IRGC's strategy is pretty simple. The guys in Islamabad, Delhi, Beijing, Dhaka, Tokyo, and Seoul, trying hard to make ends meet, should pay the cost of the IRGC's inability to hit the American mainland. This is another level of 5D chess, realized after filling my gas tank.

Last week, a Turkish scholar and professor was visiting Pakistan for a conference. He wanted to visit and explore Islamabad. So, I accompanied him during his visit. Both his sons were born in Islamabad. He told me they used to play football in the backyard of Faisal Cami. He was visiting Islamabad after 27 Years. When we reached at the parking of Faisal Mosque, there was unusual security. I had a hard time explaining to him why there were so many extra security measures and barriers in place. He couldn't believe that some person would blow himself up in a mosque, killing Muslims, all in the name of Islam. Then I told him about all such terrorist attacks carried out in mosques in the last few years. He was shocked. Anyway, then took him to 'Peshwar morr' where he used to stay and live back in the days.

چو با سفله گویی به لطف و خوشی فزون گرددش کِبر و گردن‌کشی

The U.S. State Department has officially removed Ethiopia from the list of countries subject to the arms export ban policy. On the surface, this may appear to be a relatively standard technical policy shift and might not get enough media traction. However, decisions like this can carry significant long term implications, particularly when viewed within the broader context of shifting regional dynamics. This is a significant development, as it signals the US approach towards the broader strategic landscape, including the wider Red Sea/Horn of Africa security architecture.

Finally, we are moving toward the Battle of Marib, marking the beginning of a new phase of the war. Marib is fundamentally different from the western coast and other Yemeni regions and fronts. It has its own unique tribal and political composition, which isn't contemporary but has a historical political reality. Tribes, Islah [MB], and Yemeni forces are all integral to Marib's current structure. They do not share the same interests or ideology but share a common interest in preserving the status Quo. For almost a decade, Marib has remained Ansarallah's strategic objective, whose capture would significantly alter the balance of power in Yemen. For the opposing camp, preventing an Ansarallah breakthrough toward Marib is therefore a central military objective. Currently, Ansarallah wants to impose a high cost on Saudi Arabia to deter it from aerial operations blocking the Ansarallah's advance on the Marib front. On the other hand, Riyadh now wants to deter Ansarallah from advancing any further and breaking through the frontlines. In the coming days, both parties would move up on the escalation ladder. Ansarallah could increase the scale and geography of strikes against Saudi territory, while the RSAF could respond with a broader air campaign against Ansarallah positions and the Marib front. The principal risk is that measures intended to establish deterrence instead generate reciprocal escalation. The significance of Marib therefore extends beyond territorial control. A major battle would test the cohesion of the government-aligned camp, Ansarallah's ability to convert military pressure into territorial gains, and Saudi Arabia's willingness to sustain escalation in defense of the existing balance. Marib could consequently become the point where Yemen's military, tribal, political, and regional dimensions converge.

"There is a narrow way through.."

One of the most popular and misleading analyses of the current oil crisis is to reduce it to the disruption or blockade of key maritime corridors in Asia, particularly the Strait of Hormuz and Bab al-Mandeb. Structurally, however, the crisis has already moved beyond the trade corridors. The central issue is no longer simply whether oil can be exported, but whether there is sufficient refining capacity to process and redistribute that oil once the wider energy system is disrupted. This is why developments stretching from Riyadh to Moscow should not be viewed in isolation. Damage to production, refining, storage, transportation, and energy infrastructure across the region is interconnected. The real danger, therefore, is not merely a temporary shortage of crude. It is the potential restructuring and prolonged disruption of the entire oil supply chain. The wider repercussions could be lasting and potentially devastating, particularly for Asia, whose economies remain deeply dependent on imported energy and interconnected maritime supply chains.

This is not the complete updated list, as the recently damaged aircraft and helicopters in Jordan, as well as the MC-130Js lost in Iran during a rescue mission, are not listed. However, this raises questions about the regional security equation with respect to Israeli losses in the war. It's Israel which has been the driving force. All the equations, from balance and deterrence to operational realities, are greatly influenced by the IDF. A factor that greatly influences the calculus of both Americans/CENTCOM and Iranians/IRGC. This is why the real question is how many planes Israel lost.

Yedioth Ahronoth reported, citing Israeli officials, that any potential Israeli assistance to Saudi Arabia against the Houthis must be linked to a '180-degree' change in Riyadh's policy, distancing itself from Turkiye and Pakistan and returning to the path of the Abraham Accords. The same officials say there is currently no indication that Saudi Arabia has requested Israeli assistance, even indirectly.

UAE has been a major commercial and financial gateway for Iran, especially under U.S. and Western sanctions. The ecosystem couldn't be created anywhere else, especially with the financial crisis on the cards. However, it is still a temporary reconciliation for this 'no war, no peace' phase.

This is one of three nodes. The other two are Russia and the Falklands. While the UK [England] remains focused on monitoring and calculating the potential Russian threat, a different geopolitical game is unfolding elsewhere. According to this scenario, the United States and Israel are preparing an unexpected strategic move involving Argentina and the Falkland Islands. The first phase of this involves Israel recognising Argentina’s sovereignty claim over the Falkland Islands, particularly following the events in the West Bank. As for the US, its posture depends on active British participation in the upcoming regional war. Britain’s strategic commitments and ability to respond simultaneously to challenges in different regions would be tested, especially if it coincides with escalation with Russia.

Ghalibaf is genuinely one of the most interesting accounts on X. The multilayered writing is always impressive. Even though it is one of the most difficult arts. Constructing something so that different readers get different depths of meaning according to their knowledge and interpretive ability is truly a lost Art. It requires not only intelligence, but restraint, ambiguity, cultural awareness, and a very precise understanding of how people interpret language. It is truly amazing that, for some, he comes across as intellectual, while for others he is simply another vague and shit poster.

Pakistan's fighter aircraft, Early Warning, and Troops are already deployed in Saudi Arabia. Even that news was posted several days after the deployment. The problem with much of Social media is that it has created an environment where media projection and strong political posturing carry more value than the actual realities on the battlefield and ground. Traditionally, Pakistan does not advertise its 'security affairs.' What Pakistan is doing and would be doing would be done on the battlefield, not in the media. Regardless, I have explained that even Saudi Arabia has very limited involvement at this stage, which reflects the threshold and current level of threat. The whole campaign about the Mecca Accord is multi-dimensional Pshy-Ops. Algorithms often create echo chambers. There is less willingness to understand and more to oppose. This results in people making 'sweeping statements' even about complex geopolitical matters.

Crescent will meet them somewhere around Tabuk. It would be a legendary battle.

According to the latest statement by Ansarallah, the Saudi Air Force carried out approximately 129 airstrikes across Taiz, Marib, Hodeidah, Al-Jawf, Saada, Amran, and Hajjah over the past 48 hours. While the figures have not been independently verified, the footage and battlefield reporting suggest the number may be close to the actual figure. Even so, the reported scale of the air campaign appears relatively limited given the nature of the current security crisis and the pace of Ansarallah's advance, especially since the targets bank has expanded to include military equipment, convoys, troop concentrations, and logistical movements. However, the level of Saudi involvement raises an important question. Is Riyadh exercising strategic restraint, or are there operational limitations on what its air power can achieve? The apparent restraint could reflect Saudi Arabia's reluctance to become deeply re-entangled in Yemen, as well as the recognition that air power alone cannot reverse territorial losses. Under these circumstances, expectations of direct Turkish or Pakistani military involvement are far fetched.

The binary in politics and geopolitics is a step further away from reality.

US has been bombing the Iranian coastal belt for the last several months to secure Hormuz and deny Iran depth. Meanwhile, it sat idle as Ansarallah swept through the coastal belt of Yemen, allowing the security dynamics to become a multi-Strait equation, despite reportedly several requests by Saudis. The question isn't about the strategic incentive or tactical feasibility. It is about Strategic interests, cost and regional vision. Saudis are being put under a multi-domain and multi-directional siege and are in the worst possible situation. As for its options, Pakistan has broad strategic but narrow tactical space, constrained by the limited regional ecosystem and security complexities. However, in a wider calculus, its limited involvement would hand over the initiative and space to other actors. This brings us back to the scenario of US-Israeli entry into the Red Sea and the wider regional security equation. Israel's direct entry into the Red Sea equation under the pretext of 'International maritime security' and direct military presence in Somaliland, complemented by already ongoing projects in the Horn of Africa. As for the US, from OPEC to the Abraham Accords, everything seems to be on the negotiation table now. The Israelis and Americans do have the interests but not the incentive and conditions yet to intervene. The cost they want to impose on Saudi Arabia and others goes beyond the Red Sea and directly shapes the regional security architecture and strategic alignments.

"NIXON DOCTRINE" The bigger issue is not ISR. It is the kill chain. If all the CENTCOM security Architecture can offer is an 'advisory role and intelligence', then it's not cost-effective for the KSA and broader Gulf security. This does not take away the limited level of direct Saudi military involvement. However, the Gulf has been heavily investing in the US military-industrial complex and its regional security Architecture. For Riyadh, the security commitments are expected to be far more than a mere advisory role. ISR only adds value when there are operational arms and field units available to execute operations based on that intelligence. CENTCOM does have the complete kill chain. However, the limited participation reflects the US 'interests' in the region.

The events of the last few days reflect the broader reality of the battlefield in Yemen. Ansarallah’s focus on the western coastal lines, rather than the fronts in Al-Jawf and Marib, suggests that they have adopted a strategy of defence in depth combined with forward attack, allowing them to absorb pressure while maintaining the initiative in selected areas. Considering the current dynamics, it is clear that Ansarallah is waging the war primarily at the strategic level, while the forces aligned with the Presidential Leadership Council (PLC), including National Resistance, the Giants Brigades and Southern units, were largely operating at the tactical level. The failures are not tactical but operational. The collapse along the coast has much to do with synergy, coordination, force structure, and combat readiness. The deeper dilemma, however, lies in the profound divisions across political, economic, tribal, and regional lines. These divisions make it difficult to establish a coherent command structure and unified military strategy. By comparison, Ansarallah currently appears to possess stronger command and control, internal synergy, and coordination, allowing it to concentrate forces and exploit weaknesses more effectively. This difference is becoming important in determining how the battlefield develops.