Rob™ (Franchised)

A couple of thoughts on foreign policy after the historic Democratic wave (sorry if any of this is depressing; we political scientists are almost as dismal as economists): 1. Do not expect a radical departure from Trump’s pro-Russia stance without substantial Republican support. The president’s Article II powers give him substantial control over diplomacy and the executive branch’s conduct of foreign policy, so Democratic control of Congress will not by itself change his Ukraine policy. Congress can investigate the administration, shape funding, condition aid, and pass legislation tightening sanctions. But any bill Trump opposes would face a veto, and overriding it would require a two-thirds majority in both chambers. The Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act gives the president broad waiver and termination authority, leaving him considerable room to avoid its sanctions, which is why I was skeptical of it. 2. On Iran, Congress has more leverage because Article I gives it the power to declare war. The War Powers Resolution of 1973 requires the president to end unauthorized hostilities within 60 days of submitting a report to Congress, unless Congress declares war or specifically authorizes the use of force. The president may extend that period by up to 30 days only if he certifies that military necessity requires time to withdraw U.S. forces safely. If the 60-day period has expired without congressional authorization, Congress can invoke the resolution’s withdrawal requirement, though enforcement of the law has been contested. In practice, however, Iran’s actions in the Strait of Hormuz mean the United States is engaged and will likely need to remain involved to keep shipping lanes open. Congress can scrutinize how Trump prosecuted the war and use its oversight and funding powers to press his administration to end the conflict through diplomacy, but there are no easy ways to clean up the mess Trump has made in the Persian Gulf. 3. Article I gives Congress the power to impose tariffs and regulate foreign commerce, though Congress has delegated substantial tariff authority to the president through legislation. Republicans chose not to use their constitutional powers to rein in Trump. Democrats can seek to reclaim that authority by amending or repealing the statutes behind his tariffs. Any such bill, however, would face Trump’s veto, which Congress could override only with two-thirds support in both chambers. That would require significant Republican support. I’m optimistic some Republicans may come on board, given that tariffs were one of the reasons the party suffered such major losses in the midterms. 4. It is very unlikely that Trump could withdraw the United States from NATO unilaterally. Federal law bars withdrawal without either the consent of two-thirds of the senators present or an act of Congress, although the president’s constitutional authority to withdraw from a treaty remains legally contested. He can still weaken NATO by reducing U.S. forces in Europe or changing their posture and role, though Congress has restricted some troop reductions through funding limits. Congress can scrutinize his decisions and use legislation and appropriations to constrain them. Article II makes Trump commander in chief and gives him broad authority over the military’s operations, while Congress retains powers over funding, military regulation, and authorization for the use of force. That leaves him considerable room to reshape America’s military posture even if he cannot withdraw from NATO outright. 5. Should the PRC blockade or invade Taiwan, Congress could authorize U.S. military action through an AUMF or declare war. The Taiwan Relations Act commits the United States to maintain the capacity to resist coercion, but it does not guarantee that the United States would defend Taiwan. Trump could veto an AUMF or declaration of war; Congress would need two-thirds majorities in both chambers to override him. Even with authorization, Trump would retain operational control as commander in chief. If he chose not to commit U.S. forces, America might not intervene militarily. The unfortunate reality is that Congress has delegated far too much authority to the executive branch, and Trump has abused those delegated powers. The Constitution also gives the president substantial leverage over legislation through his veto, which Congress can override only with two-thirds support in both chambers, and broad authority over foreign policy. Congress retains important powers over funding, trade, and the use of military force, but those checks may prove inadequate to restrain Trump. In a deeply interconnected world, security and economic challenges abroad can have far-reaching effects at home, giving him ample opportunity to further damage America’s standing and prospects during the remainder of his term. Two changes are needed to prevent another Trump-like figure from wielding power in the same way. A future Democratic administration should work with Congress to restore legislative authority in areas where Congress has delegated too much of its Article I power to the executive branch. Congress should also give serious consideration to a constitutional amendment limiting the broad discretion the president now enjoys over foreign policy.