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My dear friend and I posted an article on God's antecedent will, defending the view that it is a will of good pleasure. Much appreciation if you give it a read!
Link below β¬οΈ
βFor substance, which has a quiddity in the absolute sense, does not depend on something else so far as its quiddity is concerned. An accident depends on its subject, however, although a subject does not belong to the essence of its accident (in much the same way as a creature depends on the creator, yet the creator does not belong to the essence of the creature), so that an extrinsic essence must be placed in its definition. In fact, accidents have being only by reason of the fact that they inhere in a subject, and therefore their quiddity depends on their subject. Hence a subject must be given in the definition of an accident at one time directly and at another, indirectly.β
β St. Thomas Aquinas, Metaph., lib. VII, lect. IV, n. 1352.
ππ―ππ π’ retweeted
Replying to @cappadocianist
They are only making fun of me out of ignorance. Scholastic theologians (whether Protestant or Catholic) frequently begin their treatment of topics by a consideration of the nominal definition of something, which is revealed by a study into its etymology.
While the real definition often departs from the strict sense of a term vis-a-vis its etymology, the study of its etymology is often a first step.
βJust as Aristotle, by the unanimous judgment of all, claimed for himself the glory of this wisdom among philosophers, so, among theologians, you will find no one whom you would dare to prefer to Thomas Aquinas.β
β Card. Thomas de Vio Cajetan, O.P., Praefatio In Ia.
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Our new YouTube Channelβ¦
youtube.com/@1438official?siβ¦
βI have always held this man (Cajetan) in the highest esteem, for he greatly helped the Church of Christ by his writings. It would take too long to praise his learning and talent . . . [...] and I am not accustomed to mock the errors of those whose talent I admire.β
β Fr. Melchor Cano, O.P., De locis theologicis, Book VII, Ch. III.
Replying to @L00seN00se
"Cajetan would not even be able to persuade himself that the book of Genesis was written in the Hebrew tongue." - Melchior Cano, De Locis Cap 11.
βThe opinion of the Thomists, however, is that aptitudinal inherence belongs to the essence of an accident, and that it is not a relation.
For it must be known that something is absolute or relative in two ways, namely from a subject and from a term. An entity absolute from a subject is that which is not naturally received in another, such as substance. Something relative to another as a subject is that which is essentially naturally received in another, such as every accident. That which is absolute from a term is that which formally does not regard another precisely as a term toward which it is directed, such as substance, quantity, and quality. That which is relative to another as a term is that which formally regards another precisely as the term toward which it is directed, as does the category of relation. For in this the relation belonging to the category of relation differs from the other respects of the remaining genera, which some call transcendental: the respect belonging to the genus toward something is essentially toward another, not as a recipient or an efficient, final, or formal cause, but precisely toward another as a term; for one of the relatives is neither the form nor the end nor the efficient cause of the other, but a term. For this reason Albert the Great says that one of the relatives is not to be defined through the other, because the word through denotes causality.
The respect of the other genera, which for lack of vocabulary is called a respect, essentially regards another; but as a subject, matter, form, and things of this kind. Thus matter essentially regards form, and conversely, as was said above concerning the commensuration of the intellectual soul. Since, then, aptitudinal inherence imports a respect toward another as recipient, we say that it is not of the genus of relation, but identified with each genus, signifying now an absolute entity and now a relative one. Hence aptitudinal inherence is not prevented from belonging to the essence of an absolute accident by the fact that it is a respect; indeed, from the fact that an absolute accident is not absolute from a subject, though it is absolute from a term, it follows that an essential dependence upon a subject belongs to its essence, which aptitudinal inherence explains.
[...]
To the first argument on the contrary it is said that the minor premise of the first argument is false, and Scotus appears to have been deceived because he did not see the difference between the respect In and Toward. For the respect In is not a relation. Although such a respect terminates at a subject, and consequently the subject is a term, nevertheless it does not terminate as a term, but as the recipient of that respect; and this must be carefully attended to here. For it is one thing to say, βA is the term of such a respect,β and another to say, βA terminates such a respect as a term,β as is clear from what has been said.β
β Card. Thomas de Vio Cajetan, In De Ente et Essentia, cap. VII, q. XVI.
Replying to @logos_asarkos @Dogmaticist
Even distinguishing finis qui (objective) and finis quo (formal), the latter still consists precisely of the speculative intellectβs vision of the essence of God and not the fruitio as an act of the will, which is only consequent upon it.
We could further distinguish in theology an intrinsic and an extrinsic end (as does Cajetan), and beatitude is only identified with the latter.
So your response is insufficient.
βNegation of itself makes no species. For when I say βmanβ or βhorse,β or something of the sort, these are species. But whatever anyone has put forward in a negation does not declare a species, for not being a man is not a species. For every species establishes being (esse), whereas negation, whatever it proposes, severs from that which is being. When I say βman,β I have, as it were, spoken of something (quiddam), but when I say βnon-man,β I have destroyed by negation the substance of man. Thus, therefore, the division of a genus into species of itself lacks negation. [β¦] Further, affirmation is prior and negation posterior, and what is first ought also to be ordered first in division. It is also always necessary that definite things be prior to indefinite ones: equal to unequal, virtue to vices, the certain to the uncertain, the stable and fixed to the changeable. But all things which are expressed either by a definite part of speech or by affirmation are more definite than either a noun with a negative particle or a whole negation. Therefore the division must be made by the definite rather than by the indefinite.β
β St. Boethius, Liber De Divisione, PL 64, col. 882.
βSince being is not a genus, then being cannot be of itself the essence of either substance or accident. Consequently, the definition of substance is notβa being of itself without a subject, nor is the definition of accidentβa being in a subject; but it belongs to the quiddity or essence of substance to have existence not in a subject; while it belongs to the quiddity or essence of accident to have existence in a subject. But in this sacrament it is not in virtue of their essence that accidents are not in a subject, but through the Divine power sustaining them; and consequently they do not cease to be accidents, because neither is the definition of accident withdrawn from them, nor does the definition of substance apply to them.β
β St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, III, q. 77, a. 1, ad. 2.
ππ―ππ π’ retweeted
"[Confessors] are guilty of serious sin if, while sitting in the holy tribunal of Penance, they hear their penitents carelessly without advising or questioning them, but immediately pronouncing the form of absolution when the penitent has completed the list of sins."
ππ―ππ π’ retweeted
Please pray for someone very dear to me for a successful interview π€
βAn accident can exist per se negatively, I concede; positively, I deny. For quantity in the Eucharist exists per se negatively, because it exists independently of a subject of inherence, and without actual inherence: because it is sustained by God in the genus of efficient cause by means of his action, and by mere extrinsic maintenance; but it does not exist per se positively by means of some positive mode of perseity superadded to the quantity itself, as substance exists.β
β Fr. Josephus a Vilanova, O.S.A., Cursus Philosophicus, tom. II, disp. VI, dub. I, cap. III, no. 33.
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Replying to @EamonnClark
His school commonly uses the same or similar language as Card. Aguirre, O.S.B.:
βConcerning the separated accident, it is said not to exist through itself intrinsically, as is required by the formal character of substance, but rather through the extrinsic conservation of God, who continues the accidentβs being without the support of substance. Hence, that accident expresses an aptitude for inhering, which substance does not express.β
β Fr. John of St. Thomas, O.P., Cursus Philosophicus Thomisticus, Secunda Pars Artis Logicae, q. XV, a. I, ad. II.
βI reply by distinguishing the minor. As to the first part, that being per se belongs negatively to the accident, I concede it. As to being per se positively, I deny the minor and the consequence. The Eucharistic accidents exist per se, the βnegativelyβ falling not on βto beβ and βto exist,β since they exist positively, but on the βper se.ββ
β Fr. Giovanni Siri, O.P., Universa Philosophia Aristotelico-Thomistica, tom. I, Syntagma IV, q. III, art. I, Β§ III, ad. I.
βTo this argument the response is clear from what was said in Β§ 1. Granting the major, we deny the minor. To the proof of the antecedent, the antecedent must be distinguished and conceded if understood of a negative mode of being through itself β that is, not in another; but denied if understood of a positive mode β a positive mode that grounds repugnance for being in the subject of sustenance and dependence. For since being in a subject is essential to every accident, a mode conferring the opposite demand is repugnant to it. And we further deny the consequent absolutely: because divine subsistence cannot supply the negative mode of being through itself that an accident once separated has by virtue of that state. But if it were united, it would confer on it a mode of being through itself positively β of which, however, an accident is not capable, as we showed at greater length above. The proof of the antecedent establishes nothing against this doctrine: for the fact that an accident can be preserved separated from the subject only proves that it can have a mode of being through itself negatively β that is, without dependence on a subject to which it actually inheres. But it does not prove that it can have a mode to which being in a subject through true dependence on it is repugnant. And this latter was required for it to be said to have a mode of being through itself positively β in whose place divine subsistence would be substituted and play a role.β
β Collegium Salmanticensis, Cursus Theologicus, tom. IX, tract. XXI, De Incarnatione, disp. IX, dub. V, Β§ III, n. 71.
Here is something much more simple:
βThe quantity in the Eucharist is not in another as in a subject β actually β I grant; aptitudinally and exigitively β I deny. For though with the substance of bread removed in the mystery of the Eucharist, the quantity is no longer actually in it as in its subject, but is preserved by God miraculously without any subject β it always naturally demands a subject, so that if it were not divinely preserved, it would perish with the removal of the substance of bread. Hence it is always an accident, because an accident is what demands to inhere in another as in a subject; while substance is what demands to be in itself and not in another, as has been said with St. Thomas.β
β Fr. Antonio Goudin, O.P., Philosophia, tom. I, Logica, Logicae Majoris, pars I, disp. II, q. II, art. I, ad. II.























