Sascha Hyer

BOLO: U.S. Homeland Plot Commander Name: Mohammad al-Hawshani Nationality: Saudi Arabian Age: 21 Affiliation: Islamic State’s West Africa Province (ISWAP) Role: Selected as one of the commanders for al-Qaeda’s upcoming U.S. homeland plot Location: Unknown, assessed to be on U.S. soil This story begins with deception as this is a war after all. The ruse started in the Calmiskaad Mountains, a range in the northeastern Bari region of Puntland, Somalia. After a strike on suspected terrorists there, a Saudi passport was recovered. The passport belonged to Saudi ISWAP member Mohammad Al-Hawshani. It was left intentionally to be found. For al-Qaeda’s upcoming plot, the selection of attackers and elevated positions such as Mohammad’s commander role was not based on battlefield skills alone. Candidates were screened for clean profiles: no criminal or terrorist history, not on watchlists, and so forth. For the most critical operatives, the plan went even further: to render them effectively “dead” in official records. The idea was that leaving Mohammad’s passport at a location likely to be struck would lead one to conclude he was killed, and authorities are far less likely to pursue someone believed dead. That same kind of ruse allowed Hamza bin Laden to plan the homeland plot with relative impunity as late al-Qaeda leader Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri’s deceptions convinced parts of the U.S. intelligence community (IC) he was dead, leaving agencies years behind on his networks and plots. What we know about Mohammad: he progressed through a highly connected selection process reminiscent of the 9/11 hijackers, but with a far broader operational role. Commanders chosen for this effort do more than act as individual attackers; they run portions of the plot on the ground, oversee pre-attack preparation, and manage multiple cells. These cells have varied objectives: some target hometowns and veterans’ communities, some target high-value sites in the Washington, D.C., area (including the FBI building), and others are slotted as suicide operatives for al-Qaeda’s Bojinka-inspired airline plot. Our assessment is that Mohammad is involved in running cells intended to strike in local communities where people live, work, and play. To assume this role, Mohammad required at least two senior approvals. He needed endorsement from the then-head of the ISIS Military Commission, now-deceased Abdullah Makki Muslih al-Rifai. Since Makki was the ISIS official in charge of deployments and of ISIS external operations cells (like Shamsuddin Jabbar’s cell, for example). and he also required approval from the head of al-Qaeda’s Military Commission, Hamza al-Ghamdi (Osama bin Laden’s former bodyguard), because Mohammad’s role is part of an al-Qaeda plot, and as al-Ghamdi leads operations in Somalia for al-Qaeda central. In some cases, commanders were met or hand-selected by Hamza bin Laden or the mastermind of the plot, Saif al-Adel; whether Mohammad had a face-to-face meeting with either is unknown. Mohammad received his Saudi passport on November 26, 2024, and transited through Egypt en route to Ethiopia, which issued him a visa upon his arrival on December 18, 2024. He used Ethiopia as his gateway into Somalia. He left behind all of his documents in those mountains, including credit cards—materials now in the possession of the Puntland Counter-Terrorism Forces (linked below). While he intended to travel to the U.S. under a false identity, both the Saudi government (which issued the passport) and the Ethiopian government (which issued the visa) hold legitimate biometric records for Mohammad. We request, in good faith, that each government (@KSAmofaEN, @KSAmofa, @MFAEthiopia) provide those biometrics to @DHSgov and the @ODNIgov at the soonest available opportunity. We have observed signs of nepotism in some homeland plot appointments, and given Mohammad’s age, we strongly suspect he is a second-generation terrorist. We request that the Saudi government also provide full familial details for Mohammad to U.S. authorities. History appears to be repeating itself: a Saudi national poised to attack the U.S. in a 9/11-style event (although this attack by the sons of bin Laden is far grander in scope and size). If Mohammad had departed directly from Somalia, we believe he could have reached his intended transit point at the U.S. southern border as early as the end of January 2025. If he chose to undergo additional training in Africa, that would likely have delayed him by roughly six months. Mohammad likely traveled from Africa through illicit pipelines to South America, up through Central America and Mexico, and then over the southern U.S. border. Because these journeys rely on many different pipelines, we request information from anyone who may have encountered him along the route: what name he gave, what nationality he claimed, where he said he intended to go in the U.S., and who was facilitating his movement. While such travels are dangerous, we currently assess that Mohammad did not die en route, but welcome any credible, contradictory information. In the U.S., Mohammad was expected to oversee multiple terrorist cells. Cells average five to ten operatives and are generally geographically based. So he would likely not run cells in a handful of states, but is operating within a state and possibly a neighboring state. Then another commander would be in a separate region of the U.S. running those cells. Mohammad’s responsibilities include direct communication with, and at times in-person contact with, homeland attackers on U.S. soil. This presents an opportunity to locate not only him but other cell members. Importantly, these cells are not limited to a single group like al-Qaeda or his group affiliation ISWAP. They are intentionally mixed: IMU, TTP, ISIS, HTS, Haqqani network elements, al-Shabaab, and others may be interwoven within the same cell. Focusing only on group labels risks missing the cells themselves—that’s by design. Al-Qaeda understood that stovepiped analysis across the intelligence community categorizes terrorists solely by group affiliation. Under that system, intelligence officials and law enforcement would fail to identify mixed cells, operating instead on outdated assumptions that al-Qaeda and ISIS do not work together. We ask the public to report any sightings of Mohammad directly to law enforcement, and to more than one authority: local police, county and state agencies, the FBI, and the Department of Homeland Security, given that this suspect is likely in the country illegally and living under a fraudulent identity. Do not confront or question Mohammad if you are not law enforcement; he should be considered armed and dangerous. Please see my linked post below on security considerations regarding this Be on the Lookout (BOLO). If you have information, please contact your local authorities and federal partners immediately. Time is critical. BOLO: U.S. Homeland Plot Commander