ett Q3 som krossade alla förväntningar (efter -20 månaden innan): -10% 🤣
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Analyst upgrade with chunky eFCF estimates for $TIGO "eFCF of about $1.1bn in 2026, $1.55bn in 2027 (+41%) and $1.83bn in 2028"
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#AUTO - AI & idiosyncratic worries fading? Berenberg upgrades to BUY - target 650p ... says the Deal Builder problems are mostly behind it, with retailer numbers recovering faster than expected, and calls about 14x FY27 earnings an unjustified discount
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$SCR.TO to acquire $GFR.TO at C$11 GFR shareholders can choose: * 0.25 SCR shares per GFR share: a 15% premium based on Friday’s close * C$11 cash per share: a 39% premium No proration. Waterous Energy Fund, which owns 72% of GFR, will roll into SCR shares. One of my personal worries for $GFR always was "will you as minority shareholder see the upside of the cheapness of the stock" and I'd say a 39% premium is more than I expected. WEF rolling their stake at a lower price also seems good for both $SCR and $GFR shareholders. Downside: hardcore GFR bulls might think the stock should be worth more and now their pure play GFR upside is diluted into SCR ceo.ca/@newswire/strathcona-…
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New bonus tied to hitting 2bn in eFCF in “the medium term” Currently at 1.1bn guided eFCF for 2026 Vamos $TIGO
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How? Easy, just reach 20% fcf-margins (Narrator: this is not easy)
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I saw the "Bekaert to sell China for ~$2bn" again (which is about BEKB current market cap), but I doubt the math works. $BEKB.BR China was 19% (€711m) of sales in 2025 and likely a smaller share of profit (they don't dislose margins per region) $2bn is roughly €1.8bn,which would be about 2.5x sales for the Chinese segment while BEKB is at 0.6x EV/S AFAIK, the $2bn traces back to a single Bloomberg story citing unnamed sources, with talks "at an early stage", and it's been copied everywhere since. Seems rich, even with synergies. But I'd be happy to be proven wrong, since it would be nice to see a Belgian company monetize "hidden" assets and play the public markets game properly
Replying to @elvermo @business
Interessant, maar het lijkt me toch sterk als dit "enkele miljarden" oplevert.... Omzet uit China was €711m of 19% v totale 2025 omzet Enkele miljarden = meer dan 2.5x sales? Bekaert zelf noteert aan EV/sales v 0.6
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Good luck seeing any of that money “Bekaert is paying 140 million euros for Thai construction specialist Dextra, and it won't stop there. CEO Olivier Biebuyck wants to thoroughly overhaul the industrial group through new acquisitions and potentially sales as well.” “This is my first acquisition, but it won't be my last."
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Leaking that you discussed going private, "but conversations haven’t progressed nor has Universal begun a sales process" three days before earnings... probably not bullish. (reading between the lines: Bolloré will sell, but his ask was too high and he has no pressure to sell) $UMG.AS
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Buy-and-hold since then, dividends included: $WLFC: $67.65 → $40.23: −39.3% $AER: $97.49 → $155.55: +62.2 A lot of multiple compression for WLFC. Is anyone still following this and pumped about it?
Jet engine lessors seem to be hot stuff right now. $WLFC is still being pitched as cheap even after a 4x YTD. This video answered some of my key questions: youtube.com/watch?v=YGebhW0V… My main question being: There's a "hard market" in both aircraft and engines (= good for lessors). So why this instead of $AER? The answers: - aircraft lease is 7 years - jet engine lease is 1.5 years => the jet engine part has way more torque to the "spot price" => $WLFC is almost a pure play on engines: earnings have skyrocketed and will continue to do so My personal quick thoughts: $AER is less quick to benefit from new spot price, but will also reap the rewards for a longer time. Happy to hear any additional thoughts on the topic
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Replying to @jefke00
I was long $WLFC at the beginning of the year, sold when they started issuing converts, haven't done deep research on them since but looking a bit interesting at 6x Fwd P/E. Engine leasing has definitely cooled some, and the price action has been miserable. $FTAI also interesting, although the engine powerplant thing I think won't pan out long term.
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Barco $BAR.BR: sometimes your insider just really likes the company and his purchases have no predictive value on the "earnings inflection" Down another 13% today insiderwatch.be/chart/BARCO
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Is this like when American investors find a UK stock and curse it?
Barco’s $BAR.BB Chairman and main shareholder continues to buy stock aggressively through various trading vehicles and has even accelerated recently. We’ve mentioned that Barco itself has been buying back shares and plans to cancel them all, resulting in a significant jump in the Chairman's ownership (he's already at ~30%) and potentially a takeout offer. What’s more, Barco recently fired its IR. We spoke to the guy, and there doesn’t seem to be a successor. Hmm, interesting. Barco might be worth a look at these levels: not much growth, but with very solid products and market shares in some of its main markets (mainly high-end cinema projectors, e.g., IMAX is Barco) and strong cash flow generation. Roughly 6x EV/EBITDA on 2026e.
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$COO: Last December Browning West got W. Rosebrough (ex- $STE CEO) on the board, with the board committing to consider him as chair by the end of 2026. That's now happened, and the CEO is out. What matters though is still getting CooperVision back to growth: In theory this is the "compounder", the high-ROIC segment, but results have been lacking. Needs to show a return to organic growth so people can believe again
$COO caught my attention last year because of Browning West's "activist" involvement: Criticism: - company has 2 unrelated divisions (vision - CVI and CSI - fertility/women's health) - lack of FCF and lack of focus on ROIC Solution: - get rid of CSI and focus on the CVI, the best segment - introduce FCF and ROIC hurdles in mgmt comp - strengthen the board with experienced medtech and vision-care operators globenewswire.com/news-relea…
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Tetragon $TFG.AS out with a new tender offer for $50m, the 3rd this year. At $15, that's for 3.8% of shares. At a discount to NAV of 63%, this increases NAV/share by 2.5%
Looking at Tetragon $TFG.AS again. I think this is a reasonable summary: "Tetragon is a controlled permanent-capital vehicle trading at roughly one-third of NAV. The base return comes from NAV/share growth, a ~3.5–3.6% cash dividend yield and accretive tenders well below NAV. At this discount, buybacks can be economically attractive even to the fee-earning principals: the value they gain through their large equity stake can outweigh the management fees lost from shrinking NAV. The catch is revealed preference. Management appears to prefer measured tenders while preserving a large capital base and fee stream, rather than maximizing NAV/share through very large tenders. So I would not underwrite discount closure as the thesis. That remains entirely in the controllers’ hands. At the current valuation, I think a reasonable base case is ~10–12% annual shareholder returns with no rerating: roughly 7–8% ex-dividend NAV/share growth + ~3.5% dividend yield, with some additional tender accretion possible. Historical NAV performance plus continued discounted tenders could get you into the 12–13% range. A genuinely large tender or eventual discount narrowing would produce substantially more. The bear case is weaker NAV performance, dilution offsetting buybacks, token-sized tenders and the discount remaining huge indefinitely. There is also the risk that management eventually takes the company private at a large premium to the quoted price but still a substantial discount to NAV."
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