Jaroslav Lobačevski 🇱🇹🇺🇦jaras@infosec.exchange (@yarlob) header
Jaroslav Lobačevski 🇱🇹🇺🇦jaras@infosec.exchange (@yarlob) profile picture

Researcher at GitHub Security Lab. Tweets are my own. And BTW, russian warship go https://nitter.cf/t.co/lEE0gfVtxE yourself.

Joined November 2017
Photo by Jaroslav Lobačevski 🇱🇹🇺🇦jaras@infosec.exchange (@yarlob)Photo by Jaroslav Lobačevski 🇱🇹🇺🇦jaras@infosec.exchange (@yarlob)Photo by Jaroslav Lobačevski 🇱🇹🇺🇦jaras@infosec.exchange (@yarlob)Photo by Jaroslav Lobačevski 🇱🇹🇺🇦jaras@infosec.exchange (@yarlob)Photo by Jaroslav Lobačevski 🇱🇹🇺🇦jaras@infosec.exchange (@yarlob)Photo by Jaroslav Lobačevski 🇱🇹🇺🇦jaras@infosec.exchange (@yarlob)Photo by Jaroslav Lobačevski 🇱🇹🇺🇦jaras@infosec.exchange (@yarlob)Photo by Jaroslav Lobačevski 🇱🇹🇺🇦jaras@infosec.exchange (@yarlob)Photo by Jaroslav Lobačevski 🇱🇹🇺🇦jaras@infosec.exchange (@yarlob)Photo by Jaroslav Lobačevski 🇱🇹🇺🇦jaras@infosec.exchange (@yarlob)
This is big. Allows to safely run untrusted code on any trigger as if it was pull_request.
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Jaroslav Lobačevski 🇱🇹🇺🇦[email protected] retweeted
We have a partial port of GrapheneOS to the Pixel 11 series after a week of work on it. We're unable to complete the port due to lack of support for ARM hardware memory tagging in software, firmware and near certainly hardware. It appears Google cut an important security feature to save money. ARM hardware memory tagging (MTE) is used by GrapheneOS across the entire base OS including the kernel and every standard base OS process. It's only temporarily disabled for a few device-specific processes. It greatly improves protection against nearly all remote exploits and many local exploits. Pixel 8 launched with hardware MTE support in October 2023. We integrated it into our hardened_malloc project and began using it across the OS later that month. Android and the Pixel OS never started using it by default. Android Advanced Protection Mode in Android 16 enables it for a few processes. Apple's Memory Integrity Enforcement (MIE) is an always enabled feature on the iPhone 17. It's simply a high quality implementation of MTE using the latest standard extensions. It uses MTE in the most secure mode in the kernel and a large portion of userbase. They did a very good job integrating it. Apple's MIE and Android 16+ AAPM don't use MTE for user installed apps unless those explicitly opt in. GrapheneOS enables it for more apps automatically and has a toggle for users to opt-in for every user installed app. There's a per-app toggle to opt-out for incompatible apps which is uncommon. Neither iOS or Android encourage app developers to opt into MTE and other more aggressive security features used in the base OS. Apple's docs warn developers of performance and stability issues. Even Signal doesn't opt-in. Our approach enables forcing using MTE in the standard allocators regardless. Pixel 11 does have security improvements including moving to post-quantum secure verified boot (ML-DSA) and replacing Samsung Shannon IMS with AOSP IMS. Titan M3 should significantly improve protection against data extraction in Before First Unlock state. It's too bad they ruined it by cutting MTE. Pixel 11 series is a lot more expensive for an incremental improvement to the CPU, the same underpowered GPU and reduced RAM for the Pro base models. They finally caught up to the last generation of Qualcomm cellular radio. It's overpriced, the upgrades aren't impressive and losing MTE is appalling. Compared to the Pixel 11, a Snapdragon 8 Elite Gen 5 has ~40% higher single threaded CPU performance, ~80% higher multi threaded performance, over 100% higher GPU performance and a far better cellular radio. It also finally has MTE. The next gen is what will be in the first Motorola with GrapheneOS. Pixel 9a and earlier (including Nexus devices) were the Android Open Source Project reference devices. Pixel support was removed from AOSP with Android 16. It's now harder to support Pixels than many other devices and massive progress towards open source firmware and driver libraries was discarded. Compared to the stock Pixel OS, GrapheneOS ships AOSP patches months earlier and Linux kernel patches many months earlier. However, we rely on them for firmware and most driver updates. We also want to move to new kernel branches earlier. These things can be improved with our Motorola partnership. We strongly recommend against buying Pixel 11 devices. Pixel 8, 9 and 10 have much better overall security for GrapheneOS. Pixel 10 is cheaper with similar hardware and MTE. Pixel 11's Titan M3 should improve BFU security for users without a strong passphrase, but losing MTE craters AFU security. We haven't determined what to do about this situation. It may be best for us to skip the Pixel 11 series devices. We can shift our focus entirely to the upcoming Motorola devices instead. Pixel 10a was really a 9th gen Pixel, so hopefully the Pixel 11a does the same with 10th gen and includes MTE.
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This article didn't receive the attention it deserves. No wonder I have noticed it only now... machine-learning-made-simple…
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"...generating a proof-of-concept (PoC) exploit is required for defenders. Theoretical vulnerabilities identified through static analysis inevitably produce a high volume of false positives."
Replying to @mattjay
He began by replicating Mythos findings with his specialized harness. Then went on to find more critical novel zero days in open source code that he can't share yet because they're not fixed. TL;DR - harnesses are where the magic is. provos.org/p/finding-zero-da…
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PoC for CVE-2026-48095 in 7-Zip 26.00 on Linux without ASLR bypass.
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Jaroslav Lobačevski 🇱🇹🇺🇦[email protected] retweeted
But do you know what coreutils are a fertile ground for? Race conditions around file creation, deletion, permission setting, and so on. The original code accounted for decades of hard-learned lessons in that space. The Rust rewrite did not: seclists.org/oss-sec/2026/q2…
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Jaroslav Lobačevski 🇱🇹🇺🇦[email protected] retweeted
If you missed the talk at @1ns0mn1h4ck , our latest blog post is now available for you to explore. In this post, researchers @Hacker_Chai and @SachaKozma detail their journey to a 1-click RCE exploit on the Samsung S25 phone. Check it out here: bugscale.ch/blog/shoot-for-t…
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Jaroslav Lobačevski 🇱🇹🇺🇦[email protected] retweeted
🫣 1st attempt to build something that keep coming to my mind, I present BinCodeQL (I couldn't think of other explicit name!) that I worked on as my side-project, based on Datalog/Souffle + Binary Ninja MLIL-SSA + CC Opus-4.6 + Google ADK. 1/n GitHub: github.com/tosanjay/BinCodeQ…
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Jaroslav Lobačevski 🇱🇹🇺🇦[email protected] retweeted
The blog.mantrainfosec.com/blog/… post by @xoreipeip shows how prepared statements can be exploited in NodeJS using mysql and mysql2 packages leading to SQLi! 🪄 So use of prepared statement might not be the ultimate solution here 🥵 as a side note, @xoreipeip later found this overlooked article with similar concept after doing his own original research: flattsecurity.medium.com/fin…
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Jaroslav Lobačevski 🇱🇹🇺🇦[email protected] retweeted
I didn't comment on their last rant but calling this CVE slop is cringe. In fact, vendors like this are exactly the reason to impose disclosure timeline restrictions. Imagine blaming researchers for reporting a UAF in a codec used by a framework with 100m users
Here's an example of Google's AI reporting security vulnerabilities in this codec: issuetracker.google.com/issu… We take security very seriously but at the same time is it really fair that trillion dollar corporations run AI to find security issues on people's hobby code? Then expect volunteers to fix.
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7-Zip: The PoCs for the old GHSL-2025-058 (CVE-2025-53816) and GHSL-2025-059 (CVE-2025-53817) have been published github.com/github/securityla…
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Interesting post mortem analysis at words.filippo.io/compromise-… My two cents: 1. Re: recommendation to use actions/github-script instead of shell to avoid... YAML interpolation. It is Actions Interpolation. You can have script injection with ${{ }} in github-script too! 1/n
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... artifact - a file. Well... :) it makes it harder to get injection because the untrusted data is in the file, not in the easily interpolateable context. The main recommendation though is to do all the heavy lifting in a sandboxed untrusted workflow and use the results ... 3/n
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... in a safe manner, for something simple as commenting on the pull request, messaging a slack channel, etc. in the privileged workflow. That is the recommendation. 4/4
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