Material Security (@material_sec) header
Material Security (@material_sec) profile picture

Helping lean security teams protect the email, data, and identities that live in Google Workspace and Microsoft 365.

San Francisco, CA
Joined March 2020
Attackers stopped asking for your password. Passkeys made that phishing much harder, so now the pitch is “just go through this OAuth flow.” Real Google login. One click on Allow. The token bypasses your identity protections. @BleepinComputer
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Of 702 HIPAA breaches under HHS investigation, 144 involved email, and 85% of those were account takeovers. We’ll be at HS-ISAC Fall Americas Summit in Tucson, Dec 1 to 3, talking about what’s already sitting in the inbox. Booth #15! Book time with us: hubs.li/Q04FWgRG0
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Replying to @KairosAIS
@KairosAIS runs fellowships, workshops, and a residency for people working on risks from advanced AI. Their team is now using Material. Welcome to the roster!
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27 suspected North Korean IT-worker personas reached onboarding at the organizations we monitor over the past year. That means offer letters, background checks, equipment requests, or first-day IT setup. What they could have opened on day one depends on how sharing was managed before they ever applied. We looked at four companies where a persona reached onboarding in the last 30 days. At one, about 15 million files were flagged as source code and 130,000 as containing bank or routing numbers. Almost none of it was shared beyond its owners. At another, 68% of roughly 400,000 files containing Social Security numbers were open company-wide or by public link. So were 71% of its bank and routing files. Any account inside the company could reach them with no special permission, so a new account wouldn’t have had to look for anything. At a third, about 1,900 source code files were shared by public link, readable by anyone with the URL. At the fourth, 21% of financial files and 17% of credit card files were shared beyond their owners. Same adversary, very different blast radius. Catching the mask at the door matters, but so does knowing which files hold what, who can reach them, and where sharing has drifted wider than intended, before a case starts.
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“Imagine waking up to find that work has been moving forward while you were asleep.” The opening of a recruitment email from a North Korea-linked operator. Not a fake applicant this time. A recruiter, writing to real employees. There was no urgent warning and no attachment, only a side-income offer: create an account on an AI-training platform, complete the identity verification, and let someone else do the work. Eight operators, 13 organizations, about 38 employees, five weeks. The emails are below. 🔗 hubs.li/Q04FlGb-0
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Two Google Drive files with sensitive data. One is shared company-wide: contained. One is public with SSNs: overexposed. The agent stages the fix, and here we approve it by hand. Once you trust its verdicts, it can act on its own. 👇
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Replying to @aluveaux @itsvlady
The "All My Passwords" booklet keeps your passwords safe from burglars. Does nothing if your "CEO" just asks for them.
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Same adversary, very different blast radius. We found suspected North Korean IT-worker personas reaching onboarding at four of the companies we monitor. At one, almost nothing sensitive was shared beyond its owners. At another, 68% of the files containing Social Security numbers were open company-wide or by public link. 🔗 hubs.li/Q04FdPcn0
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Welcome to the roster, @togal_ai! Takeoff in minutes, not days on their side - email, files, and account takeover protection on ours.
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Most people wear a costume to a Halloween party. One suspected DPRK persona was completing onboarding paperwork at one company while pursuing opportunities at seven others, in the same mask. 18 of the 27 that reached onboarding were in process at other organizations too. hubs.li/Q04F63VD0
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41% of the suspected DPRK personas we tracked applied at more than one organization. 15 appeared at ten or more. One appeared at nineteen. Each company saw only its own hiring process. hubs.li/Q04D-t4J0
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Weeks before we published our research on North Korean IT-worker personas reaching onboarding, Belem Regalado explained access management with a bathtub in a SecurityWeek webinar. Restricting events went from 14% of access changes to 44%, and new sharing still outpaced them. Then we saw what that looks like when a fake hire gets in. At one of four companies, almost nothing sensitive was shared beyond its owners. At another, 68% of the files containing Social Security numbers were open company-wide or by public link. 🔗 hubs.li/Q04D-rhN0
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27 suspected North Korean IT-worker personas reached onboarding at the organizations we monitor over the past year. Then we ran the same indicators against our own recruiting pipeline. They were there too. Nobody is too small, too technical, or too careful to be a target. 2,429 distinct personas made contact, and 41% of them applied at more than one organization. Each company saw only its own hiring process. Full research: hubs.li/Q04DTBwX0
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