ProfTalmadge (@ProfTalmadge) header
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MIT professor & Brookings senior fellow ⎮ Foreign policy, military operations, nuclear weapons, authoritarianism ⎮ Book: The Dictator's Army

Washington, DC
Joined September 2018
Photo by ProfTalmadge (@ProfTalmadge)Photo by ProfTalmadge (@ProfTalmadge)Photo by ProfTalmadge (@ProfTalmadge)Photo by ProfTalmadge (@ProfTalmadge)Photo by ProfTalmadge (@ProfTalmadge)Photo by ProfTalmadge (@ProfTalmadge)Photo by ProfTalmadge (@ProfTalmadge)Photo by ProfTalmadge (@ProfTalmadge)
Trump is reportedly planning to restart war with Iran after the election. Some of us have been briefed on the war plan. And while I cannot disclose any details, I can say this: the plan is insane. It will not achieve objectives and will set off a new cycle of escalation.
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Data from Kpler shows that China has received around 1.2 million barrels of oil a day from Iran so far in 2026, only slightly less than the same period last year. nytimes.com/2026/08/25/busin…
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What are the spaces to watch in Taiwan in the coming year? Recording on the ground in Taipei, @ryanl_hass asks @jonczin and @ProfTalmadge on the latest episode of The Beijing Brief on Taiwan's security. 🎧Listen wherever you get your podcasts: brookings.edu/articles/how-s…
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"After being here for a week... I think the idea that Taiwan doesn't 'get it' somehow about its own security situation is misplaced." @ProfTalmadge on Taipei's understanding of the need to defend itself asymmetrically vs China. 🎧 Listen to the episode: brook.gs/4hIEnml
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ProfTalmadge retweeted
Oh, maybe we’ll get a nuclear Iran and a nuclear South Korea too out of the same administration.
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ProfTalmadge retweeted
Live video of PLA Navy leadership:
President Trump has directed the Navy to tear out a complex system for launching jet fighters from its aircraft carriers and instead go back to using steam catapults. 🔗: on.wsj.com/4qA4KgV
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ProfTalmadge retweeted
The stockpile limitation is real, but let's not confuse a resource problem with a strategy problem. Even with unlimited munitions, more bombing would not reopen the Strait of Hormuz. Here's why. 🧵
Trump insisted to WSJ that “we have far more munitions than anyone in the world, and far more than we need.” At the same time, the WH said national security would be at risk if news organizations reported updated figures on Patriot and Thaad expenditures wsj.com/world/middle-east/tr…
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ProfTalmadge retweeted
This came just after Trump had said, "We're going to hit them very hard tonight, we're going to hit them hard tomorrow and there's not a damn thing they can do about it." That true. Iran can't stop the bombing, but hitting Iran harder is also unlikely to work. A 🧵.
The US carried out a third night of strikes against Iran in a battle for control of the Strait of Hormuz reut.rs/4fvNhC9
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ProfTalmadge retweeted
We cannot accept the reckless use of deadly force by federal agents as normal. There is a pattern of this administration misleading the public and withholding key facts after these killings. The public, and all who knew and loved the victim, deserve a full, independent investigation. apnews.com/article/ice-shoot…
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ProfTalmadge retweeted
Is China's SLBM test a primarily a signaling exercise for other countries? Almost certainly not. A thread on the SLBM test, what China was probably attempting to achieve, and what it might mean: 🧵
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ProfTalmadge retweeted
Many operational details of China's latest submarine missile test remain unconfirmed. With that in mind, I wanted to share a few preliminary observations in case they are helpful in informing our collective analysis. A short🧵:
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ProfTalmadge retweeted
I have great respect for retired Adm. Dennis Blair's service as PACOM commander & DNI. That said, I think his new @ForeignAffairs article significantly underestimates how much the cross-Strait military balance has changed in the years since those roles. foreignaffairs.com/china/mir…
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ProfTalmadge retweeted
Spin is one thing, but it is worth noting that virtually everything Vance says about the JCPOA in this clip is wildly misleading or outright false: 1. "The Gulf Coast Coalition loves this deal." (The "Gulf Coast" is in the southern US along the Gulf of Mexico but he is presumably referring here to the Gulf Cooperation Council or GCC.) GCC states don't "love this deal" but support it to end the war that Trump started that led to thousands of attacks on their countries and shut off their exports. 2. "The Obama deal allowed enrichment, ours will not." The Obama deal allowed enrichment that was strictly limited in level, amount, location and types of centrifuges, and carefully monitored by the IAEA. The Trump MOU says nothing about enrichment except that Iran "agreed to discuss the issue...related to Iran's nuclear needs." 3. "The Obama deal allowed the accumulation of stockpiles of weapons-grade material, ours is actually leading to the destruction of that stockpile of enriched material." ??? The Obama deal did not allow the accumulation of any enriched uranium, let alone "weapons-grade material." In fact, the JCPOA required Iran to ship out 98% of all its enriched uranium, leaving it with no more than 300kg of LEU. It was only after Trump tore up that deal that Iran was free to expand that stockpile to thousands of kg, and to start accumulating 60% highly enriched uranium, 400kg of which is still in Iran. All the MOU says about that is that the US and Iran "have agreed to resolve" its disposition and that this will be done "on-site" (not in the US as Trump promised) and does not say to what level. 4. "The Obama deal gave them over a billion dollars of American money." Once again simply false. The JCPOA unfroze some of Iran's own assets and suspended oil sanctions in exchange for comprehensive and nuclear commitments, and did so only after the IAEA had verified their implementation. The Trump MOU gives Iran "immediate" waivers for exports not just of oil but of derivatives and associated services, commits to making frozen assets available without restrictions, and pledges to develop a $300 bn fund for reconstruction and development in Iran. It also undertakes, in any final nuclear deal, to terminate "all types of sanctions" against Iran, which include sanctions for human rights abuses, ballistic missile production, and sponsorship of terrorism. It's one thing to try to sell an agreement that even your own supporters consider astonishingly weak. It's quite another to try to mislead the American people with blatant distortion of the facts.
JD Vance just gave the clearest breakdown of the Trump vs. Obama Iran deal distinction I've heard. Here it is — the Gulf State test: The Gulf Coast Coalition loves this deal. They hated the Obama deal. Why? They thought Obama made Iran stronger. They think Trump makes Iran weaker. Vance: "They know more about this, and they have more to lose than anybody, including the USA. So I trust their judgment." The negotiating position: Obama in 2015: Iran has a sophisticated nuclear program. Let's bribe them with American money to stop it. Trump in 2026: We already destroyed your nuclear program. Promise not to rebuild it, and you get some sanctions relief. One is negotiating from fear. The other is negotiating from rubble. The substance: "The Obama nuclear deal allowed enrichment, ours will not." "The Obama deal allowed the accumulation of stockpiled weapons-grade material, ours is actually leading to the destruction of that stockpile of enriched material." "The Obama deal gave them over a billion dollars of American money. This deal gives them $0 of American money." Bottom line from @JDVance: "We're coming at it from a position of strength, and the fact that our gulf coast partners love this deal."
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This is literally just the JCPOA. They literally have an MOU to negotiate the same deal Trump ripped up.
Replying to @DashaBurns
Administration officials say the core bargain is simple: Iran gets access to sanctions relief and the global economy if it accepts verification measures, curbs nuclear activity, and reduces support for destabilizing regional activity. The details remain largely undisclosed.
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ProfTalmadge retweeted
Obviously have to wait and see actual details of any deal but if it's anything close to this it is no wonder Trump has been so reluctant to agree to it. -Iran has made pledge not to acquire nuclear weapons many times, including in the JCPOA. -The Strait was already open without tolls before the war. -Iran was already negotiating over HEU and centrifuges before the war. -Unfrozen assets and licenses to sell oil, even if initially limited, will provide regime revenue it didn't have before the war. --The only way to get agreement on the nuclear issues will be to provide (significantly) more economic relief. -The deal does not address ballistic missiles or proxies--for which the JCPOA was heavily criticized. -In fact it depends on Israel *not* attacking Hezbollah. -Nor does it free American detainees (which was at least a meaningful tradeoff for the "pallets of cash" that were in any case a fraction of the economic relief Trump will give Iran.) -Far from helping Iranian protestors, as Trump pledged, the deal leaves them in an impoverished country and in the hands of a vengeful and repressive regime. These are not reasons to oppose a deal that would provide a chance to end the war and open the Strait but they underscore how badly the war has backfired and explain why Trump has been so hesitant to end it on these terms.
📜🇺🇸🇮🇷What's in the Iran deal Trump says he's ready to sign. A diplomat involved in the mediation walked me through the latest draft & said "the U.S. & Iran have agreed on the text of a deal" but noted it still needs final sign-off. My story on @axios axios.com/2026/06/12/iran-de…
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"It is clear that Iran went to school on the U.S. way of war and understands how to leverage its limited assets to strike at the heart of U.S. power projection capabilities both on land and at sea." @ProfTalmadge and Mara Karlin write: brook.gs/3RZGeIF
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ProfTalmadge retweeted
Will people finally stop calling this a ceasefire now? A ceasefire that requires regular strikes and salvos is like a vegetarian who eats steak on weekends
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The fundamental question we should be asking about U.S. policy toward Iran is simple: what is the actual objective? If the goal is freedom of navigation, a U.S. president has the diplomatic tools to ensure the Strait of Hormuz remains open as long as he lifts the maritime blockade. If the goal is to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon, then there are well-established mechanisms sich as limits on enrichment, stockpile reduction, and intrusive inspections, that can significantly push Iran away from breakout capability. But if the goal is broader, meaning ending Iran’s regional influence or eliminating its control over strategic chokepoints, then we are no longer talking about containment or deterrence. We are talking about regime change. And that’s where the core problem lies. The administration’s rhetoric often implies ambitions that resemble regime change, yet in practice it is neither willing nor able to pursue the kind of sustained, large-scale military and political effort that such a goal would require. As a result, policy falls into a strategic gray zone, meaning applying pressure without a clear end state. Continuing to escalate under these conditions is unlikely to achieve meaningful results. Instead, it risks worsening global economic instability, especially through energy markets, without bringing the U.S. closer to a resolution. At some point, a basic decision has to be made: If the U.S. accepts that the current Iranian regime will remain in power, then it should pursue a realistic agreement based on existing frameworks, focused on nuclear constraints and regional de-escalation. If the U.S. seeks fundamentally different outcomes, then it must acknowledge what that entails: a long, costly campaign, potentially involving boots on the ground and months (or years) of sustained conflict. Trying to do both - demanding concessions that effectively amount to regime transformation while negotiating with that same regime, is inherently contradictory. It assumes Iran will capitulate under pressure, despite no clear indication that it sees itself as defeated. As long as U.S. policy remains in this strategic limbo, it risks achieving neither objective, ending up with escalation, economic fallout, and no durable solution. You can’t have it both ways... #iran
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A war of choice now in its 3rd month is now a war of necessity b/c Straits (open 2/28)have become a true choke point. Iran won’t give up weaponizing its geography; Trump can’t quit b/c of what he fears most: being seen as a loser/failure in gravest crisis of his presidency.
Trump on Truth Social: Iran has taken some shots at unrelated Nations with respect to the Ship Movement, PROJECT FREEDOM, including a South Korean Cargo Ship. Perhaps it’s time for South Korea to come and join the mission! We’ve shot down seven small Boats or, as they like to call them, “fast” Boats. It’s all they have left. Other than the South Korean Ship, there has been, at this moment, no damage going through the Strait. Secretary of War Pete Hegseth and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Dan Caine, will have a News Conference tomorrow morning
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