us army, ret., military history
Joined November 2020
- Tweets639
- Following376
- Followers72
- Likes35.2K
dsw retweeted
USS Gettysburg (CG-64) Ticonderoga-class guided missile cruiser coming into Norfolk, Virginia - November 12, 2026 SRC: X-@AirAssets
dsw retweeted
Palmer Luckey exposes why mega corporations don’t want manufacturing to return to America: “They want to outsource everything and hire cheaper, non-American labor.” 🇺🇸
“These analysts telling you it’s going to cost $37,000 to build an American iPhone or $100,000 to buy an American computer are trying to prop up a status quo that mega corporations want to keep going.
They want to outsource everything. They want to hire cheaper, non-American labor. They’re willing to say and do anything to convince you that it can’t be fixed, that it can’t come back to America.
How do I know they’re wrong? Because I make stuff in America every day.
We’re not going to let people lie about what America can and can’t do anymore. We’re just going to do it.”
dsw retweeted
WW2, Red Army: Organizational Effectiveness. (2/2)
Force Structure.
In WW2, only 12.5% of the Russian field army personnel, total 5 million troops, were dedicated to logistics, 17% for the German army and 24% for the US Army.
This was a conscience decision made by Russian planners to generate more immediate combat power.
As a result of prioritizing combat units over support units, Russians artillery units had only three units of fire (400 rounds- 76mm) and two units of fuel for their tanks.
Consequently, most Russian artillery was expended in the first three days of a campaign (one day expenditure 1 million rounds represented one week of artillery ammunition production of the annual production of 50 million rounds).
400 rounds for 20,000- 76mm guns was 8 million rounds, 52,000 tons, 116 supply trains or 20,800 truckloads.
Further, Russian motorized units could not exploit more than 200 kilometers. Historically, Russian units could not advance more than 120 kilometers from their rail lines.
With the Russians having just two units of fuel, 300 gallons (0.9 tons) per T-34, means that a Russian tank corps could probably advance no more than 200- 400 kilometers during an offensive and exploitation operation.
Historical evidence shows this to be the case. Even the Germans in May 1940 and the US 12th Army Group in Sept 1944 had to pause after advancing 400 KMs across France.
dsw retweeted
The Midterm is Not the Endterm
It is too soon to calibrate the direction of the post midterm Democratic and Republican Parties.
But if the first 72 hours are any indication—and despite the soon to be Speaker’s denials—the Left is already bragging about subpoenas, and it is intoxicated by the notion of investigations and impeachments.
Heady Democrats have entirely forgotten the politically suicidal fashion of the 2021-4 five civil and criminal courtroom circuses, the Mar-a-Lago raid, and the blue state deballoting efforts.
All that and more fueled the Trump recovery.
Wild talk of multi-trillion-dollar new agendas grows, like socializing the health care system, a renewed Green New Deal, student loan forgiveness, and illegal alien amnesties, along with new punitive income and estate regulations and taxes.
This socialist dream is reminiscent of the 2021 giddy splurging that gave the country a 9.1% inflation rate by midterm year 2022.
Along with the Afghanistan disaster (the Left’s correction for a Middle East ‘forever war”) the inflation would ensure Biden a 40% popularity.
The idea that the Left, which cannot do much real lawmaking without a veto-proof Congress, will try to reach deals with the White House, adopt a 1995 Clinton-like realist agenda, simply claim credit for the growing Trump economy, or moderate its rhetoric is highly unlikely.
Instead, we hear crazy talk of confiscations, new billionaire and millionaire punitive taxes, imprisonments, changing the Constitution—all in full suicidal 1972 McGovern style.
Republicans are blame-gaming each other, which can be constructive if over issues and reforms rather than social media ad hominem. But they need to message far better, about both the administration’s successes and the dangers of a socialist future.
There will be likely be no planned presidential succession, or gentlemanly agreement on a front runner. That’s likely good news. More likely as of now a triangular race between front-runners De Santis, Rubio, and Vance emerges—all of whom are far preferable to any ticket with a Newsom, Harris, AOC, Mamdani, or el-Sayed.
If the Republicans can stay reasonably united, they can ensure permanent presidential vetoes of crazy leftwing legislation, fight back on the Democratic committee inquisitions, and see the economy in the final two years become an asset in recovering their popularity.
Absent in all conversations is that there is increasing evidence that the economy is actually expanding and has the potential to boom in 2027, or at least the data indicate such potential.
The jobs report came out yesterday with a stunning 165,000 jobs created in October (accompanied by the usual journalists’ adverb “unexpectantly”), dropping unemployment to 4.1%.
Revised 3rd GDP stats now show a robust 3.4% growth—likely ensuring at least 3%+ growth for the year.
Third Quarter consumer spending soared 3.8%.
Private domestic investment surged with 19.4% growth.
Just reported last week: median family income in 2025 hit a new record ($87,460)—the highest in 60 years adjusted for inflation. And poverty dipped to its lowest rate (ever 10.2%).
In October manufacturing activity grew faster than at any time in the past five years.
Yes, prices are too high, and final 2026 inflation, given gas hikes, is scheduled to increase by one point (3.7%) from last year’s (2.7%). But it is still lower than the pan-European average (ca. 4+%)—and much lower than the Biden average over four years of 5.1%.
Gas prices are already falling. On November 6 prices fell to a $4.06 average—as global oil transit is mostly back to prewar levels and refineries scramble to handle the increased deliveries.
U.S. companies are dominating all the top 10 rankings in market capitalization/usage in key area such as software, AI, digital media, space, satellite launches, and bio/genetic engineering.
Note that today gas prices are not that much higher than 4 years ago at the 2022 midterm time ($4.06 vs. ca. $3.80), and haven’t once spiked to $5 a gallon as they did in 2022, just four months before the Biden midterms.
Yet oddly, the red wave sputtered in 2022 when the U.S. was in far worse economic shape than this week when the blue wave became a tsunami.
Messaging, media, and communication count, so note:
Four years ago GDP growth was lower than today—even though the pandemic was about over and there was a dramatic return to work and spending.
The inflation rate was almost three times higher in 2022 than now.
Median family income was $14,000 lower than now. The poverty rate was higher in 2022.
The Dow was 20,000 points lower. Foreign investment will likely end the year 30-40% higher than in 2022.
Real wage growth (nominal wages minus inflation) while not great in 2026 is likely to end the year far better than in 2022 (when real wage growth fell 2-3%).
So why would “affordability” have been decisive in the 2026 midterms when it was not in 2022?
The 21% aggregate inflation rate Trump inherited force-multiplied the average 3.15% Trump inflation rate of 2025-6— yet in a way the aggregate first-term Trump inflation rate (7.7% just a third of the Biden total) did not exaggerate all that much the 9.1% inflation rate in 2022.
Messaging, however, matters. The administration did not explain adequately that a 21% rise in prices cannot be lowered without radical deflation or recession, but only ameliorated by medium family income growth and lowering the inflation rate from the Biden 2021-5 averages, both of which occurred in 2025-6, but were forgotten.
Media coverage of the Biden 2022 weak economy were muted, while Trump’s 2-year inflation rate was exaggerated during 2026.
The Iran war became the culprit as a war of choice that made the inherited Biden 21% high prices and the inability to lower were them solely Trump’s fault. Again, there was inadequate explanation of either the economic reality or why the gamble to denuclearize Iran was defensible–with the caveat that stopping the bombing at day 38 and talking with theocrats for seven months was an unfortunate mistake.
The domestic and foreign policy activism of the lame-duck Clinton (1998-2000} and Obama (2014-2016) presidencies increased after their loss of Congress. Indeed, their popularity climbed from a once nadir of below forty to sixty percent approval or above.
There is no reason why the Trump administration cannot have a successful last two years. The economy is growing.
The crime rate is at historic lows.
The border is closed shut. The radical pro-Western political transformation of South and Central America has remade the entire Western Hemisphere.
European NATO is rearming.
Oil and gas production is at highest levels of any nation in history.
The bloated federal work force has been trimmed by over 270,000 jobs.
There is no longer a 40,000-50,000 shortfall in military recruitment. The forced reforms in higher education were long overdue.
The verdict on Iran is still out.
If it is denuclearized, the crippling sanctions continued, the Strait kept open, the provincial opposition armed—and our military gone home— the regime will face an increasingly restive population
2026 was an unequivocal defeat, but 2028 need not be.
If the administration and Congress stay disciplined and united, and can message better, while the Left goes utterly berserk, drunk on their midterm successes, socialism/Islamism, and Trump Derangement Syndrome 2.0, the tide will soon radically turn— as the economy already has.
dsw retweeted
Happy 48th anniversary, Combined Forces Command!
Today, Republic of Korea and U.S. service members, DoW and Korean civilians, came together to celebrate the 48th anniversary of Combined Forces Command. #KatchiKapshida #WeGoTogether
dsw retweeted
Evolution of Field Artillery in WW1 & WW2.
In WW1, 1914- 1918, the Allies and Central Powers fired 1 Billion artillery shells from 20,000 cannons (32 rpg per day) and lost
20 million casualties.
60% of casualties were caused by artillery fires. The major powers vowed never to fight such a costly trench war ever again.
20 years later, after rewriting their respective military doctrines, the above armies in WW2 would fire another 500 million artillery rounds and lose another 30 million military casualties.
The major difference in 20 years was that the armies were now mechanized and motorized.
Further, the combatants now had joint forces with large navies and air forces in addition to ground armies.
With this competition for resources, the armies now faced less available resources which resulted in reduced ground forces and resulted in fewer troops in the trenches or now, foxholes.
The available Infantryman per kilometer of front was reduced by as much as 75%, from 2,000 rifleman per KM in WW1 to 500 rifleman per KM in WW2.
Further, the combatants of WW2 still used an evolved artillery doctrine from WW1.
Fundamental doctrine did not change from WW1: with artillery providing close fires, preparatory fires, interdiction fires, and counter-battery (CB) fires, but the tactics did change: massed fires, suppression of air defenses (SEAD), and shorter artillery preparations (now 30 mins).
This smaller Infantry footprint at times created opportunities for maneuver, but it also created opportunities for attritional stalemates: Russia 1942-1943, Italy 1943, and France 1944.
These static situations brought the combatants back to relying on artillery.
The final observation and question on artillery tactics in WW1 and WW2 was the challenge of logistics?
All of the combatant commanders wanted more artillery ammunition.
A lesson learned in WW1 was that:
“Artillery is measured by the availability of ammunition as the number of guns. The war taught that ‘artillery’s best reserve is a large ammunition supply. ”
(Quote from: CPT George W. Griner, "Evolution of Field Artillery Tactics." CSCC, 1933, p. 31-32; Later MG Griner, US 27th ID, Okinawa, April 1945.)
dsw retweeted
WW2. Tank Attrition.
1. Background. FM 100-5, 1976, p. 2-3, an M-4 Sherman tank could destroy another tank at 500 meters. A modern tank
(M-60A1) could destroy a tank at 1,500 meters with two rounds, p. 2-9; further, anti-tank weapons (ATGMs) had a pK of 0.5 out to 3 kilometers.
2. Historical Examples. In the Battle of Kasserine, February 1943, US 1st Armored Division lost 183 tanks out of 250 tanks, a 73% loss.
3. In Kursk, 5-18 July 1943, the German 9th Army and 4th Panzer Army with 2,700 tanks lost 1,236 tanks (45.8%) over 14 days (3.27% a day). The Russian Central and Voronezh Fronts with 2,420 tanks lost 2,276 tanks (94.0%; 6.72% a day). Overall, the Germans had a 1.84- 1 exchange ratio. (Dupuy, Great Battles, p. 86)
4. In the Normandy Campaign, July 1944, two tank battalions from the US XIX Corps lost 79 tanks (77%). There were twenty US tank battalions in US VII Corps. However, during Operation Cobra the US XIX Corps took the brunt of the German XLVII Panzer Corps counterattack being on the US VII Corps east flank.
The attacking German XLVII Panzer Corps probably had a strength of 120 tanks, and lost 100 tanks (83%). Further, 200 US tank losses can be estimated. It had been documented that US 1st Army lost 500 tanks a month or 125 a week during the Normandy Campaign. It can be estimated in one week during Operation Cobra that the US 1st Army lost 250 tanks of 1,000 tanks, 25%, 5% a combat day, while the Germans lost 17% a day.
Another historic example, 18-20 July 1944, 2nd British Army executed Operation Goodwood with three armored divisions against six German divisions of the 5th Panzer Army: 500 British tanks against 400 Germans tanks (Ellis, “Brute Force,” p.358). In three days the British lost 500 tanks and the Germans lost 200 tanks. For the British this was 33% per combat day and the Germans lost 17%.
In the German Mortain counterattack against General Bradley's US 1st Army, Operation Luttich, 7-8 August 1944, XLVII Panzer Corps attacked with three panzer divisions and 190 tanks and eventually lost 100 tanks, 26% a combat day.
Overall, in the Normandy campaign, 77 days, the Allies lost 2,000 of 3,000 tanks, whereas the Germans lost most of their 1,500 tanks (57 tanks remaining). This was an Allied attrition of 67% or 1.74% per day of combat and 2.60% a day of combat for the Germans.
5. In the US 3rd Army’s Lorraine Campaign, the Battle of Arracourt, 18- 29 Sept 1944, in one week, US 4th Armored Division, Combat Command B (CCB) lost 32 of 108 tanks, 30% attrition (5% a day). The German 11 Panzer Division (and 111, 113 PZ Bde’s) lost 143 of 262 tanks, 55% (11% a day).
6. In the Ardennes, December 1944 Battle of the Bulge, in one month, the US 12th US Army Group lost 535 tanks (of 3,776 tanks), a 14% attrition rate (30% in the US armored divisions)
For 15 days of combat, US losses equal 1%. Whereas the German Army Group B lost 813 tanks (of 1,437 tanks) a 57% loss, 3.8% a combat day. (Charles B. MacDonald, "A Time for Trumpets.")
The high point for US losses was 18-19 Dec, 124 tank losses during the US 7th Armored Division and 10th Armored Division battles for St. Vith and Clervaux (Bastogne). The high point for German losses was 23-25 Dec, 74 tanks, during the US 2nd Armored Division counterattack against German XLVII PZ Corps in Celle's (Meuse River, NW Bastogne). US 2AD lost 22 tanks, while the Germans lost 84 tanks on 25 December (Cole, p. 571-573).
Losses for the US 1st Army and General Patton's 3rd Army were correspondingly high during the same time period, 70 tanks. Patton's 4th Armored Division overall lost 117 of 159 M-4 Shermans linking up with Bastogne (MacDonald, "Time For Trumpets, p. 603).
According to another source: Dupuy, "Last Gamble," p. 479- 486, the US had 3,776 tanks and lost 535 tanks. The Germans had 1,437 tanks and lost 813 tanks. The US had 2.6- 1 ratio. US losses were 14.1% and German losses were 56.6%.
Using both sources, daily US tanks losses were 0.89% per combat day, and daily German tank losses were 3.5% per day of combat.
7. In WW2, at the tactical level (Bde, Div, Corps), attrition was 15% a combat day, whereas at operational level (army), where one half of the forces are in reserve or uncommitted, the attrition was 2- 4% a day. This means at tactical level, in two calendar weeks, a division (100- 150 tanks) would have been attrited of tanks.
In WW2, the combatants made 2,000 tanks a month. US field armies lost 100 tanks a month in WW2, and with four armies in the ETO (1st, 3rd, 7th, 9th), it can be estimated that the US lost 400 tanks a month (half could be repaired).
Further, according to Gen. Patton’s, “War As I Knew It,” p. 314, 3rd Army lost an average of 105 medium tanks a month, (949 medium tanks, 26 July 1944- 8 May 1945), 9 months.
In the ETO, with the US 9th Army, 1st Army, 3rd Army and 7th Army, it can be estimated the US lost an estimated 6,000 medium tanks with half being reparable.
8. In the nine tank battles reviewed, the average tank loss ratio for the attacker was 1.96- 1. For total tank losses: 6,172 Allied tank losses versus 3,149 German tank losses. These nine battles represent a total of 172 calendar days or 86 combat days, 10 combat days for an average battle for an average loss 37- 72 tanks a combat day. Over 10 combat days, the average opponent lost 370- 720 tanks, 37% - 43% of tanks, 3.7% - 4.3% per combat day.
In the Ardennes, which was restrictive terrain, the combatants lost 20- 40 tanks a day, 1% -2% of tanks per combat day (40- 60 tanks a combat day during major armor engagements, 2 AD versus XLVII PZ Corps, Battle of Celles).
At the Battle of Kursk which was favorable open rolling terrain, over 14 combat days, the combatants lost 88- 163 tanks a day, 3.3% - 6.7% a day.
At the 2nd Battle of El Alamein, Oct- Nov 1942, which was open desert terrain, 10 combat days, daily tank losses for the British and the Germans were 45- 50 tanks a combat day, 4.9% and 9.2% respectively. Therefore, favorable open terrain increases and doubles attrition rates and tank losses.
This was in an environment where the effective range of a tank was 500 meters (versus today’s 2 kilometers), and bazooka’s and panzerfausts had an accurate range of 30 meters (versus todays ATGMs of 3 kilometers).
9. Conclusion.
Since WW2, tank effectiveness has increase four times and dispersion of armor forces has increased respectively (40 versus 10 tanks per KM). On the other hand, in the area of the main effort, 10% of the frontage, infantry and artillery has dispersed by a factor of ten (1,000 Infantry and 50 guns to 100 Infantry and 4 artillery guns per KM).
The difference in dispersion of forces (tanks x4; Infantry x10) is a reflection in the increase of mechanization of forces since the 1960s supported by the doubling of the wealth of the major industrialized nations. Indicative of this, the cost of a tank has gone from $50,000 dollars for an M-4 Sherman ($1Mil 2020) to $500,000 ($2Mil) for an M60A3 to $8 million for an M1A2 Abrams.
Despite the History of Attrition, Tanks will continue to be an important part of a combined arms tactical formation with mechanized and light infantry, artillery, mortars and drones.
dsw retweeted
Realizing everyone is distracted right now, I am at 9,659 free copies of my first book given away.
I want to break ten thousand. That way more people will eventually buy the sequels.
So if you already have it, great. I just ask every last one of you to spread the word. Get me those last 400 copies given away.
a.co/d/02ZhmlFw
dsw retweeted
Brave Rifles Return: 3rd Cavalry Regiment Uncases Colors, Reinforces Readiness in Korea army.mil/article/296242
dsw retweeted
Eighth Army honored ROK Army Staff Sgt. Nam Wun Soo, a Korean War hero of the Battle of White Horse Hill at a ceremony in Daejeon. MG Jason Curl, 8A deputy commanding general - operations, presented the Silver Star to Nam’s son, recognizing his father’s courage and sacrifice. 🫡
dsw retweeted
Drones don’t win wars on their own. Victory requires a strategic alignment of national goals with achievable military objectives, and land forces capable of seizing and holding terrain. Offense and defense still matter. So do deception, surprise, and the audacity of commanders and soldiers willing to exploit opportunities, seize and maintain initiatives throughout the war.
All of this was on display in the 2020 war for Karabakh, too often reduced to a story about drones. In our new book, "The War for Karabakh: Strategy, Technology, and Victory," @LiamSCollins and I detail how Azerbaijan prepared for war and fought its way to victory.
Understanding the outcomes of the war required looking beyond the drone stories to the decisions and battles on the ground. Get your copy @amazon or @CambriaPress amazon.com/War-Karabakh-Stra…
dsw retweeted
Gen. William E. Depuy, first US Army TRADOC Cdr, 1973, (Bn XO, US 90th ID, Normandy) said in an interview,
“The ETO (European Theatre of Opn) lasted eleven months. We had five months of operational maneuver, (July – September 1944, March- May 1945) and six months of operational attrition.”
dsw retweeted
10 consecutive months of manufacturing sector expansion and counting.
That's what happens when you put American factories and American workers first.
dsw retweeted
Fuel is the bill payer we keep cutting. In LSCO it is the thing that stops the ABCT.
We talk CPs.
We talk PAAs.
We talk rehearsals.
We talk drones.
We still treat Class III like a supporting cast member.
That is malpractice.
An M1 does not care about your slide. It burns ~17 gallons an hour sitting still and 45–57 gallons an hour moving. A current ABCT is planned at ~65,000 gallons a day average and ~100,000 at the high end. A heavy CAB can out-drink the brigade. Stack three ABCTs plus aviation and you are back in the same neighborhood as 24th Infantry Division on G-Day: four hundred thousand gallons a day and climbing.
Desert Storm is the case study we quote and then refuse to finish reading.
VII Corps wanted 2.4–2.5 million gallons a day. XVIII Airborne Corps wanted 2.1 million. That was ~900 tanker loads a day. 3d Armored Division did not fight on the MTOE. It stole the Army’s extra tankers, nearly doubled the MSB from 34 to 66, stuffed 20 more 5,000-gallon trailers into each FSB, and ran a round-robin of full trucks forward and empties back because the 5k tanker could not keep up with M1s off-road. 24th ID FSBs had to stop and recharge three times in 36 hours and pulled more than 100 COSCOM tankers forward to do it. Thirty 5,000-gallon trailers sat unemployed in one sector because nobody had the cross-country prime movers to pull them.
That machine still needed host-nation tankers, Saudi refineries, uncontested MSRs, convoy support centers every 150 miles, and C-130s dumping 100–120k gallons a day into Log Base Charlie.
And it was a 100-hour push.
Not sustained LSCO.
Not a peer who can see every BSA, LRP, and tanker column to the depth of the corps.
Not a battlefield where the log base is an HPT and the MSR is a kill zone.
We took that war, called logistics a solved problem, and spent the next thirty years chopping the force that made it possible. COSCOM mass became modular attachments. Bag farms came out of the BSB. Static Class III now lives one echelon higher at the DSSB, if that battalion can reach you. The FSC is a better retail link than 1991. The haul behind it is thinner unless someone attaches a petroleum company. TRMs and M978s are not a substitute for 320 five-thousand-gallon tankers sitting in a COSCOM. Lean logistics is a kind-world hobby.
You live or die by logistics.
Armor leaders have to be logistical geniuses or the formation dies in the first fuel halt. Strength starts with fuel. Operational reach is not a talking point. It is gallons on wheels that can survive the geometry of a lethal, deep battlefield.
Study Desert Storm carefully. Then subtract the sanctuary. Subtract the 100 hours. Subtract the Saudi truck fleet. Add SUAS, long-range fires, and a peer who will hunt every tanker.
That is the war we say we are building for.
Stop making sustainment the bill payer for other slots.
Stop training “just in time” so the rotation stays green.
Put fuel, trucks, and protected distribution back on the MTOE and into the dirt at the CTC.
Or keep pretending.
The enemy will not.
#LSCO #RaiseTheBlack
dsw retweeted
President Trump: "A party that hates America cannot be allowed to lead the people who built America."
dsw retweeted
WW2 Western Allied armies were roughly 70-90% non-combat troops.
Who were these people?
Well, for a start:
-Signals units
-Staff officers
-Engineers
-Medics
-Line of communication troops
-Transport units
-Training units
Etc.
Takes a lot of behind the scenes effort to keep the sharp end of the spear fighting.
