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பிறரின் சாதி பாராதிருப்பது மட்டுமல்ல சாதி மறுப்பு.
தன் சாதியை மறுத்து மறப்பதே சாதி மறுப்பு
Congress govt of K.Kamaraj published TN land ceiling act 58/61 in may 1962 & notified it on Oct 1962 giving time for landlords to do shady dealings liked this and also gave exclusions for religious & educational trust letting congress பண்ணையார்ஸ் of that time to own 1000 of acres
பக்கா ஜாதிய திரைப்படமான எஜமான் திரைப்படத்தில் நில உச்சவரம்பு சட்டத்தை பற்றி ஒரு காட்சி வைத்திருப்பார்கள்.
அரசு சார்பாக நில உச்சவரம்பு சட்டத்தை சொல்லும் அதிகாரிகளை வில்லனாகவும் அரசு புடுங்கிட்டு போய்ரும் என்பதை தெரிந்து கொண்டு சூதானமாக அதை ஏழை பாழைகளுக்கு எழுதி வைத்து அந்த பத்திரங்களை தானே பத்திரமாக வைத்திருக்கும் கந்தவேல் வானவராயனை ஹீரோவாகவும் காட்டி எடுத்து இருப்பார்கள்.
இந்த காட்சி ஏதோ ஆர்.வி. உதயகுமாரின் கற்பனையில் தோன்றிய காட்சி அல்ல. அரசு நில உச்சவரம்பு சட்டத்தை அமல்படுத்திய போது எல்லா பண்ணையார்களும் செய்த தில்லாலங்கடி வேலைதான் அது.
பல பாமர மக்கள் தாங்கள் உழுது கொண்டிருக்கும் நிலம் தங்கள் பெயரில் இருப்பது கூட தெரியாது அடிமையாக உழைத்த ஆட்களும் உண்டு.
எவனாவது ஒரு பண்ணையார் ஏழைகளுக்கு சொத்தை எழுதி வச்சேனு சொன்னா சத்தியமா அவன் அரசாங்கத்த ஏமாத்திருக்கானுதான் அர்த்தம்.
ஆக டிங்கு டாங்கு டிங்கு டாங்கு டோய் ☺☺
- Che.Karthikeyan, Communist
S retweeted
UGC guidlines were put on hold, Why?
“Because a BRAHMAN bench saw merit in the petition of a BRAHMAN student who said he would be discriminated as a BRAHMAN if such guidelines to protect 'lowered caste' students would see the light of the day. Yeah. Make it make sense..”
mind blowing shivaji படத்துல வாஜி வாஜி பாட்டுக்கு போட்ட set இன்னும் அப்படியே இருக்கா😲 wow
If this frame is from Dune or any other Hollywood movie Indian people would be licking over it.
This backward mentality is very sick, will never let us grow.
#RamayanaPart1
என்னோட guess correctனா வால்மீகி ராமாயணத்தில காட்டுக்கு போக சொன்னதுக்கு இராமர் தனியா போய் அவங்கப்பாவ கோத்தா கொம்மா ன்னு திட்டினாருன்னு எழுதியிருக்க வாய்ப்பு இருக்கு 😂
S retweeted
The biggest irony here is that the official constitutional system of China is actually defined as the "People's Democratic Dictatorship" (人民民主专政).
This is not even an insult; it is written directly into Article 1 of the Constitution of the People's Republic of China.
Article 1 states:
"The People's Republic of China is a socialist state under the people's democratic dictatorship led by the working class and based on the alliance of workers and peasants."
(中华人民共和国是工人阶级领导的、以工农联盟为基础的人民民主专政的社会主义国家。)
So, China at least has the intellectual honesty to admit that its own government establishment is a dictatorship, but that it is a bottom-up dictatorship where the working class organized together and pulled down the bourgeois class.
Technically speaking, the Communist Party of China has no right to feel offended when figures like Mao Zedong are labeled dictators, since they themselves consider their system a dictatorship. The offense is only justified in context. They know that according to the worldview of the average Westerner, a "dictatorship" is a title reserved for a figure who governs by a strict top-down model where the rule of law is disregarded and people's rights are violently suppressed. Mao Zedong was not such a figure. He was never among the corrupt oligarchs in China; he emerged as the leader of the party through grassroots class organization. Furthermore, his policies were geared toward unifying China and dismantling the cultural and feudal systems that facilitated imperial extraction.
It is quite funny how many people in the West consider any government not practicing liberal democracy to be a "dictatorship," as if to say their own democracy is not a dictatorship itself. In reality, every political system is fundamentally a dictatorship.
No single figure can rule as a dictator in isolation. Even a leader who emerges from a democratic election still needs loyal heads of the judiciary, the legislature, and the military to legitimize their oppressive policies. Similarly, a military strongman still needs loyal chiefs and oligarchs to suppress public anger and use state propaganda networks to rally the people. All government systems are dictatorships; it all depends on who is doing the dictating. If it is a dictatorship of the ruling capitalist class, then it is a bourgeois dictatorship. If it is a dictatorship of the working class and peasants, then it is a dictatorship of the proletariat.
If Americans truly believe they are not living under a dictatorship, then I challenge them to vote to end the military conquests in the Middle East and completely lift the embargo on Cuba. Clearly, they cannot. Just like in every Western democratic system in the world, the vote is merely political theater designed to maintain the illusion of choice. The ruling class continues to shuffle power among themselves and multiply their wealth, while the poor masses are condemned to carry the full burden of this economic exploitation and imperial blowback.
Readers added context they thought people might want to know
The CCP's 1981 resolution documents Mao's arbitrary rule, concentration of power, undermining of collective leadership, and personality cult (Sections 18, 20, 24)
characteristics associated with dictatorship.
china.usc.edu/node/20941
S retweeted
I hate to pick on Mr. Brennan here, but this is the kind of lazy thinking the Epstein regime preys on us with.
They think we're dumb enough to believe their narratives and never do any investigation of our own.
Little do they know, I'm an obsessive reader and even more obsessive about exposing the lies that keep people slaving away by emotionally manipulating them.
Sucks to suck, I guess.
First, I have no idea where Mr. Brennan gets these numbers. Some of these are real historical tragedies that the Epstein regime told him to blame on Communism and he didn't check on, some are wildly inflated figures with zero connection to reality, and others seem to be things he seems to have just thrown together without bothering to understand what actually happened.
Anyway, here we go:
1. "Nazi Germany was allied with the USSR to take Poland."
First and foremost: This is retarded on its face.
But let's actually examine what happened before August 1939, because apparently history begins with the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and everything before it just magically disappears.
Throughout the 1930s, the Soviet Union pursued a policy of collective security against Nazi Germany. (It was NOT a secret that the Nazis planned on invading the Soviets.) Soviet foreign minister Maxim Litvinov spent years attempting to construct an anti-fascist coalition with the Western powers.
The USSR joined the League of Nations in 1934, signed mutual-assistance treaties with France and Czechoslovakia in 1935, and repeatedly pursued cooperation against German expansion.
And what happened?
Britain and France repeatedly resisted Soviet proposals, distrusted Moscow, and pursued accommodation with Hitler.
In 1938, when Hitler threatened Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union maintained that it was prepared to fulfill its mutual-assistance obligations. But Soviet assistance was tied to French participation, and getting Soviet forces into Czechoslovakia presented another problem: Poland and Romania opposed allowing the Red Army passage through their territory.
So what did Britain and France do?
They signed the Munich Agreement with Hitler and Mussolini, handing Germany the Sudetenland.
Czechoslovakia wasn't even invited to the conference. Neither was the Soviet Union.
Read that again.
Britain and France sat down with Hitler and Mussolini and agreed to the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia without Czechoslovakia even being represented.
And we're supposed to believe that the great diplomatic scandal of the 1930s was the Soviet Union signing an agreement with Germany the following year?
But wait. It gets better.
In 1939, the Soviets were STILL trying to negotiate an anti-German alliance with Britain and France.
Those negotiations failed.
And we don't have to rely on Soviet accounts to establish what happened.
On August 23, 1939, American ambassador Laurence Steinhardt reported to Washington that the French ambassador in Moscow placed principal responsibility for the breakdown of negotiations on Poland, which had consistently refused to accept Soviet military assistance.
That's an actual American diplomatic document.
The French ambassador explained that Moscow had warned Britain and France that military negotiations were pointless unless Soviet troops could reach the territory they were supposedly going to defend.
Think about how effing absurd that is.
The Soviets were negotiating to help defend Eastern Europe against Nazi Germany, but the countries involved couldn't agree on allowing Soviet forces to reach the battlefield.
And then, after years of failed collective-security diplomacy, the Soviet Union signed a nonaggression pact with Germany.
Now let's talk about those pacts for a minute.
Because apparently signing an agreement with Nazi Germany automatically makes you a Nazi ally.
Interesting!
1934: Poland signed a nonaggression declaration with Nazi Germany.
1935: Britain signed the Anglo-German Naval Agreement, permitting Germany to build a navy beyond the restrictions imposed by Versailles.
1938: Britain and France signed the Munich Agreement with Hitler and Mussolini, accepting Germany's annexation of the Sudetenland.
1938: Britain and Germany signed a declaration expressing their desire never to go to war with one another.
1938: France and Germany signed a declaration concerning peaceful relations.
1939: The Soviet Union signed the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact.
Notice anything?
European governments were signing diplomatic agreements with Nazi Germany throughout the decade. These agreements differed in purpose and content, but nobody seriously argues that Britain became a Nazi ally because Chamberlain signed an agreement with Hitler.
The Soviet-German pact DID contain secret protocols dividing supposed spheres of influence in relation to nonaggression. Those protocols were not an ordinary feature of nonaggression agreements. But it wasn't an alliance or a mutual invasion.
And if you're going to explain why that agreement happened, you cannot erase the preceding six years of diplomacy.
The Western powers had already accommodated Hitler's expansion, failed to establish collective security with Moscow, and demonstrated at Munich that they were prepared to sacrifice another country's territory in negotiations with Nazi Germany.
The Soviet leadership faced the prospect of war with Germany without a reliable coalition to its west. It chose an agreement that postponed direct conflict while also securing territorial advantages. That decision can be examined and criticized without inventing some ridiculous Nazi-Soviet alliance.
And how did this fantasy alliance end? In the real world, that is?
With Hitler invading the Soviet Union in June 1941.
With the Red Army fighting the largest land campaigns of the European war.
With the destruction of the overwhelming majority of Germany's fighting power on the Eastern Front.
And with THE RED BANNER OF THE PEOPLE flying over Berlin, thank God.
The Soviet Union suffered approximately 27 million military and civilian deaths during the war.
So the country you're attempting to portray as Nazi Germany's ideological partner was also the country that made the LARGEST contribution to destroying Nazi Germany.
You don't get to erase Soviet collective-security diplomacy, erase Munich, erase the failed negotiations of 1939, erase the Western agreements with Hitler, and then erase the Eastern Front.
That's not an examination of history.
That's taking one diplomatic agreement out of a decade of events and pretending the rest of the century never happened.
That's getting taught to think in childish terms, and saying, "Yessir, Mr. Epstein, sir."
2. "The Holodomor: USSR deliberately starved Ukraine, 3.5–5 million deaths."
Or: the hollow dumber
Now THIS one deserves some attention, because the popular version of this story rests on historical propositions that can actually be investigated.
Millions of people died during the Soviet famine of 1932–1933. Nobody needs to deny that.
But the claim that Stalin deliberately organized a famine to exterminate Ukrainians as a nationality is an additional claim about intention. It isn't established merely by counting the dead.
And there's an enormous body of agricultural and archival evidence that complicates that interpretation.
Not to mention ZERO actual evidence for the claim. But who needs evidence when you got Epstein thinking for you, right?
Let's begin with historian Mark B. Tauger.
In his 1991 study, The 1932 Harvest and the Famine of 1933, published in Slavic Review, Tauger challenged the official harvest statistics on which several influential accounts of the famine had relied.
Why?
Because the Soviet harvest figures substantially overstated the grain actually available.
The distinction between grain theoretically produced in the fields and grain actually harvested, processed, and available for consumption matters enormously.
If your argument assumes that the government possessed enough food to feed everybody but deliberately withheld it, then discovering that the harvest was much smaller than your figures indicate is a pretty serious problem.
Tauger didn't stop there.
In Natural Disaster and Human Actions in the Soviet Famine of 1931–1933, he examined the actual agricultural catastrophe: crop diseases, environmental conditions, poor yields, harvest losses, and the interaction between these problems and Soviet agricultural policies.
He argued that natural and biological disasters contributed substantially to the famine.
This is a positive historical explanation, not simply a declaration that the genocide interpretation is disputed.
It examines what was produced, what destroyed the crops, and how much food was actually available.
And here's another thing.
The Soviet central government repeatedly authorized famine relief.
Not according to some Soviet propaganda poster. According to archival decisions.
On February 7, 1933, the Politburo authorized food-grain allocations for affected regions, including Dnepropetrovsk and Odessa.
On February 18, central authorities approved seed-grain loans and food assistance for Ukrainian farms.
Further relief decisions followed in March, May, and June.
These were actual government measures to provide grain and agricultural assistance during the famine.
Now, seed grain intended for planting isn't the same thing as food delivered to starving families, and a government order doesn't prove every shipment reached its destination. But these documents absolutely belong in the historical account.
They establish that the central leadership was organizing relief while the famine was occurring. If the point was to kill people, this would not have kept happening.
Unless you get your notions of history from a class of people who wouldn't spit on your grandmother if she was on fire and consider you LESS HUMAN than they are, even though you carry their water and kiss their toes.
And this isn't the only relevant archival research.
R. W. Davies, Stephen Wheatcroft, and Tauger examined all Soviet grain stocks and the famine in a 1995 study. Davies and Wheatcroft subsequently argued that Stalin's policies were ruthless, but rejected the proposition that he consciously pursued a policy of starving the peasantry.
Read that again.
These are historians examining the actual agricultural and government records, not people who simply decided the famine never happened.
There's also the rather inconvenient fact that the famine wasn't confined to Ukraine.
Kazakhstan suffered catastrophically. So did the North Caucasus and other Soviet regions.
The causes and experiences weren't identical everywhere, but any serious explanation has to account for the famine's actual geography.
Tauger's work is particularly valuable because it starts with the material conditions of production instead of beginning with a political conclusion and arranging the evidence around it.
So here's my question.
How much grain was actually harvested? How much was lost? How much was requisitioned? How much remained? What relief was authorized? What arrived? And which documents establish an intention to destroy Ukrainians as a nationality?
Those are historical questions.
"STALIN KILLED EVERYBODY" is not a historical explanation.
3. Nazino Island.
Yeah, Nazino happened.
In 1933, thousands of deportees were transported to an island in Siberia under catastrophically inadequate conditions. Starvation, exposure, violence, and cannibalism followed.
Thousands died.
The episode is documented in Soviet investigations, and officials were subjected to disciplinary and criminal proceedings.
But what are you trying to establish here?
That the Soviet state had an absolutely harsh form of punishment as a one-off while they were still trying to industrialize and surrounded by enemies attacking them on ALL sides in ALL ways? Compare that to generations of chattel slavery and get back to me.
Tragedies happen. Horrible things happen. But Epstein won't allow you to dismiss capitalism because of the horrible things that happen in capitalism?
4. "The Red Terror killed 1.3 million."
Show me your source.
Not a general estimate of deaths during the Russian Civil War. Not famine mortality. Not typhus deaths. Not battlefield casualties.
An actual historical accounting of 1.3 million people executed during the Red Terror.
Because those are different things.
The Russian Civil War involved the Red Army, White armies, foreign military interventions, political repression, famine, epidemics, and economic collapse.
The Bolsheviks carried out executions and political terror. So did their opponents.
White forces also carried out extensive massacres and antisemitic pogroms.
If you're going to discuss revolutionary terror, discuss the actual institutions, circumstances, and victims.
You don't get to attribute every death in a civil war to one side's execution squads.
5. "The Great Purge: 1–7 million executions."
Seven million EXECUTIONS?
Where are you getting this stuff?
Archival figures commonly cited for 1937–1938 record approximately 682,000 executions.
That is an enormous number of human beings, and political repression during those years was extensive. The total number imprisoned, deported, or otherwise persecuted was much greater. Ezhovschia it's called, after the anti-communist responsible. Who was caught and executed for his crimes.
Also: prison sentences, deaths, and deportations are different categories.
Seven million executions during the Great Purge is not supported by the archival figures.
If your estimate has a range from one million to seven million, perhaps you should figure out what you're actually counting before presenting it as a historical fact. Because that is an absolutely ridiculous margin for error.
6. "Tambov: 240,000 civilians killed."
The Tambov rebellion and its suppression involved brutal military operations, hostage-taking, executions, detention, and coercion.
But 240,000 civilians killed is not an established death toll.
The rebellion occurred amid civil war, agricultural disruption, and state requisitioning. Its suppression deserves examination.
What doesn't deserve acceptance is a giant number with no demonstrated relationship to actual mortality records.
7. "Decossackization: 500,000 murdered."
Again, where is the evidence for 500,000 people murdered?
The campaigns against Cossack communities involved killings, deportations, displacement, and political repression.
Historians debate their scale and character.
But estimates that combine population losses, displacement, and executions cannot simply be relabeled as murder statistics.
If 500,000 people were executed, establish that.
If you're talking about population decline, say so.
These are not interchangeable categories.
8. "The Kazakh famine: 2 million killed."
The Kazakh famine was a catastrophic event in which approximately 1.5 million people died according to one widely used estimate, with some estimates higher.
Forced settlement, livestock losses, pre-industrialization conditions, requisitions, and state policy contributed substantially to the disaster.
Again, this is a genuine historical tragedy.
But the important question is HOW it happened.
Kazakh pastoral agriculture depended on livestock and mobility. The transformation of that system, combined with requisitions and massive herd losses, devastated the traditional forms of social reproduction and ended up in tragedy.
That's an actual explanation.
Notice that we can examine the mechanisms of a catastrophe without pretending every famine death was an execution ordered by Stalin.
Interesting that all the death and destruction accompanying industrialization in capitalism isn't given the same treatment here. Because guess what? It was FAR worse.
And the remaining incidents you've named need to be identified properly before anybody can verify their figures.
Now, here's where this gets interesting.
LET'S DO CAPITALISM.
And we're going to apply the same standard you've been applying to Communism.
Every war? Count it.
Every famine under a capitalist or colonial government? Count it.
Every death caused by forced labor and slavery? Count it.
Every imperialist invasion, colonial massacre, and campaign of political repression? Count it.
Now, I wouldn't normally argue that every death occurring under a capitalist government is automatically attributable to capitalism. That's a ridiculous method of historical analysis.
But it's YOUR method.
So let's see what happens when we stop granting capitalism a special exemption from the rules.
THE CAPITALIST AND COLONIAL BODY COUNT
The conquest of the Americas. Tens of millions of Indigenous people died amid introduced diseases, conquest, enslavement, forced labor, displacement, and the destruction of existing societies. European colonial accumulation was inseparable from this process, although epidemic mortality cannot simply be equated with deliberate killing.
The Atlantic slave trade. Approximately 12.5 million Africans were forced aboard slave ships. Only about 10.7 million survived the crossing. Roughly 1.8 million deaths at sea alone, before counting deaths during capture, transport to the coast, or enslavement in the Americas.
Plantation slavery in the Americas. Generations of enslaved workers produced sugar, cotton, tobacco, and other commodities for commercial profit. People were literally owned as property and used as capital.
The Congo Free State. Forced rubber extraction, hostage-taking, mutilation, killings, and demographic catastrophe under Leopold II's colonial regime. Estimates of population loss run into the millions, although precise mortality figures remain uncertain.
The Great Indian Famine of 1876–1878. Millions died under British colonial rule. Drought initiated the crisis, but taxation, poverty, market conditions, and inadequate relief shaped its consequences.
The Indian famine of 1896–1897. Millions more died under colonial administration.
The Indian famine of 1899–1900. Another catastrophe involving millions of deaths, poverty, drought, and colonial relief failures.
The Bengal famine of 1943. Approximately three million deaths amid wartime inflation, food distribution failures, colonial policy, and agricultural disruption.
The Irish Great Famine. Approximately one million deaths. Potato blight was the immediate cause, but the existing system of landlordism, poverty, property relations, and British government policy determined much of the disaster's severity.
The Herero and Nama genocide. Tens of thousands killed through German colonial warfare, starvation, forced displacement, and concentration camps.
The Dutch colonial conquest of Indonesia. Forced cultivation, military campaigns, coerced labor, and extensive civilian mortality in the development of colonial commercial interests.
The American conquest of the Philippines. War, military repression, disease, displacement, and extensive civilian deaths during the establishment of American colonial rule.
The Opium Wars. Britain used military force to secure commercial privileges in China, including the protection of the opium trade. Nothing says "voluntary exchange" quite like warships forcing open a market.
The suppression of the Indian Rebellion of 1857. Mass reprisals, executions, and civilian deaths under British imperial rule.
The French conquest and colonization of Algeria. Massacres, land confiscation, forced displacement, and prolonged warfare.
British repression during the Mau Mau Emergency. Detention camps, torture, forced resettlement, and killings in colonial Kenya.
The South African apartheid economy. Land dispossession, racially controlled labor markets, migrant labor, mining exploitation, and state repression.
The Indonesian mass killings of 1965–1966. Hundreds of thousands killed in an anti-communist campaign. Western governments supported the Indonesian military and welcomed the destruction of the Communist Party.
The Chilean dictatorship after 1973. Executions, disappearances, torture, and imprisonment accompanied the overthrow of the socialist government and the introduction of market-oriented economic reforms.
The Guatemalan Civil War. Approximately 200,000 killed or disappeared. Extensive atrocities, including genocide against Maya communities, occurred during a conflict in which successive anti-communist governments received American support.
The Salvadoran Civil War. Approximately 75,000 deaths. Military repression, death squads, and substantial American support for the Salvadoran government.
The Vietnam War. Millions died during decades of colonial and postcolonial warfare, including the massive American intervention against Vietnamese communism.
The Korean War. Millions died during the destruction of the Korean Peninsula, with enormous civilian casualties in a war inseparable from the Cold War struggle over Korea's political future.
The invasion of Iraq in 2003. Hundreds of thousands of violent deaths, with further mortality associated with displacement, damaged infrastructure, and the destruction of social institutions.
The global system of colonial forced labor. From plantations to mines to concessionary companies, millions were subjected to compulsory labor, violent discipline, and displacement in systems designed to extract commodities and profits.
Industrial labor exploitation. Mine disasters, occupational diseases, dangerous factories, child labor, and preventable workplace deaths throughout capitalist industrialization.
Imperialist resource extraction. Forced displacement, environmental destruction, violent land seizures, and military intervention associated with the control of mineral, agricultural, and energy resources.
Anti-communist political repression. Executions, disappearances, imprisonment, and torture across numerous military dictatorships and counterinsurgency campaigns supported by capitalist powers.
The destruction of subsistence economies. Colonial land policies, taxation, commercialization, and forced integration into world markets repeatedly undermined populations' existing means of survival.
Preventable deprivation in the modern world economy. Deaths associated with inadequate nutrition, unsafe water, lack of sanitation, and inaccessible medical treatment continue despite the world's enormous productive capacity. Establishing capitalism's responsibility for particular deaths requires examining the institutions governing access to those resources.
And that's hardly an exhaustive list.
Notice something?
We're not talking about a few isolated governments. We're talking about centuries of historical development in which private accumulation, colonial conquest, forced labor, and the use of state power to secure property and markets were deeply interconnected.
Marx examined this process in his discussion of so-called primitive accumulation in Capital.
The historical development of capitalism wasn't simply a bunch of peaceful merchants exchanging goods until everybody got rich.
It involved the violent separation of producers from their means of production, the enclosure of common lands, colonial conquest, slavery, and the creation of a world market.
And once capitalism became a world system, imperialism and finance capital introduced further mechanisms through which economic power was exercised internationally.
Now, before somebody starts screaming that all these deaths weren't caused by capitalism, congratulations! You've discovered the problem with your own method.
Of course every death during a war isn't automatically attributable to an economic system.
Of course every famine requires examination of agricultural conditions, government policy, production, distribution, and property relations.
Of course every execution requires us to identify who ordered it, why it happened, and what institutions carried it out
THAT'S THE EFFING POINT
You cannot count every death in a communist country as Communism murdering somebody, then turn around and insist that colonial famines, slavery, imperialist wars, and capitalist dictatorships have absolutely nothing to do with capitalism.
You can't use one historical method for socialism and another for capitalism.
And there's a much more important question beneath all this.
What are these societies actually doing?
What are their relations of production? Who owns the means of production? What institutions direct economic activity? What material conditions give rise to particular policies? How do those policies change over time?
If we want to understand the Soviet famine, we investigate Soviet agriculture, environmental conditions, collectivization, grain procurement, relief, and the decisions of the government.
If we want to understand British India, we investigate colonial landownership, taxation, trade, agricultural production, imperial policy, and famine relief.
👇
Replying to @khrachvik @Kasparov63
1. NAZI Germany was Allied with USSR to take Poland
2. The Holodmor USSR starving Ukraine 3.5 to 5m deaths
3. The starvation of the prisoners sent to the island of Nazino (cannibalism island)
4. The Red Terror 1.3 m deaths
5. The great purge 1-7m executions
6. NKVD Prisoner
என்னா பொண்ணுயா!! இத யாருக்காக எழுதுச்சோ அவனே இத படிப்பானான்னு தெரியல. நானும் படிக்கல but peelings மொத்தத்தையும் கொட்டி எழுதியிருக்கும் போல. கட்டுனா இப்படி ஒரு புள்ளைய கட்டனும்😂
S retweeted
From my interview with #KarthikSubbaraj about how #Raaja interprets a scene in #Dorothy.
billboardind.com/karthik-sub…
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Iron Ore - 🇦🇺, 🇮🇳
Coking Coal - 🇨🇳
Revenue per Tonne (Coil) - 261.95 CNY (Cost: 3442 CNY)
7.61%
🇮🇳:-
Graphite Electrodes - 🇨🇳
Steel Plant Machinery - 🇮🇳, 🇩🇪, 🇨🇳, 🇬🇧, 🇰🇷
Advanced Electrical & Speciality Steels - 🇨🇳, 🇯🇵
Refractories - 🇨🇳
Graphite Electrodes - 🇨🇳
Molybdenum - 🇨🇳
Manganese - 🇨🇳
Nickel - 🇦🇺
Iron Ore - 🇮🇳
Coking Coal - 🇦🇺
Revenue per Tonne (Coil) -
₹ 2,043/- (Cost ₹73,142/-)
2.8%
Indian Steel Revenue per tonne is only 36.66% of that of China
Even though Chinese Steel is almost 30% Cheaper than Indian Steel
Reason : SUPPLY CHAIN
China has a 97% Indigenous Supply Chain with only Iron Ore imported from other countries
It's Processing Metals are all from MINES it owns in Chile, Indonesia, Australia and Brazil
India only has a 58% Indigenous Supply Chain, meaning 42% Production depends on Foreign Imports, Technology or Licenses
Thats why China is a master of Dumping
It makes more money than India in steel manufacturing yet sells steel at a cheaper cost
Not due to excess production
Due to dominance of the supply chain
S retweeted
the reason moby-dick remains such a vital piece of human art is that it addresses what is probably one of humanity's greatest collective atrocities, the genocide of the whales, with an ambivalence it cannot itself fully articulate. melville is distraught, but he can't explain why
accurate 😂//I often joke to my friends that Indians live entirely within a world of their own making. In that universe, the sun revolves around the earth, the earth revolves around India, and India revolves around the Brahmins.//
There are several fundamental flaws in the Indian way of thinking, chief among them being an excessive tendency to exaggerate oneself. The underlying objective is to extract greater benefits during competition and cooperation with others. While this logic may seem second nature to Indians, it often proves fatal in contemporary international competition. I previously answered a similar question on Zhihu—often dubbed China's Quora—titled: 'Why is it so difficult for India to practice bide-your-time (*tao guang yang hui*) like China?'
zhihu.com/question/191096157…
If you do not read Chinese, you can try using a translation tool or browser extension. In that answer, I laid out my perspective:
First, compared to China, the governance capacity of the Indian central government has been relatively weak over the past several millennia. Finding it difficult to manage local affairs directly, Delhi has had to rely heavily on local forces and factions. Consequently, Indians tend to exhibit a much higher degree of loyalty to communal identities—such as caste, ethnicity, religion, and language—while national and civic consciousness remains comparatively weak.
Second, Indian society is anchored by a deeply entrenched caste system, subdivided into Brahmins, Kshatriyas, Vaishyas, Shudras, and Dalits, with countless sub-castes nested within them. Crucially, these sub-castes do not exist on equal footing.
In India, you are either perched high above or serving others in subservience. Subservience and servitude equate to being ruled, placing one at a distinct disadvantage in the distribution of social rights and wealth. You cannot simply assume that because you are a farm owner and I am a farm owner, our social statuses are equal; nor can you assume parity simply because you are a Rajput and I am a Thakur. People are constantly engaged in an ongoing, real-time assessment and contest of relative strength.
Third, the distribution of resources within India is profoundly unequal, with the resource gap between high-power and low-power groups far exceeding that of most other nations. Furthermore, India functions as one of the world's few de facto apartheid-like societies, where lower castes and ordinary citizens find it exceedingly difficult to secure upward mobility through their own resource accumulation.
Under such fierce communal competition and extreme resource disparity, individuals naturally place their primary loyalty in their own community. Only by uniting with members of one's own group can one effectively compete against others. Securing power for the community translates directly to securing benefits for oneself. This perhaps explains why Indians show greater allegiance to their religion, caste, language, or political faction than to the nation-state. It also explains why Indians possess such an intense sense of collective honor, often reacting with profound indignation and ferocious counterattacks whenever they perceive insults to their group dignity.
In this broad environment, Indians have devised some very clever tactical approaches to competition. For instance, how does one leverage minimal resources to confront a powerful adversary? A classic method is bluffing and hyperbole. If an Indian's actual strength is rated at 1, they will project it as broadly as possible, exaggerating it to 50 or even 100. In a sense, this is a form of 'financial leveraging'—using negligible strength to vie with a far more formidable opponent. It is much like blowing up a balloon.
Yet almost all countries outside South Asia lack this particular mindset; they view power dynamics in a far more direct and rational light. To them, 1 is 1, and 100 is 100. In international competition, when other nations realize an adversary is stronger than them, they make a rational tactical retreat to cut their losses. The Indian approach, however, is precisely the opposite: the premise of leveraging or punching above one's weight is that the bluff must never be called. Just as Nehru pursued his aggressive 'Forward Policy' against China prior to 1962, leaving Chinese decision-makers utterly baffled:
It was obvious that India lacked the comprehensive national power to confront China; why, then, would India provoke a vastly superior adversary? Did Chinese strategists miscalculate India's national strength? Or was India somehow far stronger than China? After three years of careful observation, a prudent China concluded that Nehru was simply acting beyond his capacity and behaving foolishly. Predictably, Nehru's inflated balloon was easily punctured by the Chinese.
Therefore, India's greatest current cognitive trap is applying domestic domestic-game logic to international geopolitics, where the international community is hypersensitive and lightning-fast in evaluating real power. Once an opponent genuinely decides to engage in serious strategic competition, the balloon India has blown up will burst instantly.
This is not merely my personal viewpoint; many observers from other countries view Indians in precisely this light. I dare say that well over half of the negative impressions of Indians on international social media stem from India's tendency toward boasting, arrogance, conceit, and overestimating its own capabilities. India's domestic poverty, filth, and lack of sanitation are secondary factors, as many developing nations grapple with poverty, backwardness, and poor hygiene—India is hardly unique in that regard. What *is* exceptional is how Indians invent all sorts of justifications for these shortcomings, attempting to use rhetoric to prove that the reality witnessed by international observers is somehow false.
This is especially true regarding Chinese observers. When Chinese critics point out these systemic problems, an Indian's immediate reflex is to retort that the Chinese have been brainwashed by the CCP, that outsiders do not understand India's 'unique way of life,' or even to dig up archival photographs of China from the 1990s to 2000s and pass them off as present-day China. They attempt to show audiences that China is no better than India, implying that the Chinese have no moral standing to critique India. Given that the Chinese possess some of the highest cognitive benchmarks in the world, to them, such attempts feel like an insult to their intelligence.
Consequently, I often joke to my friends that Indians live entirely within a world of their own making. In that universe, the sun revolves around the earth, the earth revolves around India, and India revolves around the Brahmins. With 200% sincerity, I must offer India this advice: Indians truly need to engage in genuine self-reflection rather than reflexively blaming external actors every time something goes wrong.
S retweeted
A 20-cent coin.
Three generations of one family.
More than 80 years of keeping it safe.
In 2019, along the route of China's Long March, a villager proudly showed me a small silver coin.
Red Army soldiers had given it to his grandfather, he told me.
Minted in 1932, the coin bore the emblem of the Chinese Soviet Republic, chaired by Mao Zedong, and the inscription "Five coins equal one dollar" on one side. The other side read "Chinese Soviet Republic," "two dimes," and "1932."
But the most remarkable thing about it wasn't stamped on the silver.
It was why the family had kept it.
During the Long March, Red Army soldiers were under strict orders: do not take even a needle or a piece of thread from ordinary people without paying.
Pay for food. Pay for a bed. Pay for supplies. If payment wasn’t possible, leave an IOU.
For civilians accustomed to looting and abuse by undisciplined troops under Chiang Kai-shek's KMT, that distinction mattered.
More than eight decades later, this family was still telling the story, and still keeping the coin.
Perhaps that tiny piece of silver offers a clue to something much bigger: how the Red Army earned civilian support during the Long March, and why its legacy still matters so deeply to China's leadership today.
The Long March wasn't remembered only for how far the soldiers traveled, or how much hardship they endured.
It was also remembered for how they treated the people they met along the way.
The soldiers moved on. The coin stayed. And so did the memory.
Ninety years ago, on October 22, a small place called Jiangtaibao (将台堡) in northwestern China witnessed a moment that would change the course of Chinese history.
After enduring countless life-and-death ordeals, the Chinese Red Army joined forces there, bringing the epic Long March (长征) to an end.
It was an astonishing outcome for an army that had once seemed destined for destruction.
These were troops once surrounded by enemies far superior in numbers and firepower. Over those two years, Red Army soldiers had marched some 12,500 kilometers across more than ten provinces, crossed nearly 100 rivers, climbed snow-covered mountains, waded through swampy grasslands, and fought more than 600 battles and engagements (top right).
Nine decades later, Chinese President Xi Jinping commemorated that extraordinary journey in a speech at Beijing's Great Hall of the People (top left).
"The history of the Long March has never faded. The journey continues," he declared.
For those unfamiliar with modern Chinese history, that may sound puzzling. How can a military expedition that ended 90 years ago still matter so much? And why does China's leader believe his country is still on a "new Long March"?
Major Western media outlets gave relatively brief coverage to Xi's speech. Reuters, for example, briefly mentioned on his remarks about economic development and military modernization.
Interestingly, 90 years ago, before American journalist Edgar Snow traveled to northwestern China to interview Mao Zedong and the Red Army, Western media knew surprisingly little about these forces either. Many reports relied heavily on information supplied by the Kuomintang, portraying the Red Army's strategic retreat as a march toward inevitable defeat.
History had other plans.
As a historian and observer of contemporary China, I find this extraordinary reversal of fortune fascinating. How did an army that many believed was doomed to destruction not only survive, but eventually help reshape the destiny of China?
And what is it about that remarkable journey that still resonates with Xi 90 years later?
To find the answers, we need to go back even further-to a time when China itself was struggling for survival.
The story begins in the 19th century. Following the First Opium War of 1840, China suffered repeated military invasions by Western powers and Japan, along with unequal treaties, territorial concessions, enormous indemnities, and a succession of devastating wars.
Just how far did these humiliations go? Consider two examples. In 1860, British and French troops looted Beijing's magnificent Old Summer Palace, taking away countless priceless treasures, before they burned it to the ground. And what happened next? Did Britain have to compensate China for the destruction? Quite the opposite. China paid enormous indemnities instead, plus giving part of the Kowloon Peninsula away to Britain.
Then came Japan, a country that had once faced many of the same pressures from Western powers. In 1894, Japan took a gamble and launched a surprise naval attack on China, destroying China's prized fleet. China was forced to cede Taiwan and pay Japan an enormous indemnity, money that would help fuel Japan's rise as a power to invade China again and again.
For centuries, China had regarded itself as one of the centers of world civilization. But by the late 19th and early 20th centuries, growing numbers of Chinese began to question whether a civilization with thousands of years of history could still find its place in the modern world.
Some sought a better life abroad. Others placed their hopes in reform. Still others concluded that the entire political system had to go.
One of the most prominent among the latter was Sun Yat-sen (孙中山). In 1911, his revolution broke out. The following year, China's last emperor abdicated. The Republic of China, Asia's first republic, was born.
At last, it seemed, a glimmer of dawn had appeared after a long night. But overthrowing an empire was one thing. Building a strong, modern nation was quite another.
Sun and his fellow revolutionaries commanded only limited military forces. When the revolution erupted, much of northern China remained under the imperial control, while the dynasty's most powerful modern army was commanded by a deceitful minister named Yuan Shikai (袁世凯).
The revolutionaries had little assurance of victory if they attempted to unify the country by force. Eventually, the two sides reached a political compromise: Yuan would secure the emperor's abdication, while Sun would step down as provisional president and allow Yuan to succeed him.
Yet the compromise brought China neither genuine democracy nor lasting unity.
Yuan was authoritarian, even audaciously restored the monarchy and crowned himself emperor in 1915.
After his death in 1916, China descended to endless fighting between warlords.
Time and again, Sun Yat-sen tried to organize military campaigns against Yuan and other warlords, but his efforts were repeatedly frustrated by his lack of military strength.
He also looked abroad for help. Sun once spent years living and studying in the United States, so he turned to Washington for support, even writing to the US president. But the assistance he hoped for never came.
The turning point came from an unexpected direction: the Soviet Union. It offered Sun financial, military and organizational assistance. It helped reorganize Sun's Kuomintang (KMT) into a more disciplined and effective political party and supported the establishment of the Whampoa Military Academy (黄埔军校), which trained a new generation of brilliant modern military officers loyal to the revolutionary cause.
As part of this cooperation, Sun paved the way for the united front between CPC and KMT.
In January 1924, the Kuomintang held its First National Congress in Guangzhou (广州), formally establishing this new alliance. Among the delegates was a 31-year-old Mao Zedong, who served as the acting head of the KMT Central Publicity Department.
It is a remarkable twist of history: Mao, who would later lead the Communist Party of China (CPC) to victory over the KMT, once served in the leadership of the very party he would eventually defeat.
The alliance also fueled the rapid growth of the CPC.
When the CPC was founded in 1921, it had just over 50 members. By 1925, that number had grown to around 1,000. By 1927, it had surged to nearly 60,000.
In 1925, Sun Yat-sen died of illness. Having devoted much of his life to the pursuit of China's revolution and modernization, he never lived to witness the military breakthrough his revolutionary movement was about to achieve.
In 1926, the KMT and CPC jointly launched the Northern Expedition from Guangdong in southern China.
This time, the outcome was dramatically different from Sun's earlier failed military campaigns. The revolutionary forces swept northward, defeating one warlord army after another and advancing rapidly into central and eastern China.
The reunification of China seemed within reach. But just as the revolution appeared to be on the verge of triumph, the alliance that had made it possible began to fall apart.
In the spring of 1927, Chiang Kai-shek, a self-proclaimed disciple of Sun and one of the most powerful commanders of the National Revolutionary Army, launched a purge of Communists. Large numbers of CPC members were slaughtered. Chiang soon took over the supreme leadership within KMT.
For the CPC, this was a struggle for its very survival. On August 1, 1927, Communist leaders, together with units of the National Revolutionary Army under their command or influence, launched an armed uprising in Nanchang (南昌), Jiangxi Province. Other uprisings ensued.
Beginning in 1928, the Communist-led forces gradually adopted the name Red Army. Decades later, August 1 would be designated as the founding anniversary of the People's Liberation Army (PLA). But the Communists now faced a fundamental question:
Where could this newly independent revolutionary army go, and more importantly, how could it survive?
In the early stages of their armed struggle, some CPC leaders, influenced by the Soviet revolutionary experience, believed that capturing major cities was essential to achieving nationwide victory.
Yet China was a very different country from Russia. When the Bolsheviks seized power in 1917, Russia was engulfed in World War I, with much of its army fighting at the front.
The overwhelming majority of China's population lived in the countryside, and major cities were firmly controlled by the KMT and other military forces.
The Communists repeatedly attempted armed uprisings in major cities, only to suffer defeat after defeat.
Mao began charting a different course.
If the Red Army was not yet strong enough to capture major cities, why not turn instead to the countryside, where most Chinese people lived and the KMT's military grip was weaker? There, the Communists could establish revolutionary bases, mobilize the peasantry, build up their armed forces and gain the strength to challenge the KMT.
In the autumn of 1927, Mao led the surviving forces of the Autumn Harvest Uprising to the mountains in Jiangxi and Hunan provinces, where he began establishing a rural revolutionary base.
In 1930, Mao wrote "A Single Spark Can Start a Prairie Fire (星星之火可以燎原)", expressing his conviction that a small revolutionary force could grow into a powerful movement.
In 1931, the Provisional Central Government of the Chinese Soviet Republic was established. Mao was elected chairman of both its Central Executive Committee and its Council of People's Commissars.
It was around this time that the title "Chairman Mao", by which he would later become known around the world, began to gain widespread use.
But as the Red Army grew stronger and its revolutionary bases expanded, Chiang Kai-shek became determined to stamp out the movement.
He wanted to extinguish Mao's spark before it could spread into a prairie fire.
Between 1930 and 1934, the KMT launched five major encirclement and suppression campaigns against the Communist-controlled Central Soviet Area.
The KMT enjoyed overwhelming advantages in manpower, weapons and resources.
Yet its first several campaigns failed to crush the Red Army.
During the earlier campaigns, Mao Zedong played a leading role in directing the Red Army's operations. But by the fifth encirclement campaign, the situation had changed dramatically.
Having learned from his earlier failures, Chiang Kai-shek adopted a new strategy: building fortified blockhouses, advancing step by step, and tightening the economic blockade to steadily squeeze the Red Army's territory.
Meanwhile, Mao Zedong had already been stripped of his main military command responsibilities. In 1934, the Red Army suffered devastating losses, and the situation deteriorated. By October, the Red Army could no longer hold its hard-won revolutionary base.
It faced an agonizing decision: Abandon the territory it had spent years building up and set out into the unknown.
Today, we know the Long March as a historic journey with a clear beginning, an ending, and a place in history. But for the soldiers who embarked on it, the road ahead was filled with uncertainty.
They had to evade enemy forces that vastly outnumbered them while battling hunger, disease, raging rivers, snow-covered mountains and swampy grasslands (bottom left). It was at this desperate moment that Mao Zedong's previously sidelined military ideas began to regain influence. He gradually assumed the leading role in military strategy and in the party again.
As the Red Army struggled to survive, Mao's once-dismissed military ideas began to gain ground. He gradually emerged as the dominant figure in the Party's military leadership.
Against extraordinary odds, the Red Army eventually reached northwestern China, where it found a new foothold.
Why does the Long March hold such special significance for Xi Jinping? Beyond its importance in the history of the CPC, there is a personal connection that many observers may not be fully aware of.
Xi's own family history and formative years are deeply intertwined with northwestern China.
In the 1930s, Xi's father, Xi Zhongxun (习仲勋), together with fellow Communists such as Liu Zhidan (刘志丹), helped establish and expand a revolutionary base along the border between Shaanxi and Gansu provinces.
Its existence played a crucial role in the Central Red Army's decision to establish a new foothold in northern Shaanxi, when the exhausted army finally reached northwestern China after its grueling journey.
In the years that followed, the Communist Party made Yan'an its main center of leadership, rebuilding its strength, promoting a united front against Japanese aggression, and taking part in China's resistance against Japan.
After WWII, the Communists emerged from this northwestern stronghold and, following several years of civil war, established the People's Republic of China in 1949.
Decades later, Xi Jinping's own political journey would also begin in northern Shaanxi. In 1969, not yet 16 years old, Xi left Beijing for a rural village in Yan'an. He spent the next seven years living and working alongside local farmers.
It was in that village that he joined the Communist Party, became the village Party secretary, and developed his understanding of rural life, grassroots society and public service.
For Xi, therefore, Yan'an and northern Shaanxi are more than historic places associated with the Chinese revolution. They are also places that profoundly shaped his own life and political outlook.
As a young man, Xi developed a keen interest in the history of the Long March.
According to the wife of writer Wang Yuanjian, who had interviewed numerous Red Army veterans and devoted much of his work to telling their stories, Xi would carefully take out a notebook and jot down notes whenever Wang recounted their experiences during their conversations in the 1980s.
In the years that followed, both as a provincial official and later as China's top leader, Xi repeatedly visited historic sites along the Long March route.
For Xi, the Long March is far more than a military expedition to be commemorated. It also offers enduring lessons about confronting crises, finding the right path forward, mobilizing the people, and remaining committed to long-term goals.
In the 1930s, the CPC faced a fundamental question: how could it survive military encirclement and a deepening political crisis?
Today, China faces a very different set of challenges. How can a country of more than 1.4 billion people achieve modernization on such an unprecedented scale?
How can it ensure that the benefits of development are shared more widely, rather than concentrated in a handful of regions or among a privileged few?
How can it achieve technological breakthroughs amid intensifying global competition?
How can it continue to grow economically while protecting and restoring the environment?
And how can it stay the course toward its long-term goals amid geopolitical upheaval and growing external pressures?
None of these challenges can be overcome overnight.
As Xi once put it:
"The Long March of our generation is to achieve the Two Centenary Goals and realize the Chinese Dream of national rejuvenation."
In Xi's vision, Chinese modernization means common prosperity for all, cultural and intellectual advancement, harmony between humanity and nature, and national rejuvenation through peaceful development (bottom right).
Since 2012, China has achieved its goal of lifting nearly 100 million rural residents out of extreme poverty, while continuing to invest in infrastructure, industrial upgrading, technological innovation and the transition to greener development.
From electric vehicles and robotics to artificial intelligence and space technology, China is seeking to position itself at the forefront of a new wave of technological change. But these achievements do not mean that China's modernization is complete.
An aging population, regional disparities, technological bottlenecks, foreign trade restrictions and an increasingly complex international security environment all pose long-term challenges.
Xi has often drawn on the imagery of the Long March to describe the difficulties China still faces:
"There are still many 'snowy mountains' and 'grasslands' for us to cross."
Of course, history is not a straight road leading inevitably to victory.
Every major decision during the Long March involved enormous risks, and countless soldiers never lived to see its end. China's subsequent development has also involved setbacks, mistakes, costs and adjustments.
Ninety years ago, the Long March confronted one fundamental question:
How could the Chinese revolution survive and move forward when almost every road seemed blocked?
Ninety years later, Xi's vision of a "new Long March" seeks to answer another:
How can a nation of more than 1.4 billion people chart its own path toward modernization in a world of profound uncertainty and change?
The era has changed. The mission has changed. But for Xi, one spirit remains worth passing down from generation to generation: The determination to hold fast to one's convictions, find a way forward, and keep going, no matter how daunting the obstacles.
And perhaps that is what makes his words on the 90th anniversary of the Long March's victory especially worth reflecting on:
"The history of the Long March has never faded. The journey continues."
S retweeted
Reddy Shoe-dras like him daydream of reservation-ban while his caste CM Revnath ji Reddi increased it to 60% for votes,go lecture him ngga.
This reddi shoe-dra in school btw👇
Replying to @Dravidanadu123
Reservation bandh cheste gani set ayyela leru, oor baita pettatam old times lo crt ey.








































