Fund_GM (@Fund_CDM) profile picture

The behavior of the individual matters more than the behavior of stocks. The meta‑game: the decisions behind the decisions. How do you evaluate the evaluator?

Joined December 2023
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Fund_GM retweeted
Replying to @True_yes_man
I’m talking specifically about costs. Funds spend an enormous amount of time focusing on explicit costs like commission, slippage, borrow rates, tracking error, down to snacks in the kitchen. Meanwhile the biggest cost by far is usually opportunity cost. Capital trapped in mediocre ideas. Missing the fat pitch trying to save a few ticks. Time spent on things that never turn into positions. That is where most of the leakage is.
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Fund_GM retweeted
Replying to @hfreflection
One of the biggest time sinks is “watchlists” of names that never convert into positions and usually never will. Analysts updating models, reading earnings, listening to calls on companies they’ve followed for years but will never have a position in. It looks productive. It feels safe. It gives structure through each earnings cycle and gives the impression you're on top of things.
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Fund_GM retweeted
Replying to @jamesganes101
Fair point. Sell side analysts operate within compliance frameworks. That creates guardrails. But they are also solving for corporate broking, secondary offerings, and management access. The incentives are never neutral. Substack has different incentives. Not necessarily better. Just different. We once treated the NY Times and BBC as unimpeachable arbiters of truth too. Marshall McLuhan was right. The medium is the message.
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Fund_GM retweeted
Replying to @kaisreturns
Very good point. You hear your own voice more than anyone else’s. Most investors mistake introspection for self awareness. They are not the same. Introspection reinforces the story. Observation watches the behavior. The smarter you are, the better you get at persuading yourself. Which is why it helps to have someone you trust to observe you clearly.
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Fund_GM retweeted
Replying to @jktadave
@PedSaif @True_yes_man @MapOfTheCat1 There is no single right answer. In some institutions an active CIO frames regime shifts. In others they emerge from PMs who feel them first in their own books. In practice, it is usually iterative, and ideally it starts with the PMs on the front lines who are closest to the tape and the pressure. My broader point is that macro and market backdrop often play a larger role in single stock selection than we admit. It can be the deciding variable when choosing between two fundamentally attractive names. Investing decisions are far more contextual than the company in isolation. One simple discipline I use is to look at the start date of a position. What was happening in markets at that time. Where was volatility. Which styles were working. Factor momentum. What was the portfolio p&l as can see if the trade was done from a position of strength or weakness. Those conditions often explain as much about the entry as the model does. There is no clean right or wrong. Think of it like a poker hand. Each bet may make sense in real time. But as each new card hits the table, you reassess from that point forward. Now imagine being dealt the exact same two down cards later that evening, or in a different tournament. The cards are identical. The decision is not. Where are you relative to the blinds. What is your chip stack. Who are you up against. What is their chip stack. Same hand. Different context. Single stock investing is no different. The company might be unchanged. The regime, the portfolio, and the incentives around you rarely are.
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Fund_GM retweeted
Well said. What you are really describing is the value of holding up a mirror. Talking trades out loud forces clarity. Looking back at positions exposes where memory drifts. Re underwriting decisions reveals whether the thesis evolved or the story simply adapted to the price. When done properly, the other person becomes your caddie. Close enough to fully assess your performance and decision making, but one step removed from the emotional heat of the arena. They know your game. They can tell when you are forcing things, when you are chasing, when you are distracted. They can see when ego takes over, when being right becomes more important than making money, when you feel the stock owes you, when you are trading from anger rather than judgment. The key is that this is not therapy. It is performance review. Many funds are experimenting with coaching, but it often drifts toward emotional support. There is a market for that. What most PMs need, however, is a coach in the sporting sense. Someone focused on execution, discipline, and repeatable error correction. Atul Gawande makes this point well in his work on coaching in surgery. Even elite surgeons improved when someone observed them directly and gave structured feedback. Not because they lacked knowledge, but because no one sees their own blind spots clearly. Skill plateaus without external review. Investing is no different. You do not need someone to tell you what to think. You need someone who can see how you actually operate under pressure and help you refine it.
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Fund_GM retweeted
Replying to @alixpasquet
Thanks for the thoughtful response Alix. I agree with much of it, especially the parallels with sport and the military and the importance of psychological distance. I am approaching this more from a management and underwriting perspective than a self coaching one, which is why I framed it as I did. At heart, this is just game film. In sport, reviewing tape is standard. The military does the same with after action reviews. It is understanding decisions under pressure and looking for ways to help people improve. Finance is unusual in how little of this actually happens. Main reason is outcome bias. Results dominate evaluation. Good outcomes are treated as evidence of good decisions, bad outcomes as evidence of bad ones. From an oversight perspective, trade logs and post mortems are not about abstract self improvement. They are about underwriting the decision maker. Can a PM separate luck from skill. Do they misremember how they performed in the past and decisions they made. Do the same errors repeat. Do mistakes cluster when pressure rises or around certain sub sectors or style of idea. Do they think in counterfactuals and understand path dependency? That matters because returns are non linear. A small number of decisions often drive a disproportionate share of the damage. Reviewing behaviour helps isolate the recurring errors that quietly destroy value even when most decisions look fine. Looking ahead, the biggest opportunity for many funds is not extracting more alpha from markets. That game is increasingly competitive. The more durable edge is internal alpha. Not just better decisions, but a deeper understanding of the people making them. Funds that invest in understanding their PMs and analysts, their strengths, weaknesses, behavioural patterns, and failure modes, are far better placed to amplify what works and mitigate what repeatedly hurts them. That insight is hard to replicate and compounds over time. Some LPs are quite good at sensing this through narrative drift, fragile assumptions, and overconfidence. But they are constrained by access. They do not have trade logs or real time decision records. Ironically, the funds that do have that data often make the least use of it.
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Fund_GM retweeted
Replying to @TihoBrkan
Thanks for the feedback, Tiho. Always appreciated. I agree that timing and sizing are key pillars of skill. You’ve written well on this in the past. My “beside the point” comment was specifically about pitch situations, when a CIO is presenting to LPs or when an analyst is pitching in an interview. In those settings, experienced listeners are not assessing how errors will be managed through timing or sizing. They are listening for whether the underlying reasoning is sound in the first place. This is where I think Howard Marks has a useful discipline. He talks about reading a pitch with two highlighters, one for facts and one for opinions. When you do that, you quickly see whether the thesis is robust or whether most of the upside rests on assumptions, judgments, or leaps of faith. I’ve seen this frequently when working with junior analysts. The analysis is often excellent. But when you strip it back, the upside depends on a single assumption that has no real grounding in reality and no clear way to be falsified. That’s the type of misanalysis I was referring to.
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Fund_GM retweeted
Replying to @TihoBrkan
I agree that skill can be expressed through sizing and timing. Those are real edges and they matter. The problem is they are extremely hard to appraise ex ante. What can be assessed early is whether the underlying thesis is structurally sound. Some of the most dangerous misanalysis occurs when an entire investment case rests on a single assumption, leap of faith, or unknowable outcome. The position may not lose money. It may even make money. But the foundation of the thesis is still flawed. At that point, sizing and timing are beside the point. A thesis with a single point of failure is fragile by construction. If it eventually blows up, that’s not bad luck or volatility. It’s an unforced error. This is how seasoned external allocators assess pitches. They often know little about the company itself. What they’re underwriting is the reasoning structure. Does the case rely on one heroic assumption? Are probabilities invented to create comfort? Does everything only work if the world cooperates? This is also what strong heads of equities try to do internally. The role isn’t to out-model PMs. It’s to stress test how capital is being justified and surface fragile assumptions and baseless predictions before they do real damage. Individual pitches give you a look through into how someone thinks about markets and mispricings etc. Same thinking applies to why funds recruiting make analysts and PMs do pitches. Over time, these structures become easier to recognize.
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Fund_GM retweeted
Wrote this in December. Funny how quickly things accelerate. Amorim turned out to be one of the most stubborn and intransigent managers the Premier League has seen in years. His system wasn’t working, the game kept moving, and he refused to adapt. Eventually that rigidity cost him his job. Same lesson as before. Systems matter, but reality always has a vote. The managers who survive are not the ones most committed to a doctrine, but the ones most willing to adjust to what’s actually happening in front of them.
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Fund_GM retweeted
Replying to @orrdavid
I listened to a podcast he did last summer and found it striking. Not because the track record isn’t impressive, but because the way he spoke about certain names felt anchored to an earlier market regime. RMV, in particular, has been a well-understood UK compounder for years, yet it was discussed almost as if it were a newly discovered business model. That disconnect really stood out to me and he totally top ticked it. I have a lot of respect for what they’ve achieved historically, but it also highlighted how much the competitive landscape has changed and how approaches that once worked exceptionally well can start to look dated if they’re not continually re-underwritten. behindthebalancesheet.com/po…
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Fund_GM retweeted
Replying to @orrdavid
I understand the frustration, and I agree that there is a lot in this industry worth challenging. But negativity does not sell. If you met a CEO who constantly derided competitors and wrote off entire customer groups as corrupt, you would run a mile. It signals insecurity, not clarity. Criticism is easy because the flaws are obvious to anyone who has spent time inside the system. Most people do not point them out publicly not because they are blind or complicit, but because they understand that business runs on trust. People want to work with people they like and respect. Also, allocators are not one homogenous corrupt bloc. They have their own constraints, incentives and objectives. You might disagree with them, but dismissing them as unserious partners reduces optionality before the conversation even begins. It is possible to have high standards without being hostile, and to call out dysfunction without defining yourself by it. Many of the best investors are quiet about the flaws because they focus on building something better, not burning the house down. Negativity can feel principled in the moment, but it is rarely a durable strategy. People gravitate to those who make them feel confident about the future, not those who spend their time tearing others down.
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Fund_GM retweeted
I didn’t compare a scratch player to a tour pro. I used him as an example because I actually play with him to illustrate that he wins by not losing. The same guy was a +4 at 18 and said he would not have broken 90 at a US Open setup so it's all levels. You are talking about technical skill. There are plenty of players who strike it better than some PGA Tour pros but they cannot score consistently low enough to make the tour. That is exactly my point. Tom Kite wrote about playing with a couple of college kids who matched him shot for shot over a casual round and wondered how he was one of the top players in the world. He told them that in a four day tournament they would lose concentration four or five times and that would cost them everything. At the elite level the difference is not mechanics. It is the ability to stay present under pressure for days at a time. Nick Faldo often says Scottie Scheffler is the number one player in the world and not a single coach would ever teach his swing. If you didn't know who he was and Scheffler teed off at your local course you would not pick him out from one swing or one tee shot. What separates the best golfers is not the perfect swing but the ability to make good decisions under pressure and avoid the handful of mistakes that ruin a tournament. You cannot see that on camera, which is why people underestimate how wide the gap really is.
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Fund_GM retweeted
Replying to @xbtsnow
Yeah they are becoming a fascinating case study. This is why I love elite sport as a cross-read for investing. Capital allocation via transfers or draft is probably the biggest determinant of success. You won’t win the Premier League or Champions League with pure Moneyball unless you absolutely nail execution. Liverpool did that previously with Salah, Mané, Firmino, Robertson for modest sums, but still added studs like Alisson and Van Dijk, with TAA from the academy. But once you have capital you are sort of forced into thinking you can increase your hit rate on studs. The reality is it is very hard to outperform in that part of the market. NFL teams have four years of tape, every biometrics metric imaginable, rigorous interviews, and the hit rate in first round draft picks is still patchy. It is some way like a fund that raises a ton of capital off previous track in mid caps, but now has to put that capital to work in large caps. What got you here won’t necessarily get you there. Hala Madrid!
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Fund_GM retweeted
Replying to @xbtsnow
Liverpool FC look like a fund that paid up for quality growth via technically good midfield players and attacking full backs just as the game may be shifting to something more direct and physical. The players still look like “good companies” on paper. But the risk is the market regime is rotating away from where their capital is deployed.
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Fund_GM retweeted
Replying to @collision
Very good interview. Dan Sundheim said this is more art than science and that 95% of the decisions are his. Therefore the real edge is his judgement. People get upset that he hires from private equity and not from other public funds. But he is solving for his own inputs. An 80th percentile PM from another fund is very solid in isolation, but if you already have a 99th percentile decision maker, that input is not additive and actually dilutes the signal. This is true in every elite field. If you are top 20 in the world at golf, there are not many “great” golfers in your world. Not because others are bad. Because your frame of reference is elite. Tiger Woods did not need another golfer to take a few tee shots. Patrick Mahomes does not need another QB to play a few snaps. Christopher Nolan does not need another director to shoot a few scenes. Elite individuals need infrastructure around them that amplifies their skill and judgement, not a poorer version of themselves doing part of their job.
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Fund_GM retweeted
Replying to @Ksidiii
Amazing post. My first boss always had a story. Vol was high because pods and banks were blowing out of positions, trading was “sloppy,” and he made $20k scalping around. Meanwhile, the portfolio was down $5m. Classic high-level jargon talk about the vol of vol with lots of Greek letter references to mask the fact that he hadn’t a clue what he was doing. These guys usually reverse broke everything too, so he became a legend on the sell side. Often wrong, never in doubt.
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As a junior trader, the single biggest factor that will shape your success is who you learn under in your first few years. That early guidance forms the foundation for how you view markets, where you search for edge, and how you operate under pressure. One of the absolute worst breaks you can get is being trained by someone who cannot make money. You know the type. The old veteran shaking his fist at the clouds who always has a complicated reason why the market should go down. Bonds did X so stocks should be lower. The Fed did X so stocks should be lower. Repo did X so stocks should be lower. The auction did X so stocks should be lower. Unemployment did X so stocks should be lower. Endless elegant, complex views backed by zero P&L It is a brutal environment to begin your career in. Those poor habits sink in fast. They shape your decision making every day. Yet the market is giving you immediate feedback that something is wrong, because the P&L is red day after day. After a few years of soaking in that mindset, rewiring becomes extremely difficult. Failure starts to feel normal. Weak processes feel acceptable. You learn to tolerate losing because that is what you were taught, and you received positive reinforcement for it. The beauty of markets is that they tell you if you are right or wrong in real time. It does not matter if you are drawing lines on a chart or building a one hundred factor vol spline. The only judge is P&L. In many other industries it could take years for the truth to show up. In trading, it shows up by the close. Some of the best firms in the world move fast when something is not working “fire fast”. You should too. If you recognize early that the person teaching you is not profitable, do not hesitate. Move on fast. Put yourself in a place where you can grow, learn, and make money. Because if you stay in a broken system for five years, you may spend the next ten trying to dig yourself out of the hole.
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Fund_GM retweeted
All of this assumes you’re starting from a standing start. Most of this discussion around selling focuses on closing existing longs. If that’s your framework, try writing down what would make you close a long as a thought experiment. Are those the same reasons you’d short something? Is it plausible that being long gives you a better feel for how the stock trades and how management thinks?Does sitting ringside given you a better view? Is it also plausible that you’re not the only one who got pulled into a misplaced long thesis? Are you reacting to price, fundamentals, or fatigue? Are you a good proxy for the overall investor base? Why does selling a 3% or a 7% position to zero make sense but going from 3% to -2% seems like heresy? In Europe, shorts above 50bps have to be disclosed and it can stop big funds going short a name they were long because management will often cut you off. The best shorts usually have a semi-credible long thesis behind them and really work when that thesis gets busted and longs throw in the towel. There has to be some initial push and pull for any idea to really work. From experience, people who are good at selling longs are an interesting starting point for those who could become good at shorting. It often means they were never great at longs to begin with! But some have an exceptional feel for when to get off the wave and move on and seem impervious to the hidden forces that affect a lot of people once they own something and that is one of the most transferable skills for short selling an portfolio management in general.
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Fund_GM retweeted
Replying to @alixpasquet
Very true. Some analysts solve for gross exposure only. They quickly learn what kind of ideas a PM likes and start pitching to that pattern. Others have more integrity and try to balance the PM’s current ideas. The real issue is when factions develop and group two can see exactly what group one are doing. That’s when echo chambers form and resentment grows. The world is full of yes-men. It’s just incentives. People want to stay in favor, get paid, and avoid friction. It’s easier to agree than to challenge, so they feed the PM what they want to hear. PMs need to stay a little unpredictable and make disagreement safe. Everyone’s selling, even internally.
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