Distinguished Members of UN Working Group on Business and Human Rights (@WGBizHRs), I request that the Working Group transmit an allegation letter to @LockheedMartin Corporation, and to the Government of the United States, concerning a matter within your mandate that has to date drawn no response from any United Nations mechanism. On 28 February 2026, the opening day of the American and Israeli war on Iran, United States forces fired four Lockheed Martin Precision Strike Missiles into Lamerd, a city of thirty thousand in Fars province. They detonated in the air above a girls' sports hall, a school and residential streets, dispersing tens of thousands of tungsten fragments. Twenty-one civilians were killed, the youngest aged two. More than one hundred and seventy were wounded, a number permanently disabled by spinal injuries, amputations and blindness. Airwars, The New York Times and BBC Verify, with weapons analysis by Janes and McKenzie Intelligence, attributed the munitions to the PrSM. No military objective in Lamerd has ever been identified by Central Command, which first denied any strike in the vicinity and then attributed the footage to an Iranian munition, an attribution each independent analysis rejected. I visited Lamerd, examined the fragmentation damage, and met the families of those killed and injured. The strike itself engages the responsibility of a State. What engages your mandate is what follows. Within a month, Lockheed Martin concluded an agreement with the Department of War to quadruple PrSM production, reported at some $8.4 billion. It was signed after the forensic record was public, after the official account had been publicly contradicted twice, and after the Commander of Central Command had himself identified Lamerd as the weapon's combat debut and praised its performance. The PrSM had never been used in combat before. Its first operational employment was over a densely populated civilian area, and the commercial expansion of the programme followed directly upon it. Guiding Principle 23(c) requires enterprises to treat the risk of contributing to gross human rights abuses as a legal compliance issue wherever they operate, and the Working Group's own reporting on conflict-affected contexts establishes that heightened due diligence is required in such settings, including the use of leverage, and disengagement where leverage fails. The question you are uniquely placed to put is narrow and answerable: what did Lockheed Martin know about the effects of the 28 February employment when it agreed to expand production fourfold, and what due diligence did it conduct before signing? I respectfully ask that the Working Group: 1- Transmit an allegation letter to Lockheed Martin Corporation, addressed to its Chairman and Chief Executive Officer and to its Board of Directors, and publish the letter and any response in the communications database. 2- Invite the company to state (a) what operational performance, telemetry or assessment data relating to the Lamerd employment it received or could access; (b) on what date; (c) what human rights due diligence, if any, preceded the production-expansion agreement; and (d) what leverage it has exercised with its customer over the use of this munition. 3- Call upon the company to suspend performance of the production-expansion agreement, and all further transfer of the PrSM, pending an independent investigation. 4- Call on the company to preserve all material relating to the 28 February employment, which is evidence in any future proceedings. 5- Transmit parallel communications to the United States, and consider co-signature by the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions. A weapon was used for the first time over a city of 30,000 people, and the commercial consequence was a contract to build four times as many. That sequence is a matter of public record, and it is precisely the case the Guiding Principles were written to reach.