starlabs (@starlabs_sg) header
starlabs (@starlabs_sg) profile picture

A Singapore company that discovers vulnerabilities to help customers mitigate the risks of cyber attacks. Organisers of @offbyoneconf

Singapore
Joined September 2018
Full chain done 22 April. Submitted on the 7 May deadline. ZDI: sorry, we’re full. KVM entries at Berlin 2026: nil. Lesson: register EARLY. And AI makes easy bugs everyone’s now, so the edge is the deep stuff it can’t reach. github.com/star-sg/Presentat…
Then root: a unix_gc race (CVE-2026-23394) + DirtyMode past kernel IBT, SELinux switched off. Cross-tenant was the choice bit. Pagecache trick: coax /etc/passwd into cache, swap in our creds, log in. We didn’t knock. 🔑
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Then root: a unix_gc race (CVE-2026-23394) + DirtyMode past kernel IBT, SELinux switched off. Cross-tenant was the choice bit. Pagecache trick: coax /etc/passwd into cache, swap in our creds, log in. We didn’t knock. 🔑
Replying to @starlabs_sg
Escaping QEMU meant beating seccomp and SHSTK. SHSTK was all mouth, no trousers: backed by CPU and kernel, but off in glibc by default. So /proc/self/mem + ROP, and we were out.
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We built a full-chain QEMU/KVM escape on RHEL for Pwn2Own Berlin 2026. Guest to host root to cross-tenant code exec. ~100% reliable in 10s. Then came the toughest mitigation of all: the registration queue. 🤡 Our HITCON 2026 talk: “Pwn2OwNothing” 🧵
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The way in: a virtio-gpu integer overflow for an OOB write, then a second bug to turn it into an info leak and give ASLR the slip. Foot in the door.
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Escaping QEMU meant beating seccomp and SHSTK. SHSTK was all mouth, no trousers: backed by CPU and kernel, but off in glibc by default. So /proc/self/mem + ROP, and we were out.
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• /proc/self/mem + ROP past seccomp & SHSTK, the latter being all mouth, no trousers (off in glibc by default) • CVE-2026-23394 unix_gc race + DirtyMode to root past kernel IBT
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starlabs retweeted
Friends ask: “You’re a consultancy with no product, why STAR Labs?” Today’s my answer: 5 RCEs on Pixel 10 & 11, all patched by Google, from a team you could fit round 1 table. We don’t sell a box. We break the unbreakable and tell you how. 👇
What a rollercoaster. 7 weeks, 5 RCEs on Pixel 10 & 11, all officially patched by Google today. Chuffed to bits. The bounty won’t have us popping champagne, but popping Chrome? That we can do all day. The real payout was always the patch. Demo 👇
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What a rollercoaster. 7 weeks, 5 RCEs on Pixel 10 & 11, all officially patched by Google today. Chuffed to bits. The bounty won’t have us popping champagne, but popping Chrome? That we can do all day. The real payout was always the patch. Demo 👇
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Open invite to @Google, @Kimi_Moonshot, @OpenAI & @AnthropicAI : your compute, our vulnerability research. We can use your AI to find flagship-grade bugs faster. That’s a trade worth making. Huge credit to every researcher on this team. We’re only getting started.
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📚 Slide decks from OB1 2025 & 2026 are live! Catch up on talks you missed, revisit top sessions, or dive into the technical breakdowns. Most slides are up on GitHub: 👉🏻 github.com/star-sg/OBO Huge thanks to all our speakers, sponsors, activity partners, and attendees!
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To find a $113,337 Linux kernel bug may be regarded as a fortune. To have your Cisco RCE silently patched the next day looks like the universe is trolling you specifically. Two blog posts today. 🧵
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Our intern Yap Yuan Xi pointed AI at Cisco Smart Software Manager and went to make tea. It found a post-auth RCE in under an hour He spent days writing the report. Cisco had silently patched it the day after he found it. No CVE, not even a biscuit, at least not that we know of.
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If @AnthropicAI @OpenAI and @Google got spare tokens and compute for us to secure the world. We are always ready and waiting. We are just 1 email away 😉
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17 Apple CVEs. 15 in the 🍎 🌽 . All by 👀 by our team members @Google @OpenAI @AnthropicAI , your models are already in this advisory. You bring the compute, we can bring you the bugs. 🤝 support.apple.com/en-us/1490…
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On Android? Update now. We’re holding technical details while the fix reaches users. The demo speaks for itself. This is what we bring to client’s code too: the deep bugs an attacker would find, before one does. Taking on new audit engagements, fully confidential.
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We are proud to share that @hi_im_d4rkn3ss has received the Bug of the Year award at the @thezdi Vanguard Awards. The Awards were introduced by the ZDI to recognise outstanding contributions by security researchers & vendors that help strengthen the security ecosystem.
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We're incredibly proud of Thach’s achievement and grateful for his dedication to impactful security research. Our sincere thanks to @thezdi for the recognition and for supporting the global security research community. Photo credit: from SCB who was there. Thank you.
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