M. William Funk

After the Space Shuttle Challenger exploded in January 1986, killing its seven crew members, President Reagan appointed a commission to investigate. Richard Feynman, already battling cancer and reluctant to join, accepted because a former student asked. He quickly grew frustrated with the slow, formal hearings and NASA’s optimistic safety claims (1 in 100,000 chance of failure). Instead, he talked directly to engineers, who revealed far higher risks. The night before a key televised hearing, Feynman bought a C-clamp from a hardware store. During the session, he took a sample of the rubber O-ring material from the solid rocket boosters, clamped it, and dropped it into a glass of ice water (mimicking the cold launch temperature that day). After a moment, he removed it and showed how the rubber had lost its elasticity, it no longer sprang back. He explained simply: at low temperatures, the O-rings couldn’t seal properly, allowing hot gas to leak and cause the disaster. His live demonstration cut through layers of management denial and became one of the most iconic moments in engineering accountability. In his personal appendix to the report, he famously wrote: “For a successful technology, reality must take precedence over public relations, for nature cannot be fooled.”