Giorgio Maone 🐘 @[email protected]

people in Southern Italy can't buy food because diesel is too expensive for truckers to be able to get a living wage out of their job because you decided to start a pointless war in Iran just one example off the top of my head

I would like to congratulate the organizers of the 2026 Cybersecurity Awareness Month for putting together a truly spectacular event

Totalitarians, theocrats, and the promoters of artificial superintelligence share a common motivation: the subordination of humans to a manufactured construct. I wrote about the rise of Anti-Humanism, why it’s happening, and what we need to do about it. mind-war.com/p/anti-humanism

Something to be aware of when encountering viral French riot videos online. Especially when loaded with right wing narratives and talking points, as they are on X. Make note of the accounts pushing this campaign for future review. Russian intelligence services have a documented history of exploiting civil unrest to destabilize governments, deepen political divisions and undermine public confidence in democratic institutions. Warnings of possible Russian hybrid attacks came days and weeks ahead of protests in France. Large demonstrations provide opportunities for sabotage, provocations and other forms of interference to take place amid existing unrest, making it harder for authorities to distinguish politically motivated violence from coordinated foreign operations. Riots and violent confrontations can be exploited to increase tensions between demonstrators and police. A single violent incident can trigger a wider confrontation, provoke a heavy police response and undermine public support for otherwise peaceful demonstrations. Russian operatives do not need to control a protest movement to exploit it. Kremlin-linked influence networks can then circulate selective footage, misleading claims and fabricated accounts of the violence. The same incident can be presented to different audiences in contradictory ways: protesters are portrayed as violent extremists, while police and government officials are accused of authoritarian repression. Both narratives encourage hostility and distrust. This is where the GRU and Russia's wider influence apparatus become relevant. Russian military intelligence has been implicated in sabotage and other covert operations across Europe, while Kremlin-linked online networks have conducted coordinated campaigns to manipulate political debate. Physical disruption and online amplification can reinforce each other, although evidence is needed to establish whether they are coordinated in any particular incident. The timing of warnings before major demonstrations matters because authorities must prepare for the possibility of deliberate interference without treating legitimate protesters as suspects. Provocateurs can take advantage of crowded streets, existing tensions and the presence of large numbers of police officers. Any resulting violence may initially be attributed to protesters, regardless of who was responsible. Prolonged unrest also strains policing resources, consumes government attention and diverts political debate from other issues, including France's military and diplomatic support for Ukraine. Images of burning vehicles, street clashes and damaged infrastructure can be circulated internationally to portray France and its European allies as unstable. These images are particularly useful to Russian propaganda when presented without context or when isolated incidents are made to appear representative of an entire protest movement. Russia does not need to organise demonstrations to benefit from them. It can exploit legitimate grievances, amplify isolated violence and encourage opposing groups to blame one another. The protests in France may have entirely legitimate causes. That does not prevent Russian intelligence services from attempting to exploit them. But warnings of possible hybrid attacks are not, by themselves, evidence that Russian operatives have infiltrated the demonstrations or caused specific incidents.