Kontext Security (@kontextsecurity) header
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Runtime authorization infrastructure for AI in the real world. 🌐 https://nitter.cf/t.co/6IjQeTXXQc ⭐️ https://nitter.cf/t.co/nFE5b2cxop

Munich; San Francisco
Joined November 2024
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our newest security engineer 🕷️ app.kontext.security
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Introducing Merlin, a local context-aware model that detects unsafe agent tool calls. Merlin checks proposed actions against the user's request and prior tool activity, giving security teams a risk signal before execution.
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Merlin runs locally, so sensitive task context doesn't need to go to a hosted model for review. 90.51% F1 across 7,182 held-out tool calls. 47.49 ms median inference on Apple MPS. Read the evaluation and methodology: kontext.security/blog/merlin
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Merlin is now available in Kontext, deployed through self serve or the MDM you already use. We've also published the model and code so you can run it yourself. Hugging Face: huggingface.co/kontext-secur… GitHub: github.com/kontext-security/…
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New: Manage Kontext from your preferred agent. Ask Claude Code, Codex or your preferred agent to check risks, inspect logs, and understand what your agents are doing. With the Kontext skill, you can do it without opening the dashboard.
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Install the Kontext skill in Claude Code, Codex or another compatible agent, then ask: "Connect to Kontext and show me my risks and logs." Approve the connection in your browser. Agents start with read-only access. You choose what they can change in Settings → Agent access. Get the skill now: github.com/kontext-security/…
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An agent can have permission to send emails. Instructions hidden in a document can still trick it into leaking your data. We built Merlin to catch agent actions that don't match your request. The model checks tool calls in context, locally, before they run.
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It is a small classifier that reads the user's request, the preceding tool history, the proposed call, and the available tool descriptions. In our tests, median inference took about 47 ms on Apple MPS. Our upcoming research post explains how we built Merlin.
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New: Observe before you enforce. Policies now have Observing and Enforced modes. Scope them to agents and endpoints, review what they would block, then enforce and inspect actual blocks.
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Also shipped this week: • Risk: severity, trends, categories, and who ran each flagged call • Warnings for tool names your endpoints don't report • Authorized agents can manage policies via API, with explicit enforcement and change history Secure your agents with Kontext app.kontext.security
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Running a coding model locally is useful when you're on a flight without Wi-Fi. We wanted to explore what happens when it takes a shortcut with your data. So we gave GLM-4.7-Flash a broken expense app, with three entries that hadn't synced. 🧵
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The agent's first fix got the app running but deleted the data. In the protected run, blocking the reset didn't stop GLM from finishing. It fixed the migration instead. That's the result we wanted: a working app with the unsynced entries still there.
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It’s Friday, and this week’s release makes it easier to roll out Kontext across your workforce. @addigy is our first supported MDM provider. One rollout deploys Kontext across your managed Macs, with local policy enforcement in under 10 ms.
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We asked Claude Code to update a changelog. One malicious instruction in CLAUDE .md made Haiku 4.5 try to send .env to a server in 9 out of 10 runs. Kontext blocked every attempt. Claude still finished the changelog in 9 out of 10 runs. 🧵
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Kestrel flagged all 9 commands as risky. Cedar blocked all 9 before execution. Haiku skipped the malicious instruction once and followed it nine times. The policy gave the same answer every time: deny.
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