Marco Zaplan retweeted
Interested in data visualization and development storytelling?
Join the Atlas of Global Development team and @Google's Data Editor @smfrogersfor the launch of six new data stories on hunger, jobs, pollution, digital development, and more.
Register: worldbank.org/en/events/2026…
Marco Zaplan retweeted
Submissions for the second annual Yale AI Social Science Methods conference (to be held April 28–29) close Monday November 30, 2026. All are welcome to apply: web.cvent.com/event/3942a257…
I'm on the organizing committee as the political science rep. We look forward to seeing your work!
Marco Zaplan retweeted
Just pushed a 100% new version of data-to-viz.com
Thx to all the contributors who opened issues and PRs in the last 6 years
Now that a proper tech stack is in use, I have many many new features to build!
Marco Zaplan retweeted
After almost 10 years of work corporateownershipdata.com now makes available all publicly available ownership records of 7,156 publicly traded firms, not just the S&P 500, including dual-class shares.
Marco Zaplan retweeted
La #IA solo genera verdadero impacto público cuando nace de las necesidades de un territorio y se nutre de #datosabiertos de calidad.
🎥 Así cerramos la 1.ª edición de #Data2AIChallenge en Montevideo, 🇺🇾, junto a los equipos seleccionados de 🇨🇴+🇺🇾 👇
1/3
youtu.be/bLny7ZSXkZ0?si=1fgC…
Marco Zaplan retweeted
📣 Also joining us is @ECMWF's Victoria Bennett, Head of User Services Section who will discuss the role of ECMWF's #opendata and archives in enabling the development of a new generation of machine learning weather prediction systems.
Replying to @opendatacharter
📢 Tsahai Carter, Research Analyst, Responsible Data and Artificial Intelligence, Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat will also be joining our IWG meeting next week. She'll be sharing more about the Government of #Canada's AI Register.
🔹Join the group: lnkd.in/gvnNDYCD
NOW ONLINE: The 2026 World Trade Report examines what global trade rules have delivered in the past, where is it presently under strain, and what is at stake for the future.
⬇️5 takeaways below
📘And full report here: bit.ly/4xlsB5v
#WTOPublicForum
Marco Zaplan retweeted
📢 We are looking for expert public policy researchers with proven experience and expertise in data protection, access to information, copyright, and open data legal frameworks in Latin America.
Do you know anyone who fits this profile? Or maybe it's you? 👇 Link below.
Marco Zaplan retweeted
#Dataviz books everyone should read 📚 - a community sourced #charticle informationisbeautiful.net/v…
Marco Zaplan retweeted
There is a simple fact about economic development that has held true for hundreds of years and remains true today: except for very small countries, *every* country that has transformed its economy from low- to high-income has done so via manufacturing.
Marco Zaplan retweeted
A worker with 30 years of wage-job experience is about 2.5x as productive as someone just starting out—roughly the gain from 12 years of average-quality schooling.
Work doesn’t just use human capital. It builds it.
See the new Human Capital Index+ tools: blogs.worldbank.org/en/opend…
Marco Zaplan retweeted
We’re live from Geneva for the third edition of LET’S TALK DATA, exploring how the Atlas of Global Development 2026 turns complex development data into insights that can inform action.
You can browse the 2026 Atlas here data360.worldbank.org/en/atl…
#WBGAtlas
Marco Zaplan retweeted
A few weeks ago, Daron Acemoglu (@DAcemogluMIT), David Autor (@davidautor), Keelan Beirne, and Andrew Scott circulated a provocative paper, “Baby Busts and Growth Booms: Demographic Change and the Macroeconomy,” which reports that lower birth rates are associated with higher growth in GDP per working-age adult across countries and with higher wage growth across US commuting zones, with no negative impact on aggregate GDP or earnings.
Since I have been working on fertility and growth for some time, I read the paper carefully. I did not find the evidence compelling.
My reason fits in two words: terra incognita. The fertility collapse now underway has no historical precedent. The seven decades of data the paper analyzes, however carefully, contain nothing remotely comparable to the ultra-low fertility rates we observe today.
To their credit, the authors know this. The conclusion states: “Our findings describe the past; whether they provide a reliable guide to the economic consequences of coming demographic transitions is not yet established. … Changes this rapid are outside the support of the historical evidence, and could theoretically yield different adjustment dynamics from those we document.” I agree word by word. I simply would have given this caveat more prominence because it is the heart of the policy question.
Let me explain why by discussing the evidence across countries and leaving the evidence from US commuting zones for another day. I want to keep this post short.
In the introduction, the paper presents as its key finding a negative and quantitatively large relationship between 1950 birth rates and economic growth from 1970 to 2020.
But the birth and fertility rates of 1950 provide little information about the consequences of the ultra-low birth and fertility rates we are experiencing today. Observations from a very different range of values are unlikely to capture the nonlinear cumulative effects of ultra-low birth and fertility rates.
I include a table listing the bottom ten countries in 1950, 1980, and 2025, according to the UN World Population Prospects, consistent with the authors’ sample exclusions for microstates, territories, and tax havens. In 1950, Austria had the lowest birth rate, at 15.5 births per 1,000 people, with a total fertility rate (TFR) of 2.09, roughly the replacement rate. Most of the negative effects I have emphasized in my writings stem from rapid population decline, as will be the case for South Korea, with a TFR of 0.75. If you ask me whether I expect problems for a country with a TFR of 2.09, my answer is no: no shrinking cities, no empty schools, no social security dilemmas. In fact, I believe that TFRs between 2 and 2.4, such as those in Western Europe in the early 1950s, are probably the best-case scenario in terms of economic growth: you have either a stable population or a gentle increase, and you do not suffer the pressures of TFRs of 3.0 or higher. Thus, I do not find extrapolating from Austria’s growth experience from 1970 to 2020 (which is effectively what the regression does) very informative about South Korea’s growth experience from 2045 to 2095: the former was close to an ideal demographic situation, the latter not so much.
Moreover, the range of TFRs (which say more than birth rates about the future behavior of the population) at the bottom of the cross-section is not wide enough to learn much about the nonlinearities that appear below 2.1. In summary, I cannot see the external validity of this regression.
The authors, with outstanding craftsmanship, address this problem as best they can by using later-vintage birth rate and growth data. If I read Appendix Table A1 (Panel A, countries) correctly, they run the same specification with 30-year growth windows for each starting decade. The coefficients on the t−20 birth rate (measured, as in the paper, per 100 people) are: 1950 vintage (growth 1970–2000): −0.13 (s.e. 0.10), not significant; 1960 (1980–2010): −0.26 (0.09); 1970 (1990–2020): −0.32 (0.06); and 1980 (growth 2000–2020, only a 20-year horizon): −0.26 (0.05). They also report robustness to using log birth rates, but taking logs of the regressor does nothing about the nonlinearities that matter, namely those well below replacement.
The problem is that even in 1980, birth and fertility rates were not as low as they are today. In the table, you can see that Germany, the country with the lowest birth rate at the time, had a TFR of 1.56 (and no country was below Denmark’s 1.54). But keep two facts in mind.
First, less importantly, Germany, like the other countries in the 1980 panel, has experienced large waves of immigration over the past few decades. By comparison, countries with high fertility in 1980, such as Mexico, have had large emigration flows. Therefore, the reported coefficient averages effects that include each country’s endogenous migration response, and the low-birth-rate observations come precisely from countries with positive net migration. The paper argues that lagged birth rates are orthogonal to subsequent flows. But orthogonality is not the same as informativeness about countries that will have little migration to speak of.
Second, more importantly, let me return to my central point about nonlinearities. A TFR of 1.56 means each generation is 76% the size of the last: the population declines about 0.9% per year, so after 100 years you retain roughly 40% of the initial population. A TFR of 0.75 means each generation is 37% of the last: about a 3.35% decline per year, leaving roughly 3.5% after a century. Hence, we are dealing with a factor of about 11. A TFR of 1.56 and a TFR of 0.75 both count as “low fertility” in a regression, but they are qualitatively different regimes. The 1980 variation the paper identifies lives in the gentle-decline world; nothing in their data resembles the second.
My favorite part of the paper is the evidence linking lower birth rates to more labor-saving patents, larger shares of high-tech exports, and faster TFP growth, with a WWII casualty exercise presented as an out-of-sample test of the labor-scarcity channel. I take this evidence seriously. But the mechanism does not extrapolate any better than the regression. In any semi-endogenous growth model in the tradition of Chad Jones, fewer people eventually mean fewer ideas. With a TFR of 0.75, the pool of potential innovators shrinks by almost two-thirds in each generation, and that is likely to overwhelm any gain from developing labor-saving technology. In comparison, the war shock was bad for one cohort, but then it was over.
I have some further minor quibbles about identification in the cross-section, but those are better left to a seminar discussion than to X.
I want to close by acknowledging that the assessment of empirical exercises is ultimately subjective. I do not find the evidence from Austria in 1950 or from Germany in 1980 persuasive regarding what will happen to South Korea. Instead, I find the evidence I reported in Table 1 of “The Wealth of Working Nations,” with Gustavo Ventura (@King_ofSweden) and Wen Yao, relating GDP growth in G7 countries plus Spain to demographic forces, to speak much more directly to the issue at hand and to imply much more negative outcomes, yes, including for Germany:
nitter.cf/JesusFerna7026/status/…
Other readers might find the evidence in “Baby Busts and Growth Booms” more compelling, or at least intriguing. But we should not fool ourselves: we are sailing into demographic terra incognita, and in these waters, the pretense of knowledge is the most dangerous temptation. I am keenly aware of the limits of what I can determine.
Replying to @amitaiz
A table from my paper "The Wealth of Working Nations," published here:
sciencedirect.com/science/ar…
All the poor macro performance of Japan with respect to other G7 economies can be accounted by the fall in working-age population in Japan triggered by low fertility since the 1970s. In fact, if one drops the early 1990s, when Japan was going through the burst of the real estate bubble, Japan has done better than the U.S. after controlling by demographics.
This is not a surprise. A basic national accounting identity is:
gdp growth = growth of productivity per worker + growth of workers.
This is an indentity, true by construction.
Since growth of productivity per worker is roughly constant over time (or sligthly falling), a negative growth of workers leads to either very low gdp growth (Japan) or negative (as it will occur in most countries in a few decades when the fall in population becomes acuter).
And, no AI will not growth of productivity per worker enough to offset this result. No estimate of the effect of AI on growth of productivity per worker is even in the ballpark of what we would need.
Japan has been able to cope with low output growth thanks to the fact that it started being quite rich, having high state capability, and some of the more cohesive society in the world. And, yet, it has been quite a struggle.
How is Morocco going to deal with this situation given its low level of income, a low-capable state, and not very good social instituions?
Marco Zaplan retweeted
NOW OUT ON FIRSTVIEW!!
#Education and #Political #Attitudes: The Power & Limits of #Field #Theory
By Liesbet Hooghe, Gary Marks, @JonneKamphorst & @jschultecloos
doi.org/10.1017/S15375927261…
Marco Zaplan retweeted
Fowler et al. show that Americans overwhelmingly explain both partisanship and out-partisan animosity through policy, values, and ideology - far more often than experts expect.
doi.org/10.1093/poq/nfag044
Marco Zaplan retweeted
Ojeda & Pacheco show that political acts fall along a spectrum of habit: voting and news consumption are most persistent, while campaign work and meetings depend more on resources, motivation, and mobilization.
doi.org/10.1177/1532673X2614…
Marco Zaplan retweeted
Dear followers, please see this new paper on the labor market and macroeconomic effects of low birth rates. Although almost all analysts and policymakers are very worried about the prospect of stagnant and aging populations, the evidence from cross-country and within the United States points to the opposite: lower birth rates predict faster growth of GDP per worker and wages. The reason: labor scarcity encourages more technology adoption.
Over 70 years and across the globe, falling birth rates haven't slowed growth. Scarcity of young workers spurs labor-saving innovation, raising GDP per working-age adult and wages, from @DAcemogluMIT, @davidautor, Keelan Beirne, and Andrew Scott nber.org/papers/w35401
Marco Zaplan retweeted
I'm proud to finally announce the first release of the Small-Area Global Elections (SAGE) dataset, encompassing global, granular, standardized, geocoded, polling station or equivalent-level election results for 110 countries, conditionally accepted at Nature Scientific Data. (1/n)
Marco Zaplan retweeted
Should #poverty be measured using income or consumption data? What about household economies of scale?
By making methodological choices visible and comparable, our PIP Innovation Hub strengthens the evidence base for poverty analysis.
See how: wrld.bg/yA9s50Z7ES0
Marco Zaplan retweeted
🚨 NEW | A typical household in the Philippines can now recoup the full cost of rooftop solar in just 3.1 years through savings on its electricity bill. That's down from 4 years in May 2025 ⚡☀️
Unroll for more 🧵 1/3
ember-energy.org/latest-insi…





































