Frud Bezhan فرود بيژن (@FrudBezhan) header
Frud Bezhan فرود بيژن (@FrudBezhan) profile picture

Senior Editor | Iran & Middle East Journalist | @RFERL

Joined October 2011
Frud Bezhan فرود بيژن retweeted
This is a lot to take in, please take the time to read every detail of this. I will obviously be sharing this with all relevant authorities. Thank you @BylineTimes bylinetimes.com/2026/11/12/h…
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Frud Bezhan فرود بيژن retweeted
Even if Trump walks away with deal or no deal this conflict with Iran is a forever war. That is how Tehran sees it and will fall on regional states to manage the continued fallout.
Mike Pence on the GOP midterm losses: "It wasn't because President Trump started the war or took on Iran. It's because we stopped short and didn't finish it."
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Frud Bezhan فرود بيژن retweeted
🚨 IMPORTANTE Exclusiva de Reuters muestra el verdadero móvil de la operación militar que llevó a la captura de Maduro La investigación reveló que una semana antes de la operación militar del 3 de enero, el vicepresidente JD Vance abordó la futura venta del crudo venezolano con un operador de la firma Vitol y megadonante de su campaña, allanando el camino para que Vitol y Trafigura recibieran sin licitación el monopolio de comercialización petrolera que ya les ha generado cientos de millones de dólares. Registros de vuelo ubican el avión oficial de JD Vance y el jet privado de John Addison (operador de Vitol) juntos el 27 de diciembre en Bozeman, Montana, rumbo al exclusivo Yellowstone Club. Según una fuente enterada del encuentro, Vance preguntó qué tan rápido podrían vender el crudo venezolano si EEUE tomaba el control del suministro. Aunque Addison negociaba gasolina en EEUU y carecía de experiencia técnica en contratos internacionales de crudo, había donado 300.000 dólares a Vance en 2022 y 7 millones de dólares a comités de Trump en 2024 (el mismo año en que Vitol pagó 50 millones en California por un caso de manipulación de precios donde Addison fue señalado). Recomendado por Vance, Addison recibió el 5 de enero (dos días después de la operación) la llamada del secretario de Energía, Chris Wright. La Casa Blanca omitió la licitación pública y el 9 de enero Vitol y Trafigura ya tenían las licencias. Con más de 200 millones de barriles exportados en lo que va de 2026, expertos estiman que los operadores ganan entre 3 y 3,50 dólares por barril (un margen de 3,5 % a 4 %, superior al 1 %–3 % habitual de Vitol). Ambas firmas mantienen en secreto sus contratos con PDVSA, y Vitol confirmó tener además relación comercial con NABEP, la petrolera de Alejandro Betancourt Este reporte se suma a la filtración del informe de KPMG publicada ayer por The New York Times, según la cual Vitol y Trafigura concentraron el 61 % de los 12.260 millones de dólares ingresados a la Cuenta de Custodia de Venezuela antes de que Washington transfiriera casi la totalidad de esos fondos de vuelta al Banco Central de Venezuela Es decir: Una semana antes del ataque militar, el gobierno de Trump ya estaba coordinando en un club privado de esquí cómo repartir la comercialización del petróleo venezolano a sus megadonantes de campaña sin licitación pública. reuters.com/business/energy/…
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Frud Bezhan فرود بيژن retweeted
The third option (maintaining the status quo of neither peace nor war) appears, at least on the surface, to be the most attractive alternative. It spares President Trump the need to accept an agreement with Iran that would require concessions not only from Tehran but also from the president himself. Such an agreement would serve as clear evidence of the failure to achieve the war’s main objectives or even to return to the status quo ante regarding the Strait of Hormuz. At the same time, this option avoids, at least for now, another round of military confrontation with Iran, whose prospects of improving the strategic landscape are highly questionable. It seems more likely that following such a round, whose consequences would probably be even more devastating than those of the previous one, both for Iran and for its neighbors and the global economy, the parties would find themselves back at the same impasse. Another military campaign would therefore fail to resolve the fundamental challenges, including the survival of the Iranian regime, its nuclear program, and Iran’s ability to threaten maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz. Moreover, there is a significant risk that, assuming the Iranian regime survives another round of fighting (as seems likely), the credibility of the military option against Iran will be substantially undermined, at least for the foreseeable future. From the Iranian leadership’s perspective, such a confrontation, which would likely include attacks on strategic infrastructure, would represent the realization of its worst-case scenario. If the regime manages to survive it, the ability to deter Tehran in the future would be significantly weakened. Nevertheless, it is doubtful that the third option—maintaining economic pressure over an extended period—will provide a way out of the deadlock. At this stage, there is no indication that the Islamic Republic is on the verge of economic collapse, let alone political collapse. Iran continues to rebuild its strategic capabilities, its nuclear capabilities remain intact, calls for a revision of its nuclear doctrine are growing in Tehran, and Iran shows no willingness to compromise on its core demands vis-à-vis the U.S. It is reasonable to assess that if economic pressure continues, it is unlikely to lead Iran to decide, several months from now, to make concessions. On the contrary, it may well push Tehran toward further escalation, and it is far from certain that the ability to act effectively against Iran will improve in the coming months. The bottom line is that while the decision not to decide may be understandable at this stage, it is doubtful that it will eliminate the need, in the near future, for difficult decisions in both Tehran and Washington—one way or another—to break the current impasse.
"The President doesn't just have two options. It's not just return to war or sign a ridiculous peace deal. We won't do a stupid deal. The third option we have is to continue to do what we do now," Rubio said, according to three people in the G7 meeting
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Frud Bezhan فرود بيژن retweeted
Mocked at home for failed presidential bids and wild economic promises, Mohsen Rezaei is now the man Washington is betting on to deliver a deal with Iran. My profile of the ex-IRGC chief turned unlikely peacemaker, in @AlMajalla_Eng and @AlMajallaAR @MiddleEastInst en.majalla.com/node/334062/p…
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Iran After the Midterms: A Long-Term Iranian Victory Could Trigger a Short-Term Escalation I think we need to distinguish between the short-term and long-term implications of the US midterm elections. In the long run, Iran has achieved a significant strategic success. The blue wave has demonstrated something that every future American president will have to consider before launching another war against Tehran: Iran does not need to defeat the United States militarily to impose enormous economic and political costs on Washington. Disrupting global energy markets, driving up gasoline prices, and increasing the cost of living for ordinary Americans can ultimately have devastating political consequences. Once the new Congress takes office in January, pressure to end the war will increase significantly. Democrats will seek to use congressional oversight and funding restrictions to constrain Trump, although their ability to stop military operations will not be absolute. The political lesson of this war may influence American policy toward Iran for years to come. But in the short term, the situation may actually become more dangerous. Tehran feels strengthened by the election results. It has little incentive to make major concessions, particularly regarding the Strait of Hormuz, frozen Iranian funds, and its ability to export oil. Iran was unwilling to surrender before the elections, and it certainly has no reason to do so now. This leaves Trump with several difficult options. He can walk away without a meaningful agreement, but that would hardly look like victory. He can accept some Iranian demands regarding Hormuz to open the door to nuclear negotiations. Or he can continue the current pressure campaign, hoping Tehran will eventually blink. The problem with the third option is that the current situation is not static. It is an ongoing military confrontation with considerable potential for escalation. Iranian attacks on oil tankers, followed by recurring American strikes inside Iran, create a dangerous cycle of action and retaliation. Every additional night of American attacks increases the possibility of a stronger Iranian response. The potential expansion of attacks against regional energy infrastructure, including the recent strike on the Khor Mor gas field, adds another dimension to this danger. Meanwhile, the substantial concentration of American military forces in the region raises another possibility: Trump may be preparing for one final escalation, hoping that a powerful strike will either force Iran into an agreement or allow him to declare victory and end the war. But what happens if Iran responds by escalating further rather than surrendering? That is the fundamental question Washington still has not answered. There is also a danger of Iranian miscalculation. Tehran may interpret the Democratic victory as evidence that Trump is increasingly constrained and therefore underestimate his willingness to use military force. At the same time, Trump may believe that one more major strike can restore American leverage without triggering a wider conflict. Both assumptions could prove dangerously wrong. Netanyahu remains another important factor. Although politically weakened, he is still Israel's prime minister and continues to press Trump for additional military action, offering Israeli support for another campaign. He also understands that a change of government in Israel could close this window of opportunity. And this brings us to the central paradox: Iran's political success in the US midterms could actually increase the risk of military escalation before January. The elections may have accelerated the political end of the war, but they have not eliminated the possibility of one final, potentially devastating confrontation. Trump still needs something he can present as victory. Iran will not surrender. And the daily cycle of attacks and retaliation makes it increasingly difficult for either side to control the escalation. The war may be approaching its political end, but its most dangerous military phase could still lie ahead. #Iran #iran
The risk of new escalation in the US-Israel war on #Iran is receding. Five reasons why: 1/5 Republican Defeat Trump’s party suffered a crushing midterm defeat, losing both chambers. Vance blamed the war itself. The electoral backlash has dramatically raised the political cost of further escalation for Trump.
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Frud Bezhan فرود بيژن retweeted
'This is not life': Rain heaps more woe on displaced Gazans. Heavy rain has flooded tens of thousands of displaced Gazans' tents in the war-devastated territory, according to Palestinian authorities, leaving them without shelter
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Frud Bezhan فرود بيژن retweeted
Despite the major Republican losses, the role the Iran war played in those losses, and a recognition of that fact by many Republicans (including Trump and Vance), I'm skeptical that the end of the war is just around the corner. One reason is that Trump, while acknowledging the war contributed to the Republican electoral defeat, seems to still think it was one among several factors, and that the war was (and is?) the right choice. That suggests he's not looking for a quick exit. Another reason is more fundamental: Ending wars is hard. Especially when there's no clear winner and loser. In some ways, the past ~6 months has been a failed attempt by the United States (and to a lesser extent, Iran) to search for an end to the war. That's not to say the U.S. strategy for doing so has been sound, but it's long been clear that Trump would prefer to end it--an inclination vindicated by the election results. But doing so on any expedited timeline would probably require the United States to make painful compromises on key issues, such as opposing Iranian management of the Strait, wanting to deal with the nuclear issue sooner rather than later, and the sequencing of sanctions relief. Is Trump now willing to make those compromises? Iran also has little incentive to make this any easier on the United States now. It's still early days, but I don't yet see evidence that the electoral sea change will lead to a near-term sea change in U.S. policy.
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Frud Bezhan فرود بيژن retweeted
With the midterms over, attention now turns to whether the US will restart major strikes on Iran, and if so, for how long. The forces in theater could open a campaign on Feb's scale, but the munition stocks likely couldn't sustain it, and US forces would face greater risk. A 🧵.
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Frud Bezhan فرود بيژن retweeted
Journalistic malpractice. @Reuters omits the fact that Trump is not cutting off the money, just moving it. The NDAA will shield US tax dollars to Israel by moving them into the Pentagon procurement process. Less oversight, less transparency More US tax $ flowing to Israel reuters.com/world/middle-eas…
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EXCLU: The U.S. attacked Iran’s Qeshm Island on Monday, U.S. officials said, in the latest of a series of limited strikes Washington has secretly carried out against the country in recent weeks as President Trump touted the possibility of a diplomatic deal. W @alexbward @shelbyholliday wsj.com/world/middle-east/u-…
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Frud Bezhan فرود بيژن retweeted
This is pure insanity, if true!
Under pressure from Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu, the Trump administration may be within days of launching a nuclear strike on Iran. The target would be Pickax Mountain in central Iran, where Israeli intelligence claims the Iranian government has restarted its nuclear enrichment program. No conventional weapon in the American arsenal can penetrate 300 feet of solid granite to destroy the tunnels where enrichment is supposedly taking place. The only military option is a nuclear strike. Netanyahu has been pushing hard for one. “Bibi calls Trump about it every day,” says an informed observer. Netanyahu is cornered and desperate. After last week’s election results, he can’t form a government unless Trump intervenes directly in Israeli politics and brokers a deal with other parties that gives Netanyahu 61 seats in the Knesset. Otherwise, he is out as prime minister and on his way to ignominy, investigations and possibly jail. Netanyahu must stay close to Trump. He needs this war. To that end, he’s applied maximum pressure to his closest allies in the administration, including Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth and CENTCOM commander Brad Cooper. Both oppose a negotiated settlement to the war they’ve so grievously mismanaged; both are pushing to restart major combat operations. Secretary of State Marco Rubio and CIA director John Ratcliffe are also following Netanyahu’s lead, as are leaders of the Democratic Party. In a recent meeting on the subject, former president Barack Obama said he opposes the current Iran peace deal being drafted in Doha. The rest of America’s longtime allies in the Middle East are terrified by the prospect of more war. On September 27th, Netanyahu flew secretly to Abu Dhabi to enlist the UAE in his lobbying effort for a final attack on Iran. The Emiratis refused. After eight months of conflict, Gulf economies are teetering. So are global energy and fertilizer markets. They won’t recover soon. Globally, there are a total of about 850 supertankers used to transport oil from producers to the rest of the world. In October alone, 11 of them were badly damaged in Hormuz. At this pace, a global depression is imminent. A nuclear strike would radically accelerate the destruction. Fallout from a ground explosion at Pickax Mountain would contaminate the Persian Gulf, poisoning the water supply for 100 million people. And those are just some of the immediate consequences for the region. The rest of the world is every bit as exposed. No country other than the United States has ever used a nuclear weapon in war. Some would like to. An American nuclear attack on Iran would set a new precedent. The Russians have already told at least two other governments that an American nuclear strike on Iran would free them to use nuclear weapons against Ukraine. Pakistan and India would be tempted to do the same against each other, as would North Korea against Seoul. After the first nuclear strike, World War Three is inevitable. That war would be short and final. We’ve been sleepwalking toward this moment for months. Since February, the administration has quietly rewritten America’s nuclear doctrine to make first use of so-called “battlefield nukes” easier and therefore more likely. No one in Washington in either party seems bothered by this. Now we’re on the brink of it. Close observers say Trump is likely to decide by next weekend whether or not to use nuclear weapons. That would be November 7, six days from now. To his credit, he’s hesitating. At the moment, Trump is listening to his vice president, JD Vance, and to his envoy and friend Steve Witkoff, both of whom argue a deal with Iran can be made. They’re right, though it won’t be simple. The Iranians are famously frustrating to negotiate with under any circumstances, and elements of that government have become more radical since Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and his family were killed in February. After decades of isolation, even relatively moderate Iranian leaders seem confused by how decisions are made in the West. (There is a widespread belief in Tehran, for example, that the United States government controls Israel.) But overall, people who have spoken to decision-makers in Iran say there is consensus there that more war is bad for everyone and a deal is worth making. One group that hasn’t been consulted so far is the global population — the hundreds of millions of people who will be killed along with their children if Trump is pushed by Netanyahu into launching a nuclear strike next week. Now would be the time for them to speak up.
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Frud Bezhan فرود بيژن retweeted
"Everyone benefits from a comparison with Trump. But Biden’s disregard for international law in Gaza and his demonization of those who protested his Gaza policy foreshadowed the Trump administration’s dismantling of the international order." trib.al/N6SE49g
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Frud Bezhan فرود بيژن retweeted
Breaking News: The Trump administration has detained dozens of Afghan immigrants in Louisiana — including relatives of those who helped the U.S. military — and plans to deport them to Afghanistan, according to U.S. officials. nyti.ms/4jPVvrw
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Frud Bezhan فرود بيژن retweeted
I filed together this piece with @FrudBezhan -- Opium cultivation fell dramatically in Afghanistan, the world’s largest producer, after the Taliban imposed a narcotics ban in 2022. Since then, production has surged in neighboring Pakistan and Iran. rferl.org/a/opium-taliban-af…
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Frud Bezhan فرود بيژن retweeted
We spent a week in the Occupied West Bank: We saw bloody settler attacks, Palestinian homes demolished & tense interactions with Israeli soldiers Here's a short clip ⬇️ Including our attempt to reach a Palestinian family besieged by "hilltop youth" settlers - before we were violently stopped With @MillyTeasdale @MackesonPaul Ayman Abu Ramouz & Nava Mizrahi
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